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Editorial: From “a defense of doubting” to concept grounding

We have the pleasure to present a new issue of the “Qualitative Sociology Review” concerning concept creation in qualitative studies.

The construction of concepts is rooted in an intellectual tradition dating as far back as the ancient Greeks. In the opening article Robert Prus suggests that early philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle laid the epistemological groundwork for concepts that describe and explain the social world. He argues for “a defense of doubting” as a general strategy, which prepares social researchers to construct, clarify, and sharpen the categories that become sociological concepts. A general skepticism of knowing, he maintains, may help to better understand human acting.

As Thomas Scheff points out in his article on the Goffmanian strategy of concept building, concepts come often from vernacular language and are linked with the meanings coming from this language. He indicates that concepts should be grounded in the analysis of particular and concrete empirical examples that connect them with, and are described by, people in their everyday life-worlds. It is also argued that we should analyze all connotations of the concepts and their cognates. Cicero defended the power of doubting as a technique through which to assess and ground our concepts, a form of analysis which Scheff builds on.

Ethnographic research is one of qualitative strategies used to acquire direct data about the social world. A researcher can develop concepts adapting and transforming a priori theoretical categories that are external to a field of research. However, in his paper elaborating on the ethnomethodological technique known as “Rose’s Gloss,” Andrew Carlin suggests that we can elicit “information from members of society without imposing methodologically ironic categories onto members’ responses.” He argues that the researcher should not only get close to social actors as they go about their everyday lives, but also seek to understand their natural schemas of world perception and how they explain and make sense of the world.

Moreover, as shown in the article by Izabela Wagner, concepts can be formulated inductively out of the research. Building on Robert Merton’s notion of the “Matthew effect” and the symbolic interactionist concept of “career,” Wagner coins a new concept termed “career coupling.” The concept arises out of her qualitative research with musicians and scientists and is analytically grounded in their everyday life experiences. As shown by Wagner’s work, concepts are not static. They develop by exploring their applicability to new empirical situations and by connecting them with other categories that are theoretically relevant to the context. Comparative analysis of human group life in a wide range of empirical contexts is needed to sharpen the categories and make them theoretically saturated.
We may treat concepts as historically embedded and based on a strategy of doubting (Prus), as linked to common language (Scheff), as natural schemas of world perception (Carlin), and developed inductively by scientists in the research process (Wagner). In an interview published in the current issue, Kathy Charmaz suggests that, regardless of epistemological tradition, the construction of concepts demands that researchers be aware of the sources of their own terminology used in the formation of a new concept.
Special: An Interview with Kathy Charmaz:
On Constructing Grounded Theory
by Antony J. Puddephatt
Cornell University, USA

Kathleen C. Charmaz completed her dissertation at the University of California at San Francisco under the supervision of the late Anselm Strauss, and is now Professor in the Department of Sociology at Sonoma State University. She served as the editor for Symbolic Interaction between 1999-2003, amidst her many other commitments to numerous academic journals and professional organizations. Dr. Charmaz’s areas of expertise span the sociology of health and illness, death and dying, as well as qualitative methods, grounded theory, the study of academic writing, and a host of other topics, which she has often presented as guest lectures and keynote addresses the world over. Recently, Professor Charmaz has written extensively about grounded theory, challenging the objectivist leanings of the traditional model, and, by drawing on her roots in symbolic interactionism, extending the breadth and potential of grounded theory in a number of exciting ways. The culmination of this work can be seen in her recently published book Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (2006).

The following interview aims to explore Dr. Charmaz’s most recent views on grounded theory, discuss her new book, and consider some of the debates and challenges to her theory over the years from people like Barney Glaser. The interview took place between Professor Charmaz and myself by phone on July 25, 2006. The interview was tape-recorded, transcribed and then edited to enhance the flow of the discussion, and to eliminate some extraneous material. The interview explores Dr. Charmaz’s early intellectual development and engagement with grounded theory, considers the epistemology of social constructivism, tackles practical issues about doing grounded theory and, finally, presents her views on the recent fragmentation of symbolic interactionism and its future in the discipline of sociology.

chapters to various edited volumes in her field that span a range of theoretical, methodological, and substantive areas.

**Tony Puddephatt:** I recently had a chance to read your new (2006) book *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis*, and I very much enjoyed it. It was a good book for me to read, as I am going to begin a grounded theory project of sorts in the near future. It gave me a lot of new ideas, and I caught myself making errors in my past research endeavours as well. I found it very informative at a number of levels. I also found it very accessible to undergrads. The book is organized very well for a course, as it begins with a nice general introduction, proceeds into data collection techniques, different analytic coding strategies, and the importance of memos in theory construction. There is a very original discussion of theoretical sampling, and a very astute discussion of different ways of theorizing in the field. Finally, you have included practical sections on the craft of writing, and finally, the value of reflecting back on the work after much of it has been accomplished. This is not a dry cookbook styled approach, but rather represents your own unique take on grounded theory methods, and has a lot to offer professional researchers as well as those who are new to this evolving craft. I really did enjoy this book, and I would recommend it to anyone who is new to qualitative analysis, or who is looking for ideas on how to improve their use of grounded theory in practice.

**Kathy Charmaz:** I am glad that you found it useful. I work hard at making my work accessible. The book has a lot of new material on theoretical sampling, theory, and writing the results that are fairly original. It is a fairly straightforward read. I have made it fairly accessible for advanced undergraduates as well as more senior people. I have some original statements about how to construct arguments effectively, as well as delaying the literature review, rather than ignoring it, as a number of people do. My criteria for grounded theory is broader in this book. I think the most important criterion for a good grounded researcher is credibility. A number of grounded theory studies are too quick, in my view. So, striving for credibility in research is something the book really emphasizes.

**TP:** In the preface of *Constructing Grounded Theory* (Charmaz, 2006), you mention the influence of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss early on, as well as some of your mentors in your doctoral studies at University of California, San Francisco, such as Fred Davis, Virginia Olesen, and Leonard Schatzman. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how these people may have influenced you in your early encounters with grounded theory?

**KC:** I went to that program in 1968, and Glaser and Strauss's (1967) book *Discovery of Grounded Theory* had hardly been out in print. I had read it before I had enrolled, but I was more interested in the kind of work they did – qualitative sociology. They of course had a long history of work in that area, so that was definitely something that fascinated me. I was also quite interested in Fred Davis' work as well, and Egon Bittner, an ethnomethodologist. He was very bright, and had done some interesting work as a younger person. He actually left the program before we all came, but he had been associated with it early on. So there were several people whose work I knew pretty well before going, but not grounded theory per se, more qualitative research.

**TP:** Was there a course on qualitative methods you took in graduate school?
KC: Yes, I had a course on qualitative methods that I took from Sherri Cavan at San Francisco State University in my masters program. One of the reasons I was interested in that program was the qualitative emphasis. So we had an introductory field methods course with Leonard Schatzman, and a course that discussed qualitative works and theoretical works with Anselm Strauss, in our first quarter. And then we had six quarters of grounded theory with Barney Glaser, and I did work separately with Anselm. I did one reading course with Virginia Olesen, on professional socialization. She was writing on nurses and the nursing profession, she is an expert in organizations and occupations. The program was very small at that time. We [the graduate students] were a very small group. We had a very heavy intensive qualitative and grounded theory emphasis. Most of our doctoral program was concerned with qualitative research in some form or another. Many people specialized in urban sociology. I specialized in medical sociology and aging. I think these were the three major areas of specialty, in addition to social psychology and qualitative methods.

TP: Were you always doing qualitative research, or did you shift gears at some point?

KC: I was always doing it. I would have become a medical anthropologist had I not gone on into a doctoral program that allowed qualitative research. I was primarily interested in those programs that had faculty that were interested in that. A lot of them were Erving Goffman's students. I was interested in University of California, Santa Barbara, University of California, Davis to some extent, University of British Columbia, and possibly the University of Minnesota.

TP: Was there a big crisis of legitimacy for doing qualitative research at the time? How marginal was the approach in the wider discipline?

KC: It had become marginal to the discipline, yet you had this circle of elites, like Erving Goffman, Anselm Strauss, Herbert Blumer, and to some extent some of these folks commanded considerable respect within their departments. I guess what I am really referring to is the Chicago School network. Those were the kinds of schools I was really interested in. I would say a place like University of Texas would have been mostly quantitative. Like, Chicago has become quite quantitative itself. And Berkeley as well, once Goffman left. Blumer was marginalized, it’s kind of interesting. He created a department at Berkeley that was rated first in the nation for a number of years. But the people he hired then marginalized him.

TP: How did you come upon Chicago style work to begin with?

KC: Well, I took a course on deviant behaviour at San Francisco State University, which I just found fascinating. And you just ran into the Chicago School writings. All the stuff that was being done on qualitative methods was directly or indirectly coming from the Chicago School. That is of course until the ethnomethodologists got started. And of course Garfinkel’s (1967) book, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, really spurred that on.

TP: Which contemporary thinkers have shaped your thoughts on grounded theory more recently, in the last 5-10 years?
KC: Well certainly I do have that grounded theory emphasis that stems from Barney Glaser. I think I have the fluidity from Anselm Strauss, which is probably as much pragmatism and symbolic interactionism as it is grounded theory. I have been influenced by loads of people. Conversations with Susan Leigh Star and Adele Clarke, who were in a writing group I was in during the 1980s. My co-editor Antony Bryant is certainly one major source of influence. I think one major influence comes from outside grounded theory. You know, the symbolic interactionists, as well as other qualitative researchers who probably wouldn’t want to claim a grounded theory identity as clearly as I do. Certainly all of these people have had their influence, and, as I mention in the preface of the book, early on, I was influenced by relativity theory from the physical theorists, cultural anthropologists who were discovering cultural relativity, as well as sociologists who were asking questions about the philosophy of science and the philosophy of social science.

TP: Did the research experience for your major study Good Days, Bad Days (Charmaz, 1991) influence your view of grounded theory?

KC: It did, definitely. It took me a very long time to write that. It was an extension of the study I did for my dissertation. I did 55 interviews for the dissertation, and Anselm and Barney were somewhat cavalier about data collection. Barney did not believe in using tape-recorders, Anselm was not that dead set against them, but…

TP: What did he not like about using tape-recorders?

KC: The same reasons he’s got now. He thinks you learn to become a good note-taker, and that if you have a lot of detail, that just interrupts your thinking, and you can get side-tracked and derailed. But I can tell you that the interviews I did in the 1980s [after the dissertation] were just so much better. And of course I learned so much about interviewing. The materials that are available to a qualitative researcher now as opposed to the 1960s and 1970s are just enormously different. There is just so much good practical information and ideas that are available to a novice that just weren’t there when I was a graduate student working on a PhD. So I was very aware that the quality of my data was so much better. I was also aware that there wasn’t one single over-riding process necessarily. If you are familiar with Barney Glaser’s early work, he argued that there is a basic social process in the setting or experience, or a basic social-psychological process. He really touted that. It can be a really useful way of organizing your material, and focusing on the things that are important in a setting, because I think that Glaser and Strauss were absolutely correct that a lot of people gathered a lot of data, but it was very general, and it didn’t answer questions. At the time I was a graduate student, many people went into the field, like I did. I went and lived in an institution for six months and gathered a lot of data. But, it was thin, and I was in the field for far longer than Strauss would have recommended. His formula was one hour in the field, and three hours of writing notes. It was very different for me. I was in the field for eight hours and could spend a couple hours writing notes. Even as a young person, it was fairly strenuous. I have learned that there can be more than one social process. Barney Glaser, interestingly enough, has disavowed that notion that he had early on, that looking too hard for one thing forces the data into a process, which is exactly what other people who have tried it have said. It depends how you analyze things. There may be many processes that are operating within a setting.
TP: To try and reduce everything to one thing is forcing the data?

KC: Yes, you know, you may grab on to something and go with it. It may be great. But that is one of the things I learned in *Good Days, Bad Days* and it also kind of held me up, because I kept looking for the over-riding process. I did have one, which I never published. I called it “re-mobilizing” in my dissertation, but I don’t like the term. Many people were trying to get themselves going, moving on, after a chronic illness, and I used that as one over-riding thesis, and wove in identity and time around those issues. I developed them in different ways in the book, which is also much more readable than my dissertation. I didn’t like the word “re-mobilizing” for one thing, and I also saw so many more things going on. It wasn’t a matter of re-mobilizing once at all, as it might be after having one heart attack. Rather, so many people I talked to had these intermittent illnesses that were quite devastating. There is a constant process of trying to get back to where you were, or where you felt you were able to go after a round of illness, and sometimes, each time would be a plateau down. And in some cases, after surgical procedures and medication, they would plateau up, which was really interesting. So people can go up or down over the years. You often have some of both.

TP: Interesting. Maybe we can move on more directly to issues surrounding constructivist grounded theory. What started some controversy is the chapter you wrote for the Denzin and Lincoln volume that juxtaposed constructivist with objectivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000). Basically, you position constructionist grounded theory as a useful middle ground between postmodernity and objectivism, in an effort to resolve the differences between the two camps, and offer a way forward. This position seems less strong in your more recent book on the topic. What is your position on grounded theory nowadays, and has it changed at all since the strong constructionist position you took on in the chapter you wrote in 2000?

KC: Well, I thought the distinction between objectivist and constructivist was a useful one, because a number of people wanted to use grounded theory, but they were very uncomfortable with the positivistic elements. The notion of discovering something in an external reality, the assumptions about truth, and a neutral, unbiased observer. I think one of the things that has happened over the last twenty years is the postmodernist movement has made some of the concerns that many of us had in the 1960s, and articulated them somewhat differently than we would, but nevertheless brought these concerns to the forefront. It is very hard to ignore the position of the observer, as well as the issues around truth and accuracy. There are always tensions there, because truth can be local, relative, historically based, situational, and contextual. I agree with that. Now, the objectivist grounded theory, and Barney Glaser still maintains this, aims toward generalizing, simplifying, parsimonious statements, and universalizing in abstract terms so that it cuts across fields. I think that sociologists do try to offer something that is general and useful and that cuts across fields, but I think we always have to be aware of the points from which we are speaking on the kinds of data we are analyzing. I think the postmodernist movement has contributed to that. Of course, Norm Denzin’s version of postmodernism goes much further in the kind of research and the kind of writing that people engage in. I certainly advocate accessible writing, as I think we have more responsibility to more publics, rather than fewer. I think most sociologists have not worked terribly hard on that, and tend to be opaque, academic, and abstruse, and that it something I try and

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minimize in my empirical writing. In some of my writing in theory, when you are writing to a much smaller audience, I do need to use some of the theoretical terms associated with particular arguments, but I do try to use them as clearly as possible. So basically, I thought the objectivist/constructivist grounded theory chapter was a way of saving a method that could have been thrown out totally because people saw it as dated. Yet some of the basic guidelines, the type of coding, the type of memo-writing, and trying to make your memos more analytic, more theoretical, and then checking through theoretical sampling still hold. Those are very useful techniques, and they can be used from a variety of theoretical frames, or types of data.

TP: How would you respond to Glaser’s claim that as an objectivist, he is in fact aware that there could be researcher bias, and that this is important. Though, he argues in contrast to you that bias should be taken into account as a variable, and you should be able to analyze your own perspectives and feelings as just another piece of data that emerges, as a way to get at the underlying social conditions in the field (Glaser, 2002). What is your take on that argument, or effort?

KC: Well, first of all, I am not really interested in variable analysis. To me, that really smacks of positivism, and he is becoming more articulate about the fact that his version of grounded theory is a type of variable analysis. I would agree with him that the observer’s standpoint is something to be taken into account. I don’t think he does. But what I don’t think he would agree with me about is that the very view you have as an observer shapes everything you see. And that means that values and facts are connected. Everything I have read of his assumes an authoritative, neutral, expert observer. Oddly enough, it also assumes you do not necessarily have to be “accurate.” That sort of flies in the face of usual positivism, which aims towards accuracy, as he calls it “worrisome accuracy,” and he accuses researchers of pursuing “worrisome accuracy,” with the interview transcripts. He thinks you get bogged down with the details of it, and don’t see the major processes and problems in the data. Whereas I think that the observer’s standpoint is not an add-on, it is a way of seeing and I think you constantly have to be self-reflective about where you come from to have any conception of your own values, because the things that are most important to us are what we tend to take for granted.

TP: How would you respond to Glaser’s (2002) claim that “Constructionism is used to legitimate forcing. It is like saying that if the researcher is going to be a part of constructing the data, then he or she might as well construct his own way.”

KC: Well, I don’t think so. I really disagree with that, because what you try to do is to understand as best you can, knowing that it always comes out of your own perspective, but you try to understand how the people that you are talking with or studying, construct the situation. I think grounded theory can be an enormous help with the checks to catch the kinds of constructions, and to have a sense of them. But it always comes from our perspective. Now I would argue that some of the things in the Glaserian model force the data. I think when you are not aware of your own starting points, and the situations that you come from, and the positions from which you stand, you tend to think that your view is the only view.

TP: So you can be forcing things implicitly, without being aware of it?
KC: Yes. I think one example of that is often people who are of Caucasian identity will say that they don’t understand why people of colour are so concerned with identity, because they aren’t concerned with identity. It is not a problem for them. And it is those things that are a problem for people, or that raise issues, that become a way in which they see nuanced interactions in a different way than the larger public. And I think that it is the poststructuralist turn that has made those kinds of concerns more apparent.

TP: Is there a way for a method to transcend the individual using the method? Or is standpoint epistemology an irreducible problem? Can we reduce the impact of the researcher’s standpoint on the ensuing research and analysis through using the methods of grounded theory, such that the method is doing the investigating more so than the individual who carries in certain viewpoints?

KC: People often think that by using the method correctly, they are reducing the impact of the researcher, but I am not sure that is always true. Any study is situationally grounded in context and position, time, all of those sorts of things.

TP: Glaser (2002) gave the example of nurses collecting data on patients, and comparing their results in an effort to reduce each others’ biases. They engage in a sort of team collective scrutiny, in a sort of Popperian fashion, in an effort to unmask the hidden subjectivities within the reports. Do you think strategies like this have any merit for the potential to reduce bias in studies?

KC: Well, if people are all seeing the same thing, I might say to them, well, you are all quite alike! (laughs).

TP: I also got the feel from reading the book, that in 2000 you had a much stronger constructionist position (Charmaz, 2000). But more recently, you are talking more in terms of pragmatism, analyzing action, making observations, considering nonhuman actors such as institutions and organizations, and focusing on things that go beyond mere human perspectives (e.g., Charmaz, 2005, 2006). I got more of a sense in the 2000 piece that you were not interested in trying to convey one true reality, but rather present a multitude of realities that exist within varying perspectives.

KC: Yes, I think I still do. I don’t think I am that different from how I was in 2000. I try to draw fairly clear boundaries for the sake of analysis and comparison, and apparently that chapter has been quite useful to a number of people.

TP: Ok, how do you draw the boundaries?

KC: I made the boundaries rather firm between objectivist and constructivist grounded theory at that time so that people could discern some differences, and see the usefulness of grounded theory techniques for doing a different kind of research, and taking a somewhat different approach. I think it has been fairly effective in that sense because I think people are clearer now about where they place people, and where they place themselves. So for example there are a lot of positivist issues in Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) Basics of Qualitative Research, and the third edition of that will be coming out. I have heard that Juliet has told people that her position doesn’t differ that much from mine, and maybe it doesn’t. But, the way that the book was written was quite positivist and objectivist in certain ways. It had all of that
technology to apply to the data, rather than emerging from what you are analyzing. It is a very different kind of conception. So basically I was trying to lay things out, and try to save grounded theory from being cast aside, because a lot of it had subsumed a lot of positivistic kinds of approaches.

**TP**: So you set the categories of constructivist and objectivist up as ideal types? Such that no study is totally constructivist or totally objectivist?

**KC**: Yes, yes.

**TP**: If it is true that all studies carry with them both constructivist elements as well as objectivist elements, do you see these studies adopting contradictory epistemologies that might be problematic?

**KC**: Not necessarily, because I have always believed since the 1960s that things are objective because we define them as such. And, a core of people, a consensus among scholars, or a consensus among publics, define them as real. The publics who have the power to make their definitions stick are the ones whose definitions become real in their consequences. These are the definitions that are acted upon and often become reified. And, we change what we define as real. I think the classic example of how constructions of how things have changed are male and female behaviour. Over the last forty years, what is considered to be gender has really changed. So, that is a construction that people took as objective and real, and people changed, such that the definition has become much more contested. However, those things do become more concrete. That is why we can treat certain things as objective when we are studying them, things like social class, for example. As slippery as it is, we can make some assessments.

**TP**: So it is agreed upon by the collective that social class exists, therefore it is real in its consequences. As such, you can study things as though they are real?

**KC**: Yes, certain things are just, certain things are unjust based on people’s definitions. So, from a constructivist view you would want to learn, if you were in this area, about how those constructions are made, and whose viewpoints stick, and to what extent.

**TP**: Can’t we do better than a consensus theory of truth? Certainly the pragmatists tried to do better than that, and measured truth by its practical effects through action (which is materialist and goes beyond just social consensus). I am thinking about the philosophy espoused by Dewey, Peirce and Mead. Do you believe in this as another necessary requisite for truth, or do you stay at the level of a social consensus model? I guess another way to put this is, do you see a tension between pragmatist philosophy, which is quite materialist in nature, and the modern offshoot of social constructivism, which tends to be more idealist? And which of these should we prefer?

**KC**: I come closer to the pragmatists here because I endorse Marx’s statement, “Men make their own history but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” This materialist view of action shreds the extreme individualism and solipsism given in radical constructivist views. As for scientific
truths by consensus, this point does not deny the significance of power in science -- in part gained by what works -- in part by power and entrenched views, as Thomas Kuhn (1962) suggests.

TP: Glaser would argue however that there are multiple viewpoints, but they are all parts of one over-arching social reality and pattern of relations. Glaser (2002) writes “GT is a theory about a conceptualized latent pattern – e.g., cultivating, credentializing, covering, client control, ritual loss ceremonies... etc etc.” Later he writes that “Conceptual reality DOES EXIST. For example, client control is real, cautionary control is real. These processes and a host of others discovered in grounded theory impinge on us every day.” Do you disagree with this perspective that Glaser lays out?

KC: I think it is an improvement on what he was saying some years ago. Now he is saying that there are latent patterns, rather than explicit patterns that should be analyzed. To me, that is an improvement. He was saying in 1992 that you just ask your participants what is going on and they will tell you (Glaser, 1992). Well, not necessarily. Now he realizes that. I don’t think that all the patterns that he is talking about are always as important as he thinks they are. I think they are important in certain contexts but not in others. I think one has to be very careful about generalizing them, whether you are a constructivist or an objectivist. So, I think the latent patterns are an improvement, but then you have to ask for whom are they latent, for whom are they explicit, for whom do they have meaning, for whom do they not? He is aiming for generality without necessarily working on variability. He is aiming to simplify, without seeing the social world as it is enacted in a more complex way, in my view.

TP: My problem with constructivism is that proponents will argue that there is not necessarily any objective reality, and that it is relative to the viewer, and that all is an interpretation. However, it implies that if you interview somebody, it is possible to accurately present that person’s view. Isn’t this an objectivistic claim, to imply you are able to present the truth about a view?

KC: I don’t think constructivists do that. I think we try to aim for understanding the view of the people as well as we can, knowing that we are limited. Whereas I don’t think the objectivists allow for that ambiguity in knowledge. Essentially, objectivists view data and their own view as unproblematic.

TP: Could you not equally have an interpretation of a viewpoint, much like you might hold an interpretation of a social structure, or a latent social pattern, or set of conditions? Why is one kind of data privileged over another?

KC: I think the viewpoints are always interpreted, even in fairly mundane work, because of the things you choose to include, how you frame the data. You always give it a certain interpretation. For example, when you have large interview excerpts from a person. You can take it right down to what people hear, too. One observer may hear somewhat different things, and that occurs quite commonly when people take notes. Different observers will hear different things, and of course one of the hazards of interview transcription, particularly when they are not analyzed by the same person who did the interview, is you can see the statement in a different way than someone who heard it. What comes across in print might not necessarily be the

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same as something that came across in speech, but you try to do the best you can. My view on accuracy is you try to be faithful, but you always realize it is coming from a position, and it is an interpretation.

**TP:** In a recent chapter in the 3rd Edition of the Denzin and Lincoln Handbook, you talk about using grounded theory for justice studies (Charmaz, 2005). You talk about making “invisible structures visible,” as well as paying attention to systems, resources, hierarchies, policies as well as meanings and action, and so forth. Would a constructionist accuse you of reifying morality and social structures, in such a way that you are becoming the very sort of objectivist that you are warning against?

**KC:** It depends on how you study them, and what sorts of things you do. For example, I don’t think you can just take “resources” as facts given to you by a report, or an official of an organization. You really have to analyze what stands as resources in whatever actions they are engaged in, and whatever they need to achieve. I know some ethnographers will look at that as well. What sort of activities is the person engaged in and what do they need to be engaged in, like, what does it take? How do they get what it takes, or compensate for it?

**TP:** What about the implication of latent social structures lying underneath human awareness and definition, that the actors operate around and have to negotiate, yet it exists outside of their consciousness?

**KC:** Yes, or it is taken for granted, and they don’t articulate it. Well, I think any good sociologist is always looking for hidden assumptions. So, the notion of finding what is under the surface, what is tacit, what is liminal, and what certain positions tend to assume, is, I think, very congenial to a constructivist approach. I don’t think that it is necessarily objectivist. To presuppose that there are certain structures would be objectivist. However, to take a look, and a rather deep look, and try to find things that are latent, would be quite consistent with social constructionism and grounded theory.

**TP:** On page 58 of your book Constructing Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006), you talk about discovering themes that a respondent makes explicit that were previously implicit. At this point, you state that now the researcher “understands” what is going on now, they should then go back over their data again in an effort to re-read previous data in this new light. Is this sort of assumption about discovering implicit relationships or concepts in the data another slipping into objectivist assumptions, about the ability to discover an objective reality?

**KC:** Not necessarily. It can mean that you now define issues, views or actions that you had not defined before. This “understanding” arises from experience and how you conceptualize it and act toward it. The interaction that you have with research participants and subsequently with your codes and categories results in defining new leads to pursue empirically and analytically. As a result, you may go deeper into interpretive inquiry.

**TP:** I very much enjoyed the section in Constructing Grounded Theory that discusses the topic of theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2006). I don’t think that I have seen the topic discussed in that way before, that the researcher is sampling concepts, not people along some set of demographic categories.
KC: The argument has been made but no, I don’t think the argument has been presented before in the way I render it.

