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Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle's Rhetoric

Abstract

In contrast to those who more characteristically approach emotion as an individual realm of experience of more distinctive physiological and/or psychological sorts, this paper addresses emotionality as a socially experienced, linguistically enabled, activity-based process. While conceptually and methodologically situated within contemporary symbolic interactionist thought (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003), this statement is centrally informed by the pragmatist considerations of emotionality that Aristotle (circa 384-322 BCE) develops in Rhetoric. Although barely known to those in the human sciences, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides a great deal of insight into people’s definitions of, and experiences with, a wide array of emotions. Addressing matters of persuasive interchange in political, judicial, and evaluative contexts, Aristotle gives particular attention to the intensification and neutralization of people’s emotional states. This includes (1) anger and calm, (2) friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, and (7) envy and emulation.

Following an introduction to “rhetoric” (as the study of persuasive interchange) and “emotionality,” this paper briefly (1) outlines a pragmatist/interactionist approach to the study of emotionality; (2) considers Aristotle as a sociological pragmatist; (3) locates Aristotle’s work within the context of classical Greek thought; (4) acknowledges the relationship of emotionality and moral identity; and (5) addresses emotionality as a generic social process. Following (6) a more sustained consideration of emotionality within the context of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the paper concludes with (7) a short discussion of the importance of Aristotle’s work for studying emotionality as a realm of human lived experience on a contemporary plane.

Keywords

Emotionality; Theory; Ethnography; Aristotle; Rhetoric; Pragmatism; Interactionism; Persuasion; Negotiated Reality

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Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

It may seem strange to many readers that a 21st century analysis of emotionality would be based so directly and thoroughly on a text from the classical Greek era (circa 700-300 BCE). As well, where-as emotionality is typically envisioned as an internal, primarily individual, physiological, and/or psychological phenomenon, this paper approaches emotionality primarily in community-based, interactive ways. Likewise, although the term “rhetoric” is frequently used in pejorative terms to refer to more superficial persuasive endeavors, this statement recognizes rhetoric as an integral feature of contested reality, as well as human interchange more generally.

Writing as an accomplished scholar in the field, Carroll Izard (2009) has provided an exceptionally thorough overview of the neurobiological and cognitive psychological literature on emotionality. Although there are many points of correspondence between Izard’s statement and the present analysis of emotionality, there are also some important differences that attest to the necessity of approaching the study of emotionality in more sustained pragmatist/interactionist terms. To highlight some of the more consequential differences, I address three matters of particular relevance and then briefly respond to each in turn.

First, although Izard indicates some appreciation of the enabling features of language and the civilizing process for people’s experiences with emotionality, as well as an attentiveness to the developmental flows of people’s experiences with emotionality, it is apparent that the centering point for research in neurobiological and psychologically-oriented research pertains to the causal connections (as factors) between particular neural-biological conditions and researcher observations (and inferences about the emotional experiences) of human subjects.

Second, while acknowledging the problematic matter of defining emotionality, Izard claims that emphasis is and somewhat more remedial (positive, negative emotions and their implications) in its thrust. Although developed prior to the Stets and Turner and the Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman Barrett collections, Thoits’ (1989; 1995) commentaries on the sociological and psychological literature remain notably accurate in that most of the analysis and research on emotionality has remained conceptually structuralist and factor (variable) oriented. While the literature in psychology has become somewhat more attentive to sociological variables (e.g., gender, race, class), much sociological analysis has assumed more of a psychological orientation in developing explanations of emotionality. Despite a general acknowledgment of emotionality as a realm of human lived experience, relatively little attention has been given to pragmatist/social thought or ethnographic inquiry. Relatedly, most research on emotionality in the social sciences neglects the intersubjectivist nature of human knowing and acting, as well as the ways that people as agents actively participate in the developmental flows of community life (also see Blumer 1969; Prus 1996, 2007c; Grills and Prus 2008).

1 Revised version of a paper presented at the conference “Emotions in Everyday Life” (Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Lodz, Poland, June 15-17, 2011). This article has been originally published in Przegląd Socjologiczny (2013).

2 In what follows, I dialogue more directly with Izard’s (2009) statement. However, readers also may be interested in examining the materials on emotionality found in the volumes edited by Stets and Turner (2007) and Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman Barrett (2010). The Stets and Turner volume is a multi-authored, multi-perspective collection of papers that not only examines some physiological, cultural, psychological, and social features of emotionality but also (albeit from a standpoint) considers some specific emotional themes, such as love, anger, sympathy, empathy, and grief. Whereas some of the contributors to this volume would more readily connect with the pragmatist, activity-oriented emphasis that Aristotle represents, as well as his detailed considerations of the ways that people as agents might shape the emotional experiences, definitions of situations, and ensuing lines of action of others, this essentially ‘interactive’ aspect of emotionality is not adequately represented in the Stets and Turner volume. Likewise, given the multitude of approaches represented within, only limited attention is given to ethnographic examinations of emotionality and the sustained quest for concepts of more general, trans-situational processes.

Even though it claims a greater interdisciplinary quality, the Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman Barrett collection of papers is much more physiological and psychological in its...
emotionality is always present and that it is the brain that assigns direction and emphases to the emotionality that human organisms experience.

Third, there is a tendency on the part of physiologically and/or psychologically-oriented behaviorists to invoke the concepts of psychopathology or maladaptation to account for emotional experiences that might be considered inappropriate (i.e., socially undesirable) in some way.

In the first instance, we acknowledge (with Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*) that all animals have capacities for tension (as in states of relaxation and agitation) and that human experiences with emotionality are contingent on a (comparatively developed) species-related neural-biological base. However, with the exception of brain injuries, the centering position in this paper is that emotionality is a socially derived, linguistically enabled, activity-based, interactively engaged process.

Somewhat ironically, these latter matters are most overlooked by those studying emotionality in physiological and/or psychological terms – as also are the ways that people as (knowing, purposive) agents define, make sense of, adjust to, and redefine emotions within the meaningful instances of human group life in which they find themselves.

As well, in contrast to the inferences made by researchers adopting neurobiological or cognitive approaches, our focus is on human lived experience – the ways that people as participants make sense of the situations (emotions included) in which they find themselves as they engage and live through the phenomena at hand.

The inference that the brain gives direction to people's experiences with emotionality represents another major point of divergence. Although it can be agreed that the human neural-physiological system (and some interventions on the part of other people) provides the essential base for human "encounters" with sensation and motion, the acquisition of some language (and the associated access to "the conceptual whatness of the human community") radically transforms the entire matter of human knowing and acting. It is this transformation that is so much neglected in considerations of emotionality on the part of those assuming physiological and psychological approaches. In the quest for factors-oriented explanations, the essential features of human group life and the processes by which humans fit into the particular versions of the "whatness" (i.e., conceptions and related activities pertaining to "what is" and "what is not") of the communities in which they live, act, and know are so centrally neglected.

From a pragmatist/interactionist viewpoint, people's experiences with emotionality are seen as part of a much larger, emergent set of community-based processes, wherein the meanings (and significations thereof) of any and all matters of people's awareness reflect applications of the "whatness" (as in concepts, practices, and productions) of the particular contexts in which instances of human group life take place.

Expressed in other words, there is no duality of the individual and the community, of self and other, or of activity and knowing. These aspects of the human condition exist as developmental flows that cannot be comprehended except in synthetic, adjutive relation to the other.

Ironically, as well, it is only in acquiring some language – in achieving some degree of oneness with the community-based other – in accessing and sharing the reality or operational "whatness" of community life that people develop an awareness of self apart from the other, acting in more knowing (purposive or intentioned) terms, and meaningfully attend to matters of similarity and difference among members of the community.

Even though one encounters a greater attentiveness to "the impact of the group" on people's attitudes and behaviors in the subfield of social psychology in psychology, this literature also (a) is primarily focused on individuals as the central unit of analysis, (b) stresses factors/variables rather than people's interpretations of the situations and (c) generally disregards language and the realism that emerges within groups (as humans intersubjectively experience the "whatness" of community life in conjunction with others), and (d) fails to attend to the emergent, actively constructed nature of people's activities, viewpoints, and interchanges.

Those familiar with the interactionist viewpoint will recognize that this is consistent with a pragmatist approach. From this viewpoint, nothing is inherently good, bad, or meaningful in any other terms. Meaning does not inhere in phenomena – as in materials, sensations, tension, motions, or direction – nor, relatedly, is meaning (or reasoning) "built into the brain." Thus, whereas human physiology provides capacities for various kinds of cognitive processing, "the whatness of meaning" (and associated matters of definition, interpretation, invention, and knowing enactment and adjustment) denotes a group-based symbolization or conceptualization process. Meaning does not inhere in human physiology, but is the product of human group life. Meaning is generated through symbolic interchange, activity, and reflective consideration of the matters to which people attend as co-participants in a linguistically-enabled community.

It also should be noted that the same conceptualizations, methodologies, and limitations associated with physiological and psychological approaches to the study of emotionality also apply to the study of memory. Albeit also physiologically enabled, the "whatness" of memory (like emotionality) is to be understood as a socially achieved process (Prus and only as people acquire language do they develop some conceptions of "the whatness of community life" and it is only within the broader context of community knowing and acting that people acquire conceptions of, and experiences with, emotionality.

From a pragmatist viewpoint, there is no emotionality in the absence of language. All animals may experience tensions, sensations, and the capacity for motion – although with varying abilities to acquire learned patterns of behaviors or habits and/or make other situated adjustments. In the absence of language and the capacity for reflectivity that accompanies the matter of attending to the "whatness" of the human life-worlds at hand, there is no knowing (witting orientations). And, in the absence of knowing, there is nothing to be defined as emotionality. People may assign (or infer) emotionality to pre-linguistic humans and other animals, but they can only do so by analogy (i.e., anthropomorphizing).
2007b) that is integrally and intersubjectively related to people's experiences with emotionality.

Focusing on persuasive interchange as this might be developed in the (a) political, (b) judicial, and (c) morally evaluative contexts in his own time, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provides us with what essentially is a pragmatist or constructionist approach to the study of human relations. Thus, Aristotle attends to the activities, intentions, and strategic adjustments of speakers, the contents and emphases of their speeches, and the roles that people may assume as auditors or judges. Relatedly, he considers speaker preparations, interchanges, and adjustments (as they define and reconsider their situations and reengage their positions and tactics) amidst the positions expressed by others in the setting.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a complex, detailed, and densely compacted statement on influence work. Further, while Aristotle discusses emotionality in more sustained terms in Book II (chapters 2-11 of *Rhetoric*), wherein he establishes the conceptual frame for his fuller analysis of influence work, his considerations of emotionality run through the entire volume. Accordingly, even though Aristotle's analysis of emotionality is just one aspect of his depiction of rhetoric as a humanly engaged phenomenon, his attentiveness to people's emotional experiences is still so substantial that even this aspect of rhetoric can only be partially captured in the present paper.

To better comprehend the ways that speakers may define, invoke, and shape the emotional experiences of their auditors, Aristotle deems it essential that readers understand what emotionality is, the major forms that emotionality assumes in rhetorical contexts, and when and how people experience particular emotional states.

In contrast to those who have approached Aristotle's works as theologians, moralists, logicians, grammararians, rationalist or behaviorist philosophers, or structuralist social scientists, the present analysis assumes a *symbolic interactionist* approach (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003) to the study of human group life. Rooted in American pragmatism and the ethnographic research tradition, interactionism emphasizes the problematic, linguistically-known, multi-perspectival, activity-based, reflective, negotiated, situated, and relational features of community life.

Building on the conceptual and methodological emphases of Chicago-style interactionism (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969) and the broader ethnographic and constructionist traditions, twelve premises or assumptions that inform the present venture are briefly outlined:

1. **Human group life is intersubjective.** Human group life is accomplished (and becomes meaningful) through community-based, linguistic interchange. The ensuing "mutuality or sharedness of reference points" is fundamental to all realms of human knowing and acting.

2. **Human group life is knowingly problematic.** It is through symbol-based references that people begin to distinguish realms of "the known" and (later) "the unknown." Still, the viability of existing conceptions of knowing may be subject to modification as people "test out" their notions of "whatness" as they do things and relate to others.

3. **Human group life is object-oriented.** Denoting anything that can be referenced (observed, referred to, indicated, acted toward, or otherwise knowingly experienced), objects constitute the contextual and operational essence of the humanly known environment.

4. **Human group life is (multiperspectival.** As groups of people engage the world on an ongoing basis, they develop viewpoints, conceptual frameworks, or notions of reality that may differ from those of other groups.

5. **Human group life is reflective.** It is by taking the perspective of the other into account with respect to one's own being that people become "objects unto themselves" (and act accordingly).

6. **Human group life is sensory/embodied and (knowingly) materialized.** Among the realms of humanly knowing "what is" and "what not," people develop an awareness of [the material or physical things] that others in the community recognize. This includes appreciations of the sensory/body/physiological essence of human beings (self and other); acknowledging capacities for stimulation and activity, as well as denoting realms of practical (enacted, embodied) limitation and fragility.

7. **Human group life is activity-based.** The interactionists approach human activity (as in interacting, doing, assessing, and adjusting) as a meaningful, purposeful, formulative endeavor.

8. **Human group life is negotiable.** Because human activity frequently involves direct interactions with others, people may anticipate and strive to influence others, as well as acknowledge and resist the influences of others.

9. **Human group life is relational.** People do things within group contexts; people act mindfully of, and in conjunction with, specific other people.

10. **Human group life is processual.** Human lived experiences (and activities) are viewed in emergent, ongoing, or temporally developed terms.

11. **Human group life takes place in instances.** Group life is best known through the consideration and study of the particular occasions in which people engage things. Conceptions of human experience are developed mindfully of, and tested against, the particular occasions or instances in which people attend to and otherwise act toward things in the humanly known world.

12. **Human group life is historically informed, historically enabled.** As an emergent process that takes place in instances and entails situated adjustments and innovations, human group life builds on earlier group-based conceptions, practices, and productions. This takes place as people accept, resist, and modify aspects of the "whatness" they have come to know from others more generally and through their more particular considerations of subsequent activities (also see Prus 2013:32-33).

Methodologically, a fuller appreciation of these assumptions would require that social scientists...
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Robert Prus

On the Soul (Prus 1996:173-201) and influence work (Prus 1996; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003), the present paper asks if, and in what ways, Aristotle more directly intends that people who accomplish human group life than many who claim to be empiricists, reformers, advocates, and the like. Thus, Plato's speakers are notably attentive to the processes and problematics of organizing and sustaining governing practices across a wide array of social institutions. In addition to the uncertainties and negotiated nature of planning and implementing realms of community life, they are aware of multiple viewpoints, objectives, tactics, adjustments, cooperation, resistance, and the interconnectedness of people's organizational life-worlds.6

Whereas Aristotle is often envisioned as “an objectivist,” he does not reduce human existence and knowing to physical objects, physiology, or sensations. Clearly, Aristotle is attentive to people's biological essences and the things that humans encounter as sensate beings. Further, in conjunction with human capacities for experiencing sensations through touch, sight, sound, smell, and taste, all of which are facilitated by people's capacities for locomotion (mobility) and manipulation (handling), Aristotle (On the Soul, Sense and Sensibilita, On Memory) also directly acknowledges people's abilities to learn things and to remember things in deliberately recollective terms (also see Prus 2007b).

Still, more is involved, and Aristotle not only insists that people are community creatures (political animals) but also that humans are fundamentally dependent on the acquisition of language for knowing about and meaningfully acting toward the sensate world in which they find themselves:7

Attent to (1) the ways in which people make sense of the world in the course of symbolic (linguistic) interchange, (2) the problematic or ambiguous nature of human knowing (and experience), (3) the object-oriented worlds in which humans operate, (4) people's capacities for developing and adopting multiple viewpoints on [objects], (5) people's abilities to take themselves and others into account in engaging [objects], (6) people's sensory-related capacities and linguistically meaningful experiences, (7) the meaningful, formulative, and enabling features of human activity, (8) people's capacities for influencing, acknowledging, and resisting one another, (9) the ways that people take their associates into account in developing their lines of action, (10) the ongoing or emergent features of community life, (11) the ways that people experience and participate in all aspects of community life in the specific “here and now” occasions in which they find themselves “doing things,” and (12) the ongoing flows of community life in each area of human endeavor, even as people linguistically, mindedly, and behaviorally build on, accept, resist, and reconfigure aspects of the “whatness” they have inherited and come to know from others and through their considerations of subsequent activities.

Defining interactionist emphases in terms of these sorts, the present paper asks if, and in what ways, Aristotle's consideration of emotionality might parallel and inform contemporary interactionist analysis of and research on human interactivity. Having identified numerous interactionist and concept-oriented approaches to the study of emotionality, (a) Aristotle's pragmatist emphasis; (b) the linkages of morality and emotionality; and (c) a processual, concept-oriented approach to the study of emotionality.

Aristotle's Pragmatist Emphasis

Whereas both Plato and Aristotle openly build on, and debate with, positions developed by various pre-Platonic thinkers, as well as their own contemporaries, most debates one encounters in the humanities and social sciences can be traced to one or other positions that Plato and/or Aristotle articulated in their works. As Plato's student, Aristotle has learned much from Plato and his work displays many affinities with Plato's scholarship. Nevertheless, Plato and Aristotle stand as consequential counterpoints to one another in many respects.1

Perhaps most consequential, although Plato maintains some loyalties to Socrates' notions of a divinely-enabled reality (and a supra-human rationality) that stands outside of, and renders inconsequential matters pertaining to, the humanly known sensate world, Aristotle grounds his considerations of people's realms of knowledge within the parameters of the humanly experienced world. Relatedly, whereas Plato's speakers (following Socrates) sometimes insist on the existence of an external set of a priori concepts of which human perceptions are but imperfect representations (of these pure or ideal forms), Aristotle contends that people's conceptions of things are derived through comparative analysis (and inferences thereof) of people's sensate experiences with the phenomena under consideration.

Still, although Plato often is dismissed as “an idealist,” those who more carefully examine Plato's Republic and Laws will find that Plato's speakers are much more attentive to the ways in which people accomplish human group life than many who claim to be empiricists, reformers, advocates, and the like. Thus, Plato's speakers are notably attentive to the processes and problematics of organizing and sustaining governing practices across a wide array of social institutions. In addition to the uncertainties and negotiated nature of planning and implementing realms of community life, they are aware of multiple viewpoints, objectives, tactics, adjustments, cooperation, resistance, and the interconnectedness of people's organizational life-worlds.

1 In developing his dialogues, Plato typically employs a series of speakers who represent an assortment of views on particular topics. The speakers commonly engage the topic at hand from a multiplicity of perspectives and associated qualifications, shedding considerable light on the forms, possibilities, and limitations of particular viewpoints and practices. By contrast, Aristotle more directly (a) reviews fields of thought on specific topics, (b) defines sources and concepts with reference to more viable and weaker positions, and then (c) proceeds to articulate and analyze what is known about particular subject matters.

Much can be learned from Plato by attending to the more focused analysis he develops within each of his dialogues. Nevertheless, Plato often leaves readers with comparatively indistinct states of knowing (with Socratic variants of, “the best that humanly can be known, is that things cannot be humanly known”). Aristotle pursues matters more directly, precisely, and conclusively. Whereas Plato is highly instructive in many ways, Aristotle more directly intends that people who examine his materials would know things better and more effectively engage the humanly experienced or sensate world.

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6 For more sustained thematic considerations of pragmatist emphases in Plato's works, see (a) education and scholarship (Prus 2011a), (b) morality, deviance, and regulation (Prus 2011c), (c) religious representations and skepticism (Prus 2013), (d) poetic endeavor (Prus 2009), and (e) love and friendship (Prus and Camara 2010).

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These considerations make it clear, then, that the state is one of those things which exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal fit for a state. Anyone who by his nature and not by ill-luck has no state is either a wretch or superhuman...Speech, on the other hand, serves to make clear what is beneficial and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For by contrast with the other animals man has this peculiarity: he alone has sense of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. An association in these matters makes a household and a state. (Aristotle 1995:3 [Politics, Book I, 1253a; Saunders trans.)

Whereas Aristotle (as conveyed so effectively in Spangler’s [1998] Aristotle on Teaching) contends that knowing is an instructed, socially accomplished, community-based process rather than something that individuals might attain on their own, it is in Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle most clearly considers the relationship of the individual to the community and the centrality of speech for human knowing and acting.

Written in part as the base for political science or the study of the social ordering of community life, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is at once an analysis of human group life and the developmental flows of people’s activities, relationships, and experiences within. In this foundational consideration of human knowing and acting, Aristotle not only addresses (a) the interactive connectedness of the individual within the group and (b) character as a humanly engaged, activity-based process but he also considers (c) the developmental unity of human sensations, activities, and linguistically-enabled thought.

For Aristotle, there is no duality of self and other, of individual and community, of speech and thought, of mind and body, of activity and knowing, of human knowing and the environment, or of emotionality and reason. Thus, although he discusses these and other matters in more focused terms, Aristotle sees these aspects of the human condition as interwoven with one another in emergent, developmentally formulative terms.

While observing that pre-linguistic humans can develop stylistic habits, routines, patterns of behavior, or tendencies thereof, Aristotle points out that there are no inherent meanings in tension, sensation, motion, direction, or repetition. He distinguishes these non-rational (non-informed) pre-linguistic tendencies and the more closely associated “virtues of habit” people develop from “virtues of thought” (the more characteristic things that people do in more knowing terms – as a consequence of language acquisition, interchange, and associated capacities for deliberation and choice). However, and mindful of the developmental process of human acting and knowing, Aristotle observes that people’s (linguistically-enabled) qualities of thought do not exist as separate entities, but rather become interwoven with the more particular pre-linguistic (and more linguistically limited) habits that these people had earlier developed.

Aristotle envisions some tension as essential for all animal life, but contends that these states of agitation and relaxation (and any manifestations thereof) become known or defined as tensions, emotions, sensations (or any other matters) only as humans acquire some language and the associated conceptions of “whatness” (including notions of goodness and wrongness) that are embedded within the language of the communities in which they reside.

Moreover, even though pre-linguistic humans may lack an awareness of “the whatness of the human community,” their caretakers and other (linguistic) associates not only may define the characters (habits, tendencies) of these newcomers in ways that are meaningful and desirable within the broader community but these knowing others may also actively attempt to shape the characters, emotional dispositions, and other notions of “whatness” of any newcomers with whom they have contact.

Whereas Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics; also see Prus 2007a) identifies a set of “character tendencies” that people develop in both pre-linguistic and linguistically-enabled terms, he is also aware that linguistically socialized humans (as agents unto themselves) may monitor and attempt to shape their own character-related tendencies. Still, Aristotle recognizes that it is one thing to encourage others and/or oneself to strive for more balanced, dispositional, and interactional character styles and a very different matter for people to achieve this amidst their earlier habits, practices, associates, modes of thought, and their shifting, sometimes overlapping, sets of intentions and activities.

Although encompassing much more than “emotionality,” these character dispositions and situated instances of acting and relating to others become intermeshed with “the particular senses of emotionality” that people knowingly experience – even as they are learning about themselves in linguistic-conceptual terms. Accordingly, for Aristotle, it is linguistically-informed activity in which and through which people achieve the most consequential features of human interchange as they knowingly (as agents causally) enter into the flows of the “whatness” of ongoing community life.

From Aristotle’s viewpoint as well, linguistically-informed humans not only develop capacities to think in terms of the past, present, and future but they also may knowingly anticipate, imagine, and intentionally engage or act toward things in terms of the ends they have in mind. Further, people can deliberate about their options both on a solitary basis and in association with others. Moreover, Aristotle recognizes people’s capacities for affection, sincerity, and cooperation, as well as defection, deception, and conflict in developing their relations with others (also see Prus 2003a; 2004; 2007a; 2008a; 2009; Prus and Camara 2010). Those familiar with Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969) will recognize much in Aristotle’s works that parallel American pragmatist and symbolic interactionist conceptions of reality as a situated, emergent, collectively accomplished process (Prus 2003a; 2007a; 2008a; 2009) that is more or less continuously “tested out” and potentially modified as people do things and assess outcomes and objectives in relation to their earlier and present lines of activity.4

It should be noted that Plato references many of these points and related matters in various of his dialogues (e.g., Theaetetus, Sophist, Parmenides, Gorgias, Protagoras, Statesman, Republic, and Laws), often in strikingly crystalline ways. However, whereas Plato typically presents these pragmatist viewpoints amidst contrary positions (often assumed by his speaker Socrates), Aristotle much more centrally builds his analyses on these aspects of pragmatist thought. Although Plato is much more prescriptive than is Aristotle overall, Aristotle also fuses some of his analyses with moral viewpoints. Nevertheless, important differences are apparent here as well. Thus, while Plato (following Socrates) often appears to support a more theologically-oriented or divinely-inspired stance that supersedes humanly known reality (Prus 2013), Aristotle seems intent on achieving excellence in more general human (comparative) terms. Aristotle’s emphasis is more completely focused on comprehending the humanly known and engaged world.

Relatedly, those familiar with the works of Schütz (1962; 1964), Berger and Luckmann (1966), and Garfinkel (1967) also will find much in Aristotle’s texts that resonates with the intersubjectivist/constructionist approaches that these phenomenological social scientists adopt in reference to the human condition.
In developing *Rhetoric*, Aristotle is profoundly aware of people's abilities (as agents) not only to formulate a variety of views on the particular matters to which they attend but also of people's potential to persuade others of the viability of any viewpoints that they intend to represent. Moreover, as Aristotle develops his materials, it is apparent that speakers not only may try to anticipate the various interests and vulnerabilities of their audiences (i.e., judges) but that they also may endeavor to disqualify earlier definitions of situations that their auditors may have held. No less consequentially, Aristotle also recognizes that speakers may plan to render inferential the viewpoints earlier expressed by other speakers as well as those positions they anticipate that other speakers might invoke.

Aristotle envisions speakers as having the capacity not only to adjust to the representations [of reality] presented by oppositionary speakers but also to anticipate the claims that their opponents might make when preparing their own positions. In this way, speakers not only may develop presentations that would be more invincible to the arguments developed by others but also may more effectively neutralize the positions that others might later develop. Although success is always contingent on audience acknowledgment, speakers can strategically emphasize the viability of the images they present while trying to neutralize, diminish, or otherwise disqualify the claims that others might make.

