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Religion, Platonist Dialectics, and Pragmatist Analysis: Marcus Tullius Cicero’s Contributions to the Philosophy and Sociology of Divine and Human Knowing

Abstract
Whereas Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Augustine are probably the best known of the early Western philosophers of religion, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) also played a particularly consequential role in the development and continuity of Greco-Latin-European social thought.

Cicero may be best known for his work on rhetoric and his involvements in the political intrigues of Rome, but Cicero’s comparative examinations of the Greco-Roman philosophies of his day merit much more attention than they have received from contemporary scholars. Cicero’s considerations of philosophy encompass much more than the theological issues considered in this statement, but, in the process of engaging Epicurean and Stoic thought from an Academician (Platonist) perspective, Cicero significantly extends the remarkable insights provided by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Although especially central to the present analysis, Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (1972) is only one of several texts that Cicero directs to a comparative (multiparadigmatic and transhistorical) analysis of divine and human knowing.

Much of Cicero’s treatment of the philosophy of religion revolves around variants of the Socratic standpoints (i.e., dialectics, theology, moralism) that characterized the philosophies of Cicero’s era (i.e., Stoicism, Epicureanism, Academician dialectics), but Cicero also engages the matters of human knowing and acting in what may be envisioned as more distinctively pragmatist sociological terms.

As well, although Cicero’s materials reflect the socio-historical context in which he worked, his detailed analysis of religion represents a valuable source of comparison with present day viewpoints and practices. Likewise, a closer examination of Cicero’s texts indicates that many of the issues of divine and human knowing, with which he explicitly grapples, have maintained an enduring conceptual currency.

This paper concludes with a consideration of the relevance of Cicero’s works for a contemporary pragmatist sociological (symbolic interactionist) approach to the more generic study of human knowing and acting.

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Religion; God(s); Cicero; Plato; Philosophy; Pragmatism; Symbolic Interaction; Dialectic Analysis; Knowing; Epicureanism; Stoicism; Fatalism; Divination.

There are a number of branches of philosophy that have not as yet been by any means adequately explored; but the inquiry into the nature of the gods, which is both highly interesting in relation to the theory of the soul, and fundamentally important for the regulation of religion, is one of special difficulty and obscurity. The multiplicity and variety of the opinions held upon this subject by eminent scholars are bound to constitute a strong argument for the view that philosophy has its origin and starting-point in ignorance, and that the Academic School were well-advised in withholding assent from beliefs that are uncertain. Most thinkers have affirmed that the gods exist, and this is the most probable view and the one to which we are all led by nature’s guidance; but Protagoras declared himself uncertain, and Diogoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held that there are no gods at all. Moreover, the upholders of the divine existence differ and disagree so widely, that it would be a troublesome task to recount their opinions. Many views are put forward about the outward form of the gods, their dwelling-places and abodes, and mode of life, and these topics are debated with the widest variety of opinion among philosophers; but as to the question upon which the whole issue of the dispute principally turns, whether the gods are entirely idle and inactive, taking no part at all in the direction and government of the world, or whether on the contrary all things both were created and ordered by them in the beginning and are controlled and kept in motion by them throughout eternity, here there is the greatest disagreement of all. And until this issue is decided, mankind must continue to labour under the profoundest uncertainty, and to be in ignorance about matters of the highest moment. (Cicero 1951a [De Natura Deorum], I, i:1-2)

Although generally overlooked as both a philosopher and a sociologist of religion, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) is, as the preceding quote suggests, a scholar who has given the matters of human knowing and acting considerable thought. More than that, though, Cicero represents a vital link between Greek philosophical thought on religion and more contemporary Western theology and religious studies. Further, because his work addresses so many issues pertaining to human knowing and acting, Cicero’s analysis of religion is pertinent to a more comprehensive understanding of the human condition.²

Cicero’s analysis of religion, as with his other academic works, is very much indebted to classic Greek (700-300 BCE) scholarship. Indeed, Cicero’s