TP: You say early on that the constructionist view assumes that you walk into the research with a host of assumptions and perspectives that cannot be exorcised fully. The researcher cannot pretend to be a blank slate, and that you should try to be aware of your own assumptions going in. However, on the other hand, you say what is more in line with traditional grounded theory such as that proffered by Glaser and Strauss (1967), in that you should leave the literature review until after most or all of the research has been completed. I wonder if as you are theoretically sampling, and you are seeing things emerge in the data, and if the data does not have to be contained in human beings per se, but rather concepts, then would it be a good idea to sample for theoretical concepts that might be parallel by going through the library?

KC: Well, I have always argued that the library can give you great sources of comparison, and materials to sample. And as I state at the beginning of the book, I think that the notion that we go into our studies with a blank slate is impossible. You haven’t been a very good student if you’re totally a blank slate in your area. But you can go in with an open mind. I think the concept that Karen Henwood and her partner Nick Pidgeon offer of “theoretical agnosticism” is really useful, in that you try to look at things theoretically, knowing a range of theories, and think about which one might speak to the data that you have (Henwood and Pidgeon, 2003). So I am getting quite close to Barney Glaser’s conception of theoretical codes here, but those can be forced upon the data as well. So, the notion of “theoretical agnosticism” is quite good, because you go in with that doubt, and you look for some kind of interesting category or finding, which is consistent with abduction, or abductive reasoning. Then you explore, and re-check how that category holds up. I think that is really interesting. So, yes, I think with theoretical sampling, you need to have some real categories before you sample. I just read something the other day, where the author argued that representational sampling is theoretical sampling. Well, no, it is not. That is just population sampling. For example, figuring that you would want more men than women in your initial sample for studying a topic that might differentially affect men. That is a good idea, but that is not theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling is all about the concepts and the categories you are developing, and the testing that you do of them.

TP: So, say that after an initial foray in the field, you find that there is a theme surrounding status and identity. Is it acceptable at that point to go to the library and sample a bunch of literature on status and identity, in an effort to discover elements of that concept that might help to enrich your further investigation on the ground, for example, the sorts of things you look for? Could sampling concepts in the library on a topic help to increase the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity?

KC: Well, I would say that as often as you can, you should go back to the field, and test out your notions, before you go to the library. I mean sometimes you are not going to find what you are looking for at the library anyway. I’ll give you an example, when I was doing my research and I discovered that time really collapsed when people got much better. I was really embarrassed to go back and ask people about that experience, because it is so esoteric, and there is no language to consider how we think about time. We just don’t have the language yet to articulate it for the most
part, particularly in the public language. So I went back and I talked to several people, when this one woman said to me “Yeah, like, it collapsed – like a wink!” She understood immediately what I was getting at, so it was really interesting. I don’t think I would have found it in the literature. I did see that in Thomas Mann’s (1973) novel, *The Magic Mountain*, which has a lot about time in it, but I hadn’t seen it in a sociological or social-psychological literature on time at the point when I was doing the research.

**TP**: Well, if you had read G.H. Mead’s (1932) theory of time, do you think that would have helped you to ask certain types of questions in the field, and look for certain kinds of information that would be helpful, and perhaps make it more theoretically rich?

**KC**: For people who can move in between theories and literature, and then back to the data with that slight scepticism, as well as interest and curiosity, then yes. However, there is always that issue of people trying to just apply it. I think that Glaser rather over-reacts to that, assuming that students will just apply theories within the literature to their own observations. But, I think it is possible to move back and forth. I don’t think too many people have that theoretical playfulness, which is something to develop.

**TP**: I think that is a problem with lots of grounded-theory styled research projects. It can become overly descriptive, there is not a lot of theoretical material, it is often too obvious in its results, and there is the danger of people re-inventing the wheel without realizing it. What is your take on trying to get studies more theoretically informed and rich?

**KC**: Well that is really capturing my interest now. I think that throughout the discipline of sociology, we need to have more qualitative work be more theoretically informed, and have more theoretical implications. We need to move beyond description. Description is nice and it is fine, but I think we can do more than that.

**TP**: What would you say to someone like Joan Huber (1973), who would argue that any kind of sampling that is emergent is inherently biased by the whims of the researcher, who purposefully selects cases who are supporting the particular concept he or she is working with? I.e. the researcher, through emergent sampling, will simply find whatever he or she is looking for in the field, and ignore that which disconfirms the theory? Further than this, the lack of a systematic random sample means that the results cannot be trusted, as there is no way to assess generalizability to the greater population. Other empiricists might argue that the only real way to test a theory for sure is to see if it holds within a systematic sample that would allow for generalizable tests. Thus, with no sample that can be used for generalization, and no transparency of the research process that could be scrutinized by sceptics, grounded theory is not a scientific approach. What is your answer to these kinds of charges?

**KC**: I think it is a very traditional charge from quantitatively oriented scholars who critique qualitative research. I think critiques like this miss the strengths that grounded theory offers, and the kind of depth it can achieve. If you are able to administer some kind of transparent test that you can give to everyone, then it is probably going to be fairly descriptive and fairly limited, and fairly a-theoretical. That is not where my interests lie. The notion of emergence is, to me, one of the major
strengths of qualitative research in its entirety, and a definite strength in grounded theory, so I would really disagree with that. I think that people often apply a criterion that is useful for other types of research, onto qualitative research, for which it is not useful. There are other criteria that are much more important.

TP: John Goldthorpe (2000) similarly charges that qualitative researchers believe that they are immune from having to sample rigorously, but they are no more excused from the need to sample systematically than quantitative researchers. We use the notion of theoretical saturation as grounds for an adequate sample, but he would say that this is inadequate, and just because we are qualitative researchers, we are not necessarily off the hook on the issue of sampling systematically.

KC: Yes, I would definitely say that, rather strongly. I have said in many places that I think theoretical saturation is something that people proclaim. I think in the glossary I state that it is not that I support it necessarily, but I try to adhere as much to the working definitions that are around as I can. I mention this problem in my chapter on theoretical sampling, where I argue that this concept is often just rhetoric, used to legitimate a very weak sample.

TP: Goldthorpe would say that we should be adopting research strategies that span numerous researchers collecting data in numerous cities, using traditional statistical sampling methods in an effort to increase the generalizability of results.

KC: Well, as I have said, striving for a representative sample is often something that I argue against, unless it is necessary for the particular problem you are studying. I think it is a fine place to start, and certainly admirable. If you know that whatever phenomena you are studying mostly affects men, then it is great to have a sample with more men than women, and if need be, more older men if they happen to be more affected. But for me, this is a starting point, not an ending. The chapter on theoretical sampling (Charmaz, 2006: 96-122) is interesting, because I interview Jane Hood, who I have always thought is a person who has always understood it. I go back to an earlier substantive grounded theory study that she did. It is very hard to find people who actually explicate their methods, and that was difficult. Jane Hood did a very small study in numbers, but very much in depth. I mean she gathered multiple forms of data about these people over a period of 6-7 years. I think her logic is quite interesting. It bothered one of my feminist reviewers, because she thought studying the decision to go back to work for married women was dated and sexist, and that it doesn’t take into account lesbian couples - it just focuses on married couples. Jane is pretty clear about that. But I think you’ll find that interesting. I think it is interesting.

TP: What about attempts to try and make the data more public, so that people can see the transcripts and such, in an effort to make the data and research process more transparent?

KC: You can’t do that in the United States, because in order to do the research at all, you promise confidentiality and anonymity. Some of my people were very concerned about having their whole stories revealed. The narrative approach emphasizes the person’s story, and valorizes that story. Well, not everyone wants to become that recognizable. Even when you try and hide identities, and try and protect people from being known, just a few characteristics can identify a person to someone who knows
who you are talking about. And of course, some people can make wrong identifications. I presented a paper on chronic illness one time and a colleague from Illinois raises his hand and asks "Were you talking about my cousin Glenda?" (laughs). And I said, “No, I wasn’t interviewing your cousin.” He said that he had identified one of the people in my paper, and said that it sounded exactly like Glenda, but it wasn’t. In the United States, you really can’t make everything transparent. The memos, the interview transcriptions particularly, are too identifiable. I can’t even justifiably use whole interview transcripts for teaching purposes, because of possible breach of anonymity.

TP: Symbolic interactionism seems to be taking a number of different directions lately, which may have implications for how certain people approach their research within the tradition in the future. For example, David Maines (2001) wants to move the tradition towards the mainstream, and make it more simpatico with other approaches. Meanwhile, you have Norman Denzin (1997), who wants to move the tradition closer to cultural studies and postmodernism. What is your take on these trends?

KC: Well, I think what you pointed out is that the fragmentation is there. We do not speak with one voice. There are different trends occurring in symbolic interaction, different collectivities of people who centre around a particular type of approach. I think that David Maines (2001) is quite correct that symbolic interactionism in so many ways has become part of the mainstream, but that people don’t know it. I think it is very important that your generation carry pragmatism and symbolic interaction forward, on into the future. I think it is important for people who are trained by symbolic interactionists to really impart that tradition into their writings, and into their students. When you have the background, when you’ve studied with people, like in my case, it was Anselm Strauss, it makes a difference on how you view the world and the take that you have on the readings in your own field. It affects your interpretation. I would much prefer that symbolic interaction have a steady pragmatist foundation, with people who have worked in that tradition, rather than having some hotshot from Harvard, twenty years hence, rediscover it in his or her own way, without having that background, without having the insights that come from the exposure. I realize that for a number of students they have had to learn much about symbolic interaction on their own, in part because there haven’t been people in their departments who have come out of the perspective very strongly. In the chapter I wrote in the 3rd edition of the qualitative handbook (Charmaz, 2005), I advocate going back to the pragmatist tradition, and building on that pragmatist foundation. In particular, the interpretive aspects, as well as the democratic aspects. I think that as poststructuralists take symbolic interaction more towards cultural studies, they might well lose some of that foundation. That is a concern.

TP: What is your take on Ulmer and Wilson’s (2003) argument to make use of statistical survey analysis in order to test out interactionist concepts?

KC: I agree with David Maines on that issue, that much of symbolic interactionism’s writing have always been quantitative. Those who are qualitative don’t always see it, because those quantitative folks are often not part of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, and they tend to publish in other journals. But, they may well use the background. I think that Ulmer and Wilson (2003) are quite right that there is room for survey research in this area. The two might be able to complement each
other rather than compete, in certain projects. Certainly, the move towards mixed
tools would make interpretive symbolic interactionism much more congenial with
objectivist survey research symbolic interactionism, in the same project. It could be
quite useful. So, I am certainly not opposed to it by any means.

TP: So, you don’t mind integrationist approaches?

KC: No, not necessarily. I am not an expert in those areas, and I don’t want to do
them, but I see the possible usefulness of symbolic interactionism for questionnaires
and survey research, definitely. We would have a lot to offer survey research with our
emphasis on meaning, and wording, and those sorts of things.

TP: Is there anything else you would like to say?

KC: I see great possibilities for grounded theory in the future. I hope that these
possibilities are realized in sociology and beyond.

TP: Thanks very much for your time.

KC: Thanks so much.

____________________________________
Endnotes

i This name is a pseudonym to protect the identity of the case example.

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Citation

In Defense of Knowing, In Defense of Doubting: 
Cicero Engages Totalizing Skepticism, Sensate Materialism, and 
Pragmatist Realism in Academica*

Abstract
Whereas contemporary scholars in the social sciences and humanities often envision themselves as exceptionally, if not uniquely, attentive to the problematics of human knowing and acting, the competing philosophies of totalizing skepticism, sensate materialism, divine worldviews, and pragmatist realism have a much more enduring presence in Western social thought.

Plato (c420-348BCE) introduces a broad array of philosophic standpoints (theological, idealist, skepticist, materialist, and pragmatist) in his texts and Aristotle (c384-322BCE) addresses human knowing and acting in more distinctly secular, pluralist terms. Still, more scholarly considerations of human knowing and acting would be comparatively neglected by Cicero’s time and even more so after his era.

Although much overlooked by those in the human sciences, Cicero’s Academica re-engages a number of highly consequential issues pertaining to the matter of human knowing and acting. Likewise, whereas Christian theologians often were hostile to heathen (relativist, materialist, pragmatist) philosophic viewpoints, important residues of these approaches would remain part of the Western intellectual tradition though Augustine’s (c354-430 BCE) works.

Academica is centered on the historically sustained skepticist emphases of Plato’s Academy (c350-50CE) but Cicero’s text also attends to some competing viewpoints that developed along the way. In addition to (1) acknowledging some of the intellectual shifts in Plato’s Academy over three centuries, this statement also (2) provides a pragmatist critique of the totalizing skepticism of the Academicians, and (3) illustrates the ways in which Cicero, as a representative and defender of Academician skepticism, deals with critiques pertaining to the problem of human knowing and acting.

Thus, whereas Cicero is best known as a rhetorician and his text is presented as an instance of rhetorical interchange, Cicero’s Academica also may be seen as “a defense of knowing” and “a defense of doubting,” two of the most central features of scholarship.

Keywords
Knowledge; Skepticism; Pragmatism; Realism; Relativism; Symbolic interactionism; Postmodernism; Cicero; Plato’s Academy
Introduction

Although most social scientists have heard of Cicero, few appear familiar with his texts or are aware of Marcus Tullius Cicero’s (c106-43BCE) considerable relevance to the study of human knowing and acting either in conceptual, enabling terms or as valuable transhistorical and transcultural reference points.

Relatedly, whereas contemporary scholars in the humanities and social sciences tend to envision notions of sensate materialism (as in positivism, structuralism), pragmatism (as in American pragmatist philosophy, symbolic interaction), and totalizing skepticism (as in poststructuralism, postmodernism) to be comparatively recent developments, these are matters that Cicero addressed in rather explicit terms. These analytic motifs can be traced back to classical Greek scholarship and especially the texts of Plato and Aristotle (see Prus, 2003, 2004) from whom later Latin scholars would drive much inspiration, but Cicero represents an important source of intellectual continuity in Western social thought.

The material discussed here represents only a small portion of the broader corpus of texts that Cicero developed. Thus, whereas Cicero may be best known as a practitioner of rhetoric (Greek term) or oratory (Latin), he not only made considerable scholarly contributions to rhetoric, religious studies, and philosophy, but also did so ways that display considerable affinity with the sociological pragmatist emphases of symbolic interaction (on Cicero, see Prus, forthcoming).

The argument developed here is not that Cicero is to be seen as a symbolic interactionist of a more consistently Meadian or Blumerian sort (see Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1969). However, Cicero may be appreciated for his role in perpetuating the study of human knowing and acting in Western social thought through his texts.

Although Academica is only a very small part of the great intellectual resources of Western scholarship, this text enables sociologists to better understand the philosophic foundations of our own discipline. Denoting comparative historical and transcultural reference points, Academica also helps alert those in the human sciences to some of the limitations (and follies) of disregarding those intellectual predecessors who have addressed the problematics of human knowing and acting in more explicit and sustained terms.

Still, in his “defense of knowing” and “his defense of doubting,” Cicero has yet more to offer to contemporary academics. Perhaps, because the matters of knowing and doubting are so fundamental to scholarship, they often seem taken for granted. Nevertheless, since these two emphases are so sharply contested in Cicero’s Academica, this text also provides contemporary readers with a particularly valuable occasion to reflect on the relative merits of knowing and doubting.

In developing this text, two of Cicero’s Roman associates (Varro and Lucullus), in turn, are assigned the task of discussing the philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon (c130-70BCE; one of Cicero’s Greek instructors). Antiochus’ philosophy represents the base for championing the defense of knowing. Cicero, himself, will speak on behalf of Academician skepticism. Cicero assumes credit for the victory in end, with skepticism winning over knowing. However, the victory may be a rhetorical rather than a philosophic outcome.

Indeed, for scholars of the human condition, the more consequential intellectual advantage resides in the particular viewpoints that Cicero and his adversaries develop along the way. Likewise, although it may be tempting isolate the debate within Cicero’s time, the issues about the nature of human knowing and acting that Cicero addresses in Academica not only have characterized the philosophic venture from the classical Greek era to the present time but also are fundamental to the human sciences more generally and the “sociology of knowing” more specifically.
To locate the present project within a contemporary sociological plane, I will first briefly outline the premises of symbolic interactionism. Next, to better enable readers to place Cicero’s *Academica* within a broader scholarly context, a highly compacted chronological overview of Western social thought is presented.

To foster greater clarity of “what is there,” I have followed the developmental flow of *Academica*, informed readers of transitions and emphases, and provided fairly precise documentation (should readers wish more detail on the matters discussed within). Quite directly, because of the claims I am making, it is Cicero’s text rather than my commentary that is to be emphasized in this paper.

In concluding the paper, I ask to what extent the positions assumed by Antiochus and Cicero correspond with the pragmatist sociological emphasis of symbolic interaction and in what ways Cicero’s *Academica* may be used to inform, assess, support, refine, or challenge contemporary notions of human knowing and acting.

**The Theoretical Frame**

Because it is symbolic interaction (and pragmatist social thought that provides the conceptual glue that enables this project to develop in more sustained analytic terms, it is instructive to review the premises that inform interactionist analysis as well as the methodological and conceptual dimensions of this approach.

In developing this project, I have built most fundamentally on the symbolic interactionist tradition associated with George Herbert Mead (1934), Herbert Blumer (1969), and Anselm Strauss (1993). Since Mead and Blumer are particularly instrumental in articulating the theoretical and methodological foundations of a social science that attends to people’s lived experiences (i.e., the ways that people engage all aspects of their known worlds), their work serves as a consequential reference point throughout.

Because all research and all theory makes claims or assumptions about the world (regardless of whether these are explicitly recognized), eleven premises or assumptions that inform the interactionist paradigm are briefly outlined.

1. *Human group life is intersubjective.* Human group life is accomplished (and made meaningful) through community-based, linguistic interchange.
2. *Human group life is ambiguous (problematic).* It is through symbol-based references that people begin to distinguish realms of “the known” and (later) “the unknown.”
3. *Human group life is object-oriented.* Denoting anything that can be referenced (observed, referred to, indicated, acted toward, or otherwise knowingly experienced), objects constitute the contextual and operational essence of the humanly known environment.
4. *Human group life is (multi) perspectival.* As groups of people engage the world on an ongoing basis, they develop viewpoints, conceptual frameworks, or notions of reality that may differ from those of other groups.
5. *Human group life is reflective.* By taking the perspective of the other into account with respect to one’s own being people become "objects unto themselves" (and act accordingly).
6. *Human group life is sensory/embodied and (knowingly) materialized.* Within the realms of humanly knowing “what is” and "what is not," people develop an awareness of [the material or physical things] that others in the community recognize. This includes appreciations of the [sensory / body / physiological] essences of human beings (self and other), acknowledging capacities for stimulation...
and motion, as well as denoting realms of practical (enacted, embodied) limitation and fragility.

7. **Human group life is activity-based.** The interactionists approach human activity as a meaningful, formulative, multifaceted process.

8. **Human group life is negotiable.** Because human activity frequently involves direct interactions with others, people may anticipate and strive to influence others as well as acknowledge and/or resist the influences of others.

9. **Human group life is relational.** People do things within group contexts; people act mindfully of, and in conjunction with, specific other people.

10. **Human group life is processual.** Human lived experiences (and activities) are viewed in emergent, ongoing, or temporally developed terms.

11. **Human group life takes place in instances.** Group life is best known through the consideration and study of the particular occasions in which people do things; conceptions of human experience are to be developed mindfully of, and tested against, the particular occasions or instances in which people attend to and otherwise act toward things in the humanly known world.

**Western Social Thought**

To locate Cicero’s *Academica* in a broader context, what follows is a highly abbreviated statement on the development of Western social thought, albeit with particular emphasis on the continuities and disjunctures of pragmatist analysis.

Whereas an incredibly wide assortment of structuralist, skepticist, pragmatist, fictional, moralist, and religious themes can be found in the classic Greek (c700-300BCE) literature, Greek scholarship deteriorated dramatically following the death of Alexander the Great (c356-323BCE) and the dissolution of the Greek empire. Subsequent Greek thought became much more focused on moralist, fatalist, and religious matters, with scholarly (and scientific) enterprise sliding into comparative disregard.

The Romans took possession of Greece in 146BCE. To their credit, many Romans recognized the value of a Greek education and acknowledged the (already weakened) Greek scholarship of the day. Subsequently, the Romans extended an increasingly Latinized scholarly endeavor to the reaches of their empire, but added comparatively little to the academic venture.

Thus, whereas scholars such as Cicero and Quintilian maintained some philosophic emphases amidst their work on rhetoric and Cicero assigns particular relevance to Varro’s scholarship, no classical Latin author whose texts are preserved addresses human knowing and acting in more direct and sustained philosophic terms than does Cicero. As well, the overall quality of Western scholarship receded even further as the Roman Empire (c200BCE-500CE) fell into varying states of disarray.

Situated within the Roman Empire for the first few centuries of their existence, the Christians subsequently attempted to extend their (Holy) empire across Europe. Although the most consequential Christian scholars were trained in the Latin and Greek traditions of the time, Western scholarship would deteriorate even further under the Christian influence. Nonetheless, it is apparent that Augustine assumed a particularly pivotal role in maintaining an academic emphasis in the Christian world.

While the Christian enterprise also became the major integrating political mechanism in Europe during the decline of the Roman Empire and throughout the dark ages (c500-1000), the Christians also struggled for their own survival in a volatile and shifting set of territories and leaders. In the process (somewhat by default and with
limited levels of concern and competence), the Christians carried Latin scholarship through the (Western European) dark ages.\textsuperscript{vi}

Still, this notably weakened intellectual base would provide the foundations on which 13\textsuperscript{th} century Latin-European scholars would begin to appreciate the discovery of some early Greek texts. This came about as a “byproduct” of the crusades in Spain and (Greek) Byzantine. Although much “pagan” material was lost or destroyed, an instructive corpus of texts had been preserved by scholars working within Islamic, Jewish, and Greek Orthodox religious contexts.\textsuperscript{vii}

The discovery of these early Greek texts (theological, poetic, philosophic, scientific), in combination with some lesser quality but still highly enabling Latin texts, would provide the foundations for what would become known as the Renaissance. However, while the more popular or expressive-artistic 16\textsuperscript{th} century European Renaissance first became more evident in Italy (c1400), this was preceded by an intellectual renaissance (or philosophical rebirth).

Reflecting a literary and academic base barely maintained over the intervening centuries by the works of Augustine (c354-430), Cassiordorus (490-575), Alcuin (c732-804; and his patron Charlemagne), and others, the intellectual renaissance most singularly may be attributed to the more sustained introduction of secular, pluralist (and pragmatist) Aristotelian scholarship into Latin European thought (and theology). While enabled by a somewhat earlier re-emergence of a dialectic scholarly tradition in Catholic theology, this transition largely reflects the scholarship of Albert the Great (c1200-1280) and especially his student Thomas Aquinas (c1225-1274).

Still, the transition was far from smooth, comprehensive, or continuous. Thus, pragmatist thought was only partially acknowledged by subsequent scholars. In addition to those Catholic theologians who criticized Aquinas for attending so closely to Aristotle's naturalist philosophy, Aquinas (and Aristotle) also were subject to much criticism or disregard from scholars hostile to the Catholicism.

Further, amidst a broader revival of Greek scholarship in Western Europe, several of Plato's texts also surfaced shortly after those of Aristotle. Certain of Plato's works (e.g., Timaeus, Phaedo) had long been incorporated into Judaic, Islamic, and Christian theology, but most of Plato's texts were not known to Western European scholars. Subsequently, Plato's dialogues were used by Renaissance (and "Enlightenment") scholars to champion wide ranges of theological, expressive, moralist, utopian, structuralist, and skepticist viewpoints (perspectives that contrasted with pragmatist scholarship).

Likewise, with the reformation movement (most prominently associated with Luther and Calvin) that would sweep across Northern Europe and the denunciation with most things associated with the Catholic Church, the pragmatist scholarship of Aquinas and Aristotle would experience yet another consequential setback.

As a result of these political, religious, moralist, and expressive emphases, the essential familiarity of a great many scholars (and their students) with Greek thought over the past several centuries has been largely limited by their exposure to the more theological and idealist aspects of Plato's works. Relatedly, too, those of Plato's writings (e.g., Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Protagoras) that more directly introduce pragmatist themes have received somewhat less attention over the centuries.

As matters would develop, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) would not only assume a substantial role in fostering mathematical formulations of the physical sciences but related structuralist, mechanistic notions would also be applied to considerations of human conduct. Attending to (pre-Aristotelian) classical Greek philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) would resurrect totalizing skepticism. As well, pragmatist social thought which, over the centuries would find some (albeit more transient) expression in
a variety of fields (rhetoric, poetics, religious studies) would be reengaged more directly by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), John Dewey (1859-1952), and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), amongst others.

Cicero occupies only a comparatively small space in the corridors of Western social thought but his texts, directly and indirectly, have had considerable relevance for the scholarship that would follow.

**Cicero's Academica**

Focusing on human knowing and skepticism as philosophic endeavors, Cicero's *Academica* is centered on the historically sustained skepticist emphases of the Academy (c350-50BCE) after Plato's death and some competing viewpoints predominately associated with Aristotle and the Stoics. Dealing with the ways in which and extent to which things may be humanly known and doubted, *Academica* is a remarkably sophisticated statement.

Contemporary readers may notice some intriguing parallels between the positions adopted by positivists, postmodernists, and pragmatists with those of the speakers in *Academica*, but readers should approach Cicero's *Academica* with some caution.

As Rackham (1933:399-405) explains, the [extant] statement is not only incomplete but it also is composed of the remains of two separate editions of a broader text that Cicero retitled *Academica*. *Academica consists of two books, Catulus and Lucullus*. Neither the earlier or later edition has survived intact.

Instead, as it has come down to us, *Academica* is composite of two different editions of this text. Still, we do not have a complete statement. Instead, only the first half of Book I (*Catulus*) of *Academica* remains from Cicero's 2nd or revised edition. We have all of Book II (*Lucullus*) of *Academica* (but that is from his 1st or unrevised edition; and Cicero was not content with that formulation).

To confound matters a bit more, different sets of speakers appear in the two books that constitute the surviving, composite text. The statement presented here will maintain these divisions, while presenting these materials as seamlessly as possible.

Despite these anomalies, *Academica* is an important statement for pragmatist considerations of human knowing and acting. Thus, attention is given to (1) the intellectual shifts in Plato's Academy during the 300 years after Plato's death, (2) a pragmatist critique of the totalizing skepticism of the Academicians that is developed within the broader, more eclectic philosophy of Antiochus, and (3) the ways in which Cicero, as a representative and defender of Academician skepticism, deals with critiques pertaining to the problem of human knowing and acting.

Further, while *Academica* is just one of several texts that Cicero wrote that are directly pertinent to scholars in philosophy, theology, and the social sciences, it is in *Academica* that Cicero most directly engages the issue of sense-based knowing and Platonist skepticism of human knowing.