As well, in developing their cases (as in addressing “what occurred” or “seems likely to have happened”), speakers may invoke broad arrays of images pertaining to “possibilities and probabilities”, as well as proposing (and/or challenging) particular “proofs” and sanctions as they strive to shape the broader frames of reference in which the events in question are contextualized and interpreted by their audiences.

**Morality and Emotionality**

Regardless of the origins of people's conceptions of “what is desirable” and “what is not,” community definitions of morality are integrally connected with the emotional standpoints that people experience as members of those communities (also see Durkheim 1915 [1912]; Prus 2007c). As well, because group-based conceptions of morality are pertinent across the entire field of persuasive endeavor (including court cases, policy deliberations and other collective instances of decision-making, and occasions of praise and censure – as well as people’s interchanges and personal deliberations and choices), the matters of community morality and persuasive communication are relevant to a vast array of the emotional states that people experience.

Clearly, people need not approach situations involving the judgments of people or other definitions of “whatness” in more obvious emotional terms. Indeed, they may take great care to maintain rational-logical standpoints. Nevertheless, insofar as those promoting or discouraging specific viewpoints or positions either (a) become caught up in particular emotional themes of sorts themselves and/or (b) consider it advantageous to present their positions in ways that engage others in emotional terms, it is contingent on those who intend to understand human decision-making to attend to these definitional features of the situation – as well as to the ways people may manage any emotional states even in more “rationalist” contexts.

Although it may be tempting to focus on individuals more exclusively as moral agents unto themselves, it should be emphasized that Aristotle’s conception of morality in *Nicomachean Ethics* centrally hinges on the moral order of the community and the ways that people become absorbed into community life in developmental, adjustable, activity-oriented terms. Their (associated) notions of emotionality reflect the moral order of the community contexts in which they live, act, and think.

In developing his position, Aristotle introduces a series of character dispositions (e.g., courage, generosity, pride, sincerity, self-restraint, composure, congeniality, fairness, dedication, kindness) as longer-term or more enduring moral virtues and introduces the concept of a “midpoint” as an ideal approximation of these matters of character. However, he also is highly mindful of morality as an enacted, situated process that not only presumes a voluntary quality but also of people’s objectives or goals, stocks of knowledge, and sense making and reasoning practices, as well as the wisdom they have accumulated regarding the connections between things (including the feasibility, probability, and desirability of particular outcomes).

*As Durkheim (1915 [1912]) points out, learning a language involves much more than simply connecting specific sounds with particular points of reference. Notably, thus, as people learn language and associated realms of “whatness” they also learn aspects of community definitions of morality – as in conceptions of desirable and undesirable objects and activities (along with appropriate states of emotional expression. Also see Prus (2011b; 2012).*
Emotionality as a Generic Social Process

Because emotionality is such an important feature of human group life, a great many ethnographies, especially more comprehensive inquiries, address aspects of emotionality in some detail. Thus, one finds some particularly insightful accounts of people’s experiences with emotionality in studies of entertainers (Becker 1963; Roebuck and Frese 1976; Prus and Irini 1980; Stebbins 1990; Prus and Sharper 1991; MacLeod 1993; Dietz 1994), religious participants (Shaffir 1974; 1978a; 1978b; 1987; 1991; 1993; 1995a; 1995b; 1998; 2000a; 2000b; Prus 1976; Lofland 1977 [1966]), politicians (Grills 1994; Shaffir and Kleinhekte 2005), thieves and hustlers (Sutherland 1937; Prus and Sharper 1977), marketing and salespeople (Prus 1989a; 1989b; Sanders 1989), outlaw bikers (Wolf 1991), presumably ill persons (Charmaz 1991; 1995; Karp 1996), deaf children and their caregivers (Evans and Falk 1986; Evans 1987; 1988; 1994), student physicians (Haas and Shaffir 1987), university sports recruiters (Dietz and Cooper 1994), feminists (Wolf 1994), high school debaters (Fine 2001), and academics providing insider accounts of field research (see, i.e., Becker 1970; Shaffir et al. 1980; Shaffir and Stebbins 1991; Prus 1996; 1997; Grills 1998; Puddephatt, Shaffir, and Kleinhekte 2009).

One can learn much about emotionality from specific instances of ethnographic inquiry, and there is a cumulative value to these texts as general points of reference points for comprehending people’s experiences with emotionality. Nevertheless, it is important to develop a more thorough, more focused conceptualization of emotionality as a humanly engaged, humanly experienced process – to attend to the more generic, trans-situational, or trans-contextual features of emotionality as realms of human lived experience.

Building on Blumer’s (1969) statement on symbolic interaction, Denzin’s (1984) volume on emotion, and an assortment of interactionist ethnographies, Prus (1996:173-201) addresses experiencing emotionality as a generic social process (GSP). Like Denzin, Prus views emotions as self-body sensations that are intersubjectively informed or become meaningful only within the conceptual “whiteness” of community life. Whereas Prus stresses the study of emotionality in more directly engaged (i.e., situated, enacted, experienced) terms than does Denzin, both Denzin and Prus (as with the interactionists and pragmatists more generally) take the viewpoint that emotionality is to be understood within the intersubjective context of community life rather than as something that exists as either an objective or subjective essence unto itself.14

14 Although it has a less pronounced ethnographic emphasis than the present statement, readers may find Shott’s (1979) interactionist discussion of emotionality instructive. For another set of social psychological statements on emotionality, readers are referred to the edited collection of Rom Harre (1986). Katz (1999) also introduces aspects of interactionism and constructionism in his more “emotive analysis” of emotions, in which he argues that emotions might be seen as emergent art forms. While this latter position is intriguing in certain respects (i.e., recognizing that emotional experiences transcend the words that people have to describe their sensations) the problem for social scientists, in part, is one of maintaining emphasis on things that may be identified, conveyed to others, and studied in more sustained ways. In this respect, it is important to define one’s terms as directly as one is able, indicate linkages as clearly as possible, and assess these notions relative to people’s experiences through sustained ethnographic research.

13 This point is emphasized by Emile Durkheim (1915 [1912]) in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Indeed, Durkheim insists that group interchage is central to all realms of human knowing and acting, including all concepts and meaningful expressions of activity and sensations— including emotionality. In this regard, Durkheim’s viewpoint on human knowing very much resonates with the positions adopted by George Herbert Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969), as well as Aristotle’s more foundational, highly enabling Nicomachean Ethics.

Thus, the matter of “experiencing emotionality” is to be understood within the particular life-worlds in which people, as co-interactants, live, act, and comprehend things. Like people’s experiences with identities, relationships, and involvements more generally (all of which also presume physiological capacities), emotionality is best understood in more holistic terms, as part of a larger set of processes that emerge in the natural course of people’s life-world participation in the community.

Mindful of this broader standpoint, Prus (1996:141-201) provides an extended consideration of generic social processes (GSPs) or basic, trans-contextual features of community life. This material focuses on people acquiring perspectives, achieving identity, being involved, doing activity, developing relationships, forming and coordinating associations, and experiencing emotionality.15

15 For other discussions and extensions of these generic social processes (GSPs), see Prus (1997; 1999; 2003b; 2004), Prus and Grills (2003), and Prus and Mitchell (2009).

Although often taken for granted in sociological circles, emotionality is pertinent to all realms and instances of human group life. In discussing emotionality as a generic social process (Prus 1996:173-186), the objective was to articulate a set of conceptual themes that not only would epitomize aspects of emotionality as these appeared more generally in the ethnographic literature but that also would serve as focal points for subsequent research and analyses of people’s experiences with emotionality.

Prus’ (1996) analysis of emotionality did not benefit from an awareness of Aristotle’s Rhetoric or other texts from the classical Greek and Roman eras (e.g., see Prus 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2009; 2010b; 2011c; 2013; Prus and Camara 2010) but was intended to enable scholars to examine the full range of people’s solitary and trans-personal emotional experiences. Accordingly, in addressing people’s “solitary experiences with emotionality”, as well as their “interactive emotional entanglements,” the emphasis is on the developmental flows (the processes/emergence) of people’s experiences with emotionality.

This includes an attentiveness to (a) people’s initial involvements in emotional themes, (b) continuities and intensifications of emotional themes and interchanges, and (c) the disengagement or disentanglement process.16

Attending to the flows of people’s experiences with emotionality, Prus’ analysis is organized around the matters of: (1) learning to define emotional experiences, (2) developing techniques for expressing and controlling emotional experiences, and (3) experiencing emotional episodes and entanglements.

Since each of these subthemes offers a vantage point for considering and dialoguing with Aristotle’s analysis of emotionality within the context of persuasive interchange, I will briefly indicate sets of subprocesses encompassed within these three subthemes.

Learning to Define Emotional Experiences

The subprocesses listed here draw attention to people acquiring perspectives on the “whatness” of group-based conceptions of emotionality – as this pertains to people encountering, learning, and investigating emotionality in various life-worlds. In this regard, Aristotle’s Rhetoric serves as a focal point for subsequent research and analyses of people’s experiences with emotionality.

16 This conceptualization of emotionality as a generic social process is accompanied by a related discussion of “emotionality and the ethnographic self” (Prus 1996:186-197), wherein researchers’ experiences with, and attempts to manage, their own emotionality in the field are directly (and tactically) considered.
applying definitions of this aspect of human group life through (ongoing, adjutant) interchange with others in the community:

- Learning cultural perspectives on and understandings of emotionality;
- Learning cultural recipes for defining situations in emotional terms;
- Invoking or applying cultural emotional recipes in specific situations;
- Encountering, assessing, and assimilating notions, recipes, and situational definitions of emotions from others.

Developing Techniques for Expressing and Controlling Emotional Experiences

It is to be understood, as well, that emotions not only represent social essences of sorts but they also are to be examined as realms of activity. Thus, beyond acquiring stocks of knowledge and rules of thumb regarding the existence and nature of emotional situations and states, people also learn how to “do emotional activity.” Relatedly, the conceptual consideration of “doing activity” (Prus 1996:156-158) – encompassing the matters of doing performances, influencing others, and making commitments – appears quite consequential for appreciating the nature of “emotion work.”

At a performance level, people not only learn (typically enabled by explicit instruction) how to monitor their own situations and behaviors but they also learn when and how to express and manage particular emotional themes and states. These notions presume an attentiveness to Mead’s (1934) “generalized other,” human capacities for self-reflectivity, and people’s adjustments to situations as these develop. Further, beyond learning ways of monitoring, expressing, and controlling their own emotional states, people generally also learn ways of monitoring, assessing, and influencing (affecting) the emotional states that others around them may experience. Although success is problematic at all points in the process and often is centrally dependent on the definitions that others in the setting may apply to the instances at hand, relevant processes include:

- Learning to attend to emotional themes in the setting at hand;
- Learning ways of expressing emotional themes;
- Learning ways of controlling emotional themes;
- Coordinating emotional themes with others (team members and others);
- Dealing with ambiguity, obstacles, resistances, and distractions;
- Conveying images of competence (displaying ability, composure);
- Encountering competition in defining, expressing, and controlling emotional expressions;
- Making ongoing assessments of, and adjustments to, one’s emotional expressions;
- Monitoring, assessing, influencing others’ emotional practices and experiences.

Experiencing Emotional Episodes and Entanglements

Attending to the processual features of people’s involvements in situations more generally, we may ask when and how people begin to initially experience emotional episodes, when these are likely to continue and perhaps intensify, when and how they are likely to dissipate, and when and how emotional episodes may become reengaged or reconstituted. Extending an earlier discussion of people’s involvements (Prus 1996:153-156), the following subprocesses appear particularly consequential in accounting for initial involvements:

- Being recruited or encouraged to participate in particular emotional themes;
- Developing interests in, or fascinations with, particular emotional themes;
- Envisioning instrumentalist advantages to assuming particular emotional states;
- Feeling obligated to experience/express/control particular emotional themes;
- Overcoming reservations about involvement in particular emotional themes;
- Defining unexpected (inadvertent, accidental) experiences in emotional terms.

While people may learn notions of emotional states and ways of applying these notions to the situations in which they find themselves in a general sense, it is important to appreciate that emotions may be experienced on a more solitary (sometimes totally secretive) or isolated basis, as well as in more direct, interactive contexts. It might be argued that most, if not all, experiences of emotionality have some solitary or unshared components to them since people may have difficulty in completely and accurately communicating their feelings with others. Likewise, most, if not all, instances of solitary emotion entail some awareness of, attentiveness to, or interaction with others (on a specific or generalized basis). Still, it seems instructive to acknowledge the somewhat differing dynamics of more solitary versus more interactive instances of emotional experiences and expressions.

Solitary Emotional Episodes

Because people develop capacities for reflectivity or “becoming objects unto themselves” through association with others (Mead 1934), they commonly experience emotional states on their own (in more solitary terms) even in the midst of others on many occasions.

Although continuities in particular situations often reflect some mutuality (i.e., acknowledgement, acceptance, or enthusiasm) of interchange on the part of others, people (as self-reflective entities) sometimes will sustain particular emotional themes in the absence of any explicit interaction with, or encouragement from, others. Thus, while affective states such as love, hatred, jealousy, embarrassment, or excitement may reach very intense states as a result of ongoing interpersonal exchange, people may nonetheless maintain particular emotional themes on a more secretive, solitary basis – in the absence of support (as with disregard or even with more extensive resistances, challenges, and
sanctions) from others. The processes that seem relevant to these prolonged solitary pursuits are:

- Developing more intensive fascinations with particular emotional themes;
- Experiencing more acute obligations to pursue particular emotional themes;
- Making more extensive commitments to (or becoming reliant on) particular emotional themes;
- Avoiding, disattending to, or dismissing communications with others, which discourage focal emotional themes;
- Failing to attend to or define alternative emotional themes as viable modes of involvement.

**Interactive Emotional Episodes**

Mindful of the interactionist literature on “continuities” more generally, we may expect that people’s participation in emotional themes involving others are more likely to be sustained when people find themselves:

- Encountering viewpoints (definitions, justifications, encouragements) conducive to particular emotional themes;
- Attaining identities (self and other definitions) consistent with particular emotional themes;
- Becoming more adept at utilizing particular emotional states in dealing with others;
- Making commitments to (developing strategies, sty-

In addition to helping sustain other people’s involvements in particular emotional themes over time, one’s associates also may intensify or escalate other people’s sense of emotionality on a “here and now” basis. Some of these interchanges may be relatively isolated events between interactants but others may reflect earlier or anticipated exchanges to which one or other participants may refer in interpreting, defining, and acting toward the situation at hand.

Since situations become emotional experiences only when they are so defined by one or other parties, the nature and direction of any emotional theme seem rather precarious. Definitions of situations as emotional ones, thus, may very well depend on people’s pre-existing interests and on the particular aspects of the other(s) to which they attend in more immediate terms. Still, the concept of emergence (and adaptive interchange) has particular consequence here and may result in people ending up in lines of interchange and associated emotional states that they may have had no intention or desire whatsoever of pursuing. Nevertheless, insofar as the other is seen to offend or exemplify the ideals of some particular emotional theme to which someone attends or invokes, then the encounter is apt to become defined as a more noteworthy emotional experience. Expressing these matters in process terms, particular attention may be given to:

- Defining the immediate situation more explicitly in emotional terms;
- Overtly displaying or expressing emotional themes in the immediate situation;
- Carrying emotional themes over from earlier (outside) encounters (spill-overs);
- Establishing a mutuality of focus with the other around particular emotional themes;
- Developing more uniform modes of viewing and acting toward the other with respect to particular emotional themes.

Like continuities, disinvolvments from emotional episodes may reflect the activities of others, as well as the participants’ own, more individualized redefinitions of situations. Generally speaking, as with other involvements, people seem less likely to sustain emotional states on their own. Thus, many emotional interchanges (and themes) dissipate when the interactants fail to endorse or acknowledge one another’s expressed interests or affectations. As well, even when people have been extensively caught up in particular emotional themes, they may begin to question aspects of their situations on their own or with some prompting from others. Denoting an extension of an earlier (Prus 1996) discussion of disinvolvment, the following subprocesses seem particularly relevant to an understanding of the emotional disengagement or disentanglement process:

- Questioning earlier invoked perspectives (and definitions) regarding particular emotional themes;
- Finding that the activities entailed in pursuing particular emotional states are difficult to sustain;
- Disliking the sets of self and other identities associated with particular emotional entanglements;
- Reassessing the commitments (risks, costs, relative gains, longer-term implications) entailed in maintaining particular emotional states or entanglements;
- Defining alternative emotional states or entanglements as more viable (more desirable, readily accessible, encouraged by others);
- Encountering initiatives from others – interactants, third parties – to establish emotional breaks;
- Achieving desired emotional states or other objectives;
- Acknowledging acquiescence, accommodations, or other satisfactory concessions from the other;
- Recognizing incapacies or liabilities on the part of the other to continue.

While many emotionally focused interchanges have clearer or more definite endings, others may be subject to considerable vacillation. Whether these occur on a more solitary or interactive basis, they may be characterized by an unlimited number of disinvolvments and reinvolvements as the participants attempt to come to terms with the diverse sets of perspectives, identities, activities, commitments, and relationships that they associate with particular emotional themes, the parties involved,
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and the interactional contexts that have emerged to particular points in time.

Aristotle’s Rhetoric

[To provide a more adequate consideration of Aristotle’s analysis of emotionality, as well as briefly situate his analysis of emotionality within the context of rhetoric, I have extracted materials from an earlier statement on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Prus 2008a). Whereas the preceding discussion (Prus 1996) is valuable for comprehending emotionality as a generic social process, we would be most remiss if we were not to centrally acknowledge Aristotle’s conceptually detailed, highly enabling analysis of emotionality. In addition to embedded textual references to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, page references to extracts from the QSR (Prus 2008a) publication are indicated.]

In developing Rhetoric, Aristotle provides a remarkable philosophic analysis of rationality in the making. He presents readers with a comprehensive, highly instructive depiction of image work as a linguistically accomplished (and potentially contested) process.

Thus, while Aristotle discusses (1) the characters (reputations), abilities, and tactical ploys of speakers, and (2) the contents of people’s speeches and the ways in which speakers present their cases to judges, Aristotle even more centrally (3) focuses on the ways that speakers may appeal to (and alter) the viewpoints of the judges to whom messages are pitched.

Outlining an orientational frame and a set of operational tactics for embarking on influence work, Aristotle is highly attentive to the processual and problematic features of influence work.

Accordingly, Aristotle expects that speakers will not only try to anticipate and adjust to the viewpoints of judges on an emergent basis but that speakers also would try to anticipate and adjust to other speakers (e.g., as competitors/opponents) whenever these other parties enter into the process.

The speakers involved in instances of persuasive interchange may vary greatly in backgrounds, initiations, preparations, presentations, and the like, but there is no doubt on Aristotle’s part of people’s capacities for deliberative, meaningful activity and adjudicative interaction. [Prus 2008a:29]

Recognizing that most readers are apt not to be familiar with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the overall flow of this volume has been maintained. This should enable readers to establish more direct links with Aristotle’s statement and, hopefully, encourage use of this material for their own studies of human relations. At the same time, though, readers are cautioned that, far from amplifying Aristotle’s analysis, this statement only partially captures the depth, detail, and potency of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In introducing Rhetoric, Aristotle (BI, I-II) states that rhetoric represents the study of the available means of persuasion on any subject matter. He also observes that his concern is not limited to matters of successfull techniques but represents an attempt to discover the ways in which persuasion work may be engaged in the instances in which this takes place.

Largely disregarding Plato’s intense condemnations of rhetoric, Aristotle notes that rhetoric (like other arts or technologies) may be used for variety of ends. Aristotle also observes that, in contrast to many realms of study (e.g., architecture, medicine) that have comparatively specific applications or parameters of operation, rhetoric (like logic) may be used in an unlimited set of contexts in the human community.

Whereas rhetoric relies primarily on linguistic communication, Aristotle’s Rhetoric clearly attests to the limitations of words as persuasive elements in themselves. Thus, throughout this volume, Aristotle is highly attentive to (1) the speaker (interests, abilities, and images of the speaker), (2) the speech (contents, ordering, and presentation), and (3) the audience (dispositions, viewpoints, inferential tendencies, and resistances). He also is mindful of (4) the anticipatory, adjudicative interchanges that oppositionary speakers may develop as they vie for the commitments of the auditors in the setting.

For Aristotle, rhetoric does not consist of sets of disembodied words, phrases, or even more sustained texts but implies a distinctively comprehensive consideration of the ways that speakers might meaningfully engage others in order to encourage those people (individually or in groups) to embark on the lines of action desired by the speaker.

As a cautionary note to readers, it may be noted that while I have maintained the overall flow of Aristotle’s text and have provided specific chapter references to particular materials, I have assumed some liberty in the headings I have used to organize this presentation. [Prus 2008a:30]

Realms and Emphases of Persuasion

Aristotle divides rhetoric into three major primary categories (BI, III-IV), relative to their objectives. These are (1) deliberative, (2) forensic, and (3) epideictic rhetoric. Deliberative or political rhetoric is intended to encourage people to act, alternatively, to discourage them from acting in certain ways. Concerned with decision and commitment making process, deliberative speaking presumes a distinctively futuristic orientation.

Forensic or judicial rhetoric is used to charge others with offenses of some sort or, relatedly, to defend people from the charges of others. Whether these claims are invoked on behalf of individuals, groups, or the state, forensic speeches deal primarily with matters alleged to have happened in the past.

Referring to the praise or censure of people or things, epideictic or demonstrative rhetoric is notably more expressive in emphasis. It deals largely with celebrations or condemnations of some target or humanly-experienced circumstances. Demonstrative rhetoric is typically developed around some present (as in recent or current) occasion, event, or situation.

While acknowledging the time-frames characterizing each of these three oratorical themes, Aristotle also observes that rhetoricians focusing on any of these three objectives may make reference to the past, the present, and the future as these speakers present their positions to others.

Working across these three broader sets of rhetorical objectives, Aristotle (BI, III-VII) acknowledges...
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A full range of persuasive arenas, varying from dyadic encounters to political practices and interchanges of all sorts. Approaching rhetoric, thusly, Aristotle provides a highly generic statement on the ways in which people try to generate, shape, and resist other people’s viewpoints, decisions, and activities within the human community.

Further, while Aristotle gives greater attention to forensic oratory (given the typically greater complexities of court-related cases) than to deliberative or epideictic rhetoric, it should be appreciated that forensic cases also subsume decision-making dimensions (as definitions of activities, assessments of guilt, and assignments of penalties) and demonstrative features (as in condemnations or exoneration of the defendants). [Prus 2008a:31]

**Focusing on Emotionality**

Recognizing people’s general tendencies to define and act toward situations in terms of their emotional states (e.g., anger, indignation, pity, pride, fear), Aristotle (BII, II-XI) explicitly addresses a series of emotions to which speakers may attend in their attempts to deal more affectively with the audiences at hand.

Those who examine this material will find in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* the foundations of a theory of emotions. Defining emotions or passions as feelings or dispositions pertaining to pleasure (and pain) that have a capacity to affect people’s judgments, Aristotle intends to establish the relevancy of people's emotions for influence work.

Thus, as a prelude to speakers doing “emotion work” within the context of persuasive communication, wherein one knowingly and deliberately attempts to intensify or minimize certain emotional viewpoints, Aristotle discusses people’s experiences with various emotions in a more generic sense.

In what follows, Aristotle deals with (1) anger and calm, (2) feelings of friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and insconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, and (7) envy and emulation.

In addition to providing (a) instructive definitions of these emotional states, Aristotle considers (b) the dimensions of these emotional states, (c) the ways that these emotions are experienced (by whom, in what ways, and with what behavioral consequences), and (d) how speakers may enter into and shape the emotional sensations, viewpoints, and actions of others. [Prus 2008a:37]

**Anger and Calm**

Aristotle (BII, II) defines anger as a focused desire for revenge that reflects an unwarranted slight or injustice directed toward oneself or one’s friends by some other.

Aristotle distinguishes three types of slights or senses of mistreatment associated with anger: (1) instances of contempt, in which others (as agents) are seen to disparage things that targets deem important; (2) spite, wherein others obstruct target from achieving their objectives, not as rivals for the same objects but more singularly to prevent targets from achieving those ends; and (3) insolence, wherein others denigrate targets through word or deed, with the apparent intention of achieving agent superiority through the ill treatment of the target.

Relatedly, Aristotle contends, people (as targets) are more apt to become angered with others (as agents) when they see these others as: (a) preventing targets (directly or indirectly) from obtaining things targets are eager to have; (b) promoting effects contrary to those that targets desire; (c) ridiculing, despising, or denigrating targets, including their interests and talents in some way; or (d) depreciating people for whom targets have affection.

Likewise, while denigrations seem more distasteful when they are (e) produced by those to whom targets view as inferiors (vs. equals or superiors), Aristotle also notes that slights also are more hurtful when they arise from (f) people that targets had envisioned as friends or (g) people whom targets have treated well in the past.

As well, Aristotle observes that people (as targets) are apt to direct anger toward people who (h) delight in, or fail to sympathize with, target misfortunes; (i) present bad news to targets; and (j) readily listen to and talk about target failures with others.

Aristotle is also attentive to people’s tendencies to become variably incensed with others (agents), depending on those who witness particular agent slights. Thus, perceived mistreatment tends to generate heightened anger on the part of targets when it takes place in front of (a) targets’ rivals, (b) people whom targets admire, (c) those from whom targets desire admiration, (d) those whom targets respect, and (e) those from whom targets desire respect.

People (agents) may also encourage anger on the part of others (targets) when: (a) targets feel obliged to defend others (third parties) whom agents have slighted; (b) agents fail to settle debts with targets or do not return favors; (c) agents ridicule target interests or otherwise fail to respect concerns with target sincerity; (d) agents fail to treat targets as favorably as agents treat comparable others; and (e) agents forget or otherwise disregard particular things that targets consider important.

Aristotle explicitly reminds speakers that these are the themes they may use to bring their auditors into appropriate frames of mind; to generate anger in the minds of their audiences and to direct this anger toward their opponents so as to encourage auditor decisions that are more favorable to speaker objectives.

Still, Aristotle’s treatment of anger is not complete. Thus, Aristotle (BII, III) enters into a related consideration of calm or platitude; how this emotion is experienced by people and how speakers may calm, pacify, or reconcile themselves with audiences who may otherwise be disposed to anger (via the circumstances, the case at hand, or the negativizing effects of the opposing speaker) with respect to speakers or their positions.