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² This statement represents a small part of a much larger intellectual odyssey wherein I (as a symbolic interactionist) began tracing the development of Western social thought (particularly pragmatist scholarship) back to the classical Greek era (see Prus 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2010; Kleinknecht 2007). At the outset, I had no particular familiarity with Cicero’s scholarship and had no cognizance of his work on religion or philosophy. However, I became more acquainted with Cicero’s works as I began to inquire more fully into the development of rhetoric as persuasive endeavor in the classical Greek era. Given a long standing pragmatist and ethnographic interest in the nature of human knowing and acting (Prus 1996, 1997, 1999; Prus and Grills 2003) including people’s involvements in religion (Prus 1976), I was most intrigued to discover Cicero’s materials on religion. I had been reading Plato’s texts and realized that despite his willingness to engage most every area of human knowing and acting in dialectic analysis, he did not do so with religion. Cicero does this and more.
considerations of philosophy and theology have been very much influenced through Cicero’s exposure to later versions of Plato’s Academy.³

Still, in developing On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum) and his related texts Tusculan Disputations (1945), De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (On Ends of Good and Evil) (1914), De Fato (On Fate) (1942a), and De Divinatio (On Divination) (1923a), Cicero provides readers with a highly instructive set of comparative, historical, and pragmatist analyses of human knowing and acting pertaining to religion that extends well beyond that which Plato and Aristotle (given their relative timepoints) could have generated.⁴

Further, although neither of the two viewpoints (Stoicism and Epicureanism) that Cicero addresses most centrally in his writings on religion have persisted in direct forms to the present day, it should be noted that the viewpoints that the Epicureans and Stoics developed are not so different in many ways from more contemporary Western (Judaic, Christian, and Islamic) notions of divine and human knowing.

Likewise, those who may be inclined to (a) question as well as (b) defend the viability of religious (and spiritual) claims of any sort, along with those who (c) wish to better comprehend the ways that people make sense of and experience religion more generally may appreciate the exceedingly profound, thorough, and precise ways that Cicero’s Academician enters into the analysis of religion and considers people’s claims, questions, and uncertainties.

As well, because of the analytic/conceptual ways in which Cicero engages these and other religious standpoints, the issues that Cicero examines have maintained an enduring, cross-cultural relevance. Thus, matters pertaining to the existence, form, and role of any divine essence(s) are central to sustained considerations of religion as also are notions of devotion, virtue, truth, skepticism, evidence, life and death, and the physical constitution of nature.⁵

On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum)⁶

As suggested in the introductory extract, Cicero does not intend to offer any definitive answers on the nature of the gods. Instead, and in more uniquely

³ By contrast, Cicero’s exposure to Aristotle’s writings appears to have been much more limited (as also seems the case for the [Aristotelian] Peripatetics of Cicero’s day). Still, residues of Aristotle’s works (and viewpoints) are evident and these generally constitute instructive counterpoints to the more skepticist views associated with the Academic (Platonist) tradition. Thus, while Cicero lacks an adequate base for engaging Aristotle’s works in more direct terms, Cicero maintains continuity with some of Aristotle’s ideas in his philosophic debates.

⁴ Cicero appears to have written most of his works on philosophy in a comparatively short span of time (when Romans were banned from practicing law) and was apt to make use of whatever texts he had at his more immediate disposal. Although best known as an orator, it should be appreciated that Cicero had a long-standing exposure to and interest in philosophy and religious thought (e.g., see De Divinatio, II:i-ii). As well, while Cicero often acknowledges his dependence on other authors, Cicero provides a wealth of comparative historical, philosophic and oratorical analyses that is available nowhere else.

⁵ Emile Durkheim has no apparent knowledge of Cicero’s works on religion. Still, those familiar with Durkheim’s (1915 [1912]) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life will find much in Durkheim’s text (with its emphasis on religion as realms of human knowing, acting, and interchange amidst the continuities and transitions of community life) that resonates with Cicero’s materials.

⁶ This statement is derived principally from the English translation of H. Rackham’s (1951a) De Natura Deorum, but also has been supplemented by Horace C. P. McGregor’s (1972) translation of the Nature of the Gods, as well as, Paul Mackendrick’s (1989:169-184) abbreviated commentary.
sociological terms, Cicero acknowledges a plurality of viewpoints that people may develop, express, and contest with respect to these matters. Likewise, while primarily adopting the question ing (dialectic) stance associated with the Academy, Cicero allows representatives of the Epicurean and Stoic positions to state their cases at some length.

In developing On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero (Book I:1-17) identifies himself as an Augur (an elected Roman religious leader). Relatedly, Cicero explicitly acknowledges both the functional relevance of religion for community life and his own obligation to respect this office. At the same time, because matters pertaining to religion have such profound relevance for the human condition, Cicero deems it important to attend carefully to the nature of religious claims and related considerations as these have been engaged by the best minds.