In developing and defending the position of the (Platonist) Academicians, Cicero moves some distance from the sorts of positions he assumes with respect to his writings on rhetoric and religion. Oddly enough, too, while Cicero appears on the surface to win the argument for the Academicians, it is apparent (and Cicero would realize) that the claims that Cicero develops as a speaker could be sustained only by not attending more directly to certain of the viewpoints that he has Varro and Lucullus present on behalf of Antiochus (who challenges the Academician skepticism).

Whereas readers may judge the outcomes of the debate for themselves, *Academica* is an especially consequential analytic venture as well as a testimony to
the considerable quality of Roman scholarship. Thus, while by no means eclipsing the classic Greek scholars, Cicero should be acknowledged not just for sustaining an interest in philosophic venture in Western European thought, but also for providing some compelling and uniquely valuable and historical comparative analyses of the human condition (also see Cicero’s work on rhetoric and religion).

To understand Academica and the issues introduced therein, it is helpful to acknowledge some transitions in Platonic thought over the intervening centuries (see MacKendrick, 1989:126-127). To this end, five different Platonist schools or academies may be identified as having existed by Cicero’s time.

The First or Old Academy (c350-270BCE), associated with Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo and Crates adopted viewpoints closely approximating those of Socrates and Plato. Here, dialectic reasoning is used to establish skepticism about knowing about the sensate or humanly known world.

The Second (Middle) Academy (c270BCE-150) was founded by Arkesilas who adopted a position of totalizing skepticism coupled with a complete refusal to make judgments on things.

The Third or New Academy (c150-110BCE) was founded by Carneades who introduced a version of knowing based on probabilistic or plausible inferences. It is Carneades’ position that Cicero will most centrally defend.

The Fourth Academy (c110-90BCE) was associated with Philo of Larissa, who argued against human abilities to distinguish between false and true sensations in theoretical matters but asserted that Academicians could still make practical assessments of things.

The Fifth Academy (c68-50BCE) was headed by Antiochus. As an Academician, Antiochus earlier had accepted the totalizing skepticism associated with Arcesilas of the Second Academy and likewise refused to make judgments on the matters of knowing. Later, Antiochus shifted positions and adopted a viewpoint that is notably eclectic in emphases. Thus Antiochus, who becomes a central figure in Cicero’s Academica, not only displays affinities with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle but also incorporates more characteristic Stoic notions of religion, ethics, and knowing in articulating a broadly encompassing philosophic stance.

In the reconstituted, composite text, Academica, the speakers Varro and Lucullus, in turn, champion Antiochus’ criticisms of Academician skepticism. Interestingly, too, Cicero earlier had studied with Antiochus when Antiochus was a member of the Academy. While it is primarily against Antiochus’ (essentially pragmatist) position that Cicero attempts to defend Academician skepticism, Cicero also will engage Antiochus’ broader philosophy in developing his argument against Antiochus’ charges.

Academica Book I (the volume entitled Catulus) is introduced as a three person exchange (Varro, Anticus, and Cicero), but mainly is developed between Varro (a prominent philosopher of Cicero’s time) and Cicero. Varro (Academica, I: 4-8) observes that the Romans have developed little appreciation of philosophy and says that he encourages anyone who wishes to engage this subject matter to go to Greece so that they might acquire a more adequate foundation for their studies.

Cicero (Academica, I: 9-12) objects to Varro’s position and insists on the importance of developing a Latin version of (Greek) philosophy. Cicero also states that the Romans have some very capable philosophers and more specifically encourages Varro to help develop a more adequate Latin philosophy.

The exchange then centers on the Academy and whether there have been consequential shifts in philosophic viewpoints among those defined as Academicians.
The conversation assumes a more dramatic dimension (Academica, I: 13-14) when Varro rather abruptly asks Cicero if it is true, as he has heard, that Cicero has embraced the position of the New Academy (with Carneades) and rejected the standpoint of the Old Academy (following Plato more closely).

In response, Cicero directly makes reference to Antiochus who had headed the Academy but more recently has separated himself from the Academicians. Cicero says that Philo who had headed the Academy before Antiochus (and who also had been Antiochus’ instructor) had insisted that there was but one Academician standpoint. Antiochus had challenged Philo’s claim, arguing that the Old Academy and New were different in highly consequential respects.

The debate unfolds as Cicero, under the pretext of refreshing his own memory, asks Varro if he will outline both Antiochus’ philosophy and his views of the Academy.

Speaking for the deceased philosopher Antiochus (c130-70BCE), Varro (Academica, I: 15-18) traces the foundations of the Academy back to Socrates. Socrates, says Varro, first adopted the position that the only thing one could know about the human world was that one could know nothing except one’s own ignorance about it. Wisdom, thus, inheres in doubting knowledge of the sensate world. Nevertheless, Varro observes, Socrates also insisted on the pursuit of virtue.

Varro adds that while Plato carried on Socrates’ vision of philosophy, he modified it as well by concentrating more extensively or developing a science of human knowing.

While acknowledging that Aristotle approached philosophy as a yet more definite science, it was Antiochus’ contention that the (two schools) Academicians and Peripatetics that followed Plato and Aristotle, respectively, are quite similar in overall emphases.

Varro (19-23) subsequently uses Plato’s division of philosophy into ethics (behavior and morality), physics (natural science), and dialectics (reasoning) as a base for elaborating on Antiochus’ philosophy.

First addressing Antiochus’ Ethics [which more closely approximates Aristotelian notions], Varro (Academica I: 19) says that nature [vs. divinity] is to be recognized as the starting point of one’s philosophy; that the ultimate good is to be sought in nature and that it is to be recognized that all things are enabled by nature and should be pursued in ways that are mindful of nature. In articulating his position, Antiochus subsequently divides “nature” into three components with respect to humans.

To understand the human condition (i.e., human nature), it is necessary to be mindful of (a) people’s human physiology and circumstances, (b) people’s capacities for mindedness, and (c) the centrality of the human group. First, Antiochus takes cognizance of the human capacities for sensation and behavior, relating these to people’s concerns with health and abilities to function effectively.

Still, there is a more consequential overarching concern about human virtue as signified by discerning intellectual capacities and choices. In discussing “mindedness,” Antiochus is attentive to the human capacities for apprehension and memory. [Following Aristotle.] Antiochus (Academica I: 20) particularly stresses the necessity of attending to variations in people’s moral characters as signified in the habits that people develop through repetition, practice, instruction, and reason. [Like Aristotle, as well] Antiochus emphasizes the importance of achieving (moral) excellence in the capacities of the mind (as in knowledge, reason, logic, wisdom).

Yet more is involved, however, and Antiochus (Academica I: 21) adopts the [Aristotelian] viewpoint that people are to be understood within “the community” – that people are joined with one another through “the partnership of humanity.” It is in the
community that people most fundamentally realize the essence of nature. Other things, such as wealth, fame, and power are to be understood within this context.

Observing that these notions are emphasized by the Peripatetics [Aristotelians], Varro says that the Academicians [Platonists] are not so different on these matters. Both envision happiness as contingent on virtue or excellence of character but both also recognize the importance of human physiology and people’s well-being thereof. Relatedly, both place much greater emphases on virtue, duty, friendship, justice, and fairness in the quest for human happiness than sensate pleasures or the accumulation of material goods.

The focus then shifts (Academica, I: 24-26) more directly to Antiochus’ Physics. The speakers agree on the importance of extending the Latin philosophic vocabulary. However, in attending to Antiochus, they place particular emphasis on the Greek concepts of “matter” as an abstract term for a body of some sort, “force” as an active principle, and quality or “whatness” as properties or features that distinguish instances of matter and force in some way.

Addressing Antiochus’ thoughts on physics, Varro (Academica, I: 26-29) discusses the notions that matter and space are infinitely divisible. This leads to considerations of space, motion, and interspace relations followed by an argument for God.

For Antiochus, [in more distinctively Stoic terms] God not only is the source of all existence and continuity but also of all wisdom and intelligence. Antiochus not only claims that there is a divine, intelligent being that oversees all, but also insists that this divine essence knows all that will happen as well as controls all things that occur. Relatedly, all human endeavors also are fated. [While these Stoic notions of divinity and fatalism are almost entirely removed from Antiochus’ criticisms of Academician skepticism, Cicero will use these Stoic theological claims in developing his argument against Antiochus.]

Next, Varro (Academica, I: 30-33) addresses Antiochus’ Logic. He states that for both the Old Academy and the Peripatetics, truth is enabled by the senses but is to be judged in the mind. [Cicero will largely ignore this point in disclaiming sense-based perceptions.] It is in the mind that the ideas or forms of things would be known. Following Plato and Aristotle, thus, both the definitions of things and the terms given to things are products of the mind as achieved by speech, dialectic reasoning, and the persuasive quality of rhetoric.

Varro (Academica, I: 33) then comments on the disjuncture of the philosophy of Aristotle from that of Plato, more specifically (but only briefly) acknowledging Aristotle’s detachment from Plato’s emphasis on “forms” as well as Plato’s related notions of “divinely-enabled knowing.”

By contrast, Varro continues (Academica, I: 34-42), the old Academicians maintained loyalty to Plato but began to encounter another noteworthy rival in Zeno of Citium. Zeno had studied with some of the Old Academicians but subsequently articulated a Stoic position in which the predominant emphasis was on virtue as the unique and exclusive good.

For Zeno, virtue was to be the supreme good and all actions were to be judged with virtue as the reference point. Relatedly, the wise man would strive for emotional control so as not to violate notions of virtue by intertemperance.

Continuing, Zeno claims that people know things through sensations; through a “grasping” of the qualities of the particular things one encounters (i.e., has contact of some sort – as in tactile or visual contact).
Viewing sensations as the essential essences that separate ignorance and knowledge, Zeno argues that sensation constitutes a primary mechanism or first principle that serves as the basis for developing all other modes of knowing.

His claim was not that sensation provides access to all properties of the objects encountered but that the sensation of things provides a primary, albeit rudimentary, criterion for achieving knowledge of what is credible and trustworthy.

As Varro concluded his comments on Zeno, Cicero (43) affirms a statement that Cicero says Antiochus had made some years earlier. It was to the effect that Zeno’s position on sensation might be better viewed as a correction to the Old Academy rather than a distinct philosophy on its own. [This may be Cicero’s more immediate attempt to nullify Antiochus’ credibility, but this comment from Cicero in this 2nd edition of Academica also seems to preclude an important element of the defense of Academician skepticism that he subsequently adopts in his 1st or unrevised edition of Book II - Lucullus.]

At this point in the dialogue, Cicero (Academica, I: 43) assumes the task of defending Arcesilas of the Second Academy. Although alleging that Arcesilas developed his position largely as a Socratic counter to Zeno’s Stoic philosophy, Cicero describes Arcesilas’ position [of totalizing skepticism] as even more comprehensive and secular than that of Socrates:

Accordingly Arcesilas said that there is nothing that can be known, not even that residuum of knowledge that Socrates had left himself—the truth of this very dictum…nor is there anything that can be perceived or understood, and for these reasons, he said, no one must make any positive statement or affirmation or give the approval of his assent to any proposition, and a man must always restrain his rashness and hold it back from every slip, as it would be glaring rashness to give assent either to a falsehood or to something not certainly known, and nothing is more disgraceful than for assent and approval to outstrip knowledge and perception. (Cicero, Academica [Rackham trans.] I: 45)

While acknowledging Arcesilas’ position that “nothing can be known, not even doubt,” Cicero also claims that Carneades, who later headed the third or New Academy (c150BCE), respects Arcesilas’ viewpoint as well. [The text breaks off. The last half of Book I is lost]

Academica Book II (Lucullus)

[Note the change of speakers in this second book. In place of Varro, Lucullus will assume Antiochus’ position. Cicero will champion the Academician position. Two other people, Catulus and Hortensius will assume minor, casual roles as “judges.”]

After introducing Lucullus as a scholar and a statesman, Cicero emphasizes the desirability of people’s mutual involvements in philosophic studies and matters of state. Although criticism is sometimes directed toward people who engage philosophy, Cicero argues that this only enhances the reputation of those involved in political and military ventures.

[More centrally for our purposes] Cicero (Academica, II: 8-9) then makes a distinction between “the dogmatists” and the Academicians. Whereas the dogmatists claim to know the truth of their standpoints, Cicero states that the Academicians insist on the freedom to judge impartially and in more informed matters. [This will be Cicero’s primary emphasis in defending Academician skepticism].
Cicero also stresses that those who follow other schools of thought generally began to adopt these viewpoints before they had sufficient wisdom to judge the viability of the positions they subsequently, and often so intensively, advocate. They are blindly trusting in others rather than their own good judgment.

The text unfolds with Lucullus (Academica, II: 10-18) speaking throughout for Antiochus [c130-68BCE] who directs a series of charges against Academician skepticism.

Lucullus first contends that the Academicians frequently “argue from authority” (rather than evidence). In asserting their position, the Academicians typically reference a number of prominent philosophers who in one or other ways were highly skeptical of human knowing and matters of sensate experience.

Relatedly, Lucullus observes, the academicians “ignore the knowledge about things” that people have built up over the generations as they engage and investigate particular things. Lucullus takes specific exception to the Academician reliance on Empedocles [c492-432BCE] who says (Academica, II: 14) “all things are hidden and that we perceive nothing, discern nothing, are utterly unable to discover the real nature of anything.”

Lucullus (Academica, II: 16-18) subsequently criticizes the Academicians, Arcesilas and Philo of Larissa [c147-80BCE], for their rejection of Zeno’s concept of “grasping” things at a cognitive level. Zeno had claimed that people developed [images] of things from encounters with those things and would not have developed those impressions without some contact with or exposure to those particular things. Lucullus argues that one must either accept claims of some sense-based knowing or lapse into totalizing skepticism.

Reiterating Antiochus’ criticism of Academic skepticism, Lucullus (Academica, II: 19-21) also observes that the senses are not infallible, as the Epicureans claim them to be. Nevertheless, Lucullus continues, people can develop more reliable versions of sense-based experience through practice and training.

Lucullus also makes distinctions between things experienced through direct contact and the minded impressions that people may develop of things that they witness from a distance. Lucullus states, as well, that all understanding, investigation, and even discussion are impossible without this capacity to anticipate the “whatness” of things from a distance.

Lucullus (22) also asks, “if people’s notions of things cannot be distinguished with respect to true and false presentations [of things], how is action possible?” Relatedly without distinctions of more reliable or consistent sorts, how could memory be achieved and how could any science, craft, or specialized area of endeavor be possible?

Lucullus (Academica, II: 23-26) continues, if people are unable to distinguish viable from nonviable claims on some consistent basis, how could ethics, wisdom, research, and reasoning be possible?

As well, if people were unable to distinguish between things, there would be “no tendency to act.” In the absence of more particularized images of things, everything would be void of meaning. As a result, there would be no inclination or disposition to act toward anything.

He adds (27-29) that if people were deprived of the means of distinguishing one thing from another, philosophy also would be untenable!

Still speaking for Antiochus, Lucullus stresses the point that philosophers who disregard (a) the base on which knowledge is formed and (b) the goals of people’s impulses to act, lack the two most central features of philosophic wisdom. Likewise, it
is not apparent that those who refuse to take a stand on anything can be said to have a theory of anything.

Continuing, Lucullus (Academica, II: 30-32) asserts that all animals are endowed with sensate capacities for making distinctions. Envisioning the human mind as the source of sensation as well as sensation in itself, Lucullus says that, it is the mind that connects sensation and subsequent action.

Because people also possess capacities for memory, humans are seen to store sensations until these emerge as patterns as a consequence of similarities (and differences). This, according to Antiochus represents the base on which higher order reasoning and wisdom is built, culminating in the potential for virtue.

To deny or eliminate these capacities (including the ability to “grasp” sensations and attend to differences in sensation), Lucullus emphasizes, would be to deprive humans of the mind that differentiates them from other animals.

Further, Lucullus (Academica, II: 33-36) posits, for people to have notions of true and false, right and wrong, there must be some difference between the impressions of particular things. Otherwise, one could not make any claims of any sort regarding anything.

Likewise, to assert (as does the Academician, Carneades) that one can discuss or know things through probabilities still requires that one invoke some notion of differentiation or standard of certainty, of truth and falsity. If no credence is given to any representation of things (i.e., things lack discernable reference points), then all considerations of probability or plausibility are unfounded or meaningless (35-36).

Lucullus (Academica, II: 37-39) next observes that people distinguish between inanimate and animate objects based on the ability of animals to be active. To deny sensation to animals and still acknowledge activity would require that all animals act voluntarily (with minded assent).

To deny humans of the capacity for either sensation or judgment, Lucullus states, is to deprive people of mindedness. Relatedly, Lucullus adds, without the ability to make choices, human memories and conceptual matters of all sorts become inconsequential, as also would any concerns with vice and virtue (insofar as these reflect expressions of the human will).

Before people can act, Lucullus explains, they not only need to encounter some sensation but also to acknowledge it as something that has meaning. As well, the human mind is such that it cannot help acknowledging the things it knows when those objects are encountered. When one denies either sensation related impressions or the capacity to make distinctions, one renders action impossible.

Next, Lucullus (Academica, II: 40-42), still following Antiochus, attempts to define the Academy’s position on knowing. He says that while acknowledging that (a) some things are true and some are false, the Academicians claim that (b) no adequate human perceptual base exists for distinguishing false presentations from those that are true. [The argument is based on the recognition that since people may encounter similar kinds of sensations from nearly identical instances of Y1 and Y2 as well as from a notably different X, people cannot on the basis of the sensations alone correctly distinguish the source as Y1, Y2 or X. Thus, people are prone to err in identifying the true source of impressions on the basis of sensation.]

As a result, the Academicians claim that (c) it is impossible to establish that sensations do or do not have authenticity with respect to particular things. Working with this narrow contention, Antiochus charges, the Academicians concentrate on developing highly minute variants of this thesis, thereby reaffirming the conclusion that it is impossible to make viable distinctions on the basis of sensations.
Lucullus (*Academica*, 43-45) then criticizes the Academy from yet another angle. This time, he takes issues with the Academicians' practice of "defining things." While not questioning the importance of definitions, he pointedly asks how people who argue that there are no comprehensible differences between things subsequently can proceed to define two or more things as different in some way?

After noting that a great deal of Academicians discourse is centered on this earlier argument, Lucullus further asks if it is sensible for the Academicians "to claim that some presentations are false" if they have no basis for distinguishing between true and false presentations.

Lucullus (*Academica*, II: 46-63) next addresses a number of Academician claims pertaining to the inabilities of people to distinguish between sensations of things that are true and that are false. Lucullus notes that different things may generate instances of similar sensations, but this acknowledgement does *not* destroy the basis of relevant differences or the possibilities of knowledge.

Subsequently, Lucullus enters into an extended discussion (49-54) of the varying states of mind with which people might experience sensations -- as in instances of more routine alertness, sleep, possible divine revelation, intoxication, and insanity.

Alleging noteworthy differences in people's capacities both for attending to sensation and exercising reliability of judgment in these varying states of mind, the question is asked of the Academicians if they treat all of these states alike in their notions of uncertainty.

Elaborating on Antiochus' criticisms of Academician skepticism, Lucullus (*Academica*, II: 54-58) acknowledges that many sensory resemblances between things may exist but this is not an adequate basis on which to dispense with knowledge.

As well, Antiochus chastizes the Academicians for resorting to the material philosophers, whom they typically disparage, to illustrate the problem of distinguishing between virtually identical objects. Under conditions of these sorts, Antiochus says that it would be foolish for someone to make definite claims to knowledge. Still, Antiochus contends that when people do things with a particular purpose in mind, people may be able to develop methods of distinguishing objects that appear identical in other ways.

However, even more absurd, is the Academician claim (*Academica*, II: 59) that they can make probabilistic judgments of an informed sort when they claim that there are no criteria for judging between true and false sensations. In this sense, the Academician Arcesilas is much more consistent than is Carneades for Arcesilas refused to take a stand on any position (including a probabilistic stance).

Then, shifting emphasis somewhat, Lucullus (*Academica*, II: 60) raises another issue on behalf of Antiochus. He asks, "What have the Academicians accomplished in their skepticism?" What have they learned by arguing both for and against all things?

Then, referring to the typical Academician reluctance to reveal things they may have learned, the question turns to what, if anything, their "secret doctrine" might conceal and why it would be kept secret.xv

Lucullus ends by personally encouraging Cicero to forego the contradictions of the Academician tradition. Hortensius, who has witnessed the exchange, is reported to have indicated his approval to Antiochus' position at many points along the way. Catulus, the other participant in the setting, says that he would like to hear Cicero's response but also says that he can understand that Cicero may be reluctant to defend Academician skepticism.
Likening his task to a contested case in the courtroom, Cicero (*Academica*, II: 64-68) *begins his defense of the Academician tradition* of scholarship by establishing his own reputation as “someone engaged in a passionate quest for truth.” As a result, he wishes to avoid asserting things about which the truth cannot be ascertained.

Not only does Cicero state that nothing can be perceived but even if something could be perceived, it is dangerous and dishonorable to assent to something that is not certain. Still, Cicero (68) insists that *it is on the point that nothing can be perceived that his argument rests.*

Before replying to Lucullus in more direct terms, however, Cicero (*Academica*, II: 69-72) provides readers with some additional information designed to impugn Antiochus’ character. Cicero indicates that Antiochus, on whom Lucullus builds so centrally, had been a dedicated (Platonist) Academician until late in life. Cicero wonders openly about the rationale for this change as well as Antiochus’ apparent reluctance to join the Stoics despite the substantial compatibility of their philosophy with Antiochus’ later position. Cicero also suggests that Antiochus’ shift of position is self-serving.

Cicero (*Academica*, II: 72-76) then makes the case that *all of the major philosophers adopted skepticist viewpoints on human knowing.* More specifically, Cicero cites Anaxagoras [c500-428BCE] and Democritus [c460-357BCE] who deny that truth exists at all. Cicero then quotes Democritus’ student, Metrodorus who says:

I deny that we know whether we know something or know nothing, and even that we know the mere fact that we do not know (or do know), or know at all whether something exists or nothing exists. (Cicero, *Academica* [Rackham trans.], II: 73)

Cicero adds that others, such as Empedocles, Parmenides and Xenophanes, as well as Socrates and Plato, also have attested to the impossibility of knowing things. In response to Antiochus’ charge that the Academicians “argue by authority,” Cicero says that he is not merely citing names but is referencing the philosophers that he takes as models for his own viewpoints.xvi

Extending his argument for skepticism more generally, Cicero next references Chrysippus, a well-known Stoic, who also argued against the validity of sense-based experiences (thereby challenging a traditional Stoic position). Cicero also acknowledges the Pyrrhonian school, whose members insist that nothing is perceptible other than the internal sensations that people, in some way, experience.

Continuing, Cicero (76-78) says that Arcesilas (Academician) would have accepted Zeno’s notions of perception except that Zeno could not establish that one could reliably distinguish sensations from a true (particular) object from that of a false (different) object. Cicero will endeavor to prove that *since nothing can be perceived, the wise person will withhold opinion on all claims to knowledge.*

Asserting that sense-knowledge is unwarranted, Cicero (*Academica*, II: 79-90) *identifies four arguments against the senses:* (a) false or misleading presentations [sensations of things] exist; (b) false presentations cannot be detected; (c) people are unable to distinguish particular instances of things from other things that appear alike; and (d) people cannot reliably distinguish between true and false presentations of the same thing. On these bases, Cicero declares that the senses are untrustworthy for knowing things.

Then, moving on to consider the Academician use of the dialectic, Cicero (*Academica*, II: 91-97) states that dialectic reasoning does not generate (dogmatic) certainty, but instead is used to consider the feasibility of things. Then, responding to an earlier criticism of Lucullus (*Academica*, II: 49) who claims that the Academicians
deliberately push matters pertaining to the topics under consideration to increasingly absurd lengths in order to destroy viable notions of knowing, Cicero in turn challenges the Stoic use of syllogistic reasoning as a viable device for ascertaining the truth or falsity of one’s conclusions.

Cicero (Academica, II: 98-104) then introduces the probabilistic argument of the Academician, Carneades [c219-129BCE]. Carneades’ position, Cicero contends, is much more compelling than that of Antiochus and will effectively destroy Antiochus’ case.

Referencing Carneades, Cicero explains, these are two classifications of the presentations of things: (a) those that can be perceived and those that cannot; and (b) those that are probable and those that are not.

However, because the senses are unreliable, the academicians do not recognize this first distinction. As a result, it is appropriate only to approach sensations in probable / improbable terms. Cicero adds that Stoics also make decisions based on plausibility in the absence of particular grasplings, perceptions, and judgments because that seems reasonable to do.

According to Carneades, the wise person will attend only to the comparative likelihood or feasibility of things and use this as the basis for action and inaction. This viewpoint, Cicero contends, is not contradicted by the Stoics who acknowledge that things often are different from what they appear.

In another (seemingly humorous) attempt to disqualify the position Antiochus has taken, Cicero (101) proposes that the Epicurean position, “that if any sense-perception is false, nothing can be perceived” be combined with Antiochus’ position that “there are false sense-presentations” to establish that the conclusion that “nothing can be known.” If there are disagreements, Cicero (jestingly) suggests that Antiochus fight these out with the Epicureans.

Cicero then refers to the Academician, Clitomachus [c187-110BCE], who addresses these notions in highly explicit terms amidst a broader defense of the Academician position:

The Academic school holds that there are dissimilarities between things of such a nature that some of them seem probable and others the contrary; but this is not an adequate ground for saying that some things can be perceived and others cannot, because many false objects are probable but nothing false can be perceived and known.’ And accordingly he [Clitomachus-RP] asserts that those who say that the Academy robs us of our senses are violently mistaken, as that school never said that colour, taste or sound was non-existent, but their contention was that these presentations do not contain a mark of truth and certainty peculiar to themselves and found nowhere else. (Cicero, Academica [Rackham trans.] II: 103)

As Cicero (104) explains, the Academicians give no credence to sensation-based knowing in theoretical terms but, following Carneades, invoke probabilistic reasoning as a guide to practical decision-making and action. Things are not perceived as this or that, but are assigned the qualities of appearing as this or that relative to notions of probability.

Cicero (Academica, II: 105-111) continues, insisting that probability provides a viable base for action, and that this in no way denies people’s capacities for memory or other human accomplishments.
Then [in what seems a substantial concession], Cicero (105), says that the things Antiochus describes as “perceived” and “grasped” the Academicians would describe as “appearing” provided they are judged probable.

From there, Cicero (107) fleetingly addresses the topic of science insisting that much science is merely conjecture and that the sciences that Antiochus would defend are unable to distinguish truth from falsehood. This is followed by the (rhetorical) question (107) “does Antiochus refuse people the right or ability to doubt?”