Addressing the conditions under which people become calm, Aristotle observes that anger is apt to be minimized when people (as targets): (a) view incidents involving agents as involuntary, unintended, or beyond their control; (b) realize that agents treat them the same the way they treat themselves; (c) encounter agents who admit their faults and sincerely express regret for target injuries; (d) face agents who are humble and accept roles as inferiors to targets in the matters at hand; (e) share target senses of seriousness on matters of
Aristotle posits that people (herein targets) feel affection for those (agents): (a) who have treated targets well (also those people and other things that targets value); (b) whom targets anticipate will treat them (targets) well in the future; and (c) who devalue target enemies and other sources of target dissatisfaction.

Relatedly, people (as targets) tend to value those (agents) who: (d) are generous toward targets, (e) are courageous in defending targets, (f) more independently look after their own affairs, (g) are fair-minded, and (h) tend not to pry into target affairs.

Similarly, people tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who (i) have pleasant dispositions and a sense of humor, and (j) assume understanding, accepting orientations toward targets.

Among those more appreciated, as well, are people who (k) praise target qualities, (l) minimize target-directed criticisms, (m) do not maintain grievances against targets, and (n) do not oppose targets when targets are angered or otherwise are sincere in their efforts.

Aristotle also pointedly notes that affections more readily develop among people who (o) share various affinities or common circumstances, interests, and activities, provided that these matters do not put them in oppositionary (as in competitive) terms.

Aristotle further observes that people (agents) develop friendly feelings toward those: (p) in front of whom targets still feel accepted should targets make mistakes; (q) who willingly cooperate in pursuing target objectives; (r) who act as friendly toward targets in target absences as in target presence; (s) who are supportive of targets’ friends; and (t) who are open with targets, sharing agents’ own weaknesses and failings with targets.

After noting that it is difficult for people to experience friendly feelings in the midst of fear and other discomforts, Aristotle concludes that friendship is apt to be generated when (u) people do things intended to benefit the other; especially when they do so willingly, without being asked, and without expectation of compensation.

Aristotle’s (BII, IV) treatment of enmity or hatred is much less developed than his analysis of friendship. While observing that enmity may arise from instances of anger, Aristotle also notes that people may hate others more arbitrarily and diffusely for what they take to be other people’s characters, activities, or group (or category) affiliations.

In contrast to angered states, which can be more readily neutralized, Aristotle sees hatred as much more totalizing, enduring, and intense than anger. Instead of seeking revenge, thus, the emphasis in enmity, more completely, is on the destruction of the other. [Prus 2008a:39-40]

Fear and Confidence

Aristotle also contends that people are more apt to be fearful of others more generally when (j) they (as prospective targets) have made mistakes that they are not able to undo (leaving themselves vulnerable to others). Aristotle notes, too, that people are apt to experience fear (k) around the things that invoke their pity when they witness others in those situations.

Observing that people's fears are apt to intensify when (l) they believe that something specific is likely to befall them (through particular agents, in particular ways, and at particular times), Aristotle emphasizes the importance of speakers who wish to invoke fear on the part of their audiences making dangers appear as direct and imminent to these audiences as they are able.

Defining confidence as the opposite of fear, wherein people anticipate that they are safe or far removed from destructive elements, Aristotle (BII, V) subsequently endeavors to specify the conditions under which people are apt to feel invulnerable. Among the circumstances inspiring confidence are (a) the apparent remoteness of dangerous matters; (b) the
Among the kinds of things around which people more commonly experience shame, Aristotle references: (a) cowardice; (b) treating others unfairly in financial matters; (c) exhibiting excessive frugality; (d) victimizing those who are helpless; (e) taking advantage of the kindness of others; (f) begging; (g) grieving excessively over losses; (h) avoiding responsibility; (i) exhibiting vanity; (j) engaging in sexually licentious behaviors; and (k) avoiding participation in things expected of, or lacking possessions generally associated with, equals.

Further, while noting centrally that shame is apt to be intensified in all discreditable matters when (a) these things are deemed voluntary and thus, one’s fault, Aristotle also observes that (b) people also may feel shame about dishonorable things that have been done, are presently being done, or seem likely to be done to them by others.

Acknowledging the anticipatory or imaginative reactions of others, as well as actual instances of experiencing disgrace, Aristotle subsequently identifies the witnesses or others in front of whom people (as targets) are apt to experience greater shame.

Most centrally, these witnesses include people whom targets hold in higher esteem (respect, honor) and admire (friendship, love), as well as those from whom they (targets) desire respect and affective regard. People (as targets) also are likely to experience heightened senses of shame when they are disgraced in front of those who have control of things that targets desire to obtain, those whom targets view as rivals, and those whom targets view as honorable and wise.

Observing that targets are particularly susceptible to shame when dishonorable things occur in more public arenas, Aristotle also posits that people (as targets) are likely to feel greater shame when the witnesses include people who: are more innocent of things of this sort; adopt more intolerant viewpoints; and generally delight in revealing the faults of others.

Another set of witnesses or audiences in front of whom people (as targets) are more likely to experience disgrace include: those before whom [targets] have experienced success or been highly regarded; those who have not requested things of [targets]; those who recently have sought [target] friendship; and those likely to inform other people of [target] shame-related matters.

As well, Aristotle states that people (as targets) also are apt to experience shame through things associated with the activities or misfortunes of their relatives and other people with whom targets have close connections (i.e., experience an extension of the stigma attached to their associates).

Shame also seems intensified when people anticipate that they will remain in the presence of those who know of their losses of character. By contrast, Aristotle suggests that people are less apt to experience embarrassment among those who are thought inattentive or insensitive to such matters.

Relatedly, while Aristotle notes that people may feel comfortable with certain [otherwise questionable circumstances or practices] in front of intimates versus strangers, he also states that people (as targets) are apt to experience intensified shame among intimates with respect to things that are regarded as particularly disgraceful in those settings.

However, among those that they encounter as strangers, discredited people tend to be concerned only about more immediate matters of convention. Aristotle ends his analysis of shame with the observation that shamelessness or the corresponding insensitivity to stigma will be known through its opposite. [Prus 2008a:41-42]

Kindness and Inconsideration

Aristotle (BII, VI) next deals with kindness or benevolence and, by contrast, a disregard for the other. Aristotle defines kindness as benefits that one person confers on another, without anticipation of any compensation but with the intention of helping the other.

Although observing that acts of kindness are more apt to be appreciated by those in more desperate conditions, Aristotle also posits that people’s generosity become more noteworthy when the benefactors (a) do things more exclusively on their own, (b) are the first to offer assistance, or (c) provide the greatest amount of help.

Alternatively, Aristotle observes, speakers attempting to discredit particular benefactors may encourage auditors to view these people as inconsiderate of others by alleging that the benefactors: (a) acted primarily for their own advantage; (b) helped others inadvertently (versus intentionally); or (c) felt obligated to act in these manners for other reasons.

Likewise, kindness may be discredited when (d) benefactors’ assistance is defined as comparatively insignificant within their overall capacities to help others. [Prus 2008a:42-43]

Shame and Shamelessness

Aristotle (BII, VI) defines shame as a feeling of pain or discomfort associated with things in the present, past, or future that are likely to discredit or result in a loss of one’s character.

By contrast, shamelessness or impudence is envisioned as a disregard, contempt, or indifference to matters of disrepute. Shame, according to Aristotle, revolves around things envisioned as disgraceful to oneself or to those for whom one has regard.
Pity and Indigation

In addressing pity or the sense of sorrow that people feel on behalf of others, Aristotle (III, VIII) provides another highly instructive analysis of emotionality. Aristotle defines pity as the feeling of pain associated with the actual or impending injury or loss experienced by someone who is thought not to deserve conditions of this sort.

Because pity assumes that people can anticipate or experience the viewpoint of the other, Aristotle contends that this feeling is premised on the recognition that a similar, unfortunate fate could befall oneself or one’s close associates. Somewhat relatedly, Aristotle claims that pity is unlikely to be felt by people who are completely ruined (have nothing left to lose), as well as by people who view themselves as highly privileged (and invulnerable).

Instead, he posits that pity is more likely to be experienced by those who: (a) have encountered and survived related difficulties; (b) are older and wiser (recognizing human frailties); (c) are weaker and inclined to cowardice; (d) are better educated and can anticipate fuller consequences; and (e) have stronger family ties and can imagine misfortunes befalling their loved ones.

Obversely, Aristotle envisions pity as less likely from those: (a) experiencing anger or confidence; (b) who care little about others; or (e) who think people generally are of little worth or basically deserve misfortune.

Aristotle also states that (d) people in heightened states of fear or horror have little capacity for feeling pity because they are so preoccupied with their own precarious circumstances. Likewise, when people’s close associates are in great danger and people experience intense fears for them, people are unlikely to feel compassion for third parties who are further removed from themselves.

Among the things that more compellingly encourage pity on the part of others Aristotle not only references things that are (a) directly destructive (as in death, injury, disease) but also cites (b) debilitating chance events and (c) undeserved circumstances.

The latter two elements include things such as friendlessness, the loss of close friends, deformity, evil treatment from those who should treat those people better, the repeated occurrence of misfortune, and help arriving too late to offset a great loss.

While stating that people often feel pity for others with respect to (d) matters for which they themselves have fears (albeit not of an highly imminent or intense sort), Aristotle also observes that people feel sorrow for others when: (e) the unfortunate are more like themselves in character, age, or other circumstances; (f) the sympathizers could more readily experience the particular sorts of misfortunes that have happened to others; and (g) the unfortunate people are closer to themselves (as in time, location).

Focusing attention more directly on speakers, Aristotle states that those who wish to invoke pity on behalf of their audiences should strive to present their materials in more vivid and dramatic fashions (through their gestures, tones, and appearances) so that their audiences might achieve greater, more immediate senses of pity-related emotion.

Aristotle (III, IX) then addresses indignation or resentment, an emotional state that he defines in oppositionary terms to pity; namely, the pain of witnessing unwarranted good fortune on the part of others. Aristotle differentiates indignation or resentment from envy (discussed later), reserving the term envy to refer more precisely to unmerited good fortune that befalls others who are (or were) more equal to ourselves.

People’s experiences of indignation revolve rather centrally around their definitions of justice and injustice. Accordingly, people may rejoice at the misfortunes of those whom they see as less deserving, just as they may experience resentment at the good fortune of the undeserving.

Observing that indignation is less apt to be felt when people of greater abilities or longer standing advantages are the ones who do well, Aristotle states that those who are more recent recipients of unwarranted advantages are apt to be viewed with heightened resentment, especially should these same people gain further from these undeserved advantages.

In addition to the newly wealthy, Aristotle notes that indignation is often felt toward those who benefit undeservedly from office, friends, or family connections, particularly when they overtly display the effects of these advantages.

Among those particularly inclined to be envious, Aristotle references (a) those who already have experienced considerable success but have not attained all relevant successes in some area; and (b) those who are ambitious in the more specific respect (including wisdom, fame, finances, or other advantages) in which comparisons are made. Aristotle also observes that, for some people, (c) virtually anything thought desirable in some way may become a focus of their envy.

After stating that people commonly envy (d) those who are closer to themselves in circumstances, time, and location (notably family members, neighbors, associates, rivals), Aristotle also suggests that people may be envious of equals who, when compared to themselves, succeed with (e) less difficulty, (f) in shorter periods of time, or (g) with less expense or other sacrifices. On some occasions, too, people may be envious of (h) those who possess or acquire things they, themselves,
Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Once had. Recognizing that people do not pity those whom they envy, Aristotle indicates that speakers who are able to generate and direct auditor envy (as with indignation) toward speakers' opponents will neutralize auditor sympathy for their opponents.

Next, Aristotle (BII, XI) turns to emulation. For Aristotle, emulation is characterized not by any resentment or envy of things that others have but by a longing for these things to also belong to oneself. In contrast to envy, Aristotle describes emulation as a generally virtuous emotion. In emulation, one strives to be more like those who possess admirable things (typically, things thought to be within one's eventual reach). Extending these notions still further, Aristotle also notes that those who emulate or wish to be like certain people in the things these people possess also are apt to be contemptuous of third parties who fail to exhibit, pursue, or respect desirable qualities of these sorts.

Although this concludes the most directly focused of Aristotle's analyses of emotions, his consideration of emotionality is far from exhausted. Indeed, the preceding material (and the subsequent depiction of variations of people's generalized emotional viewpoints) represents only a partial account of Aristotle's statement on emotion work within Rhetoric. [Prus 2008a:44-45]

In Perspective

Whereas this paper has concentrated on Aristotle's consideration of emotionality in Rhetoric, Aristotle clearly was not the first to address emotionality or rhetoric in the classical Greek era. Thus, considerations of emotionality, activity, and relationships can be found in the works of Homer (circa 700 BCE), Hesiod (circa 700 BCE), and the classical Greek playwrights who followed them (Prus 2009), as well as a notably wide array of rhetoricians, historians, and philosophers from the classical Greek era (Prus 2004).

Those more familiar with the classical Greek literature will recognize that Plato also has much to offer to the study of emotionality through some of his dialogues. Thus, in addition to the considerations of emotionality within the contexts of organizational life and interchange, morality and regulation, and activity and character that one encounters in Plato's Republic and Laws, Plato addresses matters of great importance for a fuller understanding of emotionality as a community essence in Charmides (temperance), Laches (courage), Lysis (love), Symposium (love), and Philebas (wisdom, pleasure). Still, it is Aristotle (in Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric) who has generated the most extended, focused, and conceptually coherent discussion of emotionality on record from the classical Greek era.

Providing a temporal, developmental approach to the study of people's emotional dispositions and expressions in Nicomachean Ethics (especially Books 2-4; also see Prus 2007; particularly 9-23), Aristotle attends to emotionality as this pertains to the basic features of human knowing and acting, the emergence of character, the connectedness of character and emotionality with friendship, and the pursuit of happiness.

In developing Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle emphasizes the centrality of activity in the emergence of earlier (essentially pre-linguistic) creature acquired habits, as well as those (processually interfused) practices that are subsequently achieved through instruction, reflective thought, and self-monitoring practices. Thus, Aristotle envisions people's known emotional tendencies as taking shape within the activities that inhere in language acquisition, instruction, deliberation, and choice-making practices. He also considers the ways in which people express various aspects of character and manage their emotions as they attend to the morality of the broader community and relate more directly with (and mindfully of) particular others amidst their day-to-day activities. Still, even though Nicomachean Ethics has exceptional value for comprehending emotionality as a realm of human lived experience, it is in Rhetoric that Aristotle focuses yet more directly on emotionality as a situated, negotiable, definitional phenomenon.

Envisioning community life as revolving around sets of meaningful, deliberately engaged, and actively constructed processes (and interchanges), Aristotle is mindful of people's capacities for: instructing, learning, and intentional recollection; knowingly attending to the past, present, and future; anticipating the viewpoints of single and multiple others; managing the impressions given off to others; contemplating and developing images of “whatness”; and defining, asssessing, invoking, and challenging instances of deception. Relatedly, he is highly attentive to the matters of people pursuing objectives, making choices, and implementing and monitoring their own activities, as well as defining, making assessments of, and adjustments to, others within the fuller range of human interchange. This would include instances of cooperation, competition, resistance, and conflict; performing, sustaining, and severing alliances; and defining, experiencing, and expressing affection and disaffection toward oneself, as well as others.

In contrast to most texts produced by rhetoricians, philosophers, and social scientists, Aristotle's Rhetoric provides an instructive set of contingency statements about people's experiences with emotionality that can be more directly addressed, examined, assessed, and conceptually qualified and/or extended through ethnographic inquiry and comparative analysis.

Because Aristotle is so direct, clear, and specific in detailing the processes of interchange and the emphasis associated with the intensification and

19 Although rhetoricians have continued to envision emotionality as something that can be shaped by speakers, one notes a shift in emphasis on the part of most rhetoricians who came after Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle (a) develops a detailed analysis of emotionality as a means of informing speakers about the effective use of rhetoric and (b) approaches both rhetoric and emotionality as actively engaged features of community interchange, most rhetoricians have concentrated on “the mechanics of speech” (as in emphasizing styles of delivery, grammatical expressions, and technical instruction on how to generate emotionality on the part of others). Questioning for more immediate “practical” outcomes and “quick fixes,” the rhetoricians generally have lost focus on emotionality as a humanly experienced process that is best understood within the interactive context of community life. With some notable exceptions (especially Cicero [106-43 BCE; see Prus 2010] and Quintilian [35-95 CE]), the rhetoricians have added little to the analysis of human group life more generally or emotionality more specifically.

20 Apparently accepting the condemnations of rhetoric expressed by Socrates (via Plato), most philosophers have disregarded themselves from the study of influence work. As a result, the philosophers generally have been of little assistance in generating materials that enable one to comprehend persuasive interchange and emotionality as humanly engaged processes.
neutralization of several emotional states in Rhetoric, this material has exceptional value as a set of highly focused generic social processes. Thus, the question or challenge is how to relate Aristotle's materials to contemporary considerations of emotionality.

The problem, ironically, is not one of connecting a more diffuse statement from the past with more conceptually sophisticated statements from the more recent present but quite the reverse. Indeed, Aristotle's highly detailed conceptual, pragmatist analysis of emotionality is much more attentive to human interchange as “something in the making” than are most contemporary considerations of emotionality (see the introduction to the present paper).

Aristotle does not offer a distinctive methodology for studying emotionality as a feature of human interchange, but contemporary scholars may appreciate his general insistence on examining things in the instances in which they occur so that one might develop a more adequate base for comprehending the essence of the things under consideration. Relatedly, Aristotle stresses the importance of people arriving at the meanings of things through comparative analysis (analytic induction) in which instances are examined with reference to similarities and differences, as well as the flows and connections, to better establish the more basic features of the phenomena under consideration and the conceptual implications thereof.

Since Aristotle's work is process-based and so fundamentally attentive to activity, agency, and interchange, his analysis of emotionality is highly amenable to Chicago-style ethnographic inquiry. As well, Aristotle's more general emphasis on examining things in instances and subjecting instances to sustained analytic induction is strikingly consistent with the quest for the articulation of basic or generic social processes encouraged by theorists working in Chicago-style symbolic interactionism.20

Prus' (1996) statement on emotionality was developed without direct exposure to the analyses of emotionality found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics or Rhetoric (or other related materials from the classical Greek and Latin eras), but the texts developed by Aristotle and Prus (1996) have a distinctively complementary quality. In addition to shared emphasis on multiple participant viewpoints, activity, interaction, reflectivity, agency and resistance, and minded adjustment — as well as a particularly explicit recognition of emotionality as a consequential feature of community life — both authors are highly attentive to the problematic, socially achieved nature of people's “definitions of the situation.”

Still, whereas Aristotle is somewhat more definite in defining the parameters of emotionality as a resource within rhetorical contexts, Prus is more explicitly inquisitive and conceptually tentatively developing a research agenda for studying emotionality in ethnographic instances. Likewise, although Aristotle focuses more centrally on the role of rhetoricians, Prus attends to targets and tacticians in more proportioned terms. As well, whereas Aristotle considers the intensification and neutralization of emotionality in more formalized, public contexts, Prus is more mindful of the fuller range of people's involvements and continuities in emotionality. Still, both authors are highly mindful of both targets and tacticians and how they may more routinely enter into the theater of operations at hand.

When compared with Aristotle's more specific, thematically engaged discussion of emotions in Rhetoric (BII, 2-11), Prus' (1996) treatment of emotionality as a generic social process is notably limited with respect to specific realms of emotional experience. The GSP material Prus presents allows for a fuller range of emotional states of the very sort that Aristotle engages but does not provide equivalents to the highly detailed contingency statements that Aristotle develops in dealing with particular emotional states, such as “anger and calm” or “pity and disregard,” for instance.

At the same time, however, Prus' analysis of emotionality is notably consistent with Aristotle's considerations of people's emotional experiences in both Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric. In addition to suggesting many departure points for subsequent inquiry, Prus' (1996) statement also constitutes a frame for more explicitly conceptualizing people's emotional experiences in comparative, trans-contextual terms.

Aristotle may have focused primarily on speakers who more routinely operate in public arenas but the emotions of anger and calm, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, kindness and insconsideration, pity and indignation, and envy and emulation — that he so cogently addresses — are of exceptional relevance for examining the ways that people learn about, define, express their viewpoints and interests, and enter into extended arrays of interchanges with others in virtually all realms of human group life.21

Given the conceptual depth that Aristotle provides in his analysis of emotionality, Rhetoric suggests a great many points of inquiry into the ways that people may define, comprehend, assess, and potentially shape (promote, neutralize, and more directly contest) the affective states that others experience as well as the commitments auditors (as targets) make to particular viewpoints and lines of activity.22

Moreover, because his material was developed in another place and time, Aristotle's analysis of emotionality represents a resource of exceptional value for more comprehensive trans-contextual and trans-historical comparative analyses of influence work and emotionality, as well as the interconnectedness of these two highly consequential features of human group life.

Scholars interested in the matters of emotionality and influence work, as well as the ways in which the contested realities of community life take place on a day-to-day basis, will find a conceptual/analytic treasure chest of great value in Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Still, given the affinities of Aristotle's approach to the study of human knowing and acting with the American pragmatist tradition associated with George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer, there is even more to be gained for students of the human

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20 Those familiar with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Blumer (1969) will recognize the basic affinities of their positions on studying instances and utilizing comparative analysis with those of Aristotle on these matters — as suggested also in Prus (1996; 1997; 1999; 2003b; 2007b), Prus and Grills (2003), and Prus and Mitchell (2009).

21 As an extension of some of these notions, it would seem instructive to examine people's experiences as adjudicators, claimants, defendants, victims, and third-party associates in instances of influence work — asking about their involvements, activities, and emotional experiences “before, during, and after” encounters in particular instances of contested reality.

22 Indeed, it should not be assumed that these other (seemingly background) participants are the mere targets of the more visible speakers but may actively assume roles as tacticians in initiating and otherwise entering into the developmental flows of the interchanges at hand. See Prus (1999) for a fuller statement “on the interchangeability of target and tactician roles.”

23 In addition to those assuming roles as agents of influence in political, judicial, and evaluative settings, Aristotle's depiction of emotionality also seems highly pertinent to studies of those working as entertainers, educators, service workers, marketers and salespeople, managers and administrators, and religious leaders, as well as those involved in more casual realms (e.g., love, friendship, recreation) of human association.
condition when Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is integrated with the theoretical, methodological, and ethnographic resources of Chicago-style symbolic interactionism.

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**References**


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**Russian Wives in America: A Sketchy Portrait**

**Abstract** As more and more people around the globe join the transnational marriage market, marriage is becoming an increasingly global affair. Yet, transnational marriage migration has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. The present study is focused on post-migration experiences of twenty female marriage migrants from the former Soviet Union married to the U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents. Through participant observation, the present study investigates the issues related to transnational partner choice and immigrant adjustment of these women. While the majority of informants identified the lack of local marriageable men as the major push factor, women tended to differ significantly with respect to the factors important for their choice of partner. While some stressed the importance of ethnicity and race of their spouse, others did not. The most important finding is that, in order to legitimize their marriage and resist gender oppression both in the domestic and public domains, women produced discourses shaped by the mainstream gender ideology that stigmatizes transnational marriage migrants.

**Keywords** Transnational Mixed Marriages; Russian-American Couples; Participant Observation

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On a global scale, East and South-East Asia lead in the number of transnational marriage immigrants and emigrants (Charsley and Shaw 2006; Hays 2011; Kim 2011). In South Korea, for example, transnational marriages account for more than 30% of all new marriages (Kim 2011). In the U.S. too, Asian women, particularly those from the Philippines, dominate bride immigration (Scholes 1999; Jones and Shen 2008; Lauser 2008). Existing work on transnational correspondence marriages, not surprisingly, has focused on Asian mail-order brides and specifically on the Philippines as the major sending country (see, for example, Manderson and Jolly 1997; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Lauser 2008). However, the global marriage markets are becoming increasingly diversified (Constable 2003). Particularly, by the mid-1990s, women from the former Soviet Union became more visible among transnational marriage migrants in the U.S. (Scholes 1999; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Yet, very little evidence has been accumulated regarding the post-migration experiences of transnational marriage migrants from the former Soviet Union.

The present study aims to map unexplored terrain in the literature on Russian female marriage migrants in the U.S. Using grounded theory, data were collected through participant observation, arguably the least intrusive method of sociological research (Matthews 2005). This research strategy enabled me to enter into the daily lives of Russian women and offer an intimate glimpse into the social life of their extended circle of friends and family. I developed close relationships with more than a dozen of the transnational couples whose marital relationships I was able to follow in over a 4-year period. They put me in contact with their countrywomen. Consequently, the data were collected through a snowball recruitment technique wherein existing participants are encouraged in turn to refer members of their social networks to the study. Evidence suggests snowball sampling is an efficient strategy increasingly used with hard to reach, ethnically diverse populations. As a result of snowball recruitment, the final sample size included twenty female adults born in the former Soviet Union who are, or have been, married to the U.S. nationals.

I first became aware of the mixed Russian-American families while enriching personal friendships with the Russian community on the U.S.-Mexico border. This “immersion” into the Russian community allowed me to observe how particular circumstances influenced self-representations and post-migration identities of my informants over time. Through personal contact, I obtained information about women’s lives before marriage (e.g., prior educational and professional experiences), the process of finding a spouse, married life, family relations (including relationships with in-laws), community lives, and their perceptions of transnational marriage migration. This information is presented in the current paper with the hope that it will add to the literature on transnational migration, particularly as pertains to the questions of partner choice and post-migration adjustment. Data was analyzed inductively to identify the most prevalent thematic values, and then coded using NVivo – qualitative analysis software.

**Literature Review**

While the probability of people of different ethnic backgrounds to intermarry has been a widely discussed topic (especially in the assimilation research), the traditional focus of the literature on
interethic marriages is on couples of the same national-
yity (Kalmin 1998; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). In this 
respect, interethic marriage has been 
traditionally analyzed as a benchmark for assess-
ing the level of assimilation achieved by different 
ethnic groups (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Rodri-
guez-Garcia 2006). Nowadays, many interethnic 
marriges are intertransnational marriages in the 
sense that they unite people of different national 
origins. Conversely, not all transnational marri-
eges are interethic marriages – some transnational 
marriges are ethnically endogamous. These mar-
riages unite a migrant “importing” a marriage 
partner from his or her country of origin. This type 
of marriage is common in many Western Euro-
pean countries among religious minorities (Beck-
Gernsheim 2007). Although intra-ethnic marriages 
constitute a significant share in all transnational 
(cross-country) marriages, they are the subject of 
a different discourse, not deemed relevant for the 
present exercise (for a discussion on the latter, see 
Beck-Gernsheim 2007).