Thus, developing On the Nature of the Gods within the forum of a courtroom interchange, Cicero has (1) Gaius Velleius present the Epicurean position, (2) Quintus Lucilius Balbus articulate the Stoic viewpoint, and (3) Gaius Cotta assume the role of the questioning Academicians.

Parts of the text (some of Book III and a fuller conclusion) appear to have been lost from Cicero's original, but the material to which we still have access is quite remarkable in both substantive scope and analytical detail. Indeed, after Cicero, it is not until Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) that one finds a more detailed and comprehensive treatment of an assortment of religious viewpoints and even Aquinas does not eclipse Cicero's contributions. Likewise, David Hume's (1711-1776) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1957) appears to be a partial restatement of arguments developed between the Stoics and the Academicians in Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods.

On a more contemporary plane, Cicero's works on religion resonate notably with a constructionist (Berger and Luckmann 1966) or interactionist viewpoint (Blumer 1969). Thus, while acknowledging an [out there] to which humans may attend, Cicero not only recognizes the multiplicity of world views that people may develop in coming to terms with (the world), but also envisions people's definitions and claims as subject to ambiguity, challenge and debate as his spokespeople attempt to ascertain the nature of human and divine knowing and acting. Because many readers are apt to not be familiar with Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods, I will review the themes that Cicero introduces, while maintaining the essential flow of his analysis. This way, readers may more readily locate sections of Cicero's text on their own. Readers also are cautioned, at the outset, that Cicero does not speak of most things himself, but instead (and more like Plato) allows his speakers to address wide-ranges of theological (and secular) matters.

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7 For those who have not had the opportunity to examine Thomas Aquinas' works, I would observe that Aquinas is not only one of the most competent Aristotelian commentators of all time, but also that Aquinas is one of the most accomplished dialecticians on record (see Summa Theologica 1981). Although Aquinas fuses some of his analysis with his religious beliefs, a great deal of his analysis remains highly instructive for scholars in philosophy and the social sciences as well as for those more centrally involved in religious studies and theology. Aquinas' emphases are notably different from that of Cicero, but no other scholar of record in the intervening centuries approximates the range, depth, or acuity of Cicero's analyses.

8 Despite the unmistakable heavy reliance of Hume on Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods, Hume provides only the paltriest of references to Cicero's text.

9 Somewhat intriguingly, too, Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods grapples more directly with issues pertaining to human knowing and acting in religious arenas than does Peter Berger (1969) The Sacred Canopy or Thomas Luckmann (1967) The Invisible Religion, despite the access of these latter two authors to their own (1966) conceptually enabling text, The Social Construction of Reality.
In Book I (1-17) of *On the Nature of the Gods* (NG), Cicero sets the stage for the interchanges that follow. Here, Cicero acknowledges a basic and perplexing set of philosophic issues pertaining to a divine or supernatural (beyond human or natural object) existence. As well, he considers the qualities of any divine essences and the ways in which these essences might engage the cosmos and its human inhabitants.

In the process, Cicero not only recognizes a broad variety of theological viewpoints, but also includes stances ranging from intense piety to totalizing skepticism. Here, as well, Cicero accounts for his own interests in, and knowledge of, philosophic intrigues. In NG, Cicero intends to provide a forum in which people may consider a wide range of theological matters, weigh the evidence, and draw their own conclusions.

Velleius, the Epicurean, is the first speaker (NG, Book I:18-56). Following a general denunciation of Stoic and Platonic stances on theology (18-24), Velleius (25-43) reviews an extended assortment of viewpoints on religion. Although Velleius’ descriptions are notably truncated and should not be seen as viable substitutes for fuller accounts of various religious viewpoints, they establish a vast array of views that different people in the broader Mediterranean arena had developed with respect to theology.

In the process, Velleius not only indicates that various Greek scholars have adapted viewpoints sharply at variance from the popular, poetic renderings of the gods (as depicted by Homer, Hesiod and others), but that the positions that Greek thinkers have developed often contradict one another where they do not also connote various internal inconsistencies.

By compactly presenting this array of sources, some highly consequential theological issues become prominent. These include questions dealing with matters such as: do the gods exist/exist; does divinity exist as a singular entity or as a plurality; in what way may divine essences be part of the cosmos; of what matter do god(s) consist; are divine essences immortal; are divine entities active or passive; are people connected with divine essences; can god(s) be known to humans; is worship appropriate; and what is the relationship of virtue to divinity?