Cicero (108) subsequently addresses the issue of whether one who assents to nothing can act. Referring to reason as “the highest form of activity,” Cicero says that he uses this form of activity (i.e., reasoning) to resist notions of sense-perception, mere opinion, hasty reasoning, and the like.

Then, defining assessments of probability or plausibility as central to activity, Cicero notes that people make extensive use of probability more generally. Continuing, Cicero (110) contends that it is on the basis of knowing that choices made on probability are viable for action.

Cicero next affirms the Academician position that some things are true and other things are false, but insists that this is based on reasoning rather than instances of perception.

Cicero (Academica, II: 112-115) indicates that his argument is not so much with the Peripatetics or the Old Academy, but more centrally with Antiochus who insists on the existence of sense-based distinctions between things.

After portraying Antiochus as a minor, isolated thinker, Cicero says that were he to accept Antiochus’ position, Cicero (also) would risk offending the Peripatetics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics.

Then, focusing his attack at Antiochus more directly, Cicero (114) with an apparent air of indignation asks how Antiochus who is so critical of Cicero’s right to avoid assenting to dubious matters not only could propose to develop such a comprehensive philosophy but also presume that the particular versions of physics, ethics, and logic that Antiochus has addressed therein are the ones to which Cicero should adhere. Still, Cicero observes, Antiochus is not alone in making (grandiose) claims of this sort. Many others also insist that their theories alone are to ones to be believed.

To further establish his position on the rightness of suspending judgment, Cicero says that he will consider wisdom as this has been developed in the broader philosophic tradition. Cicero (Academica, II: 116-128) first attends to physics or the natural (and cosmic) sciences. The issue, Cicero says, is how to define wisdom in respect to science.

Going back to Thales [c624-548BCE], Cicero (Academica, II: 118-121) first emphasizes the wide base of disagreement among the major Greek scholars regarding the constitution of the cosmos and the nature of the gods.

Cicero (122) also points out the limitations and disparities of scientific knowledge with respect to human bodies, even with the aid of dissection and related inquiry. Cicero then addresses people’s diverse notions of the universe, including the nature and position of the earth. Then Cicero (125) returns to Democritus’ theory of atoms, void spaces, and multiple worlds.

Given the vast array of uncertainties and disputations in physics, Cicero (126) asks why he (or other Academicians) should be viewed with disfavor for refusing to presume that one might know these things with certainty.
Cicero (Academica, II: 129-141) next engages the realm of ethics (morality more specifically). Here as well, Cicero acknowledges a wide assortment of esteemed philosophers and the many different viewpoints they have adopted on good and evil as well as the features of, and procedures for achieving, virtue.

As with matters pertaining to physics, Cicero observes, philosophic claims about morality are highly variable in emphases. Indeed, the arguments for pursuing pleasure are no less compelling than those encouraging people to quest for virtue in highly restrained manners.

Recognizing the multiple and conflicting viewpoints that exist in the people’s viewpoints and practices, Cicero states that it is inappropriate for anyone to make claims about a true morality.

Cicero (Academica, II: 142-145) then turns to Plato’s third realm of philosophy, that of dialectics or logic. Cicero begins his consideration of philosophic reasoning by contraposing (a) the relativism of Protagoras [c490-420BCE] with (b) the inward experiential sensations of the Cyrenaics, (c) the emphasis of deliberation that Plato associates with the mind, and (d) the claims about knowing espoused by Antiochus. Cicero further observes that the most capable of dialecticians also disagree amongst themselves on many matters.

Pointing to the wide ranging positions that various philosophers in each of these areas have assumed and the intense but unresolved debates in these fields, Cicero states that it would be unreasonable for someone to adopt a position other than the skepticism of the Academicians.

Still, Cicero (143) is not finished. Why, he asks, are the Academicians to be forced into accepting such dubious positions? Cicero (144-146) then chastises Lucullus for accusing him of irresponsible scholarship.

Continuing, Cicero emphasizes the point that Zeno and Antiochus claim that only the wise man will know things. Who, Cicero asks, could possibly qualify as such a person? Cicero states that Zeno and Antiochus are effectively claiming that none of those present can know anything, even of the most mundane sort. While denouncing Antiochus’ position as highly untenable, Cicero immediately stresses that the Academician standpoint also is supported by the longstanding practice of requiring jurors not to make judgments until they have heard the evidence and to judge only on what appears to have taken place.

As Cicero concludes (147), he reminds the others of the extended differences of opinion among the greatest minds, the obscurities of nature, and the inevitable failings of the many competing systems of thought.

At this point, Lucullus, Catulus, and Hortensius all concur in endorsing the viability of the Academician position. By their acknowledgements, Cicero has won the case!

In Conclusion

While (a) the overarching message and appeal of Cicero’s defense of Academician skepticism is the right or obligation to withhold assent until one is justified in taking a stand on matters of knowing and (b) this position has extended appeal in the broader academic community, it is important that scholars return to the more basic question of how do people know things or relatedly, how do they deal with the matters of “knowing,” “not knowing,” and “ambivalence of knowing?”

Thus, rather than concluding by saying that Cicero did or did not win the debate with Antiochus, it seems much more productive to consider “what knowing as a
humanly engaged matter” represents beyond the outcome that Cicero has assigned to the debate within his text.  

Whereas Cicero invokes a wide array of arguments in his attempts to maintain the integrity of Academician skepticism (including many arguments which he, himself, would recognize as notably problematic if not more directly marginal or irrelevant to the philosophic case), I am going to use the premises of symbolic interaction as a frame of reference for considering the positions that Cicero and Antiochus (as represented, in turn, by Catulus and Lucullus) develop. These premises will be considered point by point in the order they were given earlier.

1. **Human life is intersubjective.** Although neither Cicero nor Antiochus specifically develop a theory of language in the present text, both are acutely aware of the processes and problematics of defining their terms and of the differing meanings that can be achieved through the use of words as well as the use of language in reasoning practices. Likewise, there is much recognition of focused, meaningful linguistic interchange among humans in *Academica* but little explicit theory pertaining to the place of speech and concepts in the (group-based) formulation of knowing.

2. **Human life is ambiguous (problematic).** Both Antiochus and Cicero view knowing as a realm of uncertainty. Cicero centrally insists that knowing is a problematic matter. Thus, he is reluctant to make decisions about knowing, particularly with respect to theoretical matters pertaining to physics, ethics, and logic. Still, recognizing that people need to make decisions in order to act in the practical (human lived) world, Cicero also talks about the way things *appear to be* and, following Carneades, endorses the use of probability (or plausibility) as a reasoned means of making choices.

   Antiochus is of two or more minds on the problematics of knowing and opens himself to attack on this basis. Thus, whereas Antiochus acknowledges the problematic nature of sensation, perception and inference, he does not stop there. Instead, he infuses his philosophy with notions of divine knowing, fatalism, and morality (ethics) all of which claim external standards of a more definite (but as Cicero indicates a potentially disputatious) sort.

   Nevertheless, Antiochus is highly attentive to the ways that humans and other living organisms selectively engage their environment, a basic point that Cicero fails to acknowledge. As with the activity that Cicero more casually defines as “practical,” Cicero also largely ignores the limitations and resistances that humans may encounter in learning about and questing for knowledge about things. Thus, Cicero’s notions of the problematic are largely limited to the “potentiality for error” in people’s attempts to distinguish between things.

3. **Human life is object-oriented.** Here, the positions that Antiochus develops seems much more compatible with pragmatist thought than does Academician skepticism. Thus, whereas Cicero dwells on the unreliable nature of sense perception, Antiochus envisions matter, qualities, and sensory-based distinctions to be indispensable to organic life. Still, even for Antiochus, objects are not known in direct terms but in the capacities of organisms to engage those things.

   For humans, thus, some “grasping” of sensations is fundamental to distinctions (even if some of these are unfounded), combined with capacities for memory, allow people to develop more enduring patterns of distinctions; thereby
providing some semblance of knowing. Sensations of things, thus, represent the physiological-cognitive basis in which other forms of knowing may be developed.

Likewise, Antiochus is especially mindful of the ways that people and some other organisms “engage objects from a distance” and how this is related to both knowing and activity. Cicero’s attention to objects is much less apparent. He insists that people know and act toward things as they “appear to be,” but offers little in the way of a more extended explanation.

4. Human life is (multi)perspectival. Whereas both Antiochus and Cicero acknowledge wide diversities in human thought and assessments of activity, Cicero is more consistently pluralist or noncommittal in his standpoint.

Antiochus is not as single-minded as Cicero portrays him to be, but insofar as Antiochus takes more definite stands on religion, virtue, and wisdom, for instance, his notions of theology, morality judgment assume a more singular quality. Still, this should not obscure Antiochus’ more pluralist emphasis on knowing more generally. This clearly is evident in Antiochus’ consideration (and criticism) of Academician skepticism.

5. Human life is reflective. Even though Antiochus, as noted earlier, also subscribes to a religious viewpoint that endorses fatalism, the more extended philosophy of knowing and acting that he articulates is not only pluralist in emphasis but clearly acknowledges people’s capacities for interpreting, meaningfully engaging objects, redefining the nature of those objects, and consciously making adjustments to earlier notions of things where these seem appropriate.

Cicero’s position of deliberately suspending judgment, likewise, is highly reflective as, relatedly, are the manners in which these two principal combatants engage one another in this dialogue. Still, because Cicero is the author of this text as well, one might argue that he provides yet further evidence (in his writing) of his appreciation of the reflective nature of human life.

6. Human life is sensory/embodied. Here, Antiochus (who adopts a more characteristic Aristotelian approach) to human physiology is much more consistent with a pragmatist viewpoint than is Cicero. Assuming an Academician viewpoint, Cicero tends to distance himself from such matters and concentrates more on the problematic features of sensation rather than acknowledging the existence of sensation.

7. Human life is activity-based. Although Cicero describes himself as making central use of reason and views reasoning as the most noble of human activities, it is evident, as with the matter of one’s physiological being (and related ecosystem), that the Academician position is substantially deficient with respect to considerations of activity “as activity.”

Thus, Cicero glibly dodges Antiochus’ charges that “those who do not assent to things cannot act” by saying that “not assenting is still a form of activity.” Cicero will also counter by saying that he will act mindfully of probable or plausible evidence and that he (like Carneades) is really addressing theoretical rather than practical matters in his refusal to assent. Cicero does not deny either the capacity to act or the relevance of purposive activity. Still, unlike Antiochus who emphasizes the importance of activity and seems much more intent on examining how this takes place, the Academicians appear not to have given much attention to activity as a
humanly engaged process. [By contrast, Cicero’s own work on rhetoric is acutely focused on oratory as a realm of activity!]

However, perhaps a particularly telling point is Antiochus’ question of “what Academician skepticism allows one to do;” what it has discovered and (presumably) what one might do with this information.

Insofar as he provides a direct answer, Cicero’s response would be one of having the opportunity to consider all sides and to avoid making judgments that are poorly informed. Still, this does little more than reiterate the Academician rationale for invoking this practice.

8. Human life is negotiable. Interestingly, although Cicero (a) is highly attentive to persuasive endeavor in both his practice and scholarly analysis of rhetoric and (b) envisions the development of Academica as an instance of rhetorical as well as philosophical interchange, Cicero (c) only minimally discusses rhetoric or influence work with respect to Academician skepticism.

Thus, whereas Cicero pointedly chastises Lucullus (and Antiochus) both for attempting to convert him to Antiochus’ philosophy and for denying the right of the Academicians to withhold assent on the matters of knowing, Cicero does not address negotiation as a significant analytic process in Academician views on knowing. [Elsewhere, in his writings on rhetoric, Cicero (see Brutus) explicitly condemns Socrates and Plato for disregarding rhetoric in their considerations of philosophy — as if one could separate thought from speech!]

Antiochus makes only passing reference to rhetoric (still, he does so as something to be encompassed in philosophy). Nevertheless, like Cicero, Antiochus is highly cognizant of the influence (and resistance) process. Thus, Antiochus explicitly intends not only to challenge the Academicians but also deems it necessary to advise others on how to protect themselves from the arguments of the Academicians.

9. Human life is relational. Although both Cicero and Antiochus are mindful of the tendency of philosophers to establish schools and, likewise, are attentive to the lineages and alignments as well as the disjunctures that develop in these contexts, neither speaker gives much sustained attention to the ways that people’s associations enter into their notions of knowing in more general terms.

10. Human life is processual. As with the matter of relationships, comparatively little consideration is given to the ongoing or emergent features of knowing. Antiochus seems more attentive to the developmental flow of knowing than is Cicero in Academica. Cicero seems more insistent on maintaining the rights of Academicians to “assess all standpoints without assenting to any particular viewpoint or theory” rather than addressing the processes of knowing in more direct terms.

11. Human life takes place in instances. Although Cicero presents Academica as a specific set of interchanges, this seems to be done for dramatic impact rather than encouraging a focus on the ways that people know and act in particular instances. Relatedly, whereas Antiochus argues for the necessity of examining the things that people do in trying to know or make sense of things, Cicero’s Academicians operate at more abstract levels of analysis and seem more intent on establishing contradictions in people’s notions of things than examining the ways in which people actually do things as in dealing with known, unknown, and more ambivalent or ambiguous instances of things. Indeed, it is this reluctance to examine actual
instances in the making that reveals the central weakness of dialectic analysis and the associated skepticism Cicero tries to defend.\textsuperscript{xx}

Although Cicero defends Academician skepticism with considerable intensity and ingenuity, one may still ask if he accepted the Academician skepticism as a philosophic viewpoint to be followed in a more sustained manner or whether he accepted Academician skepticism more centrally as a rhetorical challenge in which he had an opportunity to display some of the broader parameters of philosophic thought pertaining to human knowing and acting.\textsuperscript{xxi} Either way, we can be particularly grateful to Marcus Tullius Cicero (c106-43 BCE) for the extremely thoughtful manner in which he helped sustain scholarly intrigues in some highly instructive philosophic issues.\textsuperscript{xxii}

Postscript

Are there yet broader lessons for contemporary scholars? One lesson might be that “the study of human knowing” is much too important to be left to the philosophers alone. While many philosophers emphasize the value of looking at things from all sides and withholding assent in more typical Academician fashions, few philosophers actually examine the very things about which they speak.

Like the Academicians that Cicero defends, philosophers generally pay comparatively little attention to the physiologically-enabled features of human knowing and acting. Perhaps even more centrally and consequentially given their subject matter, they also ignore knowing as “activity in the making,” and seem inclined to dispense with influence (rhetoric) work as a central feature of the human condition. Most philosophers also give little attention to the human group (and human interchange within) wherein all instances of knowing take place. As a result, they tend to ignore knowing as a humanly enacted/collectively accomplished (social) process.

Still, there are important things for sociologists and other social scientists to learn from the philosophers, with Cicero and Antiochus serving as exemplars of sorts. More attention could be given to dialectic analysis wherein one examines things in more sustained, comparative conceptual terms asking in more precise terms not only where things are similar and where they are different but also how they might be best understood in analytic terms.

Likewise, it is most important that social scientists to be mindful of the matters of relative certainty or plausibility in developing their studies and analysis. This means giving greater consideration to plausibility or the relative viability of both the claims they make and the grounds on which they make these inferences. In this sense, it seems most advisable to examine things carefully, openly, and in more sustained terms in the instances in which these things actually take place.\textsuperscript{xxiii}

Beyond more routine scholarship, an attentiveness to skepticism, knowing, and plausibility seems especially important for those “social scientists” who propose to set policy for others. It is important that both policy makers and the social scientists who advise them on such matters not assume that attitudes, opinions, and moralities represent substitutes for scholarship and the associated wisdom that accompanies it.

As well, if scholars in the social sciences are to be more productive in the longer term, it also is important that they strive to avoid mixing morality, religion, and political agendas with scholarly analyses and instead concentrate on developing more generic, pluralist inquiries and analyses of human group life.
In this way, by attending to knowing and doubting within the context of generating wisdom of a more pluralist, secular sort, we may make more viable and enduring contributions to the intellectual legacy that others such as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero have so consequentially generated.

Endnotes

i More extended discussions of the interactionist tradition (theory, methods, literature, concepts) can be found in Prus (1996, 1997, 1999) and Prus and Grills (2003).

ii For an instructive but compact review of the history of Greek philosophy, see R. G. Bury’s introduction to Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism.

iii Among the preserved Greek texts of the Roman era, it is Sextus Empiricus (c200CE) who, in articulating the skeptic position of Pyrrhonism, most extensively addresses the matters of human knowing and acting in philosophic terms.

iv Christianity was formally recognized as a legitimate religion in Rome in 313CE, following the conversion of Constantine. Christianity was declared the official religion of Rome in 391CE.

v We know little about the reception of Cicero’s Academica in the intervening centuries. However, the debate Cicero engages was resumed four centuries later by one of the most consequential of all Christian philosophers. Augustine (c354-430CE) had his own agenda, but in developing Against the Academicians, this “rhetorician / philosopher – turned – theologian” became instrumental in maintaining attention on a number of issues about knowing that Cicero (of whom Augustine was particularly critical) had addressed in Academica.

vi Readers may appreciate that although East Rome (Greek-speaking; first established 286CE) did not experience the many disruptions and losses associated with the Western European dark ages, secular scholarship stagnated in the east (under the Greek Orthodox church).

vii Following a military conquest of the eastern and southern territories of the Mediterranean, Islamic scholars acquired access to various Greek texts (most likely in Egypt). After the Arabs invaded Spain (crossing the Straits of Gibraltar from North Africa), some Islamic and Jewish scholars moved to Spain bringing various Greek texts and other materials with them.

viii This statement is centrally based on H. Rackham’s (1933) English translation of Academica. However, it also has benefited from MacKendrick’s (1989:114-130) synoptical statement on Cicero’s Academica as well as Augustine’s Against the Academicians (King trans.) and Sextus Empiricus (c200CE) Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Bury trans.).

ix In addition to Cicero’s remarkable works on rhetoric (especially De Inventione, Topica, Brutus, De Oratore, Orator), readers also are referred to Cicero’s more philosophic On the Nature of the Gods, On Fate, On Divination, On Ends, and Tusculan Disputations.

x Readers might appreciate at the outset that Cicero is a rhetorician as well as a philosopher. As a rhetorician, his objective is to “win the case” – and he appears to blend the two roles at times.
xi It is difficult to underestimate the importance of these distinctions. Not only does Aristotle contend that the development of primary human conceptions of things are derived from “people’s encounters with the instances of things” (as opposition to applications of pre-existing “form” conceptualization to things to make them intelligible), but Aristotle also insists on the study of knowing as a humanly engaged (secular) process (vs. a divinely informed, inspired, or determined occurrence). Relatedly, Aristotle stresses the centrality of language and instruction for people’s senses of knowing and capacities for thought. On these bases, Aristotle stands in stark contrast to the theological positions of Socrates and Plato as well as the Stoics and Epicureans. It is not apparent that either Antiochus (judging from Cicero) or Cicero has an especially strong awareness of Aristotle’s philosophy. In contrast to their school’s founder (Aristotle), the Peripatetics later adopted (notably diffuse) positions that were more akin to those of the Academicians and the Stoics.

xii For a more extended, contemporary consideration of the importance of “knowing (and sensing) from a distance see G. H. Mead’s (1932) The Philosophy of the Present.

xiii Readers familiar with Aristotle’s [c384-322BCE] works more generally will recognize that some of the notions introduced here represent part of Aristotle’s conceptualization of the human condition. See Aristotle’s more generic considerations of mindedness in the human condition in On the Soul, Sense and Sensibilia, and On Memory; as well as Aristotle’s more direct discussions of human reflectivity, interchange, and relationships in Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics, and Rhetoric.

xiv Somewhat parallel arguments are developed by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric.

xv As indicated in Augustine’s Against the Academicians, the notion of a “secret Academician doctrine” seems to have intrigued as well as perplexed many minds. It is odd in this sense, that Cicero who had studied in the Academy would have Antiochus who once headed the Academy (and presumably would know if a “secret doctrine” existed and what it might contain) ask this question.

xvi Interestingly, even though Cicero (in other texts) sometimes references Aristotle as second only to Plato among all philosophers, Cicero makes no mention of Aristotle in developing this part of his argument.

xvii Those familiar with other of Cicero’s works will realize that while Cicero maintained particular loyalties to the (Platonist) Academics, he generally was not concerned about offending the Stoics or the Epicureans (see Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods). Cicero’s position here, thus, appears one of tactically neutralizing support for Antiochus.

xviii Although some of Aristotle’s claims about biology are unfounded, he rather explicitly recognized that people not only exist within a broader “ecosystem,” but have animal capacities for sensation and motion -- for contact dispositions (as an acceptance, tolerance, rejection) and organic adjustments. Rejecting the body-mind dualism of Plato and Socrates, Aristotle was remarkably attentive to the ways that people, as biological beings, integrate creature capacities for sensations and emotions into their notions of knowing and acting (see Spangler, 1998).

xix Here again, those who know Cicero’s works on rhetoric will note that he is acutely attentive to process not only in reference to (a) the development of rhetoric as an art (technique) and (b) rhetoric as an adjacently enacted
procedure in actual cases, but also to the historical development of Greek as well as Roman rhetoric on a comparative, analytic basis.

Those who know Aristotle’s work may appreciate that this is where Aristotle parts company with Plato and the Academicians. Thus, when Aristotle says that “nothing has any quality except in reference to what it is compared,” he also says that “things can be known only in relative to some reference point.” If there are no reference point, no criteria, there is no basis on which to make a judgment on anything.

Although Cicero defends (the totalizing) Academician skepticism associated with dialectic analysis, neither Plato nor Socrates seems able / willing to sustain this viewpoint as illustrated in the following comments on Plato’s Republic (wherein Socrates is Plato’s major spokesperson):

[Republic, VI: 513] In the midst of a discussion of students of philosophy, Socrates distinguishes four capacities of the soul (i.e., psyche [Gk], mind): reasoning, understanding, faith, and perception of sensation. He will use these four capacities (notably including sensation) as a base for embarking on a further consideration of scholarship.

[Republic, VII: 532-534] Attending to the matter of educating philosophers, Socrates examines the dialectic in more direct philosophic terms. Socrates begins by defining the dialectic as the discovery of the absolute on the basis of pure reasoning, without regard for the senses. Subsequently, however, he readjusts this definition to refer to people who attain carefully reasoned, abstract conceptions of the essences of things. Accordingly, Socrates argues, dialectic reasoning is central to the development of all the sciences.

[Republic, VII: 537-540] Whereas Socrates insists that students of philosophy become well acquainted with all realms of scholarship before engaging the study of dialectics in more sustained terms, he explicitly states that the study of dialectic reasoning represents a source of considerable risk. Because of the extreme relativism that the dialectic fosters, people who are exposed to dialectic procedures often begin to question all matters of social (and moral) order. As a result, they may become so intrigued by dialectic skepticism that they begin, inappropriately in Socrates’ viewpoint, to challenge, denigrate, and disregard all manners of thought, convention, religion, and law. For this reason, Socrates insists that after they have studied dialectics for five years (and are now about 35 years of age), students of philosophy are to be compelled to assume military or other offices. This is to be done so that they might obtain fuller, more adequate stocks of experience with which to appreciate human affairs. Socrates also cautions these people against more immediately trying to assume prominent leadership roles in the community. Only after holding office for fifteen years, Socrates says, would these people (now about 50 years of age) be qualified to instruct others on philosophy in a more comprehensive, full-time sense. I have selected only some instances from Plato’s Republic that pertain more directly to the practice of philosophy. Clearly, there is less room for “totalizing skepticism” on the part of the guardians (philosopher-kings) and others who constitute, maintain, and defend the community amidst the day-to-day challenges of human group life. Those who examine Laws will find that Plato displays little appreciation of even milder forms of philosophic skepticism. Thus, whereas Plato (and Socrates) make extensive use of dialectic analyses in more abstract analytic terms, totalizing skepticism [as Antiochus emphasizes in Academica.] falls by the wayside when one endeavors to do something, including the pursuit of philosophy.
xxii In addition to the somewhat more implicit philosophic materials on human knowing and acting that are embedded in Cicero’s highly articulate and extended discussions of rhetoric, readers also may attend to the philosophic matters that Cicero engages in On the Nature of the Gods, his defense of scholarship in On Ends, and his considerations of agency and causation in On Fate and On Divination.

xxiii Relatedly, instead of denying the human capacity for knowing, the pragmatist question becomes one of “how do people know things?” That is, how do people engage “knowing, doubting, and not knowing” as socially achieved processes? As suggested in the following extract, some of the issues of “whatness” with which scholars, including Cicero and Antiochus, have grappled regarding the nature of “knowing” may be advanced by distinguishing in more precise terms some of the major realms of knowing that are often discussed in more holistic terms. These and related notions are given more attention in Prus (1996, 1997, 1999, and Prus and Grills, 2003), but are outlined in this quotation:

Assuming some interpretive licence, we wish to suggest that Blumer’s phrase ‘obdurate character of the empirical world’ should be read as referring to four intertwined yet distinguishable features of social life which methodologically constrain and hence guide social research in ways seemingly either not considered or not accepted by postmodernist orientations. The obdurateness of reality exists in the irreducibility of intersubjectivity for the human condition. This is rooted in a pragmatic appreciation of: (1) the most basic resistances to human action experienced daily in the material and the social environments of the human struggle for existence… (2) the objectifying nature of being human [i.e., the tendencies of humans to assign names and meanings to phenomena, thereby achieving shared senses of ‘whatness’ - RP], (3) the resultant phenomenon of ‘culturally motivated resistances’ stemming from the ongoing and group nature of human life, and (4) the rudimentary and universal social processes undergirding the ongoing accomplishment of human group life. These four modes or realms of experienced intersubjectivity are interrelated, and each depends on the other for a fuller or more holistic appreciation of its significance. (Prus and Dawson, 1996: 246)

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Citation

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Concepts and Concept Formation: Goffman and Beyond

Abstract

The social and behavioral sciences need distinctive concepts to escape entrapment in cultural assumptions. Currently there are several sources for concepts, but vernacular words are most frequently used. These words are usually ambiguous and may reaffirm the status quo. This essay proposes that a new approach is implied in Goffman’s work. Most of the new terms he invented went undefined. However, he can be seen as struggling in much of his writing to develop two basic components of the “looking-glass self,” awareness structures and embarrassment. His method seems to have involved using many vernacular cognates and close examination of detailed examples of each concept. The implication is that it might be possible to ground concepts by 1. Listing and examining links to vernacular and technical cognates, and 2. Closely exploring many concrete examples. A study of one type of awareness structure, collective denial (Zerubavel 2006), can also be used to illustrate the potential of this method.