It is generally agreed that globalization has been 
the primary reason for the proliferation of trans-
national marriage (Barbara 1989; Constable 2005; 
Charsley and Shaw 2006; Castles and Miller 2009).
The age of globalization has precipitated the ero-
sion of traditional norms, including those related 
to the centrality of nationhood. Many people aban-
don national identity in exchange for tangible and 
non-tangible benefits offered by globalization. 
A new class of people emerged – those who have 
ties to networks of people and places across the 
globe rather than to a specific geographic location. 
As global travel for leisure, education, and employ-
ment increases, so does the number of transnation-
al marriages. The Internet and social networking 
sites have enabled intimate relationships to devel-
lop over geographical distance. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that in the age of globalization an ever-
growing number of people are increasingly marry-
ing across national boundaries.

Although globalization may seem to offer an op-
portunity and equal ground for everyone to enter 
the global marriage market, it would be naive to 
assume that transnational marriage flows are 
geographically gender-balanced, or that they are 
affected by the global migration flows driven by 
the tremendous power imbalance between rich 
and poor countries (and regions). Generally, trans-
national marriage is driven by the needs of certain 
groups of people to widen domestic marriage mar-
kets in terms of the number and the characteristics 
of potential partners (Taraban 2007; Jones and Shen 
2008). According to Constable (2005), a pattern of “global hypergamy” emerges by which men from 
wealthier countries marry women from poorer 
countries. The term “hypergamy” is used by Con-
stable in the sense that women utilize transnation-
al marriage as “vehicle” to migrate to a more de-
veloped country, but this geographic mobility does 
not necessarily lead to their upward social or econ-
omic mobility. In fact, it is much more common to 
see middle-class women from a less affluent coun-
try or region marrying men from a wealthier coun-
try or region who are poorer, less educated, and/or 
resident in rural areas (Constable 2005). One of the 
arguments proposed to identify the major pull 
factor in the host country or region is the existence 
of a strong male demand, in one form or another, 
for “traditional” women in the face of modernity 
(Manderson and Jolly 1997; Suzuki 2005; Thai 2005; 
Taraban 2007). In the U.S., for example, like in 
many other Western countries, women are increas-
ingly refusing to take sole responsibility for nur-
turing and care-giving household tasks while men 
are not taking up their share of them. While many 
middle and upper class American women venture 
into formerly male-coded work, the domestic work 
still remains female-coded. This domestic work is 
now increasingly taken over by women from econ-
omically disadvantaged countries or communi-
ties. However, many American men seek not only 
for domestic servants to fulfill the aforementioned 
tasks but also women who would be willing to per-
form exclusively female “reproductive” labor – that 
of childbearing. The case of the U.S. may be unique 
in a sense that here, as nowhere else, there seemed 
to be a constant demand for white wives (Ekeh 1974; 
Rosenfeld 2005). Given the persistence of racial hi-
erarchies in the U.S., it is not surprising that an 
affluent American man contents himself with hir-
ing a female domestic worker of color while still 
valuing to “import” a white wife from Russia. This 
is exactly what I observed in my study. These are, 
however, isolated cases. The number of men in the 
U.S. and elsewhere who could afford to have a paid 
domestic aid is limited.

Further, the majority of men would like to have 
a spouse who will perform domestic and cleaning 
duties under the conjugal contract in addition to 
being an unpaid reproductive worker. The accu-
mulated evidence demonstrates that, in the search 
for a spouse, the majority of men look up to their 
mothers as role models (Levant 1996; Kay 1997; 
Freeman 2005). However, their mothers had been 
raised in times when gender norms were strictly 
observed and all women were expected to be caring 
mothers and good housekeepers. More generally, 
whether in America or Asia, men who are con-
cerned that women in their country are too inde-
pendent, too assertive, or too “modern” may prefer 
to marry a more “traditional” woman from abroad 
who is often assumed to be more submissive (Con-
stable 2003; Freeman 2005).

As stated above, East Asia is the leading region 
on the global market for “mail-order brides,” as 
well as “mail-order husbands.” Transnational 
marrige migration flows originate in and circu-
late within this region. Consequently, the over-
whelming majority of literature on transnational 
marrige refers to and draws evidence from this 
region. While justifying my focus on “Russian-
American” transnational marriages, I argue that 
generalizing about all transnational marriages 
from the literature on Asian “mail-order brides” is 
difficult, if not impossible. The experiences of 
Asian and Russian “mail-order brides” differ 
more than their regions (and countries) of ori-
gin and destinations differ from each other. Ut-
imately, the way how both Asian and Russian 
transnational female marriage migrants construct 
their identities in the U.S. largely depends on the 
context of reception, which Portes and Rumbaut 
(2001) define to include racial stratification, spatial 
segregation, and government policies.

Until now, there have been only a few studies of 
Russian-American marriages, the most known of 
which is, arguably, that of Vissón (2001). Vissón’s 
study delivers an insightful picture not only of in-
tercultural family life but also of the cultural dif-
frences that can arise in relationships of that type. 
Despite its merits, that also include a large sample 
(more than 100 couples) and the depth of the quali-
tative work, too many of Vissón’s interpretations 
disclose the author’s familiarity with the world 
of the now defunct Soviet Union rather than the
post-Soviet milieu. “Marxist ideology and historical materialism were so deeply etched into the minds of the population that even the most virulently anti-communist Russians were affected by the Soviet mindset” (Visson 2001:197). Much has changed in ten years that have passed since her book was published. A new generation of pragmatic, ambitious, and materialistic young people, oblivious of their recent historical past, has matured. Some of them, not only but mainly women, entered the transnational marriage market.

A more recent study by Johnson (2007) tracks only a few stories, some of them are fictional. As such, this study is a combination of memoir, fiction, and journalistic ethnography. It lacks in-text citations and has minimal endnotes. This study, however, makes an important observation that challenges a view of “mail-order brides” as de facto economic migrants (Manderson and Jolly 1997; Kojima 2001; Wang and Chang 2002). Johnson (2007) argues one of the most decisive factors for women to search for a partner abroad and thus, to emigrate from Russia is a catastrophic lack of “marriageable” men. Johnson’s informants (who had recently emigrated to the U.S. as “wives-to-be”) conveyed that there is a shrinking pool of Russian men who meet their expectations of what a man should be. For Johnson’s informants, the lack of marriageable men was primarily defined in terms of earning power and employment. Russian women in Johnson’s study would like to have financial security and live in employment. Russian women in Johnson’s study primarily defined in terms of earning power and financial security. They would not entertain the idea of staying at home, and have unrealistic high standards for local men they would deign to marry. It is worth mentioning that, in addition to the aforementioned emphasis on low earning power, Johnson’s (2007) informants also point to Russian men’s extremely high alcohol consumption, high tobacco smoking, and risky sexual behaviors, features incompatible with the image of a good and caring husband. Consequently, premised on financial adequacy, “male marriageability” thesis is inadequate to address the problems of patriarchic norms guiding male and female expectations on the transnational marriage market and, as such, is too narrow to explain the “supply” of brides from the post-Soviet states. Seen more broadly from the perspective of a gender strain paradigm (e.g., Pleck 1995; Levant 1996; Levant et al. 2003), “male marriageability” crisis in Russia has parallels, without presuming a homogenizing effect, with many regional and local marriage markets, such as South-East Asia or African-American marriage market in the U.S. African-American men, for example, were very much in the public eye owing to their conformity to traditional masculinity behaviors and, as a consequence, high death rate and stagnated life expectancy (Wilson 1987; Lichter et al. 1992). Additionally, common to the aforementioned locales are the patterns of gender role conflict experienced by men (Wilson 1987; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Jones and Shen 2008). According to Levant and colleagues (2003), Russian men may be at risk for both dysfunction strain and discrepancy strain, which has been known to be a result of adherence to masculinity stereotypes. Russian men receive contradictory messages about their own roles within society. Following the media that promote healthy behavior, they are encouraged to abandon risky masculine behaviors. However, when they deviate from the established norms, they become the subject of public ridicule (Levant et al. 2003).

In light of Johnson’s (2007) study perhaps a cautionary note would be appropriate here. There is a demographic component of what appears to be a “deficit of men” in Russia. It should be mentioned that the pattern of marriage in the former U.S.S.R. is younger than in the U.S. (Perelli-Harris 2005; Hoem et al. 2009; Ryabov 2009). The majority of the former U.S.S.R., with the exception of Baltic states, is situated on the east of Hajnal’s line running roughly from Trieste (Italy) to St. Petersburg (Russian Federation) and attributable to the well-known study by Hajnal (1965). While examining historical change in marriage patterns, Hajnal (1965) noticed that in European societies lying on the west of Hajnal’s line marriage was relatively late and a significant portion of individuals never married. On the east of the line the norm was early and universal marriage and a relatively fast transition from marriage to the birth of the first child (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; Ryabov 2009). This divergence of marriage pattern along Hajnal’s line persists to the present day. Despite the economic and social upheaval that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the spread of westernized modes of behavior, the young pattern of family formation is still in place in countries on the east of the line (Perelli-Harris 2005). The caveat is that after the age of 25 it becomes very difficult for an unmarried woman to find a suitable local partner. The divorce rate in Russia approximates the one in the U.S., but the remarriage rate among men is significantly higher than among women (Hoem et al. 2009). Taking only demographic processes into account, one may notice that mate selection for women is highly constrained by the availability of potential partners within one’s group.

The present study was designed as a critical update of Visson’s (2001) study and an expansion of Johnson’s (2007) study, which deals with a limited number of cases. Like the two aforementioned studies, this research is based on qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews. Yet, it is markedly different from them not only in terms of time but also in terms of space and content. The main difference is that the mixed couples examined in this study were situated at the “(semi)periphery” as compared to the “core” of Russian-American unions investigated by Visson (2001) and Johnson (2007). Using the metaphor that alludes to world system theory (e.g., Wallerstein 2004), I attempt to highlight the fact that both Visson (2001) and Johnson (2007) worked with ethnically Russian women (primarily from big cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg) and white Anglo men. The ideas drawn from the analyses of these unions are not fully applicable to the explanations of cultural differences between the transnational couples analyzed hereto. In the current study, women, in their majority, were not ethnically Russian. Some of them were not even East-Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarusian). Equally so, not all (ex)husbands of “Russian” wives were truly “American.” In fact, roughly one third of them were the third-country nationals who were granted permanent residency only recently. Moreover, with respect to ethnicity, in their majority the U.S.-born American husbands were Latino (the largest group), Black, Asian, or White ethnics. Consequently, some Russian-American unions examined in this study were not only interethnic but also interracial.
Theoretical Background

Although the amount of research on transnational marriages in different cultural and geographical settings is growing, little studies have specifically looked at migration, culture, and gender through the lens of intersectionality (Nash 2008). Grounded in intersectional interrogations of power, privilege, and lived experience, intersectionality defies one-dimensional frameworks that prioritize gender, ethnicity, class, immigrant status, or other aspects of identity. These frameworks are deemed to be insufficient in grasping the complexity of transnational couples’ lived experiences and identities (Crenshaw 1991; Yuval-Davis 2006). As a theoretical framework, intersectionality is open enough to highlight the simultaneous functioning of multiple categories that influence people’s experiences, and the multiple identities that individuals themselves claim. It views constructs such as gender, ethnicity, and class as fluid and flexible, as being shaped at the intersections of various elements of social location which are continuously being negotiated within everyday relationships. It is on this basis that intersectionality contests the essentialist assumption that all women are the same or oppressed in the same way (McCall 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006; Nash 2008).

The intersectionality approach is of use in the present study because Russian women’s experiences are non-additive, unique, and cannot be predicted by simply combining the experiences of being a “woman,” “immigrant,” “mail-order bride,” “Russian,” etc. Because of certain life cycle events, such as migration in our case, certain social locations can become more salient in specific situations. A systematic analysis of Russian women’s post-migration experiences within the intersectional framework may add to our understanding of how the social location on power dimensions is shaped through interactions with the environment, in this case – American society. The recognition of power is necessary to work within the intersectionality framework because multiple social identities are involved (i.e., ethnicity, gender, social class) and therefore, multiple degrees of power differentials interact to create a unique social experience – especially for Russian women who embody a privileged race identity (white) while inhabiting marginalized gender and mobility categories (women and immigrants).

The intersectional framework can also provide a sensitizing tool enabling us to uncover stigmatizing and disciplinary practices in the host society. These stigmatizing practices imposed by the state can penetrate down into the level of family. Prior research revealed, for example, that the exercise of the state power is evident in imposing deviant sexual identities on “mail-order brides,” as those trying to sabotage “normal” intra-ethnic male-female relationships (Nagel 2003). The status of a dependent of the husband – imposed by the state – makes “mail-order brides” vulnerable and isolated in family relationships. Being aware of their (self)imposed deviant identities, these women are reluctant to get outside help as they are embarrassed about their circumstances (Oum 2003; Arieli 2007). Therefore, they are forced to craft bargaining strategies in the family to raise their conjugal decision-making power.

Despite intersectionality’s indisputable contribution to feminist studies (and the present study is intended as a contribution to this body of knowledge), utilizing the intersectional framework is methodologically problematic. I will make use of the approach introduced by McCall (2005) who identified intercategorical and intracategorical approaches to the study of intersectionality. Intracategorical complexity seeks to highlight diversity within groups. It systematically compares social locations at the intersection of single dimensions of multiple variables. Intercategorical complexity focuses on relations of inequality among already constituted groups. Whereas intracategorical complexity analyzes the intersection of a subset of categories of multiple variables, intercategorical analyses examine the full set of categories of multiple variables. McCall’s (2005) typology significantly contributes to the structuring of the field and enhances comparability across studies. The actual qualitative studies, however, demonstrate that reality is often more complex and fluid than clear-cut typologies and thus, call for the use of both an intracategorical and intercategorical analysis (Yuval-Davis 2006).

Three different contexts surfaced as salient reference groups to whom my informants turn in order to continuously evaluate their relative ranks: Russian women compare themselves both with other Russian women (intracategorical), as well as with American women, and Russian men (interracial). In the first part of the presentation of results I mainly use an intersectional analysis to highlight the diversity within the group of women (intracategorical). The second part of the results concentrates more on the power relations between constituted groups and how these relations change over time (intercategorical).

Method of the Study

As stated above, the present study employed participant observation to study post-migration experiences of Russian women, and the data were collected through snowball sampling. The main disadvantage of the participant observation method is that the data collection is time-consuming. Also, interpretation and, especially, generalizability of the data are difficult. In fact, the data collection period took four years while the snowball sample is not representative from the statistical point of view. However, it is only through this methodology that the researcher like me may gain access to social groups who would otherwise not consent to be studied. It is through this methodology that the researcher can experience and then portray social lives of marginalized groups, like “mail-order brides.” Moreover, according to Matthews (2005), data collected through participant observation are ideal in qualitative research. This is because to understand fully the participants’ lifeworld, the researcher must have an intimate familiarity with the social world in which informants act. Hence, the main goal of a participant-observer is to achieve rapport with informants. Only through rapport is the researcher able to provide the type of deep insight into the lives of informants from an insider’s perspective.

It is also important that the present study used covert participant observation method wherein informants adjust to the community role of the investigator and are unaware of the fact that their behavior is being treated as information. The study has been approved by the local Institutional Review Board and it was decided that written, informed consent may not be necessary and may, in fact, negatively impact the quality of the research. The choice of covert observation is a contentious one, but it is a tried and tested one by the researchers studying marginalized populations (e.g., Luehrmann 2004;
Freeman 2005; Lyons and Ford 2008). The unique context of the lives of Russian women demands a redefinition of the conventional ethical barriers to uncover stories of their lives, so as to prevent a perpetuation of the stereotyping, stigmatization, and marginalization they face on a day-to-day basis. Further, covert observation avoids problems of observer effect, the conception that individuals’ behavior may change if they know they are being studied.

I met some of my informants through random encounters at informal co-ethnic social gatherings and celebrations held together (birthday, engagement, Christmas), religious services, and community events. In time, social interaction was initiated by attending church, joining a club, returning visits of neighbors, and, later, spending social evenings with American-Russian families. Russian women who I already knew introduced me to other members of their network. The circle of my informants grew very rapidly and I was able to establish congenial rapsorts with them. As an insider/outsider, I was privy to intimate talk and thoughts shared by women. I visited people’s homes, observing family interactions. Participating and observing daily routines of the informants allowed me to have an intimate knowledge of their family interactions. Participating and observing daily routines of the informants allowed me to have a full picture of the life of these women, their interactions with their husbands’ kin, local community, and the American society as such.

Results

Pre-Migration Experience

The transnational marriages described in this study resulted not only from marital preferences but also from opportunity. A few Russian women found their future partners in their immediate social world. Two Russian women met their future spouses while studying abroad, as part of educational exchange schemes. Yet, two other women met their partners in Russia where these men (one of whom was a Mexican citizen back then) worked or studied. However, the majority of transnational couples relied on the services of third party intermediaries, such as matchmaking agencies. One woman said she made a conscious effort to find a foreign partner via the Internet (and she did), but shunned away from marriage agencies, contact advertisements, or other intermediaries. In general, the majority of informants were looking for a “mail-order husband” through marriage agencies. All women who met their future husbands with the help of intermediaries corresponded with them via mail, telephone, and/or other electronic means prior to seeing them in person. Despite society’s first-blanch judgment towards correspondence marriages as unstable (Constable 2003; Oum 2003), these marriages (sixteen out of twenty in this sample) turned out to be more stable than those marriages whose partners knew each other in real life before or instead of becoming “pen pals.” All but one marriage whose partners met “traditionally” (i.e., in person) lasted for less than 3 years. In contrast, the majority of correspondence marriages in the sample were still stable at the beginning of the research period. The average length of the correspondence marriages, although varied, was about 6 years at the outset of the study.

It should be noted here that finding a spouse abroad with the help of intermediaries is laden with numerous risks because of information scarcity about the prospective partner. In the absence of lengthy face-to-face interactions that characterize normal courtship, potential brides and grooms are wary of being conned. Grooms are aware of “sham marriages” that describe a criminal phenomenon of people marrying for the benefit of legal status for one and money for the other without planning a family life together. This finding is consistent with the existing literature on transnational brides originating from the former Soviet Union (Laehrmann 2004; Taraban 2007). Brides are aware of physical and emotional abuse that many “mail-order brides” may experience. Indeed, marriage as a migration strategy puts them into a vulnerable position – that of the dependent. This bad situation is arguably made worse by the exercise of state power – because most countries mandate a period of time in which a divorce leads to the foreign spouse losing her or his right of residency. In the U.S. this period is two years. Because of the risks involved in transnational correspondence marriages all but two women in the sample were visited by their future spouses in their respective countries prior to coming to the U.S. These visits lasted from a few weeks to several months. As respondents told their stories and shared their experiences, I found out that a few men came to the bride’s country several times.

It was not uncommon for couples to get married in the bride’s country of residency. In fact, fourteen women in the sample registered their marriages in their own countries before coming to the U.S. These women came to the U.S. as permanent residents because their husbands had petitioned on their behalf immediately after they married. The rest of women (six out of twenty) arrived in the U.S. on fiancée (K-1 nonimmigrant) visas and married their prospective husbands after arrival within a short period of time (1-2 years). Immediately after marriage, these women got permanent residency.

Transnational Partner Choice

When it comes to justifying a choice of a foreign spouse, a dearth of local marriageable men, who conform to the ideal gender role, is, possibly, the most identifiable theme in my informants’ accounts. My informants universally point at a “lack of good husbands,” thereby referring to the qualitative shortcomings of Russian men, such as alcoholism, adultery, and psychological problems because of the transition to market capitalism and work pressure. To the women, Russian men had not dealt well with the challenges of post-socialist marketization; they were too lazy and depressed, and were unlikely to provide the material and emotional support ideal husbands would provide. The caveat, though, is that given the harshness of the social and economic climate in Russia, traditional male roles are supported not only by men but also by women (Gal and Kligman 2000; Levant et al. 2003; Taraban 2007; Zabyelina 2009). As I have noticed, the identification of “traditional” masculinity with economic activity and “traditional” femininity with nurturing care was often considered the “natural” gender order by the majority of my informants.

Two groups of Russian women can be identified on the basis of their reflections on the basic question of the choice of a foreign partner. Being aware of the stigma attached to “mail-order brides,” and specifically of the fact that they were generally assumed to marry for pragmatic and economic reasons, all Russian women universally stressed masculine identity features of their husbands and, certainly,
not financial reasons. Yet, the experience of being married to an American husband, being it a positive or negative one, had an effect on the women’s perceptions of themselves and American men in general. Those whose marriage to American men was not a happy one (in their own judgment), and especially those who had been divorced, tended to emphasize the coincidence of their marriage with a foreigner. These women repeatedly told their acquaintances that they were not especially attracted by an American husband. Similarly, they denied the importance of their “Russian feminality” in their American husbands’ partner choice. According to them, their husbands’ choice was motivated by more personal characteristics rather than by those of the broad category of “Russian women” with the stereotypes attached to it (for a more detailed discussion of “Russian feminality” see Kay 1997). For women who were not satisfied with their past/present marital relations, the prestige, status, and assumed wealth associated with the U.S. residence were not the primary motives for marrying an American man. Quite the opposite, some informants stressed that the fact of his being a foreigner only complicated their marriage decision. They would be eager to marry “any man” who could provide a stable future. While embracing the notion that “all men are alike,” these women did acknowledge, however, that the lack of partners in the local marriage market encouraged them marrying abroad. Yet, canons of patriarchy were consistently iterated to describe “the ideal husband.” The stress was placed on such qualities of potential partner as financial security, healthy behaviors, and physical attractiveness. Also, noteworthy were numerous references to virility and chivalry as the characteristics of “the ideal husband.”

Many of the women who constituted this group were previously divorced in their home countries, lonely, and had difficulty in meeting eligible men in their home country. Many of them hinted at the fact that they were not in a position to be “choosy” as local women. The testimonials of the third-party co-nationals also confirm that some women would be considered unmarriageable outcasts in their countries of origin, who end up orienting their conjugal prospect towards a foreign partner in the hope that marriage will establish their normative social position. They daydreamed of, fantasized about, discussed, spent long evenings wishfully planning, and aspired towards “settled, married life” with local, not foreign men.

The other group of women construct their preference for an American partner around the intersection of ethnicity/nationality, thereby contrasting local and American men. The important observation is that the way these women interpret their transnational partner choice is related to their spouses’ choice for a foreign spouse. When reflecting on their decision to marry a foreigner, women compare themselves with men in their country of origin and with American women. They also frequently reflect on their husbands’ choice of marrying a Russian woman, hereby contrasting themselves with American women. For these women, the dissatisfaction with and vilification of local men comes hand-in-hand with the idealization of foreign partners. Local men are described as bossy, stubborn, egotistic, and unable to provide material comfort whereas American men are perceived as liberal, cosmopolitan, and rich.

What I did not expect to find was that the motivation to marry outside of their culture and race was explained not in terms of money, prestige, and status but sexual image. Many Russian women were attracted sexually to their partners in the first place because of their perceived sexual difference with Russian men who were commonly portrayed as “tastless,” “unsophisticated,” and “sexually ignorant.” This finding is tentatively consistent with the literature showing that selection of an ethnically different partner may amend, as it were, failures in erotic affairs with local partners (Barbara 1989; Manderson and Jolly 1997; Rodriguez-Garcia 2006). As it was the case of all interracial marriages I observed, the qualities Russian women admire in their Black and Latino mates speak volumes about the importance of sexuality in transnational partner choice. This issue that I raise here, however, is not just about sexuality but the sexuality of the dark-skinned “colonized other” (Spivak 1999). This kind of sexuality is rooted in visceral feelings about dark-skinned bodies fuelled by the myths commonly shared by all white people regardless of ethnic origin. This is not surprising as imaginational processes and erotic representations are known to play a crucial role in partner choice processes (Veevers 1988; Giddens 1992; Visson 2001; Lyons and Ford 2008). Yet, the sexual subjectivities of Russian women in interethnic, and especially interracial, marriages were masked by ambivalence which is constituted by the conjunction of two selves – the colonized and the colonizer herself being colonized. In the case of my informants, the ambivalence of the sexual subjectivity derives from the lack of a clear distinction between the identity of the colonizer and the identity of the colonized. The majority of Russian women did not perceive themselves as “the colonized other,” yet, by pulling together repertoires from multiple cultures, they understood that their whiteness makes them a desirable commodity and they can capitalize on it on the transnational marriage market. They also understood that they fitted neatly into the racial hierarchies of the U.S. and might be less readily recognized as “mail-order brides” when appearing with their husbands in public.

As long as the idealization of foreign partners was a common leitmotif, a few women acknowledged that they built up their marriage strategy by looking for foreign husbands. They also explicated their marriage as related to American men’s preference for Russian women. While comparing themselves with American women, they commented that American women lost a sense of femininity desired by American men. In Russian women’s opinion, the American side of the transnational marriage market exhibit a dynamic, somewhat reminiscent, picture of Russia. In American cases, however, the “marriageability” crisis refers to the crisis of womanhood. Disillusionment with the emancipation of American women stimulates American men to search for a partner abroad. American women are portrayed by Russian women as unreasonably demanding of men’s money and indulgence and unwilling to reciprocate with their time or attention as a “true woman” should. Hence, American men are forced to look for partners whose feminine quality allows them to achieve their masculinity.

In legitimizing their marriage and migration decisions, Russian women picture themselves as a potential answer to the “care deficit” problem. They present themselves as having specific characteristics that American men are longing for and that American women appear to have lost. While representing themselves as more feminine, beautiful, home loving, respectful towards men, and
less demanding, they rationalize their husbands’ choice of a Russian wife. These stereotypical images and characteristics attached to them fit well within the prevailing post-Soviet gender ideology, with a strong emphasis on motherhood and a revival of the “male breadwinner” family model (Gal and Kligman 2000; Luehrmann 2004). Equally important is that Russian women motivate transnational partner choice by presenting a rather stereotypical image of themselves and foreign husbands that strikingly resembles their representation on matching websites (for more information on matching agencies see Kay 1997; Johnson 2007; Zabyelina 2009). The traditional self-representation of Russian women, discursively constructed in comparison with native women, perpetuates the stereotypes of matchmaking industry. This finding points to a familiar pattern, one that is by no means exclusive to the Russian-American marriages, of utilizing matchmaking industry discourse by transnational spouses to rationalize and negotiate their marginalized existence (Wang and Chang 2002; Constable 2003; Piper and Rocos 2003; Suzuki 2005). In part, these representations derive from the images the society as a whole has towards “mail-order brides” and the transnational marriages, images that were constructed by the media, popular literature, various state policies, academic scholarship, and the very actors of transnational marriage market. The paradox is that, while adopting gender transnational matchmaking discourse, Russian women seem to be unaware that this discourse can be used against them. Yet, many of them reported that the stigma of “mail-order bride” haunted many relationships. The term was used by Russian women’s spouses against them in the context of deportation threats. The term, as used casually by friends, neighbors, or colleagues, unfairly ostracized American men and their “imported” spouses and had led many of them to provide fictitious stories of how they met their partners rather than engage in repeated defensive conversations about the transnational marriages.