After pointing out a great many inadequacies and contradictions evident within and across the positions he has referenced, Velleius (NG, I:43-56) expounds on Epicureanism. In developing his position, Velleius asserts that Epicurus (341-270 BCE), who ought to be clearly identified among the major gods, has provided a uniquely viable account of theology.

Positing that the existence of the gods are proven by the general consensus of a wide array of people, Velleius further insists on the immortality of the gods’ existence and the perfect state of their bliss. He stipulates, too, that the gods are free from passion and are to be worshipped for their perfection. The gods are not to be feared. The gods also are alleged to assume human form, but to be free of corporeal states and limitations. Likewise, Velleius contends, the gods correspond to their human counterparts in both number and likeness because the gods are constituted through a continuous stream of invisible atoms flowing from humans to these divine essences.

The (Epicurean) gods are depicted not only as highly contented essences, but also as free from all demands and obligations. Thus, according to Velleius, the gods spend their time contemplating their own happiness, virtue, and states of perfection. Notably, too, the gods neither control nor interfere with human affairs or any matters of the cosmos. Relatedly, the Epicureans directly dismiss all Stoic conceptions of divine control, fatalism and divination as unfounded.
Cotta the Academician (NG, I:57-124) then responds to the Epicureans. In a manner paralleling Cicero’s own circumstances, Cotta observes that his position as a religious office holder requires him to believe in the gods, but that he remains uncertain about their nature.

This allows Cotta to adopt a position in which he is more disposed to saying what is not valid than what is true. Cotta also states that while he has long been dubious of Epicurean thought, he (respectfully) considers Velleius’ statement to be particularly clear and thoughtful. Cotta then proceeds to dismantle the Epicurean position, in the process elaborating on several themes that Velleius has more fleetingly introduced.

Cotta (NG, I:61-64) begins by challenging the Epicurean argument for the existence of the gods from consensus. Cotta cites various atheists, agnostics, and other apparent nonbelievers as a means of showing the fundamental inadequacy of claims based on consensus.

Next, Cotta (NG, I:65-70) launches on a concerted attack of Epicurus’ theory of atoms. While giving some attention to the Epicurean argument that the gods consist of alignments of atomic particles, Cotta extends his critique to related Epicurean conceptions of the immortality of the gods, and the Epicurean argument for the spontaneous (swerve) movement of atoms within existing structures.

Subsequently, Cotta (NG, I:71-102) engages in a sustained critique of Epicurean claims that the gods assume human likenesses in appearance, manner, and mind. After considering a series of unsubstantiated assumptions surrounding general human tendencies to anthropomorphize about the gods, Cotta (I:103-114) then questions Epicurean claims pertaining to the possible basis of happiness of the gods and the nature of their substance and inactivity.

Noting that Epicureans envision the gods as contributing nothing either to the functioning of the cosmos generally or to human well-being more specifically, Cotta (NG, I:115-124) asks how people could be expected to worship gods who do nothing except contemplate their own perfection.

Then, after observing that Democritus (460-357 BCE), the atomist who preceded Epicurus, had mixed views of religion, Cotta argues that Epicurus’ own position actually denies the authenticity of the gods. Cotta further suggests that Epicurus was cynical and self-serving and that Epicureanism constitutes a threat to the religiously-inspired virtues and order of the community.

Whereas Book I of On the Nature of the Gods focuses primarily on Epicurean thought, Book II represents a sustained consideration of Stoic theology. The Stoic spokesperson, Lucilius Balbus, states that he will develop his position (NG, II:3) around four objectives: (A) proving the existence of the gods (God as the supreme intelligence governing the universe and the lesser, subservient gods); (B) depicting the nature or qualities of the gods; (C) establishing the control or governance of the world by the gods; and (D) acknowledging gods’ service to humans.

[This is a formidable agenda and takes Cicero’s spokespeople into some of the most fundamental issues that theologians and skeptics may consider. Indeed, once they reframe Stoic conceptions of divinity in their own (monotheistic) terms, Christian, Jewish, and Islamic theologians will find in Stoic thought a great many parallels to their own positions as also will the skeptics (mindful of Cotta’s [Book III] challenges) who question these latter notions of divinity.]

To prove divine presence, Balbus (NG, II:4-44) articulates a series of claims. Notably, these include arguments derived from (a) contemplating the heavens, (b) wide-spread consensus, (c) testimonials, (d) authoritative prophecies and other
divinations, (e) an orderly universe, (f) people’s capacities to reason, and (g) the apparent harmony of the universe.