Keywords
Grounded concepts; Goffman; Research methods; Concrete examples; Cognates; Awareness structures; Embarrassment

Introduction

Human intelligence is easily capable of innovation, but is often trapped in the taken-for-granted worldview of the larger society. A historical example is the assumption that the earth was the center of the universe. In the 16th century, the astronomer Tycho Brahe had many exact sightings of the planet Venus. However, he was unable to plot its orbit, because he assumed, like everyone else, that Venus and the other planets moved around the earth.

After Brahe’s death, his assistant Kepler, although a lesser scientist and mathematician than Brahe, showed that Venus traveled in an elliptic orbit, not around the earth, but around the sun. As is typical in such cases, Kepler escaped the entrapping assumption by accident. In his frustration, Kepler had resorted to a series of fantastic models of planetary movement. During his play with one of them, he noticed that he had inadvertently placed the sun, rather than the earth at the center.

With the correct assumption, the solution of the problem was obvious. The discovery that the earth was a globe, rather than flat, was also an accident, resulting from ocean voyages exploring distant places rather than seeking the shape of the
earth. The first step toward Einstein’s theory of relativity was a joke he told about a hypothetical situation involving passengers on trains.

With respect to the world of human experience and behavior, modern societies seem to be mostly trapped at the flat earth stage. For example, individualism is an unstated, but nevertheless strongly held assumption in modern societies. Similarly, we usually assume that behavior and cognition are far more important than emotions and social relationships. These assumptions provide what is taken for common sense, the unstated background not only for daily life, but also for much of the social and behavioral sciences.

These disciplines have sought to develop approaches based on distinct concepts, theories and methods independent of conventional common sense. However, the quest has had only limited success. This essay will consider only one aspect of the problem, the development of clear and distinctive concepts.

Sources of Concepts

Basic concepts in the social and behavioral sciences are generated in several different ways. The most common source is vernacular words. Another source is the ethnographic study. The approach of grounded theory by Strauss (Strauss and Corbin 1998) and others attempts to bring system into the use of ethnography.

Somewhat indirectly, surveys and experiments also have also contributed to the development of concepts. The idea of “relative deprivation” resulted from a social survey. The concept of conformity had been in wide use long before the experiments by Asch and others. But the conformity studies not only generated statistics. They also succeeded in fleshing out the concept with concrete images of subject conforming to perceptions of others even when they directly contradicted their own.

The first source of concepts, vernacular words, particularly, poses a problem from a scientific point of view. Vernacular words usually have more than one meaning, making statements that use only these words ambiguous. Is there any way that unambiguous concepts can be developed, as has been done in mathematics? Such concepts could help develop shared knowledge within and between disciplines and between world languages as well.

For example, in English the word proud can express strong approval, a positive appraisal. It can also express intense disapproval, a negative appraisal: “Pride goeth before the fall.” This latter meaning is indicative of both an exaggerated regard for self and arrogant disregard for others. In the vernacular mathematics of moral appraisal, x (proud) can be either positive or negative. Vernacular words can mean whatever the speaker wants them to mean, like the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland.

One way to avoid ambiguity is to attach an adjective. Justified pride, of course, means a positive appraisal, even if it seems a bit stilted. Usually however, one must understand the meaning of vernacular words from the context and nonverbal accompaniments. Vernacular words are loose cannons. The way that their use has impeded research will be discussed below.

Wittgenstein proposed that the reason many problems seem to be unsolvable is that they are expressed in ordinary language. Its ambiguity and bias toward the status quo, as already indicated, are impediments.

How does ordinary language support the status quo? One example is provided by the kind of nationalism that leads to or at least passively accepts unnecessary wars. Since the ambiguity of the word pride was mentioned above, think about the
meaning of “national pride.” The pliability of the word love is represented in the warfare sweepstakes with ideas such as “love of country.” English language vernacular allows one to conflate love, which is honorable, with infatuation, which is merely fatuous. Citizens confuse themselves with this and similar usages. Even studies of the political science of warfare seldom attempt to deconstruct such words.

Perhaps the most direct and effective approach to generating distinctive concepts is ethnographic study. The close study of a group or society quite different than one’s own, particularly, can generate concepts that are independent of both the researcher and the subject culture. The researcher can develop what Arthur Koestler called binocular vision, standing outside of both cultures.

However, there is a strong temptation in ethnography, and in historical research and linguistics as well, to focus on mere description, as discussed by Charmaz (2006, p. 23 and passim). Most of these studies, rather than developing binocular vision, are content only to report the similarities and differences between two cultures, instead of developing general concepts that embrace both.

This tendency can be found even in the grounded theory approach, by far the most direct and sophisticated method of concept development. In one of the earliest studies, Glaser and Strauss (1965) described variations in awareness among hospital patients with terminal illness. In some cases, patient and staff shared awareness that the patient was dying. Often, however, the staff knew but the patient didn’t. This study could have focused on a quite general issue, but it didn’t.

The central idea in the 1965 study, degrees of shared awareness, might be also central to all of the social and behavioral sciences. It is possible that the degree of shared awareness is the basis of social integration, i.e. solidarity/alienation, perhaps the most important component of social structure and process. As will be indicated below, Goffman gave considerable attention to what he sometimes called mutual awareness and other terms. But Glaser and Strauss and those who have further studied awareness contexts passed on this opportunity because they were content to describe different degrees of awareness in more concrete rather than general terms.

What can be learned by comparing Glaser and Strauss’s treatment of awareness contexts with Goffman’s explorations of mutual awareness? It is of interest to note that Glaser and Strauss mistakenly include Goffman with other theorists who fail to consider “either the structural contexts in which types of awareness occur, of the structure of the awareness context itself (Glaser and Strauss 1965, p. 13).

However it is hardly their fault, since by 1965, Goffman had referred to mutual awareness only indirectly, even if in many different ways. A flat-out recognition of the structure of awareness by Goffman had to await his definition of co-presence in terms of levels of mutual awareness in his 1983 publication, to be discussed below. Furthermore, there is no reason why Goffman’s combination of detailed particulars and general ideas cannot be added to the grounded theory approach, as outlined below.

**Concepts and Theories**

The pliability of central concepts represents a formidable barrier to the social and behavioral disciplines. In order to be understood we need to write in vernacular language. How is one to overcome the problem of ambiguity and conservatism? This essay accepts the need to use vernacular language in designing and reporting a study, but in addition, the central hypothesis can be organized around two or
more general concepts. A concept is a word that is defined so clearly that there can be only a single meaning.

General concepts are the fundamental building blocks of theory. Propositions (hypotheses) are made up of at least two such concepts, and a theory, at least two propositions. Formulating an explicit problem and hypothesis requires the use of two or more clearly defined concepts, the more general the concepts, the better.

In this approach, the first step in a study would not be the statement of a problem, the systematic collection of data, reference to a theory, or even a hypothesis. These steps are all too ambitious for beginners. Instead one would attempt to develop two clearly defined concepts, in order to avoid ambiguity and entanglement in the status quo.

Herbert Blumer (1986) called attention to this problem in two articles that dealt explicitly with the meaning of concepts. He clearly indicated that none of the basic concepts in the social and behavioral sciences are true concepts. Blumer’s solution to this problem, however, was different than the one offered here. He suggested that we must merely be aware that our concepts only sensitize us to a problem, since they do not have a single meaning.

The work on grounded theory by Anselm Strauss (1998) and others carried Blumer’s idea of sensitizing concepts forward. Strauss and those who followed provide a method of generating concepts from comparative data. But, like Blumer, this method does not insist on single-meaning concepts. Hinting at the direction taken in this essay, Giddens (1984) called for the use of examples to “instantiate” concepts, but without giving sufficient description of what this process might look like.

Goffman’s World

Goffman’s writing is difficult to understand, even though it is brilliant, original, and entertaining. One flaw is that he usually doesn’t state a clear thesis. (As indicated in the first footnote, in this essay I have tried to avoid that flaw by stating the central thesis four times in varying forms.) Either there is no thesis provided at all, or what is offered is misleading. The former, lack of a clear thesis, characterizes his longest and most enigmatic book, Frame Analysis (1974). In my interpretation, the unstated purpose of this book is to develop a definition for the concept of context, rather than using the word in its vernacular sense. As it turns out, his representation of context as a “frame assembly” is too recursive (repetitive) to be managed verbally. In mathematical notation, however, if frame is taken to mean bracket, it can be represented by recursive bracketed clauses. Note that frame assembly is yet another terminology that is closely related to the structure of awareness, since both imply bracket assemblies.

The War on Tropes

There is a substantial literature commenting on Goffman’s work that has established that it is no help with systematic theory, method or data, at least in any conventional sense. What could he be up to? One clue is provided by Goffman’s endless creation of new terms and systems of classification that seem to lead nowhere. Since the reader is never told the purpose of these rat’s nests of classifications, and Goffman himself rarely refers to them in his subsequent work, we face a mystery.
It is possible that Goffman’s main purpose was preliminary to science, to demolish ruling tropes [metaphors] in order to make room for scientific method.

The neatly worked inner stretches of science are an open space in the tropical jungle, created by clearing tropes away. (Quine, 1978: 160)

Vernacular words are ambiguous because they are metaphorical in origin, they can point in many directions. An example is provided by the idea of mutual knowledge, already mentioned above. The phrase that Clark (1981) uses for mutual knowledge is “common ground.” Mutual knowledge refers to a phenomenon of shared inner consciousness, but is stated in terms of an image that refers to the outer, material world. His metaphor merely hints at the inner phenomenon using a physical image. It therefore obscures at least as much as it reveals.

As Quine indicates, if science is to be developed, it is necessary that obstructive metaphors be overthrown. Many vernacular words and phrases, such as common ground, are mere metaphors that do not model what is being referred to. A trope is a particular type of metaphor, a master image that plays a central role in a particular culture.

One example from astronomy has been discussed above, the taken-for-granted assumption that the earth was the center of the universe. The methods of science are useless if one is entrapped in erroneous assumptions. A trope is a ruling metaphor in the assumptive world of a culture. Goffman’s hectic and relentless invention of new terms was a step toward clearing an open space for human science in the tropical jungle of our assumptive world.

Most social science theory and research depends on tropes, vernacular words that are metaphors rather than concepts. My paper on alienation/solidarity (Scheff 2006a) suggests that current social science usage assigns many different meanings to these two terms, and proposes a single-meaning concept for each of them.

In our review (2004), David Fearon and I showed that the most studied topic in all of social science, self-esteem, has never been defined conceptually. As a result, all of the some two hundred self-esteem scales confound cognitive, emotional, dispositional, and relational components. The most damaging confound, between thought and feeling, shows up in dictionary definitions.


2. Holding a good opinion of one’s self; self-complacency. (Webster's Revised Unabridged dictionary, 1998)


Two of the three definitions (1 and 3) are in terms of the emotion pride. Definitions # 1 and 3 also suggest other synonyms that, if not emotions, are at least mixtures of feelings and thought: respect, regard and esteem. These two definitions stress the affective components of self-esteem. If we assume that shame is the emotion opposite to pride, then two of the three definitions suggest that high self-esteem involves pride, and low self-esteem, shame.

Definition # 2, however, takes a different tack: it mentions no emotions or feelings. Instead, it defines self-esteem cognitively, holding a good opinion of self. Self-esteem scale items are of both kind, but with somewhat more emphasis on
cognitive elements. That is, self-esteem scales and studies contain both the cognitive, the affective and the social. One aspect of the third definition refers to “Being worthy of esteem or respect” which seems to imply a social audience, in addition to being one’s own audience.

It seems that the inclusion of many orthogonal components in the scale items has sealed the fate of all research using self-esteem scales. There have been ten substantial reviews of the results of self-esteem studies, beginning with Wells and Marwell (1976), and as late as Baumeister (2003). All ten report the same findings: the correlation between self-esteem scales and behavior is perilously close to zero. To avoid this kind of waste, what kind of work is needed preliminary to systematic testing?

Looking-Glass Self and the Emotional/Relational World

As already indicated, Goffman was involved for most of his career in a struggle to define two ideas: embarrassment/shame and mutual awareness. Although Goffman himself didn’t articulate the link between them, it can be represented by way of Cooley’s (1922) looking-glass self (LGS). This idea connects two vast realms, the social nature of the self, on the one hand, and an intense emotional life that results, on the other. Cooley proposed first that the self is social, that we “live in the minds of others without knowing it.” He went on to say that living in the minds of others, imaginatively, gives rise to real emotions, pride and shame. This process is the basis for what Goffman called impression management.

This idea underlies many of the examples that enliven Goffman’s work, and make it understandable and entertaining. One manages one’s image in the eyes of others in order to come to terms with pride and shame. This idea is not part of Cooley’s formulation (1922), which involves 3 steps:

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: [1] the imagination of our appearance to the other person; [2] the imagination of his [sic] judgment of that appearance, and [3] some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. (shame; p. l84; numbers added for emphasis)

Cooley seems to suggest that we passively accept whatever pride or shame that comes our way. Goffman took the process two steps further: 4. we attempt to manage the impression that we make on others, to gain pride and avoid embarrassment/shame. 5. If we are not able to manage it, then we further attempt to manage the resulting embarrassment. Goffman provided many, many examples to ground these two steps.

Compared to Goffman, Cooley was relatively direct in naming pride and shame (considering mortification to be a shame variant). For him these two emotions both arose from self-monitoring, the process that was at the center of his social psychology. To be sure, in his discussion of what he called the “self-sentiments,” pride and shame are mentioned only as two of other possible emotions.

But in his definition of the LGS, he referred exclusively to pride and shame. To make sure we understand this point, he mentions shame three more times (emphasis added):

The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that
other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are *ashamed* to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action—say some sharp transaction in trade—which he would be *ashamed* to own to another. (p. 184-185)

Although Cooley is explicit in suggesting that pride and shame are social emotions, he made no attempt to define either emotion. Instead he used the vernacular words as if they were self-explanatory.

As already mentioned, in current usage in English, the word pride used without qualification may have an inflection of arrogance or hubris. In order to refer to the kind of pride implied in Cooley’s analysis, the opposite of shame, one must add a qualifier like justified or genuine. And usage of the word shame, especially in English, is even more confusing, as will be indicated below. Using undefined emotion words is an invitation to the Tower of Babel.

However ambiguous, Cooley’s analysis of self-monitoring clearly suggest that pride and shame are the basic social emotions. Goffman was the first social scientist to follow up on the idea, fleshing it out with a large number of refreshingly varied examples of everyday behavior.

### Goffman’s Version of the Looking Glass

In Goffman’s basic work, *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, the LGS is not mentioned explicitly. There are three references to Cooley, but none concern the looking glass. Yet Cooley’s idea can be seen to form the basic structure of all of Goffman’s earlier writings, especially *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (PSEL), some of the chapters of Interaction Ritual, and several other books.

Like Cooley, Goffman’s elaboration on the theme of the looking glass is also ambiguous, but in an entirely different way. Cooley’s prose is simple and unassuming, mostly ordinary language. But Goffman’s, besides being dazzlingly brilliant, is also incredibly involuted and complex. It is dense with meaning, innuendo, impromptu classifications, qualifications, and expansion. It is also humorous, ironic, and witty in ways that both reveal and conceal. I propose that the thread in Goffman’s work that came closest to completion concerns emotions, on the one hand, and awareness structures (especially what he called mutual awareness), on the other.

### Goffman on Emotions

Goffman developed the concept of embarrassment in many different ways. First, he used words that imply shame or embarrassment without naming them explicitly. Many of his quotes are of this nature. For example, “his pride is deeply wounded” (p. 50) conveys shame indirectly. Another instance occurs in his discussion of the difficulty faced by the person in the role of the go-between:

> When a go-between operates in the actual presence of the two teams of which he is a member, we obtain a wonderful display, not unlike a man desperately trying to play tennis with himself... As an individual, the go-between's activity is bizarre, untenable, and undignified, vacillating as it does from one set of appearances and loyalties to another. (p. 149, emphasis added)
The idea that the activity of a go-between caught between conflicting audiences is “bizarre, untenable, and undignified” is an indirect referral to embarrassment, especially the use of the word undignified. The idea of dignity and its lack, almost always a cognate or pride and shame, occurs very frequently in PSEL. Goffman’s references to dignity or its derivatives (17 times) always imply pride or much more frequently, shame.

Another obvious instance occurs in a quote he cited from Simmel:

An ideal sphere lies around every human being. Although differing in size in various directions and differing according to the person with whom one entertains relations, this sphere cannot be penetrated, unless the personality value of the individual is thereby destroyed. A sphere of this sort is placed around man by his “honor.” Language very poignantly designates an insult to one’s honor as “coming too close”: the radius of this sphere marks, as it were, the distance whose trespassing by another person insults one’s honor (Goffman, 1959: 69)

The idea of honor, especially insulting it or having it destroyed, might well be expressed in pride and shame language.

Many passages indicate embarrassment or shame without using either word explicitly. Here is a virtuoso instance that involves two direct and two indirect referrals:

Knowing that his audiences are capable of forming bad impressions of him, the individual may come to feel ashamed (1) of a well-intentioned honest act merely because the context of its performance provides false impressions that are bad. Feeling this unwarranted shame (2), he may feel that his feelings can be seen; feeling that he is thus seen, he may feel that his appearance confirms these false conclusions concerning him (3). He may then add to the precariousness of his position by engaging in just those defensive maneuvers that he would employ were he really guilty. In this way it is possible for all of us to become fleetingly for ourselves the worst person we can imagine that others might imagine us to be (4). (p. 236. Emphasis added)

Following the logic of the LGS, the clause “he may feel that his appearance confirms these false conclusions concerning him” implies at least the possibility of shame or embarrassment. The final sentence in this passage goes much further: “In this way it is possible for all of us to become fleetingly for ourselves the worst person we can imagine that others might imagine us to be.”

This last haunting line implies a shame state, brief though it may be, that is extremely intense. More than any other passage in Goffman, perhaps, this one takes us on a jolting roller-coaster ride through all three steps of the LGS: the imagination of the others’ view of self, the imagined judgment of the other of self, and, with powerful impact, the actual, not imagined feeling about self that is the result. For Goffman’s actors, social interaction, if not a vale of embarrassment, is a slippery slope because of the constant anticipation of the possibility of embarrassment or its even more painful variants.

At first sight, one would think that reference to so many different vernacular words and phrases was simply a flaw, pure and simple. But it may be that it was also a strength, in that the inclusion of all these cognates would enable both Goffman and his readers to understand the purview, and indeed, the central meaning of the
concept of embarrassment. The work of Zerubavel (2006) on collective denial seems to illustrate this point (see below).

**Embarrassment and Mutual Awareness: Grounding Two Concepts**

Although Goffman casually used metaphors for mutual awareness (e.g., the phrase “mystic union.”), he also used many terms and phrases that refer to awareness structures more directly. The least direct one is his elaborate and complex definition of “being in a state of talk.” Since his definition requires an entire page of text, I will not repeat it all here. Suffice to know that it contains phrases that imply mutual awareness: “…An understanding will prevail [among the speakers] as to how long and how frequently each speaker is to hold the floor…” (1967: 35; a similar formulation occurs earlier, on p. 34).

A definition that comes closer to explicitly describing intersubjective accord (Goffman, 1967):

…A single focus of thought and attention, and a single flow of talk, tends to be maintained and to be legitimated as officially representative of the encounter. (p. 34, emphasis added)

The significance of the phrase “a single focus of thought and attention” becomes more apparent if it is compared to a similar phrase, “joint attention” used by the psychologist Bruner (1983), when he is explaining how an infant learns to become attuned with its caretaker.\(^iv\) The mother, he says, is only trying to teach a new word. She places an object (such as a doll) in her own and the baby’s line of gaze, shakes it to make sure of the baby’s attention, saying “See the pretty DOLLY.” In this situation, the baby is likely to learn not only the meaning of a word, but also, since both parties are looking at the same object, how to have, jointly with the mother “a single focus of thought and attention,” to use Goffman’s phrase.

A more detailed idea of the structure of mutual awareness can be found in Goffman’s (1983) definition of what he called “co-presence.”\(^v\)

When in each other’s presence individuals are admirably placed to share a joint focus of attention [1], perceive that they do so [2], and perceive this perceiving [3] (p. 3, numbers added)

This quote points to three levels of mutual awareness: 1. joint attention (agreement), mutual perception of joint attention, and mutual perception of the mutual perception. In his book on strategy (1969) Goffman at least hints that even higher orders of mutual perception might determine the winner of strategic contests, such as spying and large scale financial transactions, if the stakes are high enough.

By implication, Goffman’s model of mutual awareness is recursive: I know that you know that I know, etc. This model, like his model of context, implies a bracket assembly. Such a recursive model might be used to provide a single clear meaning to the otherwise ambiguous concept of solidarity. Degrees of alienation can be then defined in terms of a complex typology that would involve kinds of understanding, misunderstanding, and lack of understanding at each of the levels of mutual perception. Complex though it would be, this idea can provide single-meaning definitions of solidarity and alienation.

Degree of solidarity would involve the levels of mutual awareness. The highest degree of solidarity would be mutual understanding at all levels of awareness that are
accessed by the two parties. Similarly, alienation would concern the absence of understanding at one or more levels that one of the parties accesses. This model leads to the counter-intuitive possibility that lack of mutual awareness at one of the higher levels would be more alienated than understanding or agreement at the first level. This idea will be explored further in reviewing the concept of collective denial, below.

Beginning in the 80’s, there began to be an expanding literature on what is called “mutual knowledge” in philosophy and economics (Clark and Marshall 1881; Sperber and Wilson 1986; Clark and Brennan, 1996). These ventures do not mention the earlier explorations of the looking-glass. They also have a boogie man; the possibility that they call infinite regression. The idea of cascades of mutual mind reading, I know that you know that I know..., seems to panic the authors. As Goffman implied, however, the number of recursive levels of mutual awareness is surely an empirical problem, not a conceptual one.

A conceptual definition of mutual awareness is as far as Goffman goes in attempting to explicate this idea; he didn’t provide objective indicators. Perhaps Goffman was uncomfortable about flatly stating and following up an idea that is anathema in individualistic modern societies, that at least temporarily, we can all become “members one of another.” Although church members sing this phrase, most would be loath to take its meaning literally, as Cooley and Goffman did.

However, the conceptual model of solidarity offered here can generate operational definitions also. There is already a small research literature on “mind-reading” and other minds (Malle and Hodges 2005) that could be expanded into survey research by asking questions not only about beliefs, but beliefs about other’s beliefs, etc. There is also a beginning literature on estimating shared awareness by using verbal and gestural cues in moment-to-moment recordings of conversation (Lewis 1971; Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1994)

Goffman’s attempt to establish a model of mutual awareness needs further development, however, if it is to be used with respect to more general issue of degrees of social integration (solidarity/alienation continuum). Goffman did only the easy part, solidarity (complete attunement). He didn’t continue to the point of exploring different types and degrees of alienation (failures of attunement): 2. partially attuned (only one error by one party), 3. connected/disconnected: one error by both parties), 4. partially alienated: one error by one party, two errors by the other, and 5. complete isolation (two errors by both parties). This model is outlined in “Awareness Structures: Solidarity and alienation as concepts” (Article # 55a, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/).

A Concept of Embarrassment?

In the case of the other idea discussed here, embarrassment, Goffman (1967) was not content to give only a conceptual definition, but also followed up, offering elements of an operational definition:

An individual may recognize extreme embarrassment in others and even in himself by the objective signs of emotional disturbance: blushing, fumbling, stuttering, an unusually low- or high-pitched voice, quavering speech or breaking of the voice, sweating, blanching, blinking, tremor of the hand, hesitating or vacillating movement, absentmindedness, and malapropisms. As Mark Baldwin remarked about shyness, there may be “a lowering of the eyes, bowing of the head, putting of hands behind the back, nervous fingerling of the clothing or twisting of the fingers together, and stammering,
with some incoherence of idea as expressed in speech." There are also symptoms of a subjective kind: constriction of the diaphragm, a feeling of wobbliness, consciousness of strained and unnatural gestures, a dazed sensation, dryness of the mouth, and tenseness of the muscles. In cases of mild discomfort, these visible and invisible flusterings occur but in less perceptible form. (p. 97, emphasis added)

This definition links an interior emotion with surface observables. With his usual uncanny instinct, in the last sentence he even hints at the need for further elaboration of the operational definition: "these visible and invisible flusterings [that accompany embarrassment], but in less perceptible form." This clause seems to point toward the development of more elaborate coding systems for the verbal and gestural indicators of shame and embarrassment, such as the one by Retzinger (1991; 1995). Certainly in 1967 and even today, Goffman was ahead of the curve.

Part/Whole Analysis

Perhaps we should imitate Goffman, developing concepts grounded in the details of the reality they are supposed to represent. This issue came up in an interview with the novelist Muriel Spark concerning her novel The Bachelors. The novel describes the lives of bachelors of varying ages and stations in life in London in remarkable detail. Ms. Spark, a middle-aged unmarried woman at the time, was asked how she could possibly know so much about such men. Her answer was “A lifetime of combing lint.” By lint, Spark seems to be referring to the detailed particulars of the lives of many people that she had noted. This idea might be as useful in the early stages of science as it seems to be in the writing of novels. As William Blake put it, “... Art and Science cannot exist but in minutely organized particulars.” Goffman’s way was to take initial steps towards organizing particulars.

In one chapter of Richard Lazarus’s last book (1997), he suggests a new approach, at least for him, to the study of emotion. His initial discussion, at least, implies that with respect to emotions, some lint combing might be in order. At the beginning of Chapter 8, he proposes that one might derive a classification of emotions by close study of narratives. He gives one example, a paragraph describing an actual marital quarrel. From this one narrative, he derives four types of anger: inhibited, righteous and sullen anger, and hostility.

Lazarus’s idea of classifying emotions by using narratives seems to be a step forward in this field. Plutchick (2003) has pointed out that although there have been two dozen emotion classifications in English alone, there is next to no agreement among them as to names of the basic emotions or even their number. Perhaps the main reason for this disparity is that each of the classifications is entirely theoretical, with no grounding in actual emotional events, the “thin air” method.

Even though Lazarus has a good idea, he provides only one narrative. In the rest of the chapter he goes on to derive still another theoretical taxonomy for all the major emotions out of thin air, seemingly forgetting his own suggestion about the use of narratives. He proposes many abstract concepts, but employs only one particular, the narrative about the marital quarrel.

For the development of a concept, how many parts as compared to how many wholes? It doesn’t seem likely that there should be more wholes than parts, as in Lazarus’s chapter. More likely, there should be many more parts than wholes, as is the case in Goffman’s work. Using his approach as an example, it is possible to be
explicit about the steps needed in order to ground concepts in concrete particulars, what I have called here “lint combing.”