**Socio-Cultural Adaptation**

The prior part of the analysis demonstrated that apparent variations and inconsistencies in women’s explanations of the transnational partner’s choice can be understood through the relationships in which women placed themselves (i.e., sometimes in comparison with American women, Russian men, other Russian women) and the stigmatizing context through which they are constructed. When explaining why they married, my informants stressed both their more traditional orientation than American women and the lack of marriageable men in their home country. These representations of self and other stood at the intersection of ethnicity and gender and revealed that women were caught in a predicament—at times they describe themselves as longing for more equal gender relations, while at other times—they stress their more “feminine” characteristics and search for an ideal husband who fits into a traditional male image.

In comparison with the motivations for their choice of an American husband, the intersection of gender and ethnicity takes on a distinct meaning when describing experienced post-migration identities in the U.S. The post-migration identities of women encountered were formed, for the most part, under the influence of two milieus—domestic and communal. In some way, these milieus provided different paths to cultural citizenship in the host society, with some being short and speedy, while others are tortuous and lengthy. At times, in these two milieus, my informants performed as natives and at times—as immigrants.

For most of the time, the domestic milieu Russian women inhabited assumed the cultural characteristics of the host country. The domestic milieu and the ties to husband and his family embedded in it provided Russian women with relatively rapid and direct access to open social networks (bridging social capital, in Granovetter’s terms [1983]), where access would have normally taken years, decades, and even generations to negotiate. As it was frequently mentioned by the informants, their husbands’ friends did not always react positively to the Russian spouse, but the presence of a partner’s kin and kith networks were central in opening up the social networks of the American nation.

However, the interactions with husband’s kin were not always positive. Family tensions were common. The main source of these tensions was Russian women’s commitments to natal kin. For example, some Russian women wanted to invite their parents to visit them in the U.S. and/or to send them gifts. This caused family conflicts in some cases because husband’s relatives felt that the Russian woman’s family draws resources away from the nuclear family. Some Russian women pressured their husbands to live as far as possible from in-laws as a means of staying away from unwanted family obligations and evading conflicts with in-laws. The relationship most prone to conflict was that between the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law. Many mother-in-laws just did not accept their Russian daughter-in-law’s for the sheer reason of her daughter-in-law foreignness. For those Russian women who divorced their American husbands, conflicts with in-laws were cited as one of the most common reasons of divorce.

As immigration researchers agree (Berry 1992; Ataca and Berry 2002; Aroian, Norris, and Chiang 2003), marital satisfaction is one of the expressions of socio-cultural adjustment that is acquiring fluency in the English language and developing an identity corresponding to the mainstream culture. Across different themes, which the informants’ stories juxtaposed, the connection between marital satisfaction and socio-cultural adjustment turned out to be a salient one. Indeed, those Russian women who experienced happiness and fulfillment in their marital relationships enjoyed overall better socio-cultural adjustment, including better communicative skills and, as a consequence, a larger circle of American friends, than those who were dissatisfied with their marriage. I recognize here, however, that the apparent association between marital satisfaction and socio-cultural adjustment can be, at least, partially explained by the selection of more “adaptable” persons into marriage and migration.

Further, women’s ability to integrate into local community was influenced by the time spent in the U.S. Those who came earlier were able to acquire a larger circle of friends than more recent arrivals. Similarly, those with better communication skills had been more successful in establishing social networks. Certainly, English proficiency upon arrival was helpful in lifting communicative barriers and an important contributing factor to the assimilation process overall. With respect to the baseline level of English language skills, there was a degree of difference among women that I came into contact with. On one extreme, there was one
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In general, informants assigned great importance to the role of the husband in facilitating overall socio-cultural adjustment, mastering the language and “explaining” local culture. Without spousal support Russian women could not order their environment, and consequently – find American folkways intolerably difficult to understand and manage. A few women indicated that the intimate relations with their husbands were the main means whereby they could improve their social conditions in a family. Here, the relations with the husband were instrumental rather than affectionate. Consequently, many women often had to skillfully steer themselves through normative and emotive demands.

The inequality between the spouses in the domestic milieu and Russian women’s vulnerability in comparison with their husbands could be clearly identified as specific conditions of my informants’ marital lives. Although the majority of women would not identify the relationships with their husbands as unequal, third party accounts of female co-nationals clearly pointed out the significant inequality between the partners. In this context, some authors refer to the paradox of transnational marriages (Constable 2005). While transnational marriages are often a strategy that many women embrace in their home countries, they, on the contrary, seem to reinforce the unequal relations the women want to escape from. Although migration obstacles are common to all migrants, marriage migration practices seem to introduce a specific element of inequality, namely, inequality between marriage partners. The power imbalance found in transnational marriages lies not only on gender/income/status dimension but also is reinforced by the “imported” partner’s unfamiliarity with local culture.

The discourse on inequality between Russian women and American men was especially constructed around an intersection with class – it is the high educational level of Russian women and their proclaimed equality to men’s labor market participation in the home country that determined their feelings of “de-emancipation.” According to some respondents, women’s relatively high level of decision-making autonomy in the former Soviet Union makes the decrease in social status in the U.S. even more painful for Russian women than for female migrant partners from countries with less gender equity, for some women, negotiating with the host family the right to obtain some decision-making autonomy appeared to be a pivotal element in the search of social status or even of personal balance. If marital relations between the transnational partners in the U.S. were more equal, more women whom I met would be less acrimonious in negotiating gender relations and might find marriage and family to be more stable. Some of my informants who divorced a husband, or have found themselves in a difficult marriage situation, explained that their dependent status has made their marriage weak.

While the beginning of the study Russian women referred to the equality which existed between the partners, this perceived equality had decreased as their stay in American society continues. They gradually encountered a variety of integration obstacles, like finding a job, obtaining official recognition of their diploma(s), learning a new language, and building up a social network. As some of my informants pointed out, they fell in love with an image, but an image often not corresponding to reality and generating disillusion afterwards. It was easy to notice that, unlike those who came ten or more years ago, the newly arrived Russian women were very much under the influence of the grapevine stories of “stability” abroad, which were contrasted with the “hard life” in Russia. Bitter disappointment awaited those who came with unrealistic expectations. Their lack of competence in and knowledge about the new culture exacerbated the perceived loss of identity. Wrought by unexpected hardship (e.g., bad marital relationship, health issues, social isolation, etc.), many women acknowledged living through the psychological crisis which arose from the clash between lived realities and imaginations, ultimately irreducible to the simple “culture shock.” The conflict between the idealized images before migration and just after arrival, on the one hand, and the reality of mixed couple life, on the other, is a recurrent finding in research on transnational marriages (Manderson and Jolly 1997; Constable 2003; Freeman 2005).

As Table 1 shows (see Appendix), about one half of the Russian-American marriages that my informants ended up in were not successful. Although these data are not generalizable, approximately half of all marriages ended in divorce in the main bride-sending countries represented in the sample (e.g., Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus), which is also quite true about the host country (the U.S.A.). The major source of marital instability in Russian-American families, as the communication with my informants revealed, is the conflict of expectations about domestic roles. The majority of Russian women were eager to find more equality in the domestic milieu while their transnational husbands expected them to assume the roles of traditional wives. Domestic roles were not so much rejected by my informants as deemed insufficient – they were not enough to provide financial and intellectual satisfaction. It should be noted here that all Russian women, at least for some time in the U.S., were stay-at-home housewives, none of them were initially active in the professional domain. Nevertheless, all informants, with no exception, had accumulated years of working experience back home. There was a range of the previous occupational statuses in the group, from the vaunted position of medical doctor to the more “pink-color” of one a salesperson or a secretary. There were even those who were quite successful in the business world. One woman (now self-employed) used to be an owner of a matchmaking agency in Russia. The majority of Russian women I spoke with had college degrees and were yearning to mobilize college education as a crucial class identity marker independent of income. Without recognition of their foreign credentials, nevertheless, it was very difficult for them to find employment. Despite attempts to gain jobs only a few succeeded.

The majority of Russian women were not prepared to experience downward social mobility, particularly the fact that their professional and other societal-level qualities were devalued. A few women, nevertheless, were seemingly satisfied with their housewife status and even despised those women who worked. They also commented on the fact that
Russian Wives in America: A Sketchy Portrait

Igor Ryabov

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Russian immigrant women’s agency is their intense pride in their own culture and language. Russian women participated in every community activity that could promote their heritage. By saying that Russian women express agency I do not wish to ignore the structural and ideological factors that constrain their choices. Yet, given their circumstances, Russian women made choices and negotiated their relationships with the husband and his kin in the domestic milieu. In the community milieu, Russian women were able to connect with each other and develop a social network of their own. Here, their agency became manifest primarily through the sense of belonging to an imagined community where they felt free of constraints imposed on them by the host society and their husband’s family (similar findings have been reported by Constable 2003; Charsley and Shaw 2006; Arieli 2007). Even though not been encouraged by their husbands to be out and participate in networking, my informants figured out some strategies to escape from their “private space” (domestic milieu) and find their real “public space” (community milieu). Given the fact that the majority of Russian women, as stated above, were not active in the professional domain, the ethnic community became the core of their public space. Because many women felt that the social resources they possessed in their country of origin had been lost in the move to America, the ethnic community was essential to recuperate the perceived loss of identity. Ultimately, the ethnic community was the site of social capital formation. Having acquired linguistic and cultural skills over many years, women who left Russia a long time ago were a great resource for newcomers. Time in the U.S. matters because those individuals who had not been in the U.S. for long were generally content, at least initially, to bide their time and limit their sphere of action to domestic sites. By maintaining dense webs of communication, Russian women were able to overcome subjective and objective difficulties in forging their own informal support networks.

Furthermore, rather than only seeking out fellow nations, some Russian women attempted to enlarge their network by socializing with other transnational marriage migrants of various national origins. In their search for new friends in America, Russian women usually sought out other women and thus, they wound up acquiring a whole new group of mixed-nationality friends. As a matter of fact, some Russian women were more ready to associate themselves with women from other ethnic groups rather than co-ethnics. The search for friends from outside of the community of Russian wives was primarily dictated by the growing tensions within this community. All communities have divisions within them and the decision to embrace someone as one of the group may be guided by established markers, such as commonality of religion, kinship, or class, but often comes down to personal issues and bonds of trust and friendship that make exceptions for some (Rodríguez-García 2006; Lyons and Ford 2008). As social network theorists (Blau 1977; Blau and Schwartz 1984) point out, personal and intimate social networks are built around social structures which both unite and divide us. The choice of a friend, in general, is determined by the degree of propinquity, both in terms of physical distance and socially constructed social distance. These propinquitous characteristics simultaneously shape one’s friendship opportunities and preferences.

According to Blau’s theory of relative group size (Blau 1964; Blau 1977; Blau and Schwartz 1984), the larger the group, the more likely its members are to have a relationship between just themselves. The community of Russian women I came into contact with was united as long as it stayed small. However, as the number of newcomers rose, boundaries based on tastes, lifestyles, and cultural preferences became visible. Some women were able to form a group unto themselves, interacting less with others. For example, some women who were second-generation college graduates often looked down upon those less educated and who had low-status husbands. In this instance, education defined a social circle that is closed to outsiders (Bourdieu 1984). Further, I was surprised to see how quickly some Russian women internalized the racial prejudices that exist in American society and developed their own biases and stereotypes. Particularly, it was not uncommon for Russian women to form friendships with each other according to the race/ethnicity of their husbands. As a result, they reproduced the same racial boundaries among themselves that paralleled American society. It is also worthwhile to note my informants’ unspoken understanding that belonging to a nation had layered definitions and that citizenship and national identities could mean different things in different situations. With time, the community of Russian women developed ethnic boundaries, in addition to those mentioned above. Moreover, the community exhibited a pedigree with respect to political ideologies brought from abroad and acquired in the U.S. (primarily through the contact with their spouses). It was due to these political ideologies that the first signs of conflict arose. Tensions amounted and the onset of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War marked the final split of the community. Nationalistically-minded Ukrainians lead the revolt. Since the schism, one
Conclusion

Inter-ethnic transnational marriages, sometimes known as “mixed marriages,” are becoming more and more common across the globe due to processes of globalization of local marriage markets, or “global hypergamy” as Constable (2005) called it. Using participant observation, the present study focuses on post-migration experiences of women from the former U.S.S.R. who married American men. The rationale was twofold – to let the women explain their choice of marriage partner and to look into their post-migration identities. An intersectional analysis revealed the diversity within the experienced identities and subject positions of Russian women married to American men. Depending on the specific barriers encountered in the receiving society, different aspects of post-migration identity came to the foreground. In order to motivate and legitimize their and their partners’ marriage decision, my informants shifted the discourse content according to the marital relationships in which they are placed. While facing stigmatization and integration barriers in American society and being aware that they belonged to a stigmatized group, Russian women generated discourses in order to maintain a positive self-image. All these images and discourses were, to a certain degree, a combination of the gender ideologies in sending and receiving societies, the available integration channels and attitudes towards them in the U.S. In both domestic and public spheres, for example, women were willing to capitalize on their whiteness and relatively high educational attainment.

In explaining their and their husbands’ choice of a foreign spouse, Russian women produced two sorts of narratives. A first group of respondents motivated transnational partner choice by putting forward a stereotypical image of Russian women and American husbands that strikingly resembles the presentation of both parties on international dating websites. For a few, different ethnic and racial backgrounds of a spouse was one of the decisive factors. They were attracted to an exotic sexual image that was integrated in the romantic love ideal vehemently aspired for. In contrast, women in the second group described their and their partners’ choices as not being guided by identity features of “Russian women” or “American men.” In their accounts, no specific reference is made to the ethnicity of their partner. For these Russian women, following a husband or father fits into their vision of appropriate gender roles. Although different in content, both groups of women attempted to legitimize transnational partner choices and to defend the romantic love ideal. In other words, they chose to migrate in order to marry and not vice versa.

The combination of the intra- and intercategorial approaches allowed me to understand apparent inconsistencies in Russian marriage migrants’ presented identities, and their integration trajectories and senses of belonging in American society. The first inconsistency that I found is a conflict between women’s expectations about their gender roles and family life in the U.S. and their partners’ expectations about their prospective wives’ roles. Second, there are conflicting images of the “ideal man.” On the one hand, Russian women complain about the excess of patriarchy in Russia, and, on the other, they reproduce the same stereotypes by picturing their “ideal man” as the breadwinner and cetera. Third, there are conflicting images of their lives immediately after arrival in the U.S. and some time hereafter. Russian women encountered a number of obstacles in the domestic and public domains, including, but not limited to, stigmatization and integration barriers that were not envisioned upon arrival. Not surprisingly, the majority of my informants were confined to the domestic sphere and made only timid attempts to get themselves established professionally. Many Russian women expressed an ambivalent sense of belonging in American society – on the one hand, they felt alienated because of experienced stigmatization and significant barriers to labor market participation, and on the other hand, they did not want to go back to their home countries and strived for a full incorporation into American society.

References


Although the present analysis clearly demonstrates intersectionality’s added value for studying transnational mixed marriages, further research is required. The study is limited to participant observation and in-depth interviewing would be able to shed light on issues that were hidden to the eye of a participant-observer. Additionally, I approached Russian women as a singly group, but significant variations could be observed with more refined methodology. It would be of intellectual benefit to focus on social categories, such as gender, ethnicity, class, and marital status, which fundamentally shape marriage migrants’ identities and lived experiences. I did not intend, however, to generalize across the experiences – the limitation of “speaking for” dominated, marginalized, or subordinated social groups and their consciousness has been clearly pointed out (Spitak 1999).


Appendix

Table 1. Sample description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years Abroad</th>
<th>Duration of Current Marriage (+), Divorce or Separation (-) [in years]</th>
<th>Country of Origin (Self)</th>
<th>Country of Birth (Spouse)</th>
<th>Ethnic Origin/Ancestry (Spouse)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Mexican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Latino (Multiple Ancestries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Peruvian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Palestine (West Bank)</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Multiple Ancestries/Mixed Race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Ghanaian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Mexican</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Latino (Multiple Ancestries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>WASP</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Korean</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Irish</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Source: self-elaboration.

Levels of Disagreement Over Contested Practices

Abstract
This article unravels the tangled threads of argumentation that can be found in public debate over institutional practices. An analysis of letters to the editor (n=1551) written about two contested practices (American Indian mascots and the exclusive teaching of evolutionary theory) uncovers three analytically distinct levels of disagreement in the discourse. In the first level, partisans debate the effects of keeping or eliminating the contested practice. This disagreement over consequences leads to a second disagreement over how the social criteria for adjudicating controversies apply to the situation. This application level sits atop a third foundational level of the discourse where partisans debate the nature of social reality and the definition of the rules.

Keywords Framing; Laminations; Indian Mascots; Evolutionary Theory; Intelligent Design

The fact that the same obdurate conditions can be interpreted in multiple ways stands among the most enduring and significant contributions of social science. Nowhere is this fact more evident than the various battles over the definition of contested practices — recognizable institutional conduct whose legitimacy has been challenged in the public sphere (see Silva 2007:245). Contested practices are as varied as abortion, segregation, teaching evolutionary theory, and sports teams’ usage of Indian mascots. Sociologists have outlined a number of features of how people define these components of their world.\(^1\) In addition to being an important subject of research, the notion that contested practices are socially constructed is also an important feature of several courses taught by sociologists (e.g., social problems, social movements, gender, race and ethnicity).

Despite the substantial body of work produced after the “discursive turn,” there is still much to learn about the ideational processes involved in the social construction of contested practices. This article focuses on one particular lacuna — the intertwined — yet, analytically distinct — levels of disagreement that exist in the discourse. We know that defenders and advocates of the status quo will offer different versions of reality. They will not, however, be in complete disagreement. There will be some points on which adversaries will be in accord (Thomson 2010). Moreover, there will be matters on which allies will quarrel (Benford 1993). Given this confusing situation, the analysis presented below answers the following question: What are the basic types of disagreement that exist in the discourse over contested practices?

This question was inductively unearthed and addressed by taking a somewhat uncommon approach — an analysis of a large number of letters to the editor (1551) published about two separate controversies — sports teams’ use of Indian mascots and the teaching of evolutionary theory in public schools. Discourse analyses typically focus on a single case. A comparison of the discourse over two controversies allows one to transcend the matters that are specific to a particular dispute and observe the general or basic features of the discourse. In this instance, the comparative method demonstrates how discourse over contested practices will be composed of three levels of disagreement. At one level, there is a disagreement over what is occurring and what ought to occur. At a second level, partisans disagree about how the cultural rules for defining reality apply to the dispute over the contested practice. At a third level, participants in the discourse will describe the context that surrounds the controversy. These constructions of social context include definitions of the rules that are applied in the second level.

Awareness of these levels of disagreement will improve scholars understanding of how partisans construct reality. The concepts articulated here should allow scholars to better organize the complex permutations of political discourse. Being “sensitized” (Blumer 1969) to these levels of disagreement should facilitate a more nuanced approach to the study of discourse. That is, scholars can more readily observe the disagreement that exists within factions and the agreement that exists between factions. Correspondingly, we gain a more thorough understanding of the discursive processes that are involved in the definition of contested practices. Finally, these findings may have pedagogical value as attentiveness to these levels of disagreement can help scholars to explain disputes over contested practices to students.

The following section provides a description of the two cases and an explanation for why it is important to understand the levels of disagreement found in the discourse surrounding each contested practice. Next, the literature on “framing,” as well as the data and methodology are discussed. The results of the analysis are then presented. Finally, the article concludes with a consideration of the relevance of these findings to future research.

Two Contested Practices

Both the controversies over Indian mascots and evolutionary theory are examples of contested practices. Each will be briefly described before making an argument for the usefulness of doing a comparative analysis of them.

The Indian mascot controversy dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s where students at Dartmouth College, Stanford University, Syracuse University, and the University of Oklahoma successfully protested their teams’ Indian mascots (Spindel 2002). The issue has been discussed in the American media at the national level (Rosenstein 2001) and local level (Silva 2007; Callais 2010). While these Indian mascots have been defended by fans...
While controversy over the place of evolutionary theory in American public schools goes back to, at least, the Scopes trial of 1925, I focus on its most recent phase that began in the 1980s, when anti-evolutionists sought to reduce the significance of evolutionary theory and/or to introduce the concept of “intelligent design” (ID) into the classroom (Numbers 2006; Binder 2007; Larson 2007). The thrust of the intelligent design argument is that the irreducible complexity found in natural structures points to the impossibility of unguided, incremental evolution; rather, it is more likely that an Intelligent Designer, who may or may not be the Judeo-Christian god, guided the development of living things. The intelligent design movement has met resistance from those who are concerned about the quality of science education and those who believe that intelligent design, despite its claims to the legitimacy of each has been challenged in the public sphere. Both practices would continue unabated were it not for this challenge. As contested practices, both evolutionary theory and Indian mascots encounter support and opposition in the public sphere. This pattern of support and opposition is, in part, a result of the fact that a contested practice, be it the war in Afghanistan, affirmative action, voter identification laws, or the cases under consideration here, are embedded within a complex mélange of cultural logics. The controversy over Indian mascots is discussed in terms of the autonomy of school boards, community traditions, the First Amendment, and racism. Likewise, conflict over evolutionary theory involves lofty notions of censorship, religious freedom, and sound science. Given the number of abstract issues that are in play, there should be multiple paths by which advocates for change or retention travel to justify their position. If there are multiple paths, then there are likely to be important within faction disagreements (see Benford 1993). Correspondingly, there are likely to be points on which people who take pro and con points agree with each other, as well (see Thomson 2010). One way to better understand the discourse over any particular contested practice is to discover the patterned places in which partisans disagree with each other in all contested practices. To discover these basic types of disagreement, I turn to a theoretical literature that is well suited to the task.

Frames and Laminations

Numerous students of social movements have drawn upon Erving Goffman’s (1974) theory of framing to describe how partisans attempt to define contested practices (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004). Frames are “the statement(s) required to place and to understand a strip of activity: ’on the beach,’ ‘play fighting,’ an 18th- century drawing room” (Scheff 2005:381). In everyday life, this sort of framing is relatively unproblematic, but in political discourse partisans will offer competing framings of the same situation (Snow 2004). This sort of contentious framing is readily apparent in the cases analyzed in this article. Mascot defenders often frame the practice as an “honor.” While others claim that it is “harmless” or an “important tradition.” Detractors frame it as “racist.” Evolutionists define intelligent design as “non-scientific” or “religious.” Many anti-evolutionists use the frame of “scientific” to define intelligent design. While the concept of framing provides a way to look at how people construct reality, it is a lesser known component of the theory that will help to disentangle the various points of agreement and disagreement between factions.

There are often multiple levels or, in Goffman’s (1974) parlance, “laminations” to the definition of the situation. To explain this concept Goffman (1974:183) references “the play within a play” that occurs in Hamlet. One lamination is an audience watching a theatrical production of Hamlet. Inside of that lamination is a second lamination – the fictional world created by the play. Within this theatrical world lies a third lamination wherein another world – the play within a play – exists. For another example, think of a lecture in an introductory sociology course. One lamination would be the transference of wisdom about “mores” and “norms.” Suppose that within the lecture hall two students engage in a bit of quiet flirtation. On top of the lecture lamination is a second “flirtation” lamination. While Goffman’s theory helps to conceptualize the multiple layers of reality, his articulation of laminations is not readily applicable to the analysis of public discourse over contested practices. In fact, for decades, laminations were all but ignored by the myriad of frame analyses of political discourse.

Mark M. Hedley and Sarah A. Clark (2007) revisited the concept of laminations and succeeded in adapting it to this task. They analyzed the discussion that developed in a university email listserv over a planned protest of the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq. Hedley and Clark (2007) found that an initial debate over the acceptability of the specific protest developed three additional laminations – the legitimacy of anti-war protests, the rightfulness of the war, and whether the listserv was the best place for the discussion. Based on their analysis of the discourse, they argue that each sub-debate that developed in the discourse represents a distinct lamination. They show that public debates over contested practices (such as the acceptability of teaching evolutionary theory or using Indian mascots) will spawn a number of sub-debates which take the form of laminations within the discourse. Moreover, people who agree on a dispute found in one lamination may disagree on a point being debated in another lamination (Hedley and

(King 2004; Staurowsky 2004), roughly two-thirds of the 1970s era mascots have been replaced (Pember 2007). In 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) ruled that teams with Indian mascots may not host or display the imagery at official post-season tournaments. The policy has succeeded in compelling a number of teams to retire their mascots. Some universities (e.g., Florida State University), however, have convinced the NCAA to allow them to retain their Indian mascot after demonstrating tribal support for it (Pember 2007; Staurowsky 2007).

By including two cases I hope to identify general discursive patterns. As such, I will be less interested in the particular features of each case and more focused on the observed patterning across cases (see Skocpol 1984). While teaching evolutionary theory and symbolizing sports teams with Indian imagery are very different types of institutional conduct, both are cases of contested practices. The legitimacy of each has been challenged in the public sphere. Both practices would continue unabated were it not for this challenge. As contested practices, both evolutionary theory and Indian mascots encounter support and opposition in the public sphere. This pattern of support and opposition is, in part, a result of the fact that a contested practice, be it the war in Afghanistan, affirmative action, voter identification laws, or the cases under consideration here, are embedded within a complex mélange of cultural logics. The controversy over Indian mascots is discussed in terms of the autonomy of school boards, community traditions, the First Amendment, and racism. Likewise, conflict over evolutionary theory involves lofty notions of censorship, religious freedom, and sound science. Given the number of abstract issues that are in play, there should be multiple paths by which advocates for change or retention travel to justify their position. If there are multiple paths, then there are likely to be important within faction disagreements (see Benford 1993). Correspondingly, there are likely to be points on which people who take pro and con points agree with each other, as well (see Thomson 2010). One way to better understand the discourse over any particular contested practice is to discover the patterned places in which partisans disagree with each other in all contested practices. To discover these basic types of disagreement, I turn to a theoretical literature that is well suited to the task.
Levels of Disagreement Over Contested Practices

I sought letters to the editor published in American newspapers that advocated a pro or con position. Between November 2004 and January 2005, I searched for documents that contained the words “Indian” and “mascot” within twenty words of each other and also the words “letter” or “letters” to obtain 471 letters written in favor of mascot retention and 278 that called for elimination. There were 9 letters that addressed the issue without clearly lending support to either side. I classified a letter as pro-mascot if it stated that it wanted an Indian mascot retained and/or if it provided frames that supported keeping the mascot or undermined those that called for change (and vice versa). The letters come from 104 newspapers. These newspapers include national publications (The Christian Science Monitor and USA Today) and ones centered in 32 states and Washington, D.C.

The controversy over evolutionary theory is considerably larger than the mascot debate, and, consequently, my inquiries (conducted intermittently between February 2007 and January 2009) yielded thousands of pages of letters and other material published between 1985 and 2008. Given the enormous amount of material, I reduced the sample to a manageable level by using a random sampling procedure of the collected data that yielded 793 letters published between 1987 and 2008. There were 429 letters that aided the cause of exclusively teaching evolutionary theory and 325 that lent support to reducing the prominence of evolutionary theory. There were 39 letters that did not seem to help one side over the other. These data were collected using the search terms “intelligent design” and “creationism,” and “letter” or “letters.”

Methods and Data

Letters to the editor are the ideal data for examining public discourse over contested practices. First, they are a “mediated public sphere,” where partisans disseminate their political opinions (Perrin 2005:171). These letters represent one of the best opportunities to offer competing definitions of evolutionary theory or Indian mascots. While answering this question, I sought to learn more about the nature of laminations. Are the laminations of the discourse independent of each other or are they somehow connected? Do new laminations eclipse previous laminations (as suggested by Hedley and Clark [2007]) or is there overlap? If the disagreements build upon each other, they can be said to be levels of disagreement. I now turn to the data and methodology used for uncovering and answering these questions.

In general, I followed the procedures outlined by John Lofland and colleagues (2006) to analyze the data. At the outset, I wanted to take advantage of the comparatively large size of the sample and the use of two cases to contribute to the basic theory of political framing. I began by detailing the types of justifications that were used for retaining Indian mascots. I then compared these pro-mascot framings with anti-mascot framings. Next, I compared the framings for and against the retention of Indian mascots with the framings for and against evolutionary theory. Based on these comparisons I began to establish a scheme for the general forms of framing that could be found in the data. I then compared these general types that I had found with the types described in the framing literature. I determined the general framing forms I had found were best thought of as laminations. That is, certain framings seemed to be geared towards different laminations in the discourse. These different laminations housed distinct sub-debates. At this point, I arrived at my research question of discovering the basic types of disagreements that exist within the discourse. That is, how are the types of laminations found in the Indian mascot discourse similar to the types of laminations found in the evolutionary theory discourse? Once I uncovered the basic types of laminations, I used the qualitative software program, NVivo, to re-code the data for the types of laminations that could be found in each letter. In this final round of analysis, I was able to confirm that there were in fact three levels of disagreement. Given that laminations are a relatively underdeveloped concept, I also probed the data further to discover the general features of these laminations and the ideational relationship that exists between laminations.

Findings

The analysis uncovered three basic disagreements: an effects disagreement, an application disagreement, and a foundational disagreement. Each mode of disagreement is housed within a specific lamination of the discourse. In the first lamination, partisans disagree over what is occurring and what should occur. In a second lamination lies a dispute over how cultural rules for adjudicating cultural conflicts apply to the matter at hand. The frames deployed in the application lamination support the frames used in the effects lamination. Finally, there is the foundational disagreement which exists in a third lamination of the discourse. The frames deployed in this lamination are used to construct the social context that surrounds the contested practice. This discussion of context usually includes articulations of the rules that are applied in the second lamination. I will explicate these levels of the discourse with some empirical examples.
Effects Lamination

The effects lamination includes framings of what is happening and what “ought” to occur. In the evolutionary theory discourse, partisans make a number of claims about the effects of exclusively teaching evolutionary theory, the potential effects of reducing the instruction of evolutionary theory, and/or teaching an alternative, such as ID. One such claim is that teaching alternative theories alongside evolutionary theory would improve student learning. For example:

[It]he bottom line is we can continue to call each other names, or we can put the childish antics aside and encourage our youths to form their own thoughts by teaching them both views and encourage them to think for themselves. (Anchorage Daily News [AK], July 22, 2005, italics added)

The italicized portion of the quote addresses the effects lamination by claiming that teaching ID would not have the outcome of “promot[ing] alternative scientific theories,” but would instead have the consequence of breaching the “wall separating church and state.” If the statement included a discussion of how to use the rules governing the relationship between science, religion, and public schools, it would be addressing the application lamination. If the statement included a more thorough discussion of why church and state should be separated in the first place or explaining the criteria of the rule, it would be a contribution to the foundational lamination. These are just two of the estimated results. This level of the discourse is replete with estimates including: teaching evolutionary theory as a non-threat to religion. In either case, there would be no need for this hypothetical man or woman to travel to the second level of the discourse. By contrast, if a person does care about the goals of promoting team spirit and the goals of being non-racist, or the goals of teaching sound science and not undermining Christian faith, he/she would logically need to compare the ways determining what is happening. He/she might also need to decide how to prioritize or reconcile incompatible goals. The second and third levels of the discourse are where people debate how to think about these sorts of things.

Application Lamination

The application lamination forms as partisans try to explain how one should assess the diametrically opposed claims made in the effects lamination. In doing so, they move beyond a dispute over the definitions of the situation – to a contest over how to define the situation. It is in this second lamination where partisans demonstrate how they think the rules for interpreting reality apply to the interpretation of the contested practice.

In the discourse over evolutionary theory, partisans would draw on standards derived from the institutions of law, science, and religion. For illustrative purposes, I will focus on how both sides would attempt to apply scientific criteria to their definition of the situation. For example, an anti-evolutionist argues:

[It]he remarkable complexity and precision of life at the molecular level, the enormous gaps in the fossil record, the almost complete absence of transitional life forms, and the obvious designs that abound in the wonderful chief tradition links many generations of Illinois, including my uncle, daughters, some of my dearest friends, and me” (Chicago Sun-Times [IL], March 8, 2001:30). This author is defining the mascot as an important tradition for the people represented by the team. This assemblage of frames defines the practice as positive and worthy of retention. Another mascot defender writes, “[i]t is laudatory rather than belittling that some professional baseball and football teams and colleges...use Native American names” (Times-Picayune [LA], November 5, 1995:C2). By contrast, a mascot opponent writes, “[t]his behavior is racist; it trivializes our culture and belittles us as a people” (Bangor Daily News [ME], October 18, 1997, italics added). In the italicized portion, this author asserts that the practice is disrespectful towards Indian people and culture. Taken together, these three authors have provided three distinct versions of the consequences of Indian mascots.

To some extent, this level of the discourse is self-contained; for some people, the effects lamination presents unambiguous choices. The decision between defining Indian mascots as an important tradition and Indian mascots as racist will (likely) be clear for certain people. While I do not have any evidence for how anyone actually interprets the discourse about these controversies; logically, if a person is concerned about the sense of tradition fostered by a mascot and he/she does not care about racial discrimination, then, it does not make sense that he/she would care about how one arrives at the conclusion that the practice is racist. There would be no reason for him/her to move on to the second level of the discourse as he/she could construct his/her position towards the contested practice by taking each side’s claims at face value. Likewise, if a person does not care at all about Christianity, he/she would not be concerned that evolutionary theory is a threat to Christian faith. Accordingly, he/she would not need to learn the ways of framing evolutionary theory as a non-threat to religion. In either case, there would be no need for this hypothetical man or woman to travel to the second level of the discourse. By contrast, if a person does care about the goals of promoting team spirit and the goals of being non-racist, or the goals of teaching sound science and not undermining Christian faith, he/she would logically need to compare the ways determining what is happening. He/she might also need to decide how to prioritize or reconcile incompatible goals. The second and third levels of the discourse are where people debate how to think about these sorts of things.
This author explains how his definition of evolutionary theory fits with scientific rules (i.e., the need for empirical evidence). One of his claims is that life's microscopically observable “complexity and precision” is evidence against evolutionary theory. He and other anti-evolutionists who make this argument are seeking to influence how uncontrover-
sional evidence should be scientifically interpreted. Of course, evolutionists would counter this assertion: “[t]he amazing complexity and intricacy of life and its processes are, by themselves, not evidence of a creator or intelligent design” (Register-Guard [OR], May 28, 2005). This evolutionist agrees with the anti-evolutionist that complexity is observable, but disagrees about how to scientifically apply this observation to the evaluation of evolutionary theory and ID. The above anti-evolutionist also notes that evolutionary theory has not been supported by the predicted discovery of “transitional life forms.” This framing is also addressed by evolutionists:

Arguments using bogus science are frustrating and exasperating. Challenges such as “Show me the transitional fossils!” are merely ruses. Information is available to anyone who cares enough to take the time to look it up (here are two freebies – Archaeopteryx and Epihippus). (Daily Herald [IL], May 7, 2000:17)

This evolutionist responds to anti-evolutionist claims (such as the one quoted above) that evolutionary theory is undermined by absence of “transition fossils” by mentioning two such examples. Taken together, these excerpts show that some evolutionists and anti-evolutionists are in agreement about the rule that scientific data should be used to define the situation (not all anti-evolutionists take this position). These letter writers disagree about how this rule applies to the situation. These claims are not directly addressing the effects lamination because they do not predict what will happen if evolutionary theory is exclusively taught. Rather, they are addressing how to apply scientific rules to the evaluation of evolutionary theory. This represents not just a disagreement about what should happen but a disagreement about how to use the same standards to interpret the practice. Note that they are not discussing whether science should be used to define the practice or what science consists of – that is the sort of debate that occurs in the foundational lamination.

The application lamination can also be found in the mascot discourse. Oftentimes both sides seemed to be in agreement that racial discrimination is undesirable. The effects lamination contained incompatible estimations on whether Indian mascots are a violation of anti-racist norms. Several mascot supporters would argue that the practice was not an instance of racial discrimination. Mascot opponents would argue that the practice had the effect insulting and/or dehumanizing a racial minority. For example:

...there are more white mascots in college and pro sports than American Indians. Just to name a few – Fighting Irish, Spartans, Trojans, Cowboys, Cavaliers... These seem to be perfectly acceptable, and so should American Indian mascots. (State Journal Register [IL], November 20, 1991:4)

We would be shocked if someone put on a public minstrel show, and rightly so. Dancing around in a cartoonish Indian suit to amuse sports crowds is no different. (Los Angeles Times [CA], May 4, 2002:A22)

These statements represent contributions to the application lamination because they are arguing over how to apply standards to judging institutional practices to the definitions of Indian mascots. Both authors are, implicitly, drawing on the same abstract social rule – racist practices should be discontinued. However, they are making different arguments about how to apply this rule – the first author applies the rule by comparing Indian mascots to white mascots, which are acceptable practices. By making this comparison, he is not only claiming that the practice is harmless, he is also making an argument about how to use the social rules governing the practice – if it is acceptable to use white mascots, it is also acceptable to use Indian mascots. The second author compares Indian mascots to the patently disrespectful and antiquated practice of whites performing in “blackface” in Jim Crow era minstrel shows. He is going beyond the effects lamination to demonstrate how the situation should be defined. A comparison of these analogies shows that they both agree with anti-racist norms. They support their position in the effects lamination by offering different ways of applying anti-racist norms to the contested practice. It would be a contribution to the foundational lamination if either quotation included a full articulation of the rules that are being used or justification for why the rule should exist.

A social rule that was drawn on by both sides of both debates is that certain people have a privileged authority to judge contested practices. This rule was applied through the use of “credentialing” (Coy and Woehrl 1996) wherein partisans would tout their own or their allies’ authority. For example:

[a]s a 1979 graduate of South Stokes High School and descendant of mixed-blood heritage, including Cherokee, English, German, Scots, and Dutch, I say leave the Saura mascot alone. (Winston-Salem Journal [NC], April 9, 2003:A12)

Since the 1980s...an increasing number of anthropolo-
gists, biologists, astronomers, and scientists have recog-
nized the shortcomings of the Darwinian theory as well as the evidence of “intelligent design” in our planet and the universe. (Stuart News [FL], September 7, 1998:A8)

Here, the first author is using two identity frames (partial Native American and alum) to back her claim that the mascot should be retained. The second author asserts that ID is accepted by people with the authority to judge theories. Neither author substantiates why certain identities should be endowed with a privileged voice (which would be a contribution to the foundational lamination). Instead, they address the application lamination by asserting a particular rule – that the views of people with greater authority should be given more consideration than those without such authority – better applies to themselves than to their opponents. By implication, others should give their contributions to the effects lamination greater consideration.

Similarly, partisans in both debates would draw on this rule by impugning the character of their opponents. For example, an anti-evolutionist “vilifies” (McCaffrey and Keys 2000) the above-mentioned Judge Jones (who ruled against introducing ID to high-school students in Dover, PA) as having an “arrogance” that “defies understanding” (Tennessean [TN], January 2, 2006). Likewise, an author in the Indian mascot controversy addresses the application lamination by undermining the character of his opponents by framing them as “childishly stubborn” (Chicago Sun-Times [IL], February 7, 2001:24). When letter writers discuss the characteristics of the people
who support or oppose their position, they are engaging a debate about how the general standards of authority apply to the adjudication of a particular dispute.

The application lamination is analytically distinct from the effects lamination and foundational lamination. In the effects lamination partisans answer the question of what should occur. In the application lamination they debate how to use the cultural norms that govern the interpretation of reality. In the application lamination, when anti-evolutionists and evolutionists disagree about how to interpret empirical evidence, they are, at least publicly, in agreement about the rule requiring the use of empirical evidence. As partisans begin to elaborate upon the basis and definition of these rules (e.g., answering the questions “What constitutes empirical data?” or “Why should we care about empirical data?”), they move away from the application lamination towards the foundational lamination.

**Foundational Lamination**

In the foundational lamination partisans outline their version of the surrounding cultural and historical context. The frames given in the foundational lamination are more abstract than the ones given in the effects lamination or application lamination.7 These abstract framings include the articulation of the general rules that are used in the application lamination and a justification for using one set of standards versus another. As partisans move from the effects lamination to the foundational lamination, they oftentimes use frames that are similar to the ones proffered by some of their opponents and different from those used by many of their allies.

The evolutionary theory discourse developed a robust foundational lamination where partisans debated the general definition of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the value and role of religion, as well as the efficacy and nature of science. To describe this lamination, I will focus on how partisans outlined the scientific criteria that were used in the application lamination. Some authors on both sides of the debate framed science as being (or that it should be) honest, open-ended, and politically neutral:

> [a] real scientific theories are open-ended ideas that attempt to answer the mysteries of the universe. They are meant to encourage a healthy debate among scientists until the theory can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Capital [MD], February 20, 2006)

Science is supposed to approach knowledge with an open mind, not stubbornly to refuse to listen to any suggestion that the prevailing theory could be wrong. The inquiring scientific mind should be open to ideas and observations… (Manhattan Mercury [KS], November 27, 2005)

Both of the above authors frame science as open to considering new ideas. They move on to disparate applications of this similar framing of science. The first author addresses the application lamination by claiming that ID does not meet the criterion that science should be open-ended. The second author applies the rule of openness in the exact opposite manner — that an open-minded science should consider the supernatural. Other framings of science could be found in the foundational lamination. Some anti-evolutionists would argue that science is not open-ended. For example:

> [b] If we were to really define what science is, we would have to define the limits of science and what is not science. (Capitol [MD], February 20, 2006)

This post-modern author speaks to the foundational lamination by framing scientists as inherently biased. Based on this framing of science, he argues, in the application lamination, that scientists should not have the authority to invalidate ID because religion and science are inseparable. Anti-evolutionists, then, were able to make similar contributions to the effects lamination (i.e., framing evolutionary theory as needing to be reduced) that were based on disparate constructions of science.

The foundational lamination was also found in the discourse over Indian mascots. This lamination contained disagreements over the construction of Native Americans and their attendant rights, the autonomy of local school boards, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the definition of mascots. For the purpose of describing the foundational lamination, this section will focus on the various definitions of mascots that were proffered. Unsurprisingly, mascot opponents and supporters proffered contrasting definitions of mascots. For example, a critic of Indian mascots writes, “mascots are not human beings, they are good luck tokens” (San Antonio Express-News [TX], November 10, 2001:10B). This author is framing mascots as non-human “good luck tokens.” Such a definition facilitates the construction of the mascot as racist in the application lamination. If mascots are not humans, one can argue that using a race of people as a mascot is dehumanizing. The comparison of Indian mascots to “blackface” – discussed in the application lamination – fits with this conceptualization of mascots.

The above framing of the general practice of using mascots contrasts with pro-mascot writers who define mascots in a way that can include humans. For example:

> (by definition, a mascot brings “good luck.” I doubt “Redskin” was chosen to degrade or make fun of but rather to bring pride, strength, and wisdom to Arvada High School’s students. (Rockey Mountain News [CO], April 28, 1993:42A, italics added)

The author contributes to the foundational lamination in the italicized portion when she defines mascots as something that “brings [good luck].” She then moves on to the application lamination where she applies the positive abstract definition of mascots in general to the use of Indian mascots in particular. The comparison of Indian mascots to other human mascots is in accord with this positive depiction of mascots.

Both of the above examples claim that mascots are connected to notions of good luck. While the first example does not allow for the possibility of people, including Native Americans, to be used, the second definition is constructed to include humans. The discourse, then, has reached a third level where partisans are now offering different articulations of the rules.

An interesting property of this third level of the debate is that people who call for the same policy will sometimes define the rules differently. For example, a mascot supporter writes:

> I would like to remind you that a human being isn’t really a mascot. A mascot is something like Florida’s Albert the Alligator … The Seminole is the symbol of Florida State University, in honor of the only un-
Knowledge of these levels of the discourse has pedagogical value. It provides a means for scholars to dissect the cultural disputes that we seek to explain to students. Whether the contested practice is evolutionary theory, Indian mascots, affirmative action, war, or abortion a discussion of each level of the disagreement can help to facilitate student learning by identifying the stances that people may take in each of the basic points of disagreement. Doing so will allow scholars to facilitate student learning without over-simplifying matters. For instance, to describe the controversy over evolutionary theory, a professor could outline the various frames that exist in the foundational lamination – for example, the disparate definitions of science. He/she could then discuss the various applications of these contrasting definitions, making note of the fact that some anti-evolutionists and evolutionists use the same definitions of science but to different ends. Finally, a discussion of the effects lamination would show students that, indeed, there are anti-evolutionists who seem more concerned about protecting a faith in a literal interpretation of the Bible than they are about maintaining a high quality science education, but that other anti-evolutionists frame their opposition in terms of wanting to improve science education. Likewise, this lecture would show evolutionists who seem to hope that evolutionary theory will undermine faith in the supernatural and evolutionists who conclude that evolutionary theory should not impact one’s belief in god.

Discussion and Conclusion

The comparison of two large samples has demonstrated the existence of three laminations which house three levels of disagreement in the discourse over contested practices. These findings provide several scholarly contributions. The most general contribution is untangling the various types of disagreements. It is one thing to be able to recognize the complexity of the discourse and be aware of the fact that political factions cannot be understood in monolithic terms. It is another thing to be able to practically organize this complexity. This finding will help sociologists who are studying any particular contested practice to do so.

Knowledge of these levels of the discourse has pedagogical value. It provides a means for scholars to dissect the cultural disputes that we seek to explain to students. Whether the contested practice is evolutionary theory, Indian mascots, affirmative action, war, or abortion a discussion of each level of the disagreement can help to facilitate student learning by identifying the stances that people may take in each of the basic points of disagreement. Doing so will allow scholars to facilitate student learning without over-simplifying matters. For instance, to describe the controversy over evolutionary theory, a professor could outline the various frames that exist in the foundational lamination – for example, the disparate definitions of science. He/she could then discuss the various applications of these contrasting definitions, making note of the fact that some anti-evolutionists and evolutionists use the same definitions of science but to different ends. Finally, a discussion of the effects lamination would show students that, indeed, there are anti-evolutionists who seem more concerned about protecting a faith in a literal interpretation of the Bible than they are about maintaining a high quality science education, but that other anti-evolutionists frame their opposition in terms of wanting to improve science education. Likewise, this lecture would show evolutionists who seem to hope that evolutionary theory will undermine faith in the supernatural and evolutionists who conclude that evolutionary theory should not impact one’s belief in god.

This sort of explication of the discourse over contested practices will help students to understand the various positions that people take, as well as the logic by which people arrive at those positions. In so doing, students will gain insight about how they justify their opinions. They will also obtain a deeper understanding of how others are able to take positions that differ from their own.

Uncovering the existence of these three laminations improves our knowledge of the discursive processes involved in the construction of contested practices. More specifically, this study demonstrates a previously unacknowledged decision confronting partisans – those who seek to influence public opinion must choose how much space to devote to each lamination. For example, if an author feels that the audience is already aware of the contending ways of applying social rules, he/she would spend more time discussing how these rules are constituted. This choice is a basic component of how people actively define contested practices, and to this point it has largely been ignored. Scholarship has suggested that frame articulation (i.e., providing support for one’s frame) is a predictor of political success (Cress and Snow 2000; McCammon 2009). By identifying the basic laminations of political framing, we gain a fuller sense of what frame articulation requires.

This article provides a clearer picture of the role of laminations in political discourse. Laminations will not only develop, they will do so in a predictable fashion. Moreover, certain laminations build upon and support each other in the discourse. Contrary to the idea that laminations come to completely (if only temporarily) obscure pre-existing laminations (Hedley and Clark 2007), we can see that laminations may only partially cover pre-existing ones. The three types of laminations often coincided within a particular letter. This property of laminations can be found in other, non-politicized interactions. As new features of an interaction develop, the old laminations may still remain. To return to Golfman’s (1974) example of Hamlet, the audience members watching the play that occurs within Hamlet should be aware of the fact that they are watching two plays at once. The first play is only partially obscured by the second.

Certainly, this article has left many relevant questions unanswered. While it is clear that authors must choose which laminations to address, it did not – and could not – show if this rhetorical choice has any influence on how a reader defines the contested practice. Likewise, this cross-sectional analysis does not show us whether or not the proportion...
interpret contested practices, it is my hope that this article will facilitate this ongoing effort.

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References


An Empirical Analysis of the Structuration of American Ideologies About Economic Justice

Abstract

A consensus has been forming among structural social psychologists that most Americans hold beliefs in both individualistic and structural explanations of inequality. Yet, even many who espouse structural beliefs nonetheless emphasize individual-level explanations of inequality to disproportionate extents. This study is aimed to identify common trends in the logic used by a conventional group of Americans – MBA students – to rationalize their more general political and economic beliefs. While a large number of studies have emphasized the prevalence of dominant ideology beliefs, and others have speculated theoretically on how such beliefs are reproduced, this study aims to bring these bodies of work together. I sought to build an initial understanding of how contradictions in Americans’ political and economic ideologies are transmuted, and to identify heuristic concepts fundamental to this process. Findings suggest that particular assumptions about human nature serve to “fill the cognitive “gap” which would otherwise present individuals with insurmountable ambiguities in their ideologies about economic justice. Respondents also reflected some level of awareness of the impact of ideology on their thought processes, even as they accept such processes, and the realities they constitute, as inevitable.

Keywords

Dominant Ideology; Structural Social Psychology; Inequality; Great Recession; Human Nature; Economic Sociology

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An Empirical Analysis of the Structuration of American Ideologies About Economic Justice

Despite some progressive social movements in the U.S. aimed at promoting greater economic equality (i.e., the Occupy movements), the concentration of corporate power and unprecedented rates of inequality have not been met with demand for fundamental social change from a majority of Americans. The recent “Great Recession” and ongoing economic struggles of Americans are due, in part, to the current divisiveness of political culture in Washington and the complex realities of a deregulated global economy. Still, the democratic response of American citizens as a whole has been, at best, ambiguous and merits further inquiry. Previous research suggests that while Americans generally believe in both structural and individualistic explanations for inequality, the latter have held disproportionate sway over the last three decades (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Jackman 1994; Hunt 1996; 2007). To best construct a discourse that can begin to transcend the relatively narrow boundaries of political discussion in America on issues of inequality, first an in-depth understanding of the framework of popular ideologies about economic justice is required. The present study attempts to build an initial understanding of how ambiguities in Americans’ political and economic ideologies are reconciled, and to identify heuristic devices fundamental to this process.

American ideologies of economic justice have been widely studied by sociologists. Yet, questions remain as to the nature of such ideologies and the particular cognitive processes which constitute them. “The dominant ideology” (Huber and Form 1973) – a widely held set of American beliefs, which commonly justify social inequalities – has been one of the most influential and debated concepts among structural social psychologists (Howard and Renfrow 2003). Most commonly associated with American dominant ideology about economic justice are the assumptions that individuals from all classes are generally able to succeed economically through merit, that “individuals are personally responsible for their positions, and third, that the overall system of inequality is, therefore, equitable and fair” (Kluegel and Smith 1986:23). The tendency among Americans to frame economic justice in terms of equal opportunity, yet oppose policies geared towards fostering equal outcomes, has been consistently shown to be associated with these assumptions (Feagin 1972; Huber and Form 1973; Della Fave 1974; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Jackman 1994). More broadly known as the “fundamental attribution error” – or the tendency of people to disproportionately favor dispositional explanations for behavior over structural explanations – such assumptions have been frequently supported empirically as strong predictors of attitudes favoring anti-egalitarian policies (Feagin 1972; 1975; Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986; McLeod and Lively 2003; Hunt 2007). Specifically, the fundamental attribution error corresponds to the view that, because America offers equal opportunity, individuals are to blame for their economic hardships and thus, undeserving of social assistance (see also Gans 1995).

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and gender boundaries to some degree. Still, little empirical work has documented how Americans resolve the contradictions between support for policies geared towards promoting equal opportunity and the rejection of those aimed at reducing unequal outcomes. How do simultaneous beliefs in structural and individualistic explanations for inequality exist. There also remains little empirical work on how people rationalize beliefs in conventional ideologies about the causes of inequality in the face of economic uncertainty and systemic economic crisis.