A weakness in Goffman’s use of this method is that in some cases he resorts to hypothetical situations. Although they help the argument along, hypotheticals have serious drawbacks in science. The most glaring one is that they always lack the ambient details, the minute, seemingly irrelevant particulars that often provide the key. Another fault is that since hypotheticals are imaginary, the author is locked into his or her own head.

Attempts to apply a new concept to concrete instances generate what may be a powerful ally, one’s human intuition. The discipline of examining the extent to which an abstract concept is appropriate to many concrete examples forces one to see both the concept’s strengths and limitations, if only intuitively. To the extent that the concept stands up in this informal testing, one might then have the confidence to proceed with more formal tests.

The 16-th century scholar-poet-scientist Pascal remarked that one can be a pedestrian poet using only intuition, and a pedestrian scientist using only system. He went on to say that to be a creative poet or scientist, one needs to use both resources. The method outlined here is an attempt to follow Pascal’s suggestion.

Perhaps by adding the development of grounded concepts to the grounded theory approach, one might have the best of both worlds. The close examination of particular instances of some of the awareness contexts in Glaser and Strauss’s study (1965) might have been an incentive to think in terms of the much more general concepts of solidarity and alienation. As Goffman’s work on mutual awareness suggests, the more concrete the observations, the more likely the relevance of general concepts will be recognized.

For brevity, only one example will be used to illustrate how the use of the most general concepts can widen the horizon of empirical studies. Research on awareness contexts in dying could be linked the very large issues of life and death raised by Norbert Elias in his profound discussion of the loneliness of the dying (1984). One might be able to show, for example, the relationship between social networks in the life span and in dying: solidarity relationships in life usually lead to connectedness with others in dying, and alienated relationships in life are linked to lonely deaths.

**Collective Denial**

At this time there seems to have been only one study that illustrates some of the basic components in the method that has been outlined here. Zerubal (2006), who was Goffman’s student, has provided a book-length analysis the idea of collective denial. His study has two basic components. The first is the discussion of words and phrases (cognates) that are equivalent to, or at least clearly related to, the idea of collective denial: e.g., the elephant in the room, collective silence, casting a blind eye, etc. Since he also uses a technical term himself (intersubjectivity) closely related to the idea of awareness structures, his approach hints at including not only vernacular cognates, but also technical ones.

The other component is his review of a very large array of studies, and in some cases, concrete examples, that involve collective denial. One type of study that he reviews is that of families in which incest has been committed but kept silent for many years. From some of these studies he quotes commentary by family members, giving a sense not only of the general issue (collective denial), but also the particulars of
some of the cases. Similarly, he reviews many studies, mostly concerning Germany, of the collective denial of the Holocaust.

The extended nature of Zerubavel’s review of vernacular cognates makes his study somewhat unique. His analysis of ordinary language usage is so exhaustive that it takes of a sizable portion of the text. The recounting of so many words and phrases that refer to collective denial has a lapidary effect; it marshals layer after layer of cognates. It doesn’t take long for the reader to realize that there is a whole language for referring to collective silence.

However, for future usage, a more efficient procedure might be to give a full analysis for only the most common cognates, such as the three mentioned above. After that, it might be sufficient to simply provide a list of cognates in the appendix. This is approach that Retzinger used (1995) in her treatment of anger and to shame cognates.

There is a second difference between Retzinger’s method and Zerubavel’s. Most of Retzinger’s book involves analysis of moment-to-moment discourse, so actual instances of the occurrence of emotion cognates occur repeatedly. Her analysis serves to provide informal support for the inclusion of words as cognates on her lists.

Zerubavel’s book, however, makes much less use of word-by-word analysis, so most of the empirical instances he provides or cites do not provide support for his naming of cognates. The instances referred to in his book are mostly citations, even though excerpts and in some cases, discourse is provided.

Zerubavel’s book follows much more closely to Goffman’s usage that Retzinger’s does. Goffman didn’t directly analyze vernacular cognates, as both Zerubavel and Retzinger do. Nor did he concern himself with comparing technical cognates; in fact he used a wide variety of terms for awareness structures or closely related ideas without noting the links, as mentioned above.

Yet Zerubavel’s book is a considerable advance over Goffman. As already noted, Zerubavel tends to use a single term linked to awareness structures, intersubjectivity. He singles out this term because it involves “the very essence of sociality.” Further, he cites (p. 82, fn. 13) his own extended discussions of this term in one of his earlier books (Zerubavel 1997). Perhaps the next step would be to compare the technical term that one uses to refer to awareness structures with those that others have used. Goffman also left this step out. He didn’t even relate his own terms for various types of awareness structures to each other, much less to those used by other authors.

Perhaps there is one more step needed in Zerubavel’s analysis of collective denial, to locate it in the spectrum of types of awareness structures. For brevity, I will illustrate this type of analysis with respect to a single situation, the family that is silent about the child’s molest by one of the parents.

There is agreement at the first level regarding the molest: all three persons know it to be a fact. At the second and higher levels, however, there is uncertainty. Each person thinks that at least one of the other two knows, but since all are silent, one or more of the persons may doubt themselves in a fundamental way. If such an outrageous act is not acknowledged, perhaps it didn’t really happen. In this way, the awareness structure of collective denial leads not only to alienation in the form of isolation between the three persons, but also the possibility of alienation from self within one or more of the persons, self-estrangement. The giving up of real memories and other vital parts of the self is the core component of what might be called engulfment, characteristic of dysfunctional families, organizations, ethnic groups, and nations.
A somewhat more complex but still alienated structure of awareness would be involved if all three were certain at the first level, as above, but one or two of the three were certain at the second level, knowing that one of the other persons knows. The structure typically occurs in what is called a triangle: two persons allied against a third. Suppose the child privately reveals to the mother that she was molested, and the mother acknowledges that she already knew it. This might decrease the alienation between mother and child. However, if they don’t reveal their knowledge to the father, then collective silence would continue, and so alienation within the triangle.

If, however, the two reveal that they know to the father and to others, and both he and they acknowledges the molest, then the three members of group still might not be happy, but they would no longer be alienated with respect to the molest. Having to bear an unbearable secret no longer, the healing of the relationship might begin between mother and daughter, and given appropriate kind of responses by the father and others outside the family, between the mother, the daughter and the father.

Conclusion

This essay has proposed a method of grounding concepts in relevant cognates and examples, as Goffman tried to do in the case of mutual awareness and embarrassment. The strength of this method is that it avoids the thin air option, on the one hand, and also premature commitment to a particular theory, method or data, on the other. Instead it draws on diverse examples, helping to develop concepts that might have some palpable relationship to the human condition. The first two steps in the grounding of a concept would seem to involve:

1. List of the relationship of the new concept to already existing usage with respect to both vernacular and technical words and phrases.
2. Exploration of concrete examples, to show the plausibility and limitations of the new concept.

The listing of cognates might have the advantage of showing the interrelationship of studies that use different terms, and also make studies accessible to the public. There are many different disciplines now involved in the study of what I have called awareness structures here, but different terms are in use.

Psychologists, for example, use the tropes of mind reading and other minds. The phrase used in philosophy is also other minds or intersubjectivity, in psychiatry, also intersubjectivity or attunement, and in economics, “mutual knowledge.” The only group that refers to the important theoretical work on this topic by C. H. Cooley and G. H. Mead is the one made up of sociological social psychologists. It is a Tower of Babel. Work in one discipline seldom refers to work in other disciplines. The reading public, of course, is shut out by all of the disciplinary worlds.

Since the grounding of concepts in this way takes a great deal of time and effort, and is indirect and roundabout, there must be a better way. Until one is found, however, this method might be helpful along with the other more established methods.
Endnotes

i This essay expands one of the themes of Scheff 2006. The statements in boldface represent the central thesis in four different forms: 1. Title. 2. Abstract. 3. Text. 4. Conclusion. Through repetition, I try to avoid one of the flaws in much of Goffman’s work, the absence of an explicitly named central thesis. I am indebted to Bengt Starrin for suggesting the title of this paper.

ii Chapter 5 (Scheff 2006).

iii Chapter 3 (Scheff 2006).

iv Attunement is the term used by Stern (1977) in his studies of infant-caretaker relationships. It is difficult to choose a name for the state of mutual awareness in English, since our language establishes individuals as the fundamental unit, rather than pairs or larger groups.

v Luiz Baptista called this quotation to my attention. As indicated earlier, the idea of levels of mutual awareness plays a prominent role in my discussion (2006, Chapter 5) of context and consensus.

vi Bengt Starrin called this chapter to my attention.

vii Although narratives are much better than thin air, they are still quite abstract, being verbal descriptions. Goffman went quite far with verbal texts. However, in developing concepts, especially emotion and relation concepts, verbatim recordings of discourse may ultimately be needed. Such records make available the verbal and non-verbal indicators of emotion and connectedness, the minute particulars.

References


Citation

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“Rose’s Gloss”: Considerations of Natural Sociology and Ethnography in Practice  

Abstract  
This paper explores the nature and use of “Rose’s Gloss” for ethnographic research. Rose’s Gloss is a technique – credited to Edward Rose, late of the University of Colorado at Boulder – for eliciting information from members of society without imposing methodologically ironic categories onto members’ responses. This facilitates what Rose called “natural” (people’s own) rather than “professional” (stipulative) sociology, which is the distinctive feature of the “Ethno-Inquiries” approach to social research that he pioneered. A pilgrimage to Jerusalem provided unexpected opportunities to document the worded nature of social life. The pilgrimage demonstrates how Rose’s Gloss can be used as an ethnographic practice to pass as a competent participant in study sites.  

Keywords  
Description; Edward Rose; Ethno-Inquiries; Ethnomethodology; Fieldnotes; Holy Land; Jerusalem; Observation; Pilgrimage; Passing  

Introduction  
In this paper I do not wish to present an ethnographic problem, namely an outline of a theoretical basis for ethnography, would that be desirable, feasible or at all possible (Sharrock and Anderson, 1982). Rather than subordinating the task of ethnography to the art of writing, I shall be taking “ethnography” at its etymological meaning—the description of people (ethnos people and graphia description). I shall outline analyses derived from “being there” and “walking by”; in other words, being within a locality, or witnessing a scene, which is a perspicuous setting or event for ethnographic description, providing “ethnographic slices” (Richman, 1999) from an organized pilgrimage to Jerusalem.  

Vignettes form the basis of ethnographic description, from my happening to be there or be walking by. Further, these sites and sights highlighted culturally located identities: settings were “identity rich” in that those relevant categories were occasioned by location and activities. These vignettes are connected through the work of Edward L. Rose: at the time of this pilgrimage, I was beginning my research on Rose’s work. I shall also discuss interrelated themes within Rose’s work, the relevance of Rose’s work for doing ethnography, and the importance of “glossing practices”.  

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Edward Rose’s Forms of Natural Sociology

Whilst this paper constitutes a long-overdue consideration of “Rose’s Gloss”, it would be a misapprehension to regard Rose’s analytic positions as limited to this feature. As suggested elsewhere (Carlin, 1999: 61), Rose’s contributions to sociology and the human sciences are not reducible to “Rose’s Gloss”. Rose is associated with a variety of distinctive forms of inquiry. For example, the diachronic, etymological analysis of ordinary terms and the discipline’s specialist vocabulary; demonstrations of natural-language productions, known as the ‘Small Languages’ inquiires; linguistic ethnography, or ethnography “from within”; forms of narrative analyses maintaining the primacy of people’s first-person accounts at the expense of analysts’ methodologically ironic glosses, rather than the other way around (the traditional approach of “professional”, “qualitative” sociology).

These approaches constitute a radical epistemological position: that natural or ordinary language terms precede professional sociological terms; that professional sociological terms are derived from, adjunctive to and indeed parasitic upon ordinary language terms; that the world is a worded entity, which has been linguistically constituted by people themselves without the overlay of professional sociological terms; that any social analysis must coincide with how people orient to their social world, for to do otherwise would produce methodological irony. This epistemological position may be glossed as the attempt to produce “natural sociology”.

This emphasizes, then, that “natural” sociology is not to be misconstrued as “naturalistic” sociology. For Rose, natural sociology is precisely embedded within and exhibited by members’ own categories. It is located in accounts produced by people in the world, upon which professional sociology, including naturalistic sociology, necessarily relies.

Via discussion of Rose’s epistemological position, what follows is a way of approaching ethnographic practices, from a setting where members’ activities were publicly available, in which observations could be made and presented qua ethnography. Indeed, what “ethnography” consists of – members’ practical activities of seeing, talking, recognizing, and methods of sense-assembly. Prior to ex post facto considerations, for example “thick description” (Geertz, 1975), or the ironies of “writing culture” (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), is the intersubjective nature of the world as we see it as members of society, or “people in the world”. I then proceed to explicate Rose’s Gloss and its implications for doing ethnography.

Bases of Ethnographic Work: Pilgrims in Jerusalem

A way to consider ethnography is illustrated by an organized pilgrimage to the Holy Land. A feature of the observations was the analysis “in flight”; that is, I was engaged in bringing analytic resources to scenes being witnessed at the time. Further, I had been assembling work by Edward Rose, who had visited Manchester in October 1994. As a consequence, I attempted to select such resources that were cognate with Rose’s programme for ethnography, the Ethno-Inquiries.

Rose emphasizes the importance of members’ understandings, how they are realized via their culturally-shared, ordinary language practices, and how they prefigure the competing or methodologically ironic glosses of members’ knowledge in sociologists’ reports. On his last visit to Manchester, Rose (1994a) recalls that earlier that summer he had been sitting at the gates of a children’s learning centre in
Boulder, next to the university. He was waiting for the students to show up for a class he was giving on Field Methods, when “the world walked by”.\textsuperscript{xix}

In Jerusalem I realized what Rose (Rose, oral statement, in Lennard, Psathas and Rose, 1963) had meant regarding the “mythologizing of fieldwork”:

[S]tart with the proposition that a social scientist is an ordinary person, perhaps confronted by special tasks that he may wish to handle in ways that are not ordinary – possibly with special analytical devices... [I]n the course of facing his professional tasks, he relies and constantly relies on much of the equipment that he has as an ordinary person. (p. 35)

Rose first saw this in 1933 when he accompanied his teacher, the anthropologist Paul Radin, conducting “fieldwork” on a Reservation. Rose had watched Radin leaning against a fence, whilst having “an ordinary conversation” in “ordinary language” with one of his “informants”. Thus there was an important realization for Rose: that whatever the written account says, from whatever perspectival approach in which it falls, fieldwork is carried out through language (Watson, 1997).

My status and role were ambivalent – my “credentials” as a pilgrim per se and qua participating/non-participating observer (Gold, 1958). After all, I was on a pilgrimage and had not elected a site in which to “do ethnography”.\textsuperscript{xii} Nevertheless, I engaged in activities that a pilgrim-on-pilgrimage would do, as well as some ordinary activities that an ethnographer-observing-pilgrims-on-pilgrimage would do.

For Rose, social scientists are “prone to take for granted a great deal of what has already been decided by ordinary people in the description of the social scene” (Lennard, Psathas and Rose, 1963: 36). They encounter a previously “well-described scene”. I encountered this well-described scene as any other member would encounter it: a well-described scene in a well-formulated world. Phenomena were amenable to Goffmanian conceptualization (“keying” and “framing” activities as “pilgrimage-type” rather than “touristic” activities) but, in Rose’s terms, I tried to avoid “the Goffmanizing of the world” (quoted in Watson, 1998: 207).

Rose tells us how to proceed with our inquiries, to look for things that are in the world and to listen to the words brought forth by people in the world: “For one thing, the world is largely right here. It’s close to us. And secondly, we have two ... means to get to it: the observation of the world, and the talk about it” (Rose, 1994c). I watched the world from within, and listened to words that were brought forth by people in the world.

Throughout his writings Rose has consistently advocated the re-emplacement of a “natural sociology”, which acknowledges that the corpus of sociological concepts are not its own; rather, we can find the provenances, meanings and uses of sociological concepts in lay, ordinary language. In his foundational paper “The English record of a natural sociology” (Rose, 1960: 193-194, emphasis supplied), Rose argues that:

 [...] notions of society and of persons in society are sociological comprehensions manifest to people themselves involved in a society. Such understandings can be called natural if they freely occur without deliberate professional direction

From the English record we know that people have talked about pilgrims and going on pilgrimages.\textsuperscript{xi} I shall mention how ordinary talk brought forth by people in the world has been concerned with going on pilgrimage.
It was meaningful – as Rose (1994b) says, it was a “meaningful matter” – for pilgrims talking in Jerusalem to distinguish between their being on a pilgrimage as opposed to being on a holiday. The pilgrimage/holiday distinction was generally supplied whenever anyone referred to it as a “holiday”: the celebrant said on the coach towards the airport, “Yes, we’re going on a holiday but it’s a special holiday, a pilgrimage, so there we have a lot of praying to do”. This “sensitized” me to a distinction made by people themselves. As such, when I heard a cognate remark in the hotel near St. Stephen’s Gate, I took a note of it on a napkin in the hotel dining room. The note reads “This hotel is lovely but it’s a pity about the view. Still, we’re on pilgrimage so we with have to put up with some suffering”. (The word “some” was underlined heavily.) Seated at breakfast the following morning, while other diners were selecting from the self-service breakfast bar, a woman opposite confided in me: “When you’re on pilgrimage you should be fasting and being holy: you never know when you’ll next get to eat, so I’m going to save this piece of toast ‘til later!” She giggled. I scribbled on another napkin.

Rose’s Gloss

An accountable feature of occasioned inquiries, something that can be observed or seen and hence be commented or reported upon, is the employment of a highly felicitous information-elicitation device which, in an appendix to a foundational article in Ethnomethodology, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) refer to as “Rose’s Gloss”.

Rose is credited with a practical method of worldly inquiry “that makes deliberate use of the property that definiteness of circumstantial particulars consists of their consequences” (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 366; emphasis supplied). Garfinkel means that the adequacy, veracity or “definiteness” of an utterance or statement embedded within the talk, i.e. a “circumstantial particular”, can be determined by noticing the “consequences” of producing this utterance. Put otherwise, how the respondent treats this utterance, what actions are performed subsequent to its production, for example whether it is confirmed or disconfirmed; its treatment as a “topic initiator” in the sense of its generation of topic; and, retrospectively, what topic it generated. By treating Rose’s first gloss in a sensible and meaningful way, the respondent’s second gloss provides the sense of the thing that Rose was talking about.

Rose explicates the use and usefulness of glosses in inquiries about the world. When a person is “moved to tell” (or makes a remark), then consider this move (or remark) to be a first gloss. This first move, the first gloss, is followed by a second gloss: the second gloss may be produced by an interlocutor, commenting on or replying to the first gloss; or by an ethnographer, talking about the first gloss.

In the draft version of The Werald, Rose (1988) outlines a third gloss in talking about how to proceed in our inquiries, that is, by commenting on the ways in which we can study the world of people and their things – as they are known-in-common by people themselves – through their talk. Rose (1988: 2) enjoins sociologists to:

Have knowledge of the world of people start with and continue to depend on knowledge within that world. Listen then to people telling what they know about themselves. Reflect on what they tell.

Then on your own tell what you make of the talk of people about themselves and their world.
Rose’s Gloss, as brought forth by Garfinkel, approximates to a first gloss. By producing a first gloss on a thing in the world, Rose gains firsthand access to the thing from his expert or consultant on the world. By producing this first gloss on a thing, the world is “made available” to inquiry through people’s talk: Rose hears the world’s authentic, spontaneous and unrehearsed second gloss on the thing. The second gloss “repairs the indexicality” or provides the sense of the first gloss. In the second gloss, Rose hears the world commenting upon itself. The third gloss shows how valuable is the production of a first gloss to obtain the second gloss, the world’s commentary upon itself. Garfinkel (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970) provides a third gloss through his discussion of Rose’s Gloss as an ethnographic technique.

Rose’s Gloss – by its artfulness, ordinariness and simplicity – allows an inquirer to gain access to parts of the world which are not intuitively available to him/herself, such as members’ knowledge of the world. Rose’s Gloss gets people to talk about the world and all its features as people themselves know them, providing for hitherto untapped sources of richly-textured versions of the world without influencing, structuring or organizing talk about the world.\textsuperscript{xiv}

Rose’s Gloss elides a problem associated with interviews: How can an informant be asked a leading question when a question isn’t being asked of them? As Watson (Watson, oral statement, in Rose, 1994d) says,

the big problem of ethnographic interviews is that you tend to get your respondent ‘singing your song’: you set the relevances and he or she has to reply along those relevances. [Rose’s Gloss] at least minimizes that kind of interview interference.

To illustrate Rose’s Gloss, Garfinkel describes an occasion where Rose’s host collects him at the airport of a city with which he is unfamiliar. Whilst driving through the city Rose apparently looks ahead at something, and continues to look at it as the car drives past by turning his head. The “serial arrangement” of these “notable particulars”, namely doing “looking ahead” and doing “watching something go by”, is significant, in that Rose visibly engages in this sequence of activities (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 366). When Rose remarks “It certainly has changed”, he knows that his host will find and understand that the “it” to which Rose refers is the thing that he has been watching – that which Rose observed from the car window.

Garfinkel reports that the reply (the second gloss) to Rose’s remark (the first gloss) (“It certainly has changed”), approximated to “It was ten years before they rebuilt the block after the fire”. Having intersubjectively established the topic of conversation, Rose’s host – and now Rose – understand and know what they are talking about, Rose produces further talk on the topic. Or, as Garfinkel says, “Picking [up the reply Rose] formulates further the concerted, sensible matter that the two parties are making happen as the recognizable, actual, plainly heard specifics in a course of a conversation: ‘You don’t say. What did it cost?’” (All quotes Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 366). In a seminar at the University of Manchester (which was taped and transcribed by this author), Rose challenges the accuracy and provenance of Garfinkel’s version of this incident (however, the analytical power of Garfinkel’s formulation, and of Rose’s Gloss itself, is not diminished).

Rose originally met Garfinkel at a conference in New Mexico. Garfinkel had been highly critical of an article that Rose had published with one of his graduate students about the “Small Languages” project (Rose and Felton, 1955), which Garfinkel regarded as experiments in simulation.\textsuperscript{xv} During the late ‘Fifties and early ‘Sixties, Rose and Garfinkel visited each other frequently: Rose and Garfinkel worked at the University of Colorado at Boulder and the University of California, Los Angeles

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respectively. On one of these occasions, Garfinkel collected Rose at the airport, to drive back to his home in the Palisades. Rose looked out of the window at a place that he thought he recognized.

Rose said to Garfinkel “They sure have made a lot of changes around here lately, haven’t they?” to which Garfinkel confirmed to Rose that changes “around here” had indeed been made and started to talk about them. In Rose’s account of this incident, however, Garfinkel suddenly stopped explaining these changes and accused Rose of “fooling”.

According to Rose (personal communication, July 11, 1996), Garfinkel treated whatever Rose said with suspicion, having recorded a conversation (Garfinkel and Rose, 1958) about Rose’s experiences as a “medium” whilst a graduate student at Berkeley. For Garfinkel, Rose was attempting to stretch his credulity too far if Rose would have him believe that Rose was so familiar with this particular neighbourhood of Hollywood. Garfinkel, however, was not in possession of the knowledge that Rose had in fact lived in that neighbourhood as a small child.

He couldn’t believe that I’d ever seen that place before, and that I’d said ‘They’ve made a lot of changes around here’ just to get him, as a native, to tell me what the ‘truth’ was, and I’d write it down as an ethnographer...

The utility of Rose’s Gloss as an ethnographic technique is questioned by Gumperz and Hymes (1972: 308), who regard the open-endedness of the opening remark, a first gloss, providing for too unpredictable a response, a second gloss, from the respondent. However, their criticism is based upon an intuitive approach to interaction, rather than naturally occurring interaction. Although Garfinkel’s account of Rose’s Gloss is a reconstructed account, it reports an interactional episode that actually happened, not an invented simulation or experiment. As Rose says, Rose’s Gloss is “a natural way to secure the truth” because “whatever [the respondent] would have said would have been the truth ... about that place. Where else would I get a more succinct, more comprehensive truth about that particular place?” (Rose, 1994d).

In 1965, Rose and his research team conducted an ethnographic project on Larimer Street, Denver’s Skid Row district. The supporting documents to the main report, *The Unattached Society* (Rose, 1997a), consist of verbatim transcripts of conversations between Rose and experts on Skid Row. This preservation of the talk allows us to read how Rose, in the course of his inquiries about the world, produces a first gloss or how “to comment is such a way that you induce a natural statement about what it is you’re interested in” (Rose, 1994d). In “A Quiet Strip” (Rose, 1997b), a conversation with Officer Schalbrack from the Denver Police Department, we find the following (Rose, 1997b: 79-80):xvii

S: Each drunk is handled in this manner: if he has a local address, I attempt to send him home first. In most cases he is incapable of taking this advice and if I find him on the street later, I arrest him and put him in jail to sober up or for any other disposition that the judge might make on the thing. That’s one of the problems of the afternoon shift. The next thing that I notice is that each particular shift will have a somewhat different group of people on it. I won’t run into those people on the night shift that I do on the afternoon shift.

R: The afternoon shift is a busy one, is that right?
S: No. The night shift will be the busiest one of the two. And towards the end of the month of the afternoon shift our logged actions will drop down considerably from the beginning.

I also use it for contact with the businessmen on the street, to find out what the current conditions of business are. I find that in periods of poor business they are inclined to complain a great deal more than they do during periods of prosperity.

Rose, wanting the inside story from an expert with insider’s knowledge, produces a first gloss (“The afternoon shift is a busy one, is that right?”) which will eventuate in the establishment of the veracity of the first gloss by attending to the second gloss (“No. The night shift will be the busiest one of the two”), which is followed by further explanation. Later (Rose, 1997b: 83):

R: On this first walk down the Street you stop in at the Wine Cellar, I trust?

S: That’s right.

R: That’s a special sort of bar, it seems to me.

S: Well, you are quite right. There is a large proportion there of homosexuals who hang out in that particular bar.

R: Do they hang out there or just visit?

S: There is a portion that hangs out in there and then there is an even larger portion that come to and from that bar. They have, oh say, half a dozen bars through the downtown areas, like that particular thing there.

In this sequence of talk, Rose uses a first gloss to consult an expert on the Street to uncover what the topic of inquiry should be, what the topic of inquiry actually is. In response to Rose’s gloss, “That’s a special sort of bar, it seems to me”, Schalbrack brings forth and topicalizes the presence of homosexuals on Skid Row. With the establishment and maintenance of this uncovered topic for inquiry, Rose’s subsequent utterances prompt further elaboration of these particulars by Schalbrack (Rose, 1997b: 83 ff.).