This study is aimed to identify common trends in the logic used by a conventional group of Americans – MBA students in the Northeastern United States – to rationalize more general political and economic beliefs. While a large number of studies have emphasized the prevalence of dominant ideology beliefs, and others have speculated theoretically on how such beliefs are reproduced (Del-la Fave 1974; Sallach 1974; Giddens 1979; Hebdige 1979), this study aims to connect these literatures. I sought to discover common patterns in how a conventional group of Americans “make sense” of the current economic crisis, the particular heuristics integral to the rationalization of their views, and where in the overall structure of their argument such concepts become instrumental.

Most questions asked of respondents focused on events related to the recent “Great Recession,” since this is a contemporary event with structural causes and implications which implicitly conflict with dominant ideology beliefs, and which has created a sense of uncertain job prospects for blue-collar and white-collar workers alike. Thus, by framing questions in the context of the current recession, respondents were especially likely to reflect carefully on structural economic trends implicated by this event and publicly discussed in contemporary political and academic discourses. How (if at all) respondents rationalized continued beliefs in general tenets of dominant American ideologies about inequality provided, in this context, an especially lucid account of the heuristic processes made effective in doing so. On the other hand, the extent to which respondents espoused such tenets at all, in the context of the Great Recession, indicates their relative strength in the collective American consciousness.

One methodological approach common in social psychology in analyzing ideology corresponds with the idea that people unwittingly seek cognitive “consistency” rather than “efficiency” through the use of heuristics or cognitive “shortcuts,” guiding the formation of solutions to problems which would otherwise be impossible amid various ambiguities and lack of information (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Still, as Kluegel and Smith illustrate, even many of the more structural-oriented groups also adhere to dominant ideology beliefs. Hunt (2007) also found that explanations for poverty cited by African Americans and Hispanics have become more similar to those of white's over the past three decades, though African Americans remain the most progressive group in terms of their attitudes about the causes of inequality and poverty. Findings of Rytina, Form, and Pease (1970) suggest that those who profit most from the status quo are disproportionately likely to reiterate dominant ideology beliefs, though even the working poor have been shown to favor dispositional factors over structural trends in explaining inequality (Gans 1995).

African Americans are unique in their tendency to support structural over individualistic explanations for inequality to greater extents than whites (Hunt 2007). The young, women, college educated, and politically liberal are also more likely to older individuals, men, the uneducated, and the politically conservative to support structural explanations for inequality (Kluegel and Smith 1986). Still, as Kluegel and Smith argued, these trends among the attitudes of particular groups towards political issues lie more so in their disparate understandings of how the world works than in contrary values. However, as the literature on American dominant ideology indicates, a majority of Americans agree, on at least a basic level, that individuals hold significant power over their own economic fate. How, then, does this shared belief persist amid various differences and a simultaneous recognition of structural causes of inequality and injustice? According to Hochschild (1981), what individuals believe to be the most just social system possible rests on a type of foundational knowledge about social relations which, to some extent, simplifies complex institutional relations constituting social life in a capitalist society (see also Giddens 1979). Similarly, Sallach (1974) suggests that the inability of individuals to conceptualize the nature of their dependency on the wider society is due, in large part, to the challenge of understanding the complex nature of capitalist social relations. Perhaps, then, identifying how people conceptualize, or simplify, supposed basic underpinning(s) of such relations may help to determine why (if at all) American dominant ideologies about inequality have persisted amid otherwise stark differences across political lines.

To fulfill this purpose, and answer the basic questions discussed above, I framed specific interview questions (discussed below) around the following research questions: Is there a common set of heuristic concepts which underscore individuals’ understandings of the social causes and implications of the 2008 crisis? Are there concepts which are integral to individuals’ understandings of this event which have not been empirically documented by previous research on American economic ideologies? If so, what role do they play in (re)shaping respondents’ more general views? Or, where in respondents’ overall logic do these concepts repeatedly appear, and why? Finally, what is the basis, if any, upon which differences between individuals’ attitudes about inequality and the legitimacy of the contemporary capitalist structure become less divisive, and how (if at all) do the identified heuristic concepts maintain such a basis?

Although various quantitative studies have indicated important trends in Americans’ attitudes about inequality, their methodological approach inhibits a more in-depth understanding of the logic underscoring conventional ideologies and why and how alternative realities are rendered untenable or undesirable. Hebdige quotes Stuart Hall’s definition of ideology as “transparent” because of its “naturalness,” or “its refusal to be made to appear transparent, for any, upon which differences between individuals’ understandings of the social causes and implications of the 2008 crisis?” Are there concepts which are integral to individuals’ understandings of this event which have not been empirically documented by previous research on American economic ideologies? If so, what role do they play in (re)shaping respondents’ more general views? Or, where in respondents’ overall logic do these concepts repeatedly appear, and why? Finally, what is the basis, if any, upon which differences between individuals’ attitudes about inequality and the legitimacy of the contemporary capitalist structure become less divisive, and how (if at all) do the identified heuristic concepts maintain such a basis?

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transparency” (Hebdige 1979:11) – provided an especially instrumental analytic framework for a qualitative analysis of cognitive process. By identifying such truths – claimed as universal and implied as self-evident – and how they fit within the overall logic underscoring general ideological beliefs about contemporary capitalism and economic justice, I sought to determine how (if at all), and to what extent, dominant ideologies about inequality and economic justice are reproduced through discourse (Giddens 1979).

Method and Data

Sample and Data Collection

Data we collected using a combination of semi-structured and open-ended interviewing and analyzed using a grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Respondents were MBA students from five universities in the Boston area, including Boston College, Northeastern University, Boston University, the University of Massachusetts-Boston, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This group was chosen because they represent a group of young-to-middle-aged professionals who are all especially embedded within environments (i.e., business schools and corporations) particularly prone to promoting adherence to conventional beliefs about economic justice and market-oriented ideologies (Frederick 2008; Freeman and Newkirk 2008). Being ensconced within such a culture is likely to result in members being especially knowledgeable of the ideologies commonly espoused within it, if not becoming more faithful in such ideologies. At the same time, asking this group of educated people, of whom a majority is uncertain of their future career prospects,2 about a recession that exacerbates such uncertainty could seemingly only encourage them to second-guess conventional ideological beliefs. This point can only add to the reliability of the study. This sample, however, is quite specific, coming from similar institutions that promote a relatively conventional worldview. As such, it is uncertain whether respondents’ attitudes are shaped by business school experiences and not reflective of the population more generally. This is a potential limitation of the study.

Interview questions asked to all respondents include the following: Has the current economic crash made you rethink your career goals? If so, how? Who or what do you think is to blame for the crisis, and why? What do you think about how the economic crisis is currently being handled by the U.S. government? Do you think anything else should be done, and why or why not? Do you see any problems with how the economy has been functioning over the last several years? What permanent changes (if any) do you think need to be made? What do you think are the main reason(s) why recent corporate scandals have occurred (such as Enron, etc.)? How, if at all, do you think the government should deal with these scandals?

Follow-up questions were unique to each interview and were broad and open-ended, simply encouraging respondents to elaborate on previous comments by asking, “how exactly do you mean?” – or a variant of this – and by showing general appreciation of everything that is said. Most respondents seemed interested in the topics we discussed and were apparently happy to give in-depth responses to most questions without much prodding from the interviewer. To establish rapport with respondents as best as possible in a short amount of time, and before asking the above listed interview questions, I asked each participant why he/she decided to get an MBA degree, where he/she was from originally, his/her area of specialization, and similar, personal questions. This also helped me to obtain demographic information from respondents, relevant for comparative purposes at the stage of analysis. Each respondent was interviewed only once, due to time and funding restraints. Data gathered from multiple interviews with the same respondents have been shown to be more reliable, due to the rapport that is built over time (Edin 2000). The one-time interaction between interviewer and interviewee is thus, one potential limitation of this study. On the other hand, most interview questions were non-personal in nature; thus, the effect on reliability of having only one interview with each respondent was likely minimal.

Among the 23 respondents interviewed, 14 were male and 9 were female, with ages ranging from mid-twenties to early forties. The sample includes five students from India studying with temporary visas (four men and one woman), in addition to a man from Iran and a woman from Vietnam. The sample also contains two Asian-American men and one Mexican-American man, with the remainder being Caucasian (six men and seven women). Surprisingly, all but two international students conveyed very conventional attitudes about economic justice prevalent within conservative circles in the U.S. Yet, how they adopted these views may differ from the American-born population. The relatively substantial size of foreign-born participants may thus be an additional limitation. Nine respondents had specializations in finance, four in accounting, three in marketing, one in entrepreneurship, one in global management, and one in health care administration. Of the four students who did not declare a specialization, three aim to enter the non-profit sector. I included individuals with different specializations and backgrounds in order to best capture a diverse sample of the MBA population. All interviewees were second-year students or recent graduates (who had been graduates for less than 1 year from the date of the interview). Since Boston is a city known to contain a diverse and relatively liberal population – as compared to central or southern regions of the U.S. – the chances of recruiting students with diverse views, not neatly aligning with conventional American business ideologies, were relatively fair. In this sense, the findings are especially striking.

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extent, pose problems of validity and reliability, and is a limitation of the study. I offered a compensation of $20 for participation. The interviews were conducted between August 15, 2009 and October 30, 2009 in reserved study rooms on the respective campuses of respondents, or in other public places of their choosing, ranged from 45 minutes to 2.25 hours, and lasted on average 1.25 hours. All participants were advised that they could refuse to answer any question or end the interview if they felt it was necessary. Only one respondent refused to answer a question, none ended the interview prematurely. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed by the author. All names have been changed to protect the identities of respondents.

Analysis

The systematic, grounded theory approach employed for the study began with a form of literal coding, followed by a process of data reduction, or identifying themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 1984). Themes were not predetermined by the author but emerged from an analytic-inductive process. No software was used in the analysis; all open codes were marked by hand, and then consolidated into themes on a data excel sheet. Every line containing any amount of substantive meaning was coded in language similar to that used by respondents. The same open codes emerging from at least four interviews were then tagged, with all others discarded. All interviews underwent open coding before thematic coding began. After the initial thematic coding of 10 interviews, selective coding was employed to speed up the analytic process (Glaser 1998). The ways in which each code was framed by participants – in relation to the more general beliefs conveyed at the given point of the interview from which it emerged – were compared with these same instances in all other interviews with the same open code. This was done after categorizing all quotes with the same code together in an excel sheet and developing new codes indicating similarities in how they are used by respondents to express a particular view or set of views. These theoretical codes were then compared, with particular attention paid to how (if at all) each code links with others within the logic underpinning overall belief systems conveyed by respondents. The latter two stages of thematic coding correspond to a process defined by Strauss and Corbin as “axial coding,” in which “data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories” (1990:96).

Results

Consistent with previous studies, respondents generally espoused quite ambiguous ideas about what constitutes economic justice and what they felt were the causes and proper solutions to the “Great Recession.” Most respondents framed their comments in ways which implicated both “the system” and individuals as at fault. Still, roughly 78 percent of respondents expressed either unfavorable or ambiguous attitudes towards structural solutions, disproportionately emphasizing individual-level solutions and explanations for social inequality more generally. Even while many saw structural flaws as contributing to economic decline (approximately 65 percent), all but five among this milieu also saw the source of such flaws as lying within individual dispositions and behaviors. Ironically, human propensities respondents associated with causes of the crisis were also consistently posited as rationales behind the general belief that structural economic change would inevitably fail. References to “human nature,” or more specific, naturalistic explanations of human behavior, were cited in similar proportions by both genders and by those from different ethnic and national backgrounds. Such naturalizations included the notions that individuals easily adopt “mass crowd mentalities,” in the words of one respondent, that they are naturally greedy, that disproportionate monetary incentive is most necessary in promoting productivity and filling the most important work with the most qualified people, and that people are naturally competitive. A majority of respondents (approximately 70 percent) cited a combination of at least two of these concepts, most commonly during points of discussion at which attention to structural causes of economic hardship transitioned to discourse on possible solutions (or lack thereof). One example of this general position was reflected in the commonly held logic of eleven respondents who suggested that “greed” is – in particular – fundamental in driving competition and economic growth. As one young man commented, “greed is good to a certain extent because it motivates people. I don’t think there’s any way you can stop that. It’s like an innate thing.” According to this logic, restraining the extent to which individuals are able to pursue this natural inclination by imposing regulatory limitations or a more equitable distribution of wealth would hinder the incentives which drive economic productivity. In Peter’s view, success in business relates to almost a sexual thing...in terms of more money, more power, you know, you are able to get more women... I think that relates to guys in business in a lot of ways. I think those are absolutely basic...things of human nature. I don’t think they will change any time soon. But, when I think of all the unavoidable things that business, greed and competition or drive has created... [sic]. You know, look at the quality of life we have. A lot of those things would not be here if everyone was kind of just fat, lazy, and content with no drive to do anything... Life wasn’t born easy. And now we have all these benefits that society has given us, like medical care and all these things. But, just because it’s there, doesn’t mean you just give it, that you just deserve it. You still have to work hard for some of those things. I think everyone needs to scale down their expectations...

Four respondents (1 woman and 3 men) offered rationales behind their views favoring the deregulation of markets in response to the current recession by explicitly citing a type of Social Darwinism. A young man from India, for example, explained how he believes[i] in Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest. I just can say this is equal under capitalism. So why should you drug somebody and save him for another two days because you know he is going to die? But, that’s the hard truth because if you are smart enough, you survive in this world. It’s true everywhere; it’s not even just the market... I think that’s nature.

As seven other respondents explained with more depth, human nature not only determines the limitations of non-capitalist social structures but also informs their views about economic justice on an individual level. Because the human characteristics (greed, competition, etc.) associated with the positive facets of capitalist society – such as improved quality of living – as well as negative facets, are also posited as innate, such characteristics also structured how respondents framed their discourse on ethics. The quote from Peter cited above reflects this trend, as do others cited below.
As mentioned above, many respondents commented on what they perceived to be the systemic implications of the current recession. Yet, such comments were, nonetheless, disproportionately grounded within the broader frameworks of discussion centered on individual-level concepts (i.e., human nature) proposed as the bases of systemic problems. More than half of respondents (approximately 65 percent) pinpointed elements of “the system” as partly at fault for the crisis – ineffectual regulations and unfair lending practices being the most common. Nonetheless, a majority of this milieu supported either individual-level solutions – such as enhanced work ethic and financial responsibility – or favored structural solutions, but feared that the hindrance of free-markets would impede financial incentives and economic recovery. Just five respondents primarily stressed the need for progressive economic policies to address the recession. For example, Sarah blamed the crisis on a combination of things – greed among executives, lack of innovation among “dinosaur” industries (General Motors in particular), lack of effective regulations, and a “trickle-down” business culture wherein authority structures hinder employees’ ability to act ethically. While she does indicate a belief that the system facilitated unethical behavior, and that changes in the structure of business are necessary, she, at the same time, suggests that the efficacy of such changes will be limited, or even counter-productive, if not taking account of tendencies in human nature:

...not knowing it’s okay to speak up… There has to be incentives in place to stop them from being greedy… I guess part of the reason we’re in trouble is [because] there weren’t enough regulations. But, it’s hard to stop people from being greedy. People are going to be greedy; its human nature… I haven’t quite made up my mind about financial regulations because I think you need to be really careful about what incentives you’re giving people who are particularly in the finance industry.

Those not in this general milieu either solely invoked conservative beliefs in individual responsibility when discussing causes and solutions to the recession (three men and two women) or put blame predominantly on structural trends (three women and two men). Generally, there were no differences in the prevalence of each view according to respondents’ academic specializations, gender, or ethnic background.

One respondent concentrating on finance, Muhammad, emphasized both a belief in the social responsibility of corporations and a loyalty to dominant ideology beliefs. Several respondents seemed to struggle in balancing their views about social responsibility and common welfare with their views on how their professional worlds should run. This led their discussions to often start out on a relativley progressive note and become more individual-focused as the conversation became centered more on their own professional roles and interests. It was often at this point that many referenced assumptions of human nature, shifting from emphases on systemic implications of the recession to individual-level explanations for wider social trends they relate to that event. Five respondents – three foreign students and two Americans – noted this explicitly, commenting on how they still do not know whether particular facets of American business culture are fair, but have chosen to adhere to its conventional tenets nonetheless. Muhammad, for example, implied some level of awareness of this contradiction, indicating that part of the explanation for the ambiguity of his comments is due to the structural forces which we are all subject to yet have difficulty defining. As Muhammad explained when commenting on his belief in corporate social responsibility:

my idea is that you should be responsible to your stockholder, but there is something called social responsibility. So, I don’t know why, but the level of social responsibility is not high for some of these [American] companies.

Q: Do you think it should be?

M: This is something cultural for me. I think that you should be responsible for your society. It’s just increasing the money; making a big fat bank account, doesn’t mean that you are doing well. You should have a balance, like with your family. I have no better answer for that. But the point is, I don’t know how you will design a way that by going high [making a lot of money] you cannot [also] damage other people. Or maybe I have no intention to see the disadvantages… I don’t want to ruin anybody’s life. But, the point is that money is just moving from you to me. So, when I am increasing my amount from half a million to one million, it means that somehow the money is moving toward me [and away from others]; [But], as long as I’m not cheating, I’m not misleading you, I’m not doing a scandal or fraud, that’s okay… The money going down [to help the lower-classes in America] is not enough… I don’t know, for three generations they have been living in these public houses. So, the point is that, we can never eliminate the poverty, we can just decrease the level of pain… But, you cannot [do this] for the unemployed. They don’t go and pay attention to their kids, to their wife, pay the rent. They usually go buy alcohol and cigarettes…

Five other respondents made elaborative comments on the undeservingness of welfare recipients and long-term unemployed when discussing what they thought were appropriate versus inappropriate solutions to the recession. These comments were made during the same points in discussion where their account of structural problems shifted to individual-level explanations for those problems, and where human nature beliefs were often invoked. Some of these respondents, among others, compared their own achievements and level of responsibility to the supposed irresponsibility of others. Transforming the context of the conversation from a “system-blame” framework to criticism of behaviors associated with particular social groups (i.e., those on welfare, irresponsible consumers, etc.) was consistently instrumental for respondents in their attempts to rectify contradictions between their recognition of structural problems and beliefs that natural immutabilities of human behavior both constitute and are made productive by a market society. A normative emphasis on meritocracy and belief in particular assumptions about human nature were often implied as interdependent and underscoring more general attitudes about economic justice. According to this logic, because the current system is as good as it gets, individuals have a responsibility to abide by its normative framework. As Stephanie explained,

...it’s a true statement when they say that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer and the middle-class just stays the same. And some people who are rich don’t belong being rich. It was handed down to them from generation to generation, and it’s not fair. Life’s not fair. You know? In order to have a middle you need to have a bottom and you need to have a top. And that’s just the way life is. We do so much for the lower class; you’ve got to look at all the tax breaks...
Emphases on individual responsibility as the central cause of contemporary social ills was conveyed at least once by a strong majority of respondents (approximately 70 percent), framing their conceptions of economic justice. At the same time, as indicated above, the value of individual responsibility was often implied as legitimate in accordance with supposed limits of human nature. Because the current system is generally considered by a majority of respondents as most just in its capacity to facilitate the inherent strength of the natural inclinations or propensities of human beings—such as the pursuit of monetary self-interest and competitiveness—other systems (i.e., socialism) whose objectives (i.e., equality) are posited as inherently antagonistic with human nature are deemed unjust. Some version of this utilitarian view was conveyed by approximately 65 percent of respondents.

Interestingly, several respondents recognized the limitation of this logic, even as they adhered to it. Peter, for example, consistently espoused his belief in free-markets and the importance of individual responsibility among workers, consumers, and borrowers. Yet, he also indicated some level of understanding that these types of solutions alone may not be effective in fueling economic growth in a sophisticated capitalist society. When outlining his rationale for minimal policy change based on preconceptions of human nature and individual responsibility, and, simultaneously, on the need to “scale down our expectations” in order to curb the moral bankruptcy of consumer society, he seemed to recognize, at some level, the contradictions in such views, and demonstrate a limited, yet practical, awareness that structural forces play a larger role than he is able to explain:

I think there’s a huge growing divide between the haves and the have-nots... I’m not socialist, but it seems like the rich is getting richer and richer, and it seems like there is just a growing divide... And I think that is a real problem. I think that’s just got to come back into line. I don’t know what the answer is or how to really enforce it without making, you know, the country socialist. I guess. You know what man, I think a lot of things boil down to people’s level of decency. But, how do you instill that overnight? You can’t. I think you got to go through things like this. But, even that, I mean, I don’t know if that’s going to work...

It was at this point in the discussion that Peter offered more in-depth explanation for why he considers a lack of individual responsibility to be the primary issue, moving away from his previous emphasis on structural problems and inequality. Like many respondents, Peter framed “fairness” in both individuated and egalitarian contexts, while putting more emphasis on the former as the conversation became focused on solutions to the current recession. Just under half (approximately 48 percent) of respondents conveyed concern with economic inequality at least once. Yet, the conflict many saw between their human nature beliefs and potential implications of a more regulated or “socialist” economy often led them to favor conventional market approaches to fostering economic growth in the U.S. (i.e., low taxation, limited regulation, and minimal social welfare spending). With reasoning based on this general logic, a majority of respondents (approximately 70 percent) thought that long-term regulations should not be implemented in response to the current recession, and all but five believed that short-term intervention was necessary. As he elaborated on his time at a lending mortgage firm at the height of the housing bubble, Peter explained how blaming “big business” is unfair, even as he recognized that executives held a disproportionate share of responsibility. Also noticeable in my discussion with Peter, and with five other respondents, is that the contradiction between what they framed as financially responsible behavior as citizens and the requirements of competition and organizational loyalty as employees were transmuted by similar human nature beliefs indicated above. The result was often concluding statements reflecting fatalistic attitudes about the prospect of favorable social change. The following statement by Peter reflects these trends. It was shortly after the following statement that he provided the above-cited comment on the utility of “greed” and competition.

I think that the investment banks were the ones pulling the strings [which eventually caused the housing bubble to burst]. That’s easy for me to say; I literally sat at a desk and people would call up and say “I need a mortgage,” and I would say ok. I would pull up their credit, look at the value of their house, and I gave out...
such ideologies because we lack the wherewithal to completely transcend them. Hence, he indicates the need to “think outside the box,” as he later put it, while simultaneously falling back upon conventional, dominant ideology beliefs when elaborating more specifically on his views towards contemporary social and economic issues.

Similarly, as Tom commented on his time working for a major financial firm, he emphasized both a relatively progressive attitude about how the current recession should be resolved, as well as a pessimistic view on the likelihood or potential success of the solutions he cites. Like Peter, he indicates how organizational culture, and “life” in general, hinders people’s ability to “see the big picture.” Tom demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of global financial processes, and stressed the need for enhanced regulations. At the same time, he implied a lack of faith in the capacity of individuals to unite around such a cause, and reluctance about whether effective regulations would be worth the social costs. While not suggesting that “greed” or other human nature assumptions are necessarily good for capitalism, he concluded our discussion about the commensurability of human propensities with the implications of an overhaul of the economy. At this point, a strong majority of respondents expressed similar opposition to significant change in the function of contemporary capitalism. Moreover, respondents’ ethical attitudes were often framed around similar notions of human nature, which typically corresponded to fatalistic views towards social change, if not unfavorable attitudes towards change in general. This was particularly striking given that interviews were conducted at the height of the economic downturn. Finally, some respondents implied that they recognized the ambiguities in their rationales, felt discomfort with differences between what was implied as ideal and “realistic” ethical conditions, and were somewhat aware of the impact of ideology on their thought processes.

Discussion

Espousing conventional American beliefs about economic justice, yet simultaneously recognizing the imperfections of those beliefs in light of the current economic crisis, respondents seemed to transmute implicit cognitive contradictions and legitimize the status quo by invoking the notion that liberal capitalism is most compatible with immutable elements of human nature (competition, greed, etc.). As Hochschild (1981) points out, many Americans hold multiple social views which often contradict one another. Findings reported here suggest that assumptions of human nature may serve to “fill” the cognitive “gap” which would otherwise present individuals with insurmountable ambiguities. Given the tumultuous state of the U.S. (and global) economy during which this study was conducted, the general patterns identified above begin to suggest that this cognitive process may be pivotal for Americans in making sense of economic realities in a complex capitalist world. The cognitive point at which human nature assumptions are invoked may correspond to an incapacity to conceptualize a better alternative social system – a result of the very opaque manifestations of power such assumptions keep hidden.

This finding supports the theoretical speculation of Della Fave (1974) who proposes that human nature must be considered by a majority of society to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate equality in a complex society, and not inherently or biologically fixed. While drawing on little empirical literature, Della Fave suggests that a belief in human nature as inherently selfish and motivated only by material reward will lead subscribers to this view to oppose efforts geared towards promoting greater social equality. This study adds an empirical element to this theoretical claim, as well as to the existing literature on American attitudes about inequality. Literature on dominant ideology in America indicates that Americans tend to blame both individuals and the social structure for economic injustice, while still favoring the former to some extent. Findings from these studies tend to emphasize the role of normative beliefs of Americans in explaining why they tend to oppose wealth redistribution and favor tenets of personal responsibility. Findings reported here also indicate that normative emphasis on personal responsibility is important in explaining Americans’ generally
anti-egalitarian attitudes but also illustrate that this normative framework is often framed around an understanding of human nature which marks conceptual boundaries between the ideal of equality and its supposed unrealistic prospect. Belief in a biologically fixed human nature commensurate with a market society may thus explain, at least in part, why Americans tend to espouse the ideal of equal opportunity yet oppose government efforts in promoting equal outcomes. It may not be simply that individuals tend to hold contradictory normative political attitudes about economic justice and capitalism in general. Rather, they may tend to see conflicts between ideals of justice and limited prospects of a reality whose elements they view as containing inherently fixed boundaries. Hence, values in and of themselves may not be the most effective predictors of why many Americans oppose the redistribution of wealth (see Martin and Desmond 2010). As the findings reported here suggest, many may also believe that equality is simply an unrealistic objective or, if implemented, contrary to the public good. The human nature beliefs, espoused by both conventional and progressive respondents in this study, may correspond with the realities they constitute, as inevitable. This finding highlights, paradoxically, both a limit to, and potential opening within, American social consciousness. Individuals, regardless of their intellectual prowess, seem unable to escape many of the conceptual boundaries of common-sense which hinder the formation of alternative worldviews and social changes they may otherwise underscore. Yet, at the same time, respondents’ recognition of the impact of ideology on their reasoning, to a limited but notable extent, indicates that boundaries are not fixed, and that potential exists for new forms of common-sense to emerge within the popular consciousness.