So we can see, then, that Rose’s Gloss unproblematically occasions the revelation of certainties, of truths or “actualities” of things and the histories of things in the world. It also realizes the use of members’ categories, rather than analytically imposed categories. Without structuring or organizing, without determining what is brought forth into the world, Rose’s Gloss helps the inquirer avoid some of the difficulties attendant with ethnographic interviews. As Rose (1988: 262) goes on to say:

Then make the inquiries. Go see what is shown. Go hear what is known by the world that is so wise.

As has always been done, make sense on your own behalf of what is shown and told. Find and give back what you hear as the world’s own wisdom and, when you can, give back just a bit more of your own.

I used Rose’s Gloss in the work of “passing” as a bona fide pilgrim. In Jerusalem, however, the incidence of my “passing” was not ubiquitous, as with Agnes (Garfinkel, 1967) or the pass-Whites of Colander (Watson, 1970). Moreover,
the “risks of exposure” were potentially but minimally embarrassing rather than potentially damning (MacIver and Page, 1950: 402). Some conversations were awkward but not consequential. That is, on the interactional level there was some discomfiture, though this was not on the level of stigma found elsewhere.

Thus I noted the first occasion when I replied to the question (variously asked by pilgrims in the party) “How are you finding the pilgrimage Andrew?” with “Absolutely amazing” and “I’ve seen some things I never thought I’d ever see”, or something along those lines. The response was unexpected. I was both surprised and relieved when my interlocutor said that he “knew just what I meant” and proceeded to tell me how he had felt on his first visit to the Holy Land – visiting places which were until then “obscure” words in the Bible.

Was that all there was to it? Just mumble something like “awesome”? No: it was the expression of being awestruck, of being moved in some way; it was the knowledge that pilgrims would take it for granted that I would be talking about a site of pilgrimage – why else would I be there on pilgrimage in the first place? – and possibly that I too would take it for granted that they were alluding to sites of pilgrimage.

Such encounters, or “escapes” from being branded as a fraud on a holiday to Israel not an inter-parish pilgrimage to the Holy Land, became easier to manage. Like Agnes (Garfinkel, 1967), I learned how to limit the danger of being exposed. Pilgrims might have inferred that I was talking about this or that significant place, and I relied upon their inferring a religious reference by saying something without being explicit about what particular things to which I was referring.

In Rose’s terms, producing a remark such as “I’ve seen some amazing things...” provides a first gloss. The second gloss, produced by my interlocutor, provides the sense of the first gloss. Furthermore, I produce this gloss (“I’ve seen some amazing things...”) because I am attempting to pass as a pilgrim. Rose’s Gloss thus serves “ethnographic’ work by minimizing the tendency to provide limits or relevances for answers, as interviewing does, and by assisting in the maintenance of place as a bona fide participant (Goffman, 1989).

Conclusion

In this paper I have outlined some of Edward Rose’s contributions to ethnographic practices. These considerations have been attuned to glossing and passing, as members’ practices in the service of participant observation, and how these were affected as an occasioned inquiry during a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

These settings – sites and sights in Jerusalem – are furnished as examples of the protean resources of ethnographic work. When making fieldnotes we have to be careful to separate out observations, how we defined situations, and analytic comments. Hence, when we return to our fieldnotes (each evening when writing notes up, or when we approach the corpus of notes) we are clear about the status of individual items within the notes.

Nevertheless, the ethnographer is involved in making observations and making sense of observations, prior to the involvement of writing up research and providing an analytic gloss (or perspectival “spin”) on observations. Rather than displacing the phenomenon through concentrating on writing about conventions and cultures via the analytic attitude (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), explicative ethnography requires attention to how ordinary sense is made of settings as constitutive of analytic or conceptual sense. It is recognition that the observer is a member of the self-same
setting being studied (Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979: 223) and uses the same (ordinary natural language) methods of sense-assembly as a setting’s cohort.

Endnotes

i The textual presentation of identities – the provision of adumbrated glosses of people’s categorial incumbency – risks the stipulation of identities that is artefactual and removed from the phenomenon of description. Pilgrims are not “reducible” to pilgrims, for example. See Schenkein (1978).

ii To such an extent that subsequent etymological analyses of sociological concepts, which exclude Rose’s work, are seen to contain a “bibliographic silence” (Carlin, 2004).

iii On the importance of the “Small Languages” project, see a review of the final project report (Rose, 1967) that discusses its sphere of relevance to anthropology (Birdwhistell, 1968). For detailed analysis of the “Small Languages” project, see Slack (2000).

iv Particularly The Unattached Society (Rose, 1997a) and its appendices; for bibliographic references, see Carlin (1999).

v This trend in Rose’s work is seen especially in his applied sociology and telecommunications evaluations (Carlin, 1999), and has been used as a successful method of eliciting information by his students, including Sam Burns, Jon Driessen, Charles Kaplan, Reyes Ramos, Warren Ten Houten. The epistemological shift of this trend – “making the world available” – emphasises that it is people, rather than discursive disciplines such as anthropology or sociology, who are experts in their own daily affairs, thereby returning the authority of accounts to people themselves instead of the usurping tendency of sociology.

vi For outcomes of this, see Carlin (1999; 2002a).

vii Another feature of analysis “in flight” is to know what analytic resources are available, or to “know the literature” (Becker, 1986). I suggest refinements to Becker’s notion as follows: 1. Knowing the literature so that if you do not know the precise term you are searching for, you know where to find it. So, for example, I knew that I would need to consult the Oxford English Dictionary upon my return from Jerusalem, to pursue etymological considerations (see below); I knew which arguments I needed from Rose’s work, it was a matter of locating them on particular tapes and in particular manuscripts; I knew I would require Sacks’ work on the commentator machine (1963), making inferences (1985) and normal appearances (1972). 2. Knowing the literature is not just a feature of writing up research, or devising a new study and writing a research proposal, but enables you to make “analytic sense” of observations in situ rather than post hoc reconstructions.

viii What Rose (quoted in Carlin, 2002b: 42) sardonically calls “The Great Sociologist”, who, unlike members of society, is able to see what is “really” going on.

ix On the significance of Rose’s formulation for doing sociology, the nature of ethnographic fieldwork, and the link with Membership Categorization Analysis, see Carlin (2003: 78-79).
It was only later – months after our return from the pilgrimage – that I learned of others who had successfully ‘passed’ as bona fide pilgrims.

I did not intentionally search out a phenomenon in the world; rather, these worldly phenomena or topics of inquiry became available to me. In Rose’s terms, I was there when “the world walked by”. This means, however, that I was not prepared for the methods or contingencies of doing ethnography – I had no audio nor video tape-recorder with me, the technology which ushered in what Rose calls “the quiet (or ‘voiced’) revolution” (Rose, 1994b) in ethnography, to preserve retrievable materials for repeatable, exhaustive analysis and confirmation of observations. Rather, I had to rely on my fallible memory whilst inserting and appending marginalia on hymn sheets and tourist guides, before transferring each day’s jottings into a small, spiral-bound notebook in my hotel room.

Ethno-inquirers study the wording of the world by looking at words through history and how they relate to other words. One way of doing this is through the diachronic etymological method of analysis, pioneered by Rose (1960), to explicate the “natural sociology” of pilgrimage. This method makes available how members talk about pilgrimage, rather than how analysts re-describe pilgrimage. The word pilgrim is derived from the Middle English pilegrim, meaning one who journeys to some sacred place as an act of religious devotion. Pilgrimage is derived from a Middle English word, pilegrimage, meaning a journey made, or the act of making a journey by a pilgrim. In 1517, the word could also refer to a place to which a pilgrimage is made. We also know that from 1598, the word pilgrimize was a verb that could mean to play the pilgrim, or to go on pilgrimage.

Holy day is derived from two Old English words, meaning a day set apart for religious observance, usually in commemoration of some sacred person or event; a religious festival. In Old English, holiday (in its uncombined form) referred to a consecrated day, a religious festival. Later, in its combined form, it referred to a day on which work is suspended, a day of recreation or amusement. According to the English Record, then, pilgrims are by definition on holiday – a pilgrimage is a collection or series of holy days. Hence, we can see how being a pilgrim on a pilgrimage is “linguistically constituted”, a worded pilgrimage.

For fuller discussion of “glosses” and “moves”, see Rose and Watson (1998).

On knowledge of the world and procedural knowledge, or “knowledge how”, see Watson and Weinberg (1982).

That is, their friendship began before the term “ethnomethodology” was applied to the inquiries that they were both engaged in.

Legend: R = Rose, S = Schalbrack.

Of course, the first gloss here is an answer to a question. As such, this is a variation of Rose’s gloss.

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Citation

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Career Coupling: Career Making in the Elite World of Musicians and Scientists

Abstract

This article analyzes the interaction between the careers of people working in artistic and intellectual worlds. Two ethnographic studies constitute the basis for the analysis of career building in connection with the careers of other actors. The concept of career coupling represents the process by which professional success is achieved through the forging of relationships between novice and elite actors. Career coupling in the social world of virtuoso musicians is compared to that of career coupling in the social world of elite scientists. It was found that both groups achieve status in a similar fashion by moving through a three-stage process: (1) matching; (2) active collaboration; and, (3) passive collaboration. It is argued that the analysis of career coupling developed here can also be transferred to other professional fields.

Keywords  
Career; Professional strategies; Socialisation; Education of elites; Higher education

Introduction

This paper defines the interaction between the careers of two actors in a particular field (herein illustrated as virtuoso musicians and elite scientists), which I call career coupling. I will use the concept of career in accordance with the interactionist tradition of the Chicago School (E., Hughes, 1971 chap. 14; H.S., Becker and A. Strauss, 1956; H.S. Becker, 1970, chap. 11). This concept defines the course of professional life as a series of stages which differ in the quality of interactions according to the individuals who play a relevant part in their professional environment. I have elaborated on this concept based on the observation of career-making people working in the elite environment and the analysis of their career features. Those features—especially the process of reputation building—are the basis of artists’ and intellectuals’ career constructions (Heinich, 1999; Zieman, 1987). Career coupling is a social process, which concerns the parallel professional routes of two or more actors who cooperate, each in their own specialty, during the time necessary for them to change their rank in their respective professional worlds. By this process, the actors hope to climb in their professional hierarchy. In other words, the career coupling consists of interaction between two or more careers. The
“coupling” means that the actors, who are involved in this process, build their careers jointly. Without this close collaboration they do not evolve in their professional worlds.

Three phases are necessary in order to be able to state that such collaborations are career coupling. The first phase is the matching process, the second is active collaboration, and the third is passive collaboration. After the first stage of matching, when the actors decide to work together, they enter into the phase of active collaboration, which consists of intensive work and a close professional relationship between collaborators. At this stage, the people who belong to their professional milieu learn that the actors are collaborating. The names of the collaborators are joined and thus, their careers are joined too. The actors active in the career coupling process build their reputations together. The success of one became the success of both. In the third stage of career coupling--passive collaboration--the collaborators do not work together intensively, like in the stage of active collaboration. Each person evolves independently, but the development of the ex-collaborator’s career continues to influence the reputation of the partner. A crucial difference between those who collaborate and those who are involved in the process of career coupling is that in the second case after some period of collaboration the reputation of career coupling actors is built together and this reputation is interdependent. The strong bond between the careers of the people involved in the career coupling process constitutes the most important and distinctive criteria for differentiating the career coupling collaborators from those who cooperate to a lesser degree. The association of the names of collaborators among those in the professional milieu is the result of the process of career coupling.

This article is based on the study of the world of artistic elites, which was the primary subject of interest, and on the new fieldwork in the world of scientists--chemists, physicists and biologists--who work together in the same specialization. While the status of a researcher does not pose any particular problems of categorisation, the status of a violin soloist needs explication. I am taking into account the definition formed by Daniel L. Westby (1960: 225): “Soloist status – this term as used here means a self-employed, entrepreneurfree agent--not to the first men of the wind section, who are also referred to as soloists. Such names as Menuhin, Heifetz, Serkin and Rubinstein come immediately to mind.” My work concerns people who are perceived by professionals in their special fields as ones who, by virtue of their occupations, are international elite members. This specificity and the elitist character of this field play an important role in the analysis of the process of career making. In this paper, however, I do not present an exhaustive analysis of careers, and this is why many important aspects of careers, such as turning points, key events, capitalisation of various resources, the system of gratification, et cetera are not discussed here.

In this paper, the presentation of the career coupling process is based on the frequent cases of coupling between a master and her/his apprentice. The relationship between these categories is analysed principally through the aspect of the advisor’s role in a student’s career (Reskin, 1979; Campbell, 2003; Wagner, 2004). This influence is pertinent in the life of the participants who I observed. In the artistic field, the first question all people ask a young virtuoso is, “Who is your professor?” And in the scientists’ world: “Whose lab are you in?” However, the career-coupling process works in both directions. Not only does the master’s career influence the apprentice’s professional life, but also the apprentice’s career interacts with the master’s career.

I believe that this phenomenon concerns also other categories of actors (equivalent in professional hierarchies, position, age, etc.). Given that the results of both studies (in the artistic and scientific worlds) overlap, I am also lead to believe
that the concept developed here can apply to other professional groups although each field has its own peculiar differences.

**Methodology**

This research is based mainly on qualitative methods, which were conducted according to the Chicago School Tradition (Glaser, Strauss, 1968; Hughes, 1996; Konecki, 2000) and particularly on active observation (Peretz, 1998), including periods of participant observation in the world of virtuosos, observations in laboratories and more than one hundred formal semi-open interviews concentrating on the biographies of my respondents (seventy percent of the interviews were conducted with actors in the soloists’ social world and thirty percent with the scientific researchers). My research was carried out in seven different countries: France, Poland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada and the USA. Nevertheless, this activity was very dispersed in numerous foreign countries, but because of the small population of elite circles (soloists’ teachers and students and the scientists working in laboratories of the same specialization), these milieus have a very high level of inter-acquaintance. The actors easily recognize each other and can very quickly place one another in their respective worlds.

In my fieldwork, I have observed the lives of ninety violinists and I have had contact with about thirty parents of young virtuosos. I have collected data on the activity of more than twenty violin teachers. In addition, I have done interviews with the violinmakers and concert organisers. I have also established good relationships with twenty researchers working in bio-chemical physics laboratories. I have done interviews with scientific conference organizers and merchandisers of scientific equipment. I have supplemented the data with biographical books about celebrities from the world of violin and worlds of physics, chemistry and biology. For eight years, I have used the method of participant observation and played different roles: a young virtuoso’s relative, a translator, a concert organizer, a member of the association for young talents, host family during the time of violin competitions, a guide for people taking part in a scientific conference, and a sociologist.

I will divide my article into three parts. The first part is a short comparison of the characteristics of the worlds of the artistic and scientific elites. The aim of this comparison is to show that the functioning of the elite milieus of these two worlds is similar. The second part is a presentation of the stages of careers that concern two major categories in my research: teachers and students from artistic and scientific fields. Detailed information on their professional routes allows me to more completely explain the process of career coupling, the analysis of which constitutes the last part of my paper.

**The World of Soloists – The World of Scientists**

**Literature Review**

Studies of musicians’ work are principally concerned with the musicians who work in ensembles, especially orchestra musicians (Faulkner, 1983; Gilmore, 1987; Ravet and Coulangeon, 2003) or jazz musicians (Becker, 1963; Coulangeon, 1999; Buscatto, 2003). If the literature about musicians is extensive, to my knowledge it does not include sociological publications concerning the soloists’ class. The perception of a soloist’s career being such an individual and unique trajectory and the exclusiveness of the soloists’ world could constitute two major obstacles for a
fieldworker. The lack of research on artistic elites is in contrast with the richness of work connected with the elites of the intellectual world, and particularly about scientists (chemists, physicists and biologists). Their careers were and are the subject of many studies. The most helpful studies in my analysis were those which concern the socialization of the scientists’ students (Traweek, 1988; Delamont & Atkinson, 2001; Campbell, 2003), the specialisation and modification of scientists careers (Ziman, 1987), the impact of rapid discovery upon the scientist's career (Reif & Strauss, 1965) and the relation between age and scientific performance (Cole, 1979). The careers of the scientific elite, even the winners of the Nobel Prize, have constituted the subject of the social research done in this area (Moulin, 1955, Zukermann, 1977; Merton, 1973; Friedman, 2001). Combining the above-mentioned findings with my ethnographical research, I can compare the main characteristics of both fields.

### Evolution of Professional Activity

In the world of science, the progress of the last few years has provoked enormous changes in the organisation of the work of scientists. The most important features are the growing sizes of research teams, the increase of industry-based collaboration (Latour, 1989), and the introduction of new work practices such as the “demo” (Rosenthal, 2001). In contrast, in the world of soloists, the organisation of everyday work has remained the same as in the times of Niccolo Paganini in the 19th century. Recording is the only technique that has introduced any modification in instrumental practices. The virtuoso performers need to practice nearly eight hours a day in order to maintain their technique level.

### Evaluation of Artistic or Intellectual Activity

A common feature, which seems to constitute a major difference between the two worlds, is the problem of evaluation. Artistic education is based on subjective judgement and relative evaluation, but according to Robert Campbell (2003: 898), contrary to the popular view of the rational and objective nature of science itself, “science education is an intersubjective accomplishment, arising out of a good deal of trial, error and negotiation among faculty and students”. Pierre Joliot, professor of College de France and director of the laboratory of bio-physical-chemistry, remarks in his book that, “Evaluation of a creative research sets the same problems as evaluation of all forms of artistic expression” (Joliot, 2001: 61).

**Passion – Work- Vocation**

Both worlds have a number of features in common, such as a passion for the profession, which most scientists and virtuosos mention spontaneously in interviews. They consider passion to be the origin of their creativity, actions and professional decisions. The necessity of having a vocation for their profession and the integration of their private and professional lives, are often spontaneously declared by participants in the two worlds and were mentioned in publications by authors who studied the artistic or intellectual worlds (Becker, 1963; Heinich, 1999; François, 2000).
**Professional Internationalism**

Another characteristic common to both elite fields is the internationalism revealed in many aspects of their lives. Work teams in the laboratory, just as groups of virtuosos (solists’ class), are composed of people of different origins. In addition, the professional activities of the actors take place in various countries. They work, for example, in Russia, then in Germany or Switzerland and after that, they move to the Americas. Such paths are true for musicians as well as for scientists, whose geographical mobility is well-known. They move for long periods of time not only because they move from one laboratory to another or change residence, but also due to short events which give rhythm to their professional lives. The causes of mobility are lectures and meetings for the scientists and master classes, and festivals and virtuoso competitions for the musicians. These meetings are characteristic for both milieus for two reasons. The first reason is that they give opportunities to educate successors. The second reason is that they constitute venues of professional communication within each world, by which the actors state the existence of their world and confirm that they belong to a very narrow elite. These meetings also present these actors with the opportunity of constructing or confirming their reputation, which is fundamental for their career, a topic that will be discussed later.

**The Socialisation of Actors**

Training future generations of the elites is one of the main features of these worlds, and it explains why the two major categories of actors are students and their teachers. It is on the basis of their relationships that we can analyse the phenomenon of career coupling. Before we concentrate on that, I suggest a presentation of the model of the professional routes that occur in each world being examined. It is obvious, however, that each scientific or artistic specialization entails a specific socialization process. The timing of education is different for mathematicians, physicists or sociologists (Cole, 1979). Even within the world of musicians, the education calendar is not the same for a pianist, a violinist or a singer (Wagner, 2004). Socialization also varies from one area to another. In contrast to the socialization in the musical world based on individual teaching, in the scientific world a huge part of the socialization is realized within a team. However, the main features of socialization analyzed here, stemming from the examples of violinist virtuosos and physicists, biologists and chemists, are common.

**Soloists’ Education**

I will analyze the relationship between young virtuosos and a series of different categories of participants from their world. The first stage consists of a very strong cooperation between a professor, a young musician, and musician’s parents. This strong and professional collaboration is possible because more than 9 in 10 students have a parent who is also a musician. The second stage, which I define as “the crisis period,” concerns only the teacher and the young virtuoso without parental control. The relationship between them changes. The young soloist transforms from a docile pupil to a doubting adolescent, who looks up to “the master.” The last stage is liberation from the teacher’s control. This last stage is a modification of the interaction between these two actors. Virtuosos make new ties with other professionals of their world (such as accompanists, conductors, sponsors and...
violinmakers). These persons do not necessarily belong to the network of the teacher, contrary to the first and second stage of the process of virtuoso training. Young soloists build their own network of support (Gilmore, 1990: 149). Without these relationships, access to the soloist market is impossible. This access is determined by a sequence of different and complex selections (Wagner, 2004). One of the tools to select soloists is competition. The members of the competition’s jury choose performers to win soloist slots. Only such winners are in a position to become soloists, but the selections of winners are open to criticism within the soloists’ milieu. The difficulties of assessing artistic performance, in addition to the pushing of supporting networks, make the selection of winners (the “best” virtuosos) very difficult. As one 18-year-old violinist, born in Eastern Europe and living in the EU, suggests in an interview after an international competition:

I don’t know what to think and what to do. Look at that! They all (members of the jury) said different things: the first one liked Bach, but not Paganini, the second, just the opposite. The third liked Beethoven and he shot me down for my virtuoso piece, and the last said that I played my virtuoso piece excellently. He said he had never before heard such a good performance, but on the contrary, Beethoven was terrible. He said that I had many problems with intonation. And in this manner, they justified my failure. I do not know what to think because I heard other competitors, who passed the first stage and I am sure that they are much worse that I was. OK! They (the jury) were unanimous in two things: that I had a big talent and a bad coach. And look! (He shows me four business cards). They all invited me to join their classes and to work with them!

The world of the violin virtuoso is highly competitive, and the young virtuosos are the subjects of permanent selection throughout their educations. It takes more than 15 years for a soloist to be trained. The first contact with the professional world takes place with the introduction into the concert market at the age of about 4 or 5. At 18 to 25, they acquire full access to the adult concert market, which corresponds to the “midtown” in the “subworld of concert organisation” in Samuel Gilmore’s analysis of organization of the concert world (Gilmore, 1987).

Scientists’ Education

As far as the training of scientists (biologists, chemists and physicists) is concerned, I refer to my own fieldwork data and mainly to the findings of Robert Campbell (2003) and Sara Delamont and Paul Atkinson (2001). In accordance with their articles, I distinguish three stages, which are determined by the students’ approach to the knowledge they must acquire. The first stage is the acquisition of theoretical knowledge during graduate studies. The second stage involves the acquisition of “bench work” craft during the period of doing their PhD. The third stage, which is postdoctoral, consists of not only acquiring the skill of writing papers and making oral communication, but most importantly, acquiring the skill of translating personal doubts about technical failure into the usual troubles of routine scientific work. Young researchers realize their three stages of socialisation between the age of 18 and 32, and the training of scientists takes from twelve to fifteen years (Traweek, 1988).
Elite socialization

Despite the fact that those two training stages of education do not rely on similar criteria, major similarities can be pointed out by comparing both training paths. In both worlds, numerous factors make socialisation a very important element for acquiring professional competence. One of them, and the most important one, is the necessity of transmitting tacit knowledge, which is a crucial component of both scientific and artistic works. This kind of knowledge can only be taught through personal contact with a practitioner--through oral culture, trial-and-error and practical examples. What plays a great role in this socialisation process is the strong projection of “heroes,” which are transmitted by the teacher. Each domain has its own “heroes.” For the scientists, they are Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, and famous members of Joliot-Curie family, and for violinists, David Oistrach, Yehudi Menuhin, Isaak Stern, Maxim Vengerov or Vadim Repin. This phenomenon of “professional idols” is described by Joseph Hermanowicz (1998) for science and Robert Faulkner (1983), and Izabela Wagner (2006) for musicians. These authors show the consequences of projections, such as the “awakening” of a great professional ambition, which is indispensable to support the efforts of all categories of actors who are responsible for the transformation of a young student into a professional. Another consequence of the power of “idols” is the phenomenon of “comparative failure.” Students must readjust their goals and transform the ambition for greatness (for example winning the Nobel Prize or the Indiana Violin Competition and playing recital in the Carnegie Hall) into more realistic objectives, such as working on a very good team on interesting projects and making important discoveries, or playing solo or in a chamber ensemble in the mid-level concerts. The difference between both fields lies in the age at which the actor must accomplish such adjustments: for scientists it is after they are thirty and before they are forty, and for the violinists, it is before the age of twenty. The professional precocity of violin virtuosos develops much earlier than for scientists.

Initiators’ Careers

If socialisation in the two worlds varies with respect to age, the difference disappears when dealing with initiators. For the careers of musicians, I refer to my own fieldwork data, and for the scientists I add the study of John Ziman (1968) to my own results. The careers of the soloists’ professors and academic teachers begin between the ages of 26 to 30. It cannot be said that there is an age limit for being a teacher. In the case of researchers, they do not always have the institutional position of academic teachers, but in their laboratory work, they introduce young student researchers into the world of scientific practice, and this is why I consider this occupation to be teaching as well.

Both paths are analysed here from the point of view of the division of work. I distinguish three stages of their careers. The main occupation in the first phase is based on the central activity of an actor. For a researcher, it is work in the laboratory. For a violin professor, it is teaching pupils. The second stage consists of having been recognized as a good professional in their world and, by consequence, changing the amount of time spent on their principal activity. For a researcher, the new activity consists of management and formal teaching, and this transformation results in a decrease in time spent in laboratory research. For the soloists’ professor, this second stage involves teaching students at a high level and acquiring the status of a member of competition juries. He can also select the future members of this elite. Hence, progressively, the main activity of actors moves from the work which gives the activity
its name, (teaching – teacher, or research – researcher) to management, administrative activities, and the activities associated with being experts in their respective fields. The third stage of a successful route in the milieu of soloists and scientists evolves to almost total withdrawal from the initial activities, so as to assume the role of an expert and policy designer. The actors take strategic positions, for example, in the Ministry of Research, Ministry of Culture or at the university; they organise or preside over conferences, festivals or competitions. All those people who manage to go through the three stages have a “good reputation” in their particular worlds. Particularly in the case of researchers, the reputation crosses the boundaries of their milieu—in the case of Nobel Prize winners, for instance. Sometimes, some of them will keep their first activity: they have their “class of soloists” or “their lab,” but they do not spend very much time in this activity.

The Career Coupling Process

The reciprocity of dependencies

The process of career coupling involves interactions between two types of careers: those of an initiator and of a newcomer. The two categories must work together. For young people it is obvious. Socialization into elite circles is carried out through the education they get from members of the elite. For those of the elite, it is also necessary to collaborate with young people, because their original activity is in part or totality realized by their students. For example, directors of laboratories, busy with maintaining their prestige, need the PhD and post-doc students to carry out experiments (e.g., do bench work) and to come up with news ideas, which the directors use in their papers and speeches. An example is the case of a PhD’s European researcher in a scientific laboratory at an American research university, who collaborated with his professor (also European) on the same project. This experimental work is the subject of papers signed in the first place by the professor who, thanks to his student’s research, developed his career and won grants. The importance of students’ work is not specified with any well-known codes. Most violin soloist teachers are involved in the same process. They do not intensively practice playing the violin (from six to eight hours a day) and the sole results of their professional activity rest in their students’ playing qualities. Thus, the career of a teacher depends on the development of the careers of his/her students. Such dependency is best illustrated by the case of Eastern European violin teachers who immigrated in the 1990s. They struggled to take their best students, who are their “business cards,” to Europe or to the US. Without these “imported star students,” the teachers’ careers would easily collapse. Indeed, these immigrant teachers would have to build up new classes of soloists, just as they would lose their earlier reputation thus moving back to a previous stage in their careers. I frequently observed the same phenomena in the scientific milieu. For example, in one university laboratory, the professor had emigrated from Germany to the US, taking his old university student along. Because of the lack of new researchers in the US, which is a frequent subject of discussion between laboratory directors in the corridors at scientific conferences, the dependence of successful professionals on their young collaborators’ successes, is both relevant and blatant in the world of science. In the opinion of older scientists, we are facing a period of crisis. One of them describes the evolution of the market of physicists in the following words:

Twenty years ago, a young researcher was a white Anglo-Saxon man; after that we had white women. We can say that it was the time of the feminine laboratory; perhaps I exaggerate, but there were many women. After that,
we had the people from Eastern Europe, and now we must import the Asians and Indians. The profession is not interesting for young, talented western students—they become lawyers and executives. Science attracts many people now...we need young people and we have a crisis time.

In contrast to the scientific world, where laboratory directors explain the crucial demand for young people (PhD or post-doc students), in the soloists’ world, professors never show that they are looking for new students, as a soloists’ teacher with a good reputation “must be very busy.” Participant observation of this world enabled me to find out that, despite this attitude, the professors are always ready to hear and assess a new candidate for coupling.

**The three stages of career coupling**

We can distinguish three main stages in this process: matching, active cooperation, and passive collaboration. The “matching process” consists of the selection of collaborators. In the first stage of coupling, the previous reputation of the actors plays an important role in the matching process, according to the studies concerning the artistic world by Robert Faulkner (1983) and Ezra Zuckerman, et al. (2003). A new candidate coming from a famous virtuoso master, a famous soloists’ class or from a university with a good reputation has a better chance of successfully finding a match than an unknown candidate. To optimize the results of cooperation, the skills and the reputations of the two categories of collaborators must be similar, since one of the actors, with a good position in the field, cannot work with an actor who is unknown in the actor’s social world. It is very frequent that each person estimates the potential of a candidate for coupling differently, as in the following example of Gino—a violinist, born in Romania, to a family of musicians of Gypsy origin. He worked with two teachers, whom I interviewed. The first teacher, 55 years old, educated in Moscow, living in France says:

You know, Gino is a Gypsy, and he will become a great musician, but he lacks a head—he has not a great culture; he does not read enough, and he plays only instinctively. It is good for playing Sarasate, but this is all! [...] In addition, he has a very troublesome custom. He forgets to pay me. I am forced to ask, ‘Listen Gino, did your father forget to give you money for the lesson?’ And he responds: ‘Oh, yes, I forgot!’ And he pays me one part, because the father will complete the bill the next time, he says. However, I am sure that his father gives him all the money, but Gino takes a part for himself in the meantime. OK... You know, this is the personality!

A second teacher, who worked with Gino at the same time, says:

Gino is an extremely gifted student—a wonderful talent, and he plays as nobody else the virtuoso pieces! He will learn Mozart too. He will make it, because he makes very good progress.

Hence, matching is a decisive factor in the process of career coupling, in which the expectations of the actors must correspond.

Now, I will present the students’ principal criteria used in making the choice of professor (at the last stage of their education). Some interviews show that the reputation of a teacher plays the most important role in the student’s choice. A 24-year-old violinist, born and educated in Poland and Germany said:

When you are 24, you play on your own! It is not for learning that you go to a teacher, because at 24, you already know how to play. You go to have
the universal key to the stages--the big ones, not the small ones! You have
to make your name in this small world.

Another 24-year-old violinist, educated in the EU and USA said:

I chose this teacher because he is well known in the whole world. OK, I
have very few lessons with her, and this is all very well that she does not
teach me anything new, as far as playing is concerned. However, on my
CV, it is very important. (listing her as the teacher)

The choice of a partner in a professional career is difficult. Pierre Joliot, the
director of the historical laboratory created by Maria Curie-Sklodowska and Pierre
Curie in 1921, writes in his book that the period before engaging in their career
(which, in my analysis corresponds to matching) is very important for young people
because: “it should allow candidates for research positions – and team directors – to
limit the errors of switching (choosing one’s profile) that will have a disastrous
hindering effect throughout their careers. Through the style of research the team
director imposes on his laboratory, the affinities which can exist between him and
young researchers seem to me one of the most essential criteria for this choice”
(Joliot, P., 2001: 202).xx The criteria of choice are numerous, but the following
quotation from a thirty-five-year-old physicist is a good illustration of the first period of
coupling: “I worked with them--for a new laboratory--for a few months. They were
satisfied with me, and I could do my research as I wanted, and we still continue to
work together--we collaborate.” On the other hand, if the two parties are not satisfied
because, for example, the master is too strict and the apprentice expects some
independence, they break their collaboration. This was the case of a researcher, who
had “looked for a good PhD mentor” for more than a year, and as he says, “He was
right,” because after one year of work with a very open and tolerant laboratory
director, he made an internationally important discovery, which was the biggest
discovery of his life.

Graph 1
Active Cooperation

When, after the period of matching, the two categories of actors are satisfied, we can see that the second stage of coupling, which I call “active cooperation,” begins. In order to create favourable conditions for collaboration, the members of each category spend a lot of time together outside their workplace. Valeria A. Hernandez, in his ethnography of French laboratory research, describes this type of strong collaboration between the PhD student and his mentor as an “ideal” relationship, which is desirable to all PhD students—the harmonious collaboration of two people involved in the same passion and working on the same project of research (Hernandez, 2001, chap. 4). Events like conferences or festivals enable the possibility of staying in the same hotel, having meals together (e.g. the “cookie breaks” described by Owen Smith, 2001) or participating in team-building events, such as football matches or concerts. As in the case of some young physicists who might go to a rhythm-'n-blues concert to see the leader of the band, who is their mentor, or the violinist who goes to Church with his professor only for the pleasure of accompanying him and not because of his religious beliefs, the personal and professional lives interact. Professor Lederberg, Nobel Winner of 1958 describes his relationship with Francis Ryan: “He was my mentor at Columbia College, a very important one. It was the first time I had a chance to work very closely with an active scientist, and really understand the actual operations and workings of a scientific career. (...) I took their (professors) courses, and learned a great deal from them, but with none of them did I have very personal relationships, as I did with Francis. I ended up working in his lab and spending more than half of my time that was not occupied with my studies working on Neurospora (a mould) in his lab.”

In the artistic world, a professor can sometimes provide accommodation for his student—this being quite a common behaviour among Eastern European musicians who immigrated in the 20th century. Galamian’s flat in Manhattan is a famous example (Schwartz, 1983). This proximity influences the dynamics of work, which is crucial to the stimulation of results.

The stage of active coupling is a period of constant negotiation between the actors, and sometimes these negotiations are not easy, as suggested by this 19-year-old violin student:

She (the teacher) wanted to play my mother, a little... Yes, I think that it embarrassed me. I did not want her to know where I was at midnight; I hope that she understands this now... But this was natural because she wanted me to work very hard. I can only be grateful to her. This is why I say that she is, at the same time, a tyrant, and that is normal. Yet at the same time, she works with me a lot, and I do not have to pay for all her time. She says that I am her—her means of showing her knowledge. And, we are tied together; we have a common interest, and that is all...

During the stage of active collaboration, each actor constructs their career using the knowledge or abilities of the career-coupling partner. The novice is enriched with the initiator’s knowledge and the initiator yields profit from the performances of his young follower. This valorises and “nourishes” the master.

Coupling of reputations

Through these actions, the actors of the two categories (initiators and students) build their careers together, and their social world quickly knows about their coupling. This
is because of the small size of the elite milieu where all people know each other and everybody knows the position of each actor in their own special field. For example, in the worlds of violin-soloists or bio-computing or cellular genetics specialists, the participants know one another personally or through their productions (e.g., CDs, news from competitions, scientific papers and oral accounts of discovery). In these milieus, the information about the actors and the level and improvement of their work spreads very quickly. This knowledge about them is the basis of their reputation. In the worlds where careers are built through the process of career coupling, Robert Merton’s “Matthew effect” applies to both partners. This extension of the Matthew effect is the consequence of career coupling, in which the reputation is built in reciprocity. People’s reputations begin to be tied to one another as a consequence of their collaboration. As one of the researchers in photosynthesis told me, “theoretically, you must make yourself a name, but in reality, you cannot do this unless you known someone” (in the sense of working with someone who already has a name). An unknown actor becomes recognized by the milieu through a well-known career partner. The extension of reputation does not have only positive effects for the actors because the coupling process can reflect bad reputation, as well as good. In addition, the actors should be attentive to the reputation of their coupling partner, as is suggested by the following example. The conductor of a German orchestra advises a young virtuoso of 20 on her project of intensive collaboration with one teacher, who works with the student from time to time:

You must be careful, because to join his class is dangerous. He has not a very good reputation in Germany, and you will have very much difficulty getting concerts after your education in this class. You will only perhaps win some competitions, where he is in the jury, and that is all. Think about this before you engage in these classes.

**Passive collaboration**

At this stage, when the professional environment recognizes the link between the actors in such a career coupling, they recognize that the acquisition of professional skill and knowledge is accomplished. At this stage, the activities of both actors are less mutually dependent than they were when they were in the period of active collaboration. Therefore, we can conclude that the actors are in the third stage of career coupling, which is called “passive collaboration.” In the case of the previously mentioned pattern of teacher and student interaction, this period would correspond to the introduction of a young professional into the labour market. In this time of both names being paired, young soloists mention their teachers’ names in the personal biographies printed in concert programs or in the media. Teachers include the names of former students in publications and the media. In the world of science, young researchers do not manage their own projects, but they co-sign papers with former teachers and they maintain relations on different occasions. I could observe during conferences, that former PhD students showed they had close relationships with their former tutors, who were at the peak of their careers or retired, and had become “living legends.”
To sum up, careers in the artistic and intellectual worlds are determined by recognition within the milieu and the reputations that are built due to the coupling of actors. The somewhat haphazard nature of finding positive interaction between careers, in the sense of career coupling, can lead to professional failure. The absence of coupling opportunities may even force actors to change occupations. This is what happened to a molecular biologist, who after working in a prestigious laboratory, and having collaborated for a short time with the team of a Nobel Prize winner, had to immigrate for family reasons, and then had to resign from her research job because, in the new country where she had settled, she “did not find a stimulating person to collaborate with, do some creative work with and improve from a scientific point of view.” After three years of work, isolated in her new team, she abandoned her research. Similar examples could also be found among virtuosos.

Synchronization of Career Stages

Not all coupling processes are optimal. For the success of both actors, the stages of both of these categories of careers must be synchronized. This is clearer in the case of virtuosos because their socialization is longer and takes place at an earlier stage in their lives. The following extract of an interview illustrates a bad synchronization of the stages of a young virtuoso and her teachers’ careers:

At six, I came to M.T.’s class and I stayed with him until I was sixteen. He was hard… he had personality, big presence, very strong… and he was overwhelming, and some people could not stand him. Then, I moved to Mrs. B. She is excellent for technical teaching, she is always available, and she spares me a lot of her time, unlike M.T, who is a great violinist, a great musician. I think that his main contribution to my violin education… was a
desire to play...because if you have a teacher of this kind, of this greatness... However, in the day-to-day work, he did not spend enough time with his students; he very often missed lessons... I lost my time... I could have come to Mrs. B. sooner. All I am learning here, I should have acquired before. I do not regret studying with M.T., as I learned a lot. He gave me things Mrs. B. will never be able to give me... However, it is true that I should have studied with her earlier. The best solution would have been to have had them in opposite order.

As this extract suggests, synchronisation in career coupling is of the utmost importance. The novices in the first stage of their occupational life do not need a great master, who is in the last stage of his career, and who is really too busy to teach. In addition, the young actors in the final stage of their socialization process cannot enjoy all opportunities if their career is coupled with a master in the first stage of his career. In the absence of a high reputation, and because of a low position in the milieu, and the haphazardness of powerful networks, the initiator does not introduce the coupling collaborator into the labour market.

**Graph 3**

The synchronization process differs between one field and another. In the case of virtuosos, their education is very long and a musician has many teachers. In addition, because such training is individualized, the relationship between the actors is very strong. Also, as a result of the technical specificity of violin, a change of teacher has a great impact on a virtuoso’s training. Hence, the optimal solution is that a student and a teacher go through the stages of their careers at the same time. This rarely happens and is difficult to be achieved for many reasons.
In the case of scientists, the transition from one teacher to another is not problematic because a major part of their education is completed in large teams. They change specialisation and move from one laboratory to another. Each training stage is completed in a different institution. For them, optimal synchronisation means a good choice of collaborators at each stage of their training. The optimal synchronisation in career coupling involves collaboration between young people, who in the beginning, need an initiator who gives them the technical knowledge necessary for a young person to achieve a professional level of performance. When an adequate level of production is reached, the results of their work can be shown in the milieu, and novices begin to build their reputations. This is why young actors need a person who can help them acquire a strong position in the circle of the elite group. The careers of scientists and virtuosos are built from the first contact with the professional world. Consequently, education is an integral part of their careers (Wagner, 2004).

Conclusion

This paper suggests that career coupling constitutes a fundamental social process employed by professional groups for maintaining social control (especially through the acceptance of newcomers in their milieu and constant evaluation of the work of the members of elite). John Ziman states that the position of scientists in their milieu depends on their reputation, which is “tacit and often ephemeral” (Ziman, 1987: 84). By career coupling, the actors assure their ascension and position in their professional world. In the elitist milieu, career coupling plays the role of building positive expertise and recognition of a high level of skill, because the specificity of knowledge limits the expertise, which is reserved to the few members within the world of the given specialization. In light of the analysis of the career coupling process, the dynamics of building a career in the intellectual and artistic milieus are similar to a mechanism of gearing, which allows actors to move in the professional space. Agents cooperate with each other because they believe that their collaboration will let them approach what they perceive as professional success. This movement is not always upwards, a point that I shall elaborate on in a future article.

Career coupling is also perceptible in other milieus and other types of careers. I will conclude with an example of career coupling between two famous scientists who do not represent the case of a teacher-student relationship. One of them described his own experience of “career coupling” in an interview which I conducted:

My relations with MM were very interesting because he was a man who had this quality, which is very rare nowadays--an interest in people who do not think the same way other people do. (…) He spent his time reading papers of the least known laboratories because, he said, he knew all they did in the big ones. In addition, this is how he came across my paper. (…) In my career, I made… OK, I think that we can consider that ‘a discovery’ which I could not explore and interpret properly. And, he did it. (…) The people (of the milieu) knew that I was connected with MM… I remember that meeting, at a time when people thought that we were the two “lords of scientific research”, and the people were happy and waited for “the battle between the leaders”. The people waited for my reaction after his critique of my discovery, and I found myself in this very unlikely situation that I had to defend his critique and good interpretation of my discovery because my own interpretation was not perfectly correct… (…) With MM, we always had this kind of relationship--a mixture of competition in the positive sense of
the term, and also, on the contrary, from time to time we did things together until he died... and my assessment is that this was the person who made my career in the high sense of the term because he pulled me out of the perfect isolation in which I lay--and he struggled to do it--and finally ... not a bad investment, indeed... I provided him with the basis for his main recognition.

This model of career coupling paves the way for future research. The process of career coupling presented in this paper takes into consideration specific worlds (violin-virtuosos and researchers in biochemistry), and its application to other professional worlds should include the features of each of those worlds. This paper is only concerned with the general outline of career coupling, but this phenomenon also includes competition, breaking off of collaboration, re-coupling, conflicts and the failure of projects – all these processes being able to take place simultaneously. Meanwhile, I continue to examine this articulation between different kinds of career building since the process seems vastly diffused in the professional world. The problem of synchronisation of careers, the simultaneous building of reputation and the interrelation of the two types of careers in the life of the same person (for example, in the world of soloists, the accumulation of the reputation from soloist to teacher, concert organizer or orchestral conductor) and the perception of the coupling process by the actors involved will be the major focus of my future research. This approach to analysing careers in the two professional worlds examined provides a model of career coupling. In this way, we come to a better comprehension of the functioning of professional milieus.

Endnotes

i In accordance with W. Reader (1966), I consider soloist musicians as a professionals group. This position is not shared by the specialists of the professional world, and for example Eliot Freidson (1994: 117-136) states that the features of artists' work do not qualify this group as professionals. The world of artists is huge and in the space of artistic work we can distinguish the people, who work has all the characteristics of professionals. The soloist musicians group constitutes that case. My study shows that: entrance into this milieu is reserved for the people who are accepted by the soloists; the education is realized by the actors who belong with the world of the soloist; the control of the milieu dominates other types of control such as that of state institutions; the soloists group have their own culture. By consequence, I do not to consider the young virtuosos as amateurs (Stebbins, 1992), and their activity as “serious leisure” (Stebbins, 2004). The young virtuosos have the professional diplomas to certify their professional skill and many treat this activity as a source of income (the concert bonus, the competition prizes, and scholarships). The musical training constitutes the main activity of participants (even the virtuoso child spends most of their time on violin practice than on their school studies) and their early career constitutes a large part of their later adult, professional career. All characteristics of adult careers are present in the young virtuosos' careers (Wagner, 2006). Even the young virtuoso performances are considered by professionals from their speciality as “a professional activity.”
The results of my research are concerned only with the world of virtuoso violinists and scientists working at the crossroads between biology, chemistry and physics. That said, I believe this research can be extended to other fields.

Each soloist teacher has her/his “class of soloists.” There are, however, few teachers with an elite reputation. For example, in the USA from 1945 to 1990, according to Boris Schwartz (1983), author of “Great Masters of the Violin,” there were only four famous teachers.

As a consequence, the examples cited in this paper lack information about the circumstances (and places) that accompanied the collection of data. In turn, I am able to preserve the anonymity of the participants.

Paganini was a first violin-virtuoso and his career makes a strong impact on the history of music (see in Penesco 1997: 165-177).

For the problem of evaluation in research, see Callon, Laredo, Mustar (1995).

According to the categories of emigration elaborated by Charles Tilly (1990), who considers the movement of persons who stay in their original network not as an emigration, but a mobility, I consider the actors within the soloists' and scientists' worlds as not part of the ‘emigrant’ category, but rather, part of the ‘mobile professionals.’ They work for time to time in the place of their origin, and they practice their style and organisation of work.

For a complete analysis of virtuoso training see Wagner, 2004.

I. Wagner, PhD dissertation; the data includes the occupation of both parents (not only the fathers) of young European violin students, and the biographies of famous violinists of the 20th century.

I consider these relationships to be “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), which are most important during the period of acquiring a soloist position. Without the sponsoring of theses actors (“good fathers” in the soloists' world), and especially the celebrities of the musician world, young violinists will not be successful in the concert market (Wagner, 2004). In the case of scientists the same phenomenon was described by Reskin (1979), and Hall for physicians (1949).

Campbell quotes the work of Sharon Traweek (1988), who defined the stages involved in the formation of scientists.

For comparative failure in science see Hermanowicz (1998), Campbell (2003), Merton (1996) or Zuckerman (1977), and for music see Faulkner (1983).

The category of the soloists' professor requires further explanation. It is in exceptional circumstances that a soloist who plays a full time concert tour (more than fifty performances per year) can teach regularly at a full professor's position. The most frequent situation is that the soloist teaches the master class sporadically – gives master lessons a few weeks a year and spends the majority of his time playing concerts as a soloist. The majority of teachers who conduct the soloist's class do not regularly play as soloists, because they can not devote enough hours a day for practicing in order to maintain the high level of violin skill. The majority of soloist's professors choose teaching careers.

According to Latour's (1987) research on technology, this kind of activity can be considered as external (with various types of collaborators from outside the laboratory) in contrast to a researcher in the white blouse/gown – in the laboratory.
For an excellent illustration of the activities of a laboratory director, who is in the third stage of his career, see Latour (1989: 373-383).


Corine Lesnes, a US journalist says, “Nearly half of PhD students in the sciences (hard sciences and technical divisions) come from outside the USA, especially from Asia” (French Journal Le Monde, 29 January, 2005, p. 8).

Regarding the impact of famous universities on scientists' careers see Fox (1983: 292-294) and Hermanowicz (1998).

A virtuoso and composer from Spain, well known for virtuoso pieces inspired by Spanish folklore.

Joliot Pierre, (2001); p. 202: "L'organisation de stages de courte durée dans différents laboratoires dès la maîtrise ou lors du diplôme d'études approfondies (DEA) devrait permettre aux candidats chercheurs - et aux directeurs d'équipe - de limiter les erreurs d'aiguillage dont les conséquences néfastes se poursuivront tout au long de leur carrière. A travers le style de recherche que le directeur d'équipe impose à son laboratoire, les affinités qui peuvent exister entre lui et le jeune chercheur me paraissent l'un des critères essentiels de ce choix."


See Schwartz (1983) for A description of Galmian’s activities in US.


According to Latour (1993), this personal recognition is one of the components of the "scientific credibility capital." The others factors are: data, trough, concepts and articles (p. 107: "Ce capital de crédibilité n’est pas réservé à la reconnaissance (symbolique) que les chercheurs peuvent avoir les uns pour les autres (...) mais à l’ensemble de cycle - données, vérités, concepts et articles compris").

See Hermanowicz (1998), chapter two.

For details on the impact of the soloist class on virtuoso careers see Wagner (2004).

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*In Defense of Knowing, In Defense of Doubting: Cicero Engages Totalizing Skepticism, Sensate Materialism, and Pragmatist Realism in Academica*

Whereas contemporary scholars in the social sciences and humanities often envision themselves as exceptionally, if not uniquely attentive to the problematics of human knowing and acting, the competing philosophies of totalizing skepticism, sensate materialism, divine worldviews, and pragmatist realism have a much more enduring presence in Western social thought. Plato (c420-348BCE) introduces a broad array of philosophic standpoints (theological, idealist, skepticist, materialist, and pragmatist) in his texts and Aristotle (c384-322BCE) addresses human knowing and acting in more distinctively secular, pluralist terms. Still, more scholarly considerations of human knowing and acting would be comparatively neglected by Cicero’s time and even more so after his era. Although much overlooked by those in the human sciences, Cicero’s *Academica* re-engages a number of highly consequential issues pertaining to the matter of human knowing and acting. Likewise, whereas Christian theologians often were hostile to heathen (relativist, materialist, pragmatist) philosophic viewpoints, important residues of these approaches would remain part of the Western intellectual tradition though Augustine’s (c354-430 BCE) works. *Academica* is centered on the historically sustained skepticist emphases of Plato’s Academy (c350-50CE) but Cicero’s text also attends to some competing viewpoints that developed along the way. In addition to (1) acknowledging some of the intellectual shifts in Plato’s Academy over three centuries, this statement also (2) provides a pragmatist critique of the totalizing skepticism of the Academics, and (3) illustrates the ways in which Cicero, as a representative and defender of Academic skepticism, deals with critiques pertaining to the problem of human knowing and acting.

Thus, whereas Cicero is best known as a rhetorician and his text is presented as an instance of rhetorical interchange, Cicero’s Academica also may be seen as “a defense of knowing” and “a defense of doubting,” two of the most central features of scholarship.

**Keywords:**

Knowledge; Skepticism; Pragmatism; Realism; Relativism; Symbolic interactionism; Postmodernism; Cicero; Plato’s Academy
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Concepts and Concept Formation: Goffman and Beyond

Abstract: The social and behavioral sciences need distinctive concepts to escape entrapment in cultural assumptions. Currently there are several sources for concepts, but vernacular words are most frequently used. These words are usually ambiguous and may reaffirm the status quo. This essay proposes that a new approach is implied in Goffman’s work. Most of the new terms he invented went undefined. However, he can be seen as struggling in much of his writing to develop two basic components of the “looking-glass self,” awareness structures and embarrassment. His method seems to have involved using many vernacular cognates and close examination of detailed examples of each concept. The implication is that it might be possible to ground concepts by 1. Listing and examining links to vernacular and technical cognates, and 2. Closely exploring many concrete examples. A study of one type of awareness structure, collective denial (Zerubavel 2006), can also be used to illustrate the potential of this method.

Keywords:
Grounded concepts; Erving Goffman; Research methods; Concrete examples; Cognates; Awareness structures; Embarrassment

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“Rose’s Gloss”: Considerations of Natural Sociology and Ethnography in Practice

This paper explores the nature and use of “Rose’s Gloss” for ethnographic research. Rose’s Gloss is a technique – credited to Edward Rose, late of the University of Colorado at Boulder – for eliciting information from members of society without imposing methodologically ironic categories onto members’ responses. This facilitates what Rose called ‘natural’ (people’s own) rather than “professional” (stipulative) sociology, which is the distinctive feature of the “Ethno-Inquiries” approach to social research that he pioneered. A pilgrimage to Jerusalem provided unexpected opportunities to document the worded nature of social life. The pilgrimage demonstrates how Rose’s Gloss can be used as an ethnographic practice to pass as a competent participant in study sites.

Keywords:
Description; Edward Rose; Ethno-Inquiries; Ethnomethodology; Fieldnotes; Holy Land; Jerusalem; Observation; Pilgrimage; Passing
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Career Coupling: Career Making in the Elite World of Musicians and Scientists  

This article analyzes the interaction between the careers of people working in artistic and intellectual worlds. Two ethnographic studies constitute the basis for the analysis of career building in connection with the careers of other actors. The concept of career coupling represents the process by which professional success is achieved through the forging of relationships between novice and elite actors. Career coupling in the social world of virtuoso musicians is compared to that of career coupling in the social world of elite scientists. It was found that both groups achieve status in a similar fashion by moving through a three-stage process: (1) matching; (2) active collaboration; and, (3) passive collaboration. It is argued that the analysis of career coupling developed here can also be transferred to other professional fields.  

Keywords:  
Career; Professional strategies; Socialisation; Education of elites; Higher education
For all sociologists for whom interpretative paradigm and qualitative research methodology are basic perspectives of studying social reality. In order to enable a free flow of information and to integrate the community of qualitative sociologists.

EVERYWHERE ~ EVERY TIME

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