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References


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Positioning in an Inter-Professional Team Meeting: Examining Positioning Theory as a Methodological Tool for Micro-Cultural Group Studies

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Abstract

This paper sets out to test the possibilities of the Positioning Theory as a means to approach small group phenomena from a micro-cultural perspective. The study draws on a transcription of a videotaped inter-professional team meeting in the field of social services. Analysis of the data was set to examine how the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory suit the analysis of in-group phenomena, what different forms of positioning are present, and how the positioning is connected to the group processes. Studying the group’s interaction shows how it is possible to approach the interaction via the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory and how the positioning is intervened with group processes, such as decision-making, arguing, and conflict. The study also offers a new theoretical and empirical perspective to the research on small group dynamics.

Keywords

Positioning Theory; Positioning; Group; Interaction; Micro-Cultural

The aim of the study presented in this article is to examine the possibility of adapting the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory to the field of micro-culturally oriented group studies. The theory was originally developed by Rom Harré and Luk van Langenhove (1999a) as a means to understand the dynamic nature of social episodes and human interactions.

The perspectives arising from the linguistic turn in the social sciences can be regarded as the standing point of the Positioning Theory. The dualism between the cognitive or experimental research methods, predating the more critically and discursively oriented views taken up by the linguistic turn in the 1960s and 1970s, exemplifies the somewhat two-fold nature of social psychological research. The linguistic turn can be viewed as a turning point in social sciences as it gave way to a new era of research based on its criticism against the individually oriented experimental traditions (see Potter and Wetherell 1987; Gough and McFadden 2001).

Dualism of two different methodological and epistemological standpoints is also visible in the field of group studies. The epistemological standpoints of this field can roughly be divided into two different approaches – the cognitive, or experimental, and the psychodynamic one – both of which include various perspectives and empirical orientations (see Poole and Hollingshead 2004; Poole et al. 2004). The first focuses on how the individual cognition, such as perception, and processes of action are connected to the social realm via group membership and vice versa. The latter emphasizes the unconscious motives of human behavior, also as a basis for the functioning of groups adopting views and concepts from the psychoanalytic tradition. During the past two decades, groups have also been approached from a more cultural perspective (see e.g., Hartley 1997:29-31; Denzin 1999:308-310), and these approaches can be viewed as a third predominant approach to group studies. However, the amount of interest in groups in micro-sociological and social-psychoanalytical research in general has varied over the past six or seven decades, and in recent years more emphasis has been put on intergroup relations (see de Moura et al. 2008; Wittenbaum and Moreland 2008). One of the many reasons of why so few attempts to find new perspectives to group studies have been made is a methodological one. New and current methodological approaches have not been available or have not yet been adapted to the current issues dealing with the multiple ways of viewing groups and their dynamics.

In this study, the cultural perspectives on groups are referred to as micro-cultural group studies. These perspectives stem mostly from views of sociality in phenomenological sociology, American micro-sociology, and social psychology; also, they are present in social constructionists’ thought (see e.g., Potter and Edwards 2001; Delamater 2003). The studies on culture, interaction, and context, as well as norms, roles, social networks, and other micro-cultural phenomena as means of understanding the social behavior have gained particular interest (see Burke 2003; Rohall, Milkie, and Lucas 2007). To an extent, the cultural interpretations view human behavior and experience of individuality as something constructed in the course of everyday interaction, different relationships, and being a member of different kinds of social groups. With this perspective in mind, the study of the rule-governed nature of human behavior and the study of how individuals interpret these rules and the actions of others has gained much emphasis.

The study of social interaction – with its long and extensive history – is one of the pivotal segments of micro-cultural studies. One of the most recognizable and influential views on interaction is Robert F. Bales’ (1951) interaction process analysis (IPA). In addition to IPA, objects of group studies within this field have dealt with concepts of status, power, and leadership, as well as integration and
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cohesion (Burke 2003; see also Rohal, Millie, and Lucas 2007). Studying meetings and interactions, as well as institutional interactions (see e.g., Kangasharju 2002; Heritage 2004; Arminen 2005), is not all that new, especially, in the field of economics and management (see e.g., Asmuž and Svennevåg 2009). Meetings and negotiations, as well as communication in small groups, have also been examined from the viewpoint of organizational ethnography (see e.g., Schwartzman 1989) and conversation analysis (see e.g., Firth 1995). However, most of the critical approaches, such as the study of interactions or culture, have not yet been adapted to the in-group context to the same extent as the views represented by the two more well-known paradigms. Consequently, the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory have not been adapted to a small group level to the same extent as to the interpersonal or intergroup level.

The Positioning Theory and Micro-Cultural Group Studies

Rom Harré, one of the father figures of the Positioning Theory, sees the social reality as principally consisting of rule- and convention-governed models of cooperation, as well as joint actions (Harré 1997). The Positioning Theory is something that strives to explain the dynamic nature and the moral aspects of social behaviour within its complexity, locality, temporality, and cultural context of thought and language. According to this “dynamic paradigm” (e.g., Harré and Moghaddam 2003:3), more emphasis should be laid on the analysis of social interaction episodes than on experimental studies; also, the analysis of these episodes should focus on the situation specific meanings and roles which are both constructed during particular episodes embedded within a specific situational context. The Positioning Theory – as a study of social interactions developed within local moral orders – focuses on the moral rights and duties of interlocutors. The analysis of one’s authority to speak and take part in the interaction, as well as how these authorities, rights, and duties are distributed amongst people taking part in a particular interaction, constitutes the starting point of the theory at hand (Harré and van Langenhove 1999a:1). The use of the term “position” varies; so far, it has been used in many different ways and many different contexts regarding the field of (Social) Psychology and Sociology. More recently, it has been viewed as a more dynamic perspective of the rather static concept of the role. Whereas roles remain relatively static from one situation to another, situation specific positions are more dynamic – as guided by one’s rights and duties. Nowadays, the concept at hand is most commonly associated with the study and analysis of ever developing and symbolically mediated interaction, with the focus on both the individual- and group-related aspects of interaction (see e.g., Frosh, Phoenix, and Pattman 2003; Sammut and Gaskell 2010). This makes the nature of concepts like position and positioning more suitable for the analysis of interaction and its dynamics than more static concepts, for instance, that of the role (see Harré and Slocum 2003:126-127).

Positioning as action, or an act, refers to the determinative and discursive construction of familiar “parts” and “roles” of the speakers, which make one’s actions and the social episodes intelligible and reasonable. For instance, in a conversation between a teacher and a student the right to make certain remarks is differently committed between the two parties to an interaction. The same utterance gets a different social meaning depending on which of the interlocutors expresses it. The different utterances and speech acts then reveal the storylines characterizing the conversation (van Langenhove and Harré 1999:17). According to Harré and van Langenhove, the dynamics of the previous example can be presented as a figure referred to as the positioning triangle.

Figure 1. The positioning triangle.


In this context, position refers to the collection of rights and duties of a person (or a group) to perform certain acts. The shared presumptions of personal attributes, leading to the expectation of certain kinds of behavior, are both distributed and constructed on the discursive level. All social situations and environments create possibilities for positioning where different positions can be adopted, contended, or forced in a dynamic way. Social force, or social action, includes all the ongoing talks and activities that should be revised as meaningful actions and performances. These actions take place in different episodes, simultaneously constituting the episodes, as well as the ongoing storylines. Also, previous experiences of the interlocutors are key features guiding the episodes. The storyline refers, thus, to the patterns of functioning within the given ongoing episode which is based on previous episodes (see e.g., Harré and Moghaddam 2003:5-6). More specifically, the concept of storyline refers here to the sequences of verbal interactions and their specific nature. For example, a short discussion between a doctor and a patient could be viewed as a storyline of consultation, and that between a teacher and a student as a storyline of tutoring. Hence, storylines can be viewed in this context as an abstract, or a summary, of the ongoing interaction.

The layout presented in the positioning triangle can take place on both an interpersonal and an intergroup level, as well on an inter-institutional level when each of the triad’s basic concepts is set in its own context. A review of the studies applying the theory at hand illustrates the same perspectives, emphasizing the study on a person-to-person communication level, intergroup level interaction, and communication and interaction on a more cultural level (see Harré and van Langenhove 1999b; Harré and Moghaddam 2003). Positioning on an interpersonal level has also been approached from a narrative perspective (see e.g., Hydén 2005) – by illustrating the construction of individual agency in relation to different positions. More recently, the theory in question has been adapted, for example, to understand the Internet discourse and to – theoretically – develop a broader framework for the analysis of discourse in general in the social sciences (Schmidle 2010; Slocum-Bradley 2010; see also Linehan and McCarthy 2000), as well as to the analysis of close relationships and broader cultural and political phenomena, as well as intra-personal and inter-group positioning (Moghaddam, Hanley, and Harré 2003; Harré and Moghaddam 2008). However, the intra-group aspects of interaction and positioning, as presented in the Positioning Theory, have been somewhat left aside.
Positioning can be viewed as something that has consequences and is a part of the everyday interaction. Approaching group interaction from this viewpoint facilitates more detailed examination of the dynamics of interaction than, for example, interaction process analysis and other quantifying methods of interaction analysis.

The Aims of the Current Study

The present study aims to examine the possibilities of the Positioning Theory as a means to approach small group interaction and performance through the micro-cultural perspective. To reach the aims of the micro-cultural perspective, a natural group was considered most suitable for the study at hand. Hence, it wouldn't serve its intentions if the group under scrutiny was formed just to achieve the research purposes. With this in mind, inter-professional teams form one interesting and current example. Research concerning inter-professional working methods is of a particular interest in the field of organizational behavior and group decision-making, and the data used in this study also come from this field. Studying meetings and interactions, the focus has usually been on institutional interactions and the method of choice has usually been conversation analysis.

The aims of the study are as follows:

1. What different forms of positioning are present in the in-group interaction? How do the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory suit the analysis of in-group phenomena?

2. How, if at all, is the positioning connected to the in-group processes, such as negotiating, decision making, and conflict?

3. How do the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory suit the analysis of in-group phenomena?

Method

This article draws on analyses based on videotaped material and examples from a study led by Pirjo Nikander\(^1\) (see 2003; 2005) dealing with argumentation and rhetoric decision-making processes during the inter-professional meetings. This paper draws on observations of a 1-hour-long material of an almost 3-hours-long meeting dealing with elderly or disabled clients' home care benefits.

The function of the meeting is to make the multiprofessional case specific decisions about elderly care and home help services. The meeting at hand took place in a small conference room where everyone was seated around an oval-shaped table. The participants were seated in such a way that everyone could see each other. Altogether, eleven social and health care professionals participated in the meeting. The group included a doctor, a secretary of care giving, six home help services directors, and six nurses. The doctor was facing the secretary on the right hand side and the others surrounded them. Every participant had documents in front of him/her, and at the beginning of the meeting the doctor collected the medical statements concerning the cases at hand. The secretary also had all the cases related documents. The participants represented their own specific points of view and expertise, as well as case specific knowledge regarding each of the cases discussed. The home help services directors and the nurses have firsthand information on the cases – since they are the ones who have been in contact with the clients most recently. The meeting can be described as semi-official by its nature. No official turn allocation takes place, however, every turn taken is respected, everyone has the right to speak. The researcher is not present during the taping of the meeting.

The analysis of the data was made using a transcription of the videotaped material. The original video data were used to help observe the physical surroundings, how the participants were situated in the room – to make sure to whom the speech was directed. Hence, the focus of the analysis was on the transcribed text material. The first part of the analysis consisted of dividing the data into different storylines by assorting what (and when) happens and takes place during the meeting. Using the basic concepts of the Positioning Theory, this was followed by the analysis of each storyline and utterance. Later, the storylines, and the positioning occurring within, were viewed with group processes – as I tried to identify what processes occurred and how they were connected with positioning.

Results

Storylines Guiding the Positioning

The meeting itself forms one sort of an institutional storyline, a mode of the joint interaction which is characterized by a certain time and place, order of business, institutional role of the participants, and the central role of the chairman (see e.g., Kangasharju 2002). After examining the progression of the meeting on a more general level, the meeting can be viewed as consisting of two larger phases –

1. The contents of different orders of positioning vary, depending on, for example, what the positioning is based on (moral and personal positioning), how the positioning is manifested (tacit or intentional positioning), or who is being positioned (positioning of the self or other) (see Harré and van Langenhove 1999b). The following examples demonstrate the basic forms of positioning which take place during the meeting.

2. Storyline of Starting the Meeting

Discussion over general topics, conventions, and general terms, as well as institutionally mediated
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information, such as the maximum and minimum amounts of the benefits, is characteristic to the storyline of starting the meeting. The first extract comes from the very beginning of the meeting – as everyone is taking the seat and settling down.2

Speakers:
D: Doctor
HSD(n): Home help service director (n)
N(n): Nurse (n)
S: Secretary of care giving

Fragment 1

1 D: we should there are coming [but] meijän varmaan on tulossa [vii] [mutta] me
2 HSD1: [but] mä käyn viel mä tuun
3 surely we will start [let's start now yes and] kai me aloitetaan [ku kello on jo yli yks
4 D: [let's start now yes and] mää tarviisin tätä [there] sano ny [samalla että te tulevat
5 time goes on] [so quickly on.] aika menee [niin kovasti kyytiä.
6 HSD1: [past one] past one [yli yksi
7 (0.5)
8 we must these have to get dealt with so that we could aika menee niin kovasti kyytiä. [etä saatais

This example aptly depicts the tacit first order positioning (positioning is not argued). The doctor suggests waiting for the last ones to arrive (line 1), but one of the home help service directors suggests to start the meeting immediately (lines 2-3) and thus, through her suggestion, becomes positioned as a kind of chairman of the meeting at hand. This positioning is instantly followed by accounts on the behavior (lines 6-8). The position is accepted by the others, in this case – by the doctor (line 4). Here, the positioning is the part of group interaction development; it illustrates who has the right to start the meeting.

The next example follows the previous episode as one of the nurses gets up and leaves the room momentarily.

Fragment 2

19 N1: I will go still. I’ll come [here] mä käyn viel. mä tuun
20 (0.5)
21 HSD2: I will need this ([ to someone else ]) mä tarviisin tätä
22 N2: say at the same time that they should come [there] sano ny [samalla että te tulevat
23 HSD2: [there ([ to someone else ])] siettä [sieltä]
24 N1: [past one] [siyes
25 yli yksi
7 (0.5)
8 we must these have to get dealt with so that we could aika menee niin kovasti kyytiä. että saatais

The comment uttered by the nurse (N2, line 22) illustrates – from the positioning viewpoint – the right to tell and instruct the other nurse (N1). The extract demonstrates the first order positioning when one interlocutor is seen as someone who has the moral duty to order the other. The first order positioning is not denied and hence, it is not followed by the second order positioning (denying the first order positioning). Perhaps, in this case, the nurses positioning illustrates their relation to each other rather than the relations concerning the whole group. However, it depicts the role of positioning in the proceeding with interaction, as well as how a consensus is maintained. Imagine what would happen if the position was denied and challenged.

The following extract demonstrates the dynamic nature of positioning when – during only few utterances – adopted positions are questioned, yet, maintaining the status quo of the social order.

Fragment 3

57 S: they can already be () written () down otherwise ne voidaan jo () kirjata () ylös muuten
58 but that not before the board has, mutta että sitten vasta kun lautakunta on,
59 (0.5)
60 S: so it should be tomorrow as far as I know elikkä sen pöissä olla huomenna mun käsitöä
61 [the board meeting, [lautakunnan kokous,
62 HSD3: [but the board is today] [tänäänhän on lautakunta.
63 (0.2)
64 S: I well it might be any day now! but I will put them to the mem as a reservation [tänäänhän on lautakunta.
65 memo as a reservation [siiro muistion varaus]

The clarifying statement of the home help service director (HSD3, line 62) questions the secretary’s expert position by means of second order positioning. Although the positioning does not take place in its essential proposal-question-form, the expert position adopted by the secretary can be regarded as the tacit first order positioning, and the home help service director’s statement as intentional positioning. However, the secretary does not pay much attention to this and continues the interaction perpetuating her previous position after having briefly commented on home help service director’s statement (line 64).

 Especially the first and the second order positionings were typical for this storyline. These positions were mainly adopted by the tactic, moral, and deliberate first order positioning when the members’ expectations and duties to others and self became apparent.

In this storyline, expert positions are adopted. The next example demonstrates how one of the home help service directors (HSD3) adopts an expert position via deliberate positioning of the self by clarifying the basic concepts used during the meeting.

Fragment 4

168 HSD3: I would suggest that I could read this what mä ehdottaisin että mä voisim luette tän mistä se
169 (0.5) (-) the need for nursing consists of? (.) muodostuu se hoidettavaa
170 (0.5) (-) the need for nursing consists of? (.) muodostuu se hoidettavaa
171 [but then the limits do we know what we have [ja sitten ne rajat onko meille mitä me ollaan
172 always.] hh made about the caregiver nurse aina. hh tehty omistuloytijasta
173 .hhh so the clear limit [partition would be hhh nin ne selkeet rajan] jaas yksi ois varmaa
174 [yes] [kyllä
175 [good to] [tarkka
176 [yes] [ja kerrata
177 [yes] [joo
178 [yes] [joo
179 do revise kertaas

1 Extracts presented in this paper include both an English translation and original Finnish citations.
Not only adopting a position but also receiving one is included in the example. The deliberate first order positioning (HSD3) is confirmed by others and the second order positioning and thus, the need for accounts does not become necessary. Again, the positions designed for oneself and others are imperceptibly present within the speech-act, but, after a closer look, they become obvious. The utterances of the home help service director (HSD3) show that she has the right to position herself as an expert in regard to the basic concepts of nursing. At once, the chairman position moves to this home help service director. Now, the processes of positioning help to clarify the concepts used by the group by enhancing shared understanding.

The Storyline of Case Discussion

In the storyline of discussing the particular cases, one client’s state of health, entitling this client to the given amount of home care benefits, is introduced and discussed. This storyline makes certain positions evident as everyone in the meeting has a specific duty and role – some as experts, some as listeners and commentators.

This storyline includes the third order positioning, which refers to discussion about events and persons outside the meeting. Normally, the third order positioning occurs while referring to the episode that has already taken place (van Langenhove and Harré 1999:21), nonetheless, in this case, speaking about the client is also seen as the third order positioning since the clients are not physically present at the meeting and cannot, therefore, deny the positions appointed to them.

Similar positioning occurs in almost every case presentation when the backgrounds and the current states of the clients are examined and the position of an expert and a chairman is shared with the doctor by the person who – most recently – has been in contact with the presented client. This demonstrates the dynamic shifts of positions within the group. However, in this storyline, and especially while proceeding from one client to another, different kinds of positioning come about.

Fragment 5

2332 D: and this kind of sta-stiff and stagnant, ja tämä on pyä-very stiff and pyysähtynyn.
2333 (1.0)
2334 still picture and here has needed h-help pyysähtynyn kuva ja tässä on tarvinnu a-apua
2335 in particular uh with moving washing up nimenomaan, ih ihän liikkumisessa peseytymisessä
2336 getting dressed, (0.5) help in the toilet in bed can’t puukeutumisessa, (0.5) veeseessä aapua ei voi
2337 turn around independently must be turned over during the night and omatoimisesti kääntää yöllä käänneltävä ja
2338 wears a diaper during the night. vaippa yöllä.
2339 HSD3: yes. uh so that is true and about the kyllä, hh eli toitä paikansa ja siitä
2340 moving around that he doesn’t move around independently anymore liikkumisesta sen verran että hän ei liiku enää yhtään itsenäisesti

This example demonstrates how the doctor adopts the position of an expert by the means of the tacit first order positioning. The expert position is build up as the doctor clarifies the current state of the client; the third order positioning of the client requires the doctor’s expertise – his expert position. In this case, the client is positioned as a person who has difficulties in independent functioning. The home help service director (HSD3) approves this position (lines 2339-2340), as well as the doctor’s depiction of the client, and add some details to the client’s description, what helps her to adopt the position of an expert – by means of the tacit first order positioning.

Fragment 6

837 D: well next (client’s name)? no seuraavana (asiakkaan nimi)?
838 S: erm hey hey [hey hey tota hei hei [hei hei
839 D: [sorry, (anteeks,
840 S: so this had the right to free. ni tällä oli oikeus vapaaseen.

The doctor wants to discuss the next case (line 837), but the secretary interrupts (line 838) by getting back to the previous one. This exemplifies the secretary’s right to interrupt the doctor because of the unfinished matter. This happens according to the first order positioning and the position attributed to oneself is accepted. After this episode, each time before passing to the new case, the doctor asks, if the secretary approves it. Clearly, the doctor has not got the right to do so without the secretary’s permission. This positioning entirely alters the course of interaction at hand.

The next extract demonstrates both the conflict and positioning in the storyline. One of the home help service directors (HSD1) and the secretary (S) have been discussing a client’s right to some services, but did not agree over that matter.
This example demonstrates the disagreement between one of the home help service directors and the secretary regarding the case at hand as the secretary comments on the home help service director's statement in a harsh way (lines 972-973, 980, and 982). Now, the other expert on the case (HSD3) adopts the position of a negotiator (lines 978-979, 981, and 983) – a position in which the doctor has previously acted – and tries to clarify the issue for the other home help service director by asking the question so that a consensus could be achieved between the secretary and the other director. At the same time, the sub-storyline of disagreement changes into the tutorial one. These kinds of sub-storylines take place within the larger storyline of the meeting and describe the specific nature of the situation in which the ongoing interaction is embedded.

Discussion

All forms of positioning occurred during the meeting at hand. The positioning – of oneself and others – was often either tacit or intentional. One central form of positioning, describing the contents of the positions, was moral positioning which occurred at both the first and the third order level. In this case, the basis for positioning was the team member's expertise.

But, what makes the positioning accruing in a group different from the interpersonal positioning between two people? One prominent difference is constituted by the perlocutionary effects of the speech-acts. In this case, the adopted and suggested positions, as well as how the group members respond to them, impact upon the way the whole group functions. For instance, in extract six (Fragment 6), the perlocutionary effect of the secretary's speech-act influences the group and changes the way the interaction at hand proceeds. Also, the roles and the status of the group members influence, for sure, the understanding of what kinds of positions are possible and who is obligated or responsible to take part in the interaction. These issues might be more visible, and present, within a group setting than interpersonal settings.

This study shows both the significance and the role positioning play in the small group interaction. In this case, positioning was studied within the context of group processes and interactional phenomena of the group, varying from the progression of the meeting (Fragment 1, 2, 4) to the clarification of shared concepts (Fragment 3), argumentation and decision-making (Fragment 5), possible manifestation of conflicts, and conflict resolution (Fragment 7), as well as making change happen (Fragment 6).

Only the transcribed material of the interaction and speech-acts was analyzed in this study, leaving out the analysis of the videotaped material. This was done for two reasons. First, the videotaped material consists of data recorded by the camera that was located in the corner of the meeting room. Consequently, some participants are facing away from the camera, what would possibly make the analysis of, for instance, non-verbal communication very difficult. Second, and more importantly, in approaching the group behavior from a Harréan positioning point of view, the multimodal or non-verbal elements of interaction are not relevant. The adaptation of these standpoint makes the analysis focused on verbal communication, as well as joint construction of the situation and positions via speech-acts. This, however, can be regarded as a weakness of the approach at hand as the inclusion of viewpoints from the video-based analysis could offer additional insights to the positioning processes. Advances in the visual ethnography and the analysis of videotaped materials (see e.g., Pink 2007; Heath, Hindmarsh, and Luff 2010), as well as the developments in the analysis of the modalities of interaction (see e.g., Jones and LeBaron 2002; MacMartin and LeBaron 2006), have made it possible to analyze interactions in a more detailed way, focusing also on the embodiment, physical surroundings, and artifacts involved in the everyday interaction.

One of the aims of this study was to explore the possibilities of applying the basic concepts and ideas of the Positioning Theory as a means to analyze small group interaction. But, why is it important to study small groups from a micro-cultural perspective? One possible answer derives from the everyday life of diverse organizations. Since the explicit structures of power, and related role expectations, have changed in the aftermath of transition from bureaucratic to post-bureaucratic models of organizations, the guidelines influencing individual behavior are more negotiable and flexible (see e.g., Webb 2004).

One’s objectives and functioning within an organization are now conducted, for the most part, by individuals. Hence, the definition of a subordinate’s position, as part of organization power structures and social order, is achievable and negotiable in the course of everyday interactions. Accordingly, the studies focusing on how and in what contexts these positions are achieved and how one’s place in the social order is negotiated have become relevant.

The present study illustrates the dynamic and shifting nature of small group interaction, highlighting the need for elaborated and detailed research in this field. The empirical analysis of small group interaction demonstrates how people – fluently and effortlessly – negotiate their positions amongst each other and how proficiently they take part in the interaction that both creates and guides the small group’s functioning. It also demonstrates the micro-cultural nature of the group at hand, which have its
own manners and morality that are continuously negotiated. The group in question also has very specific methods and phases of working together, something that is observable due to the application of the Positioning Theory, in this case – the concept of storylines. The acts of positioning demonstrate the dynamic nature of negotiating identities; again, something what is very typical within the micro-cultural group studies context. In addition, the standpoints and basic concepts of the theory at hand offer a methodological tool which is suitable for the analysis of small group interactions, as well as for the examination of the linguistic and micro-cultural scopes of small group dynamics.

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**References**


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Appendix 1

List of transcription symbols.

( ) micro-pause (less than 0.3 seconds)
(0.5) pause (duration)
[ ] overlapping speech
↓ ↑ onset of noticeable pitch rise or fall
 o quiet speech
( ) a guess of what might have been said if unclear
( - ) unclear talk
, even intonation
? intonation falls to low
? intonation rise to high
# creaky voice
@ speaker emphasis
so- sharp cut-off of the prior word or sound
( ( )) transcriber’s note


For all sociologists for whom interpretative paradigm and qualitative research methodology are basic perspectives of studying social reality. In order to enable a free flow of information and to integrate the community of qualitative sociologists.

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