In contrast to the Epicureans who argue for human-like images of inactive gods, Balbus (NG, II:45-72) describes divine essence(s) as spherical in shape and as centrally active participants in the cosmos. Stoic gods not only manage all aspects of the cosmos, but they also are seen to pursue beauty, purity, virtue, and attend to all aspects of the universe in caring fashions.

Next, Balbus (NG, II:73-153) addresses the governance of the world by the gods. Observing that Stoic thought has been subject to much skepticism by the Academicians and overt ridicule from the Epicureans, Balbus (II:73-75) makes the Stoic position explicit.10 Thus, he contends that the cosmos and all that it includes has been created and maintained in orderly condition by the gods.

Relatdey, Balbus re-engages the task of establishing the existence of the gods by arguing for divine wisdom and power (NG, II:76-81). Not only does he insist that the gods are rational, cooperative entities, but that they also have extended the divine graces of reason, truth, virtue, and harmony in lesser, but somewhat parallel, manners to people. In this way, Balbus acknowledges the limited, but still noteworthy capacities of humans in order to make the argument for the much greater graces of the gods (an argument by analogy).

From there, Balbus (NG, II:81-97) embarks on an extended consideration of nature, wherein he delineates Stoic views of nature from those characterizing other viewpoints. In rather direct terms, Balbus distinguishes (a) arguments for accidental or chaotic versions of the universe from (b) arguments for the systematic integration of nature (i.e., nature as a thoroughly integrated essence), and (c) arguments from intelligent or rational design.

The Stoic position is that the cosmos is (c) a deliberate, conscious creation rather than the product of (a) a haphazard alignment or (b) a non-rational synthesis or mechanistic ordering of phenomena. In developing this position, Balbus claims that the worldly state of intricate and interdependent perfection could only be the result of intentioned and sustained effort on the part of divine essences.

To make his case more compelling, Balbus (NG, II:98-153) next addresses several of the wonders of nature, each of which he argues has been divinely generated. Here, Balbus details matters pertaining to the bountiful earth, the enabling sun, the beauty of the stars, the forces of gravity, the harmony of the planets, the marvels of vegetation, the adaptive and generative features of animal life, and the enabling and integrative features of human biology.

Also included within the wonders of nature are specific references to the human capacities for reason, knowledge, and anticipation (II:147-148), speech and the extensive enabling qualities of speech (II:148-149), the structure and utility of human

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10 Readers familiar with the larger corpus of Plato’s works (e.g., see Meno, Phaedo, Philebus, Timaeus) will find a considerable amount of theological material that is consistent with the viewpoints that the Stoics would later develop as well as a comparatively thoroughly-engaged, dialectically enabled skepticism that would form the critical base of Academic scholarship (see Charmides [on self knowledge and control], Cratylus [on names and speech], Laches [on courage], Lysis [on friendship], Phaedrus [on love, rhetoric], Philebus [on pleasure and wisdom], Sophist [on instructors], Theaetetus [on knowing]).

Put in this context, Cicero’s NG may be seen as a sustained scholarly attempt to sort out aspects of the theological and philosophic viewpoints that confound Socratic thought more generally. While Plato deals more directly with the problematic of many topics in dialectic interchanges, and even subjects virtue (Meno) and piety (Ethyphro) to close scrutiny, Plato appears to have exempted Socratic theology from similar dialectic considerations.
hands for all manners of enterprise (II:150-152), as well as people’s unique capacities for cosmic reflection and divine worship (II:153).

Balbus (NG, II:154-167) next emphasizes the benevolence of the gods for the human condition. He begins observing that all things (and features) of the world have been provided by the gods for people’s convenience and enjoyment. In addition to the vast array of worldly qualities that enable human survival, Balbus more specifically acknowledges the plants and animals that not only provide human sustenance in more direct terms, but that also facilitate other manners of human enterprise and well-being.

Balbus (II:162-167) likewise draws attention to the knowledge and insights that the gods provide for people through divination and other modes of instruction.

Book III of On the Nature of the Gods centers on Cotta’s Academician critique of Stoic theology. After indicating that he is prohibited from questioning the religious viewpoints of his own office, Cotta (III:1-6) indicates that he can still subject Balbus’ exposition of Stoicism to philosophical critique.

Cotta (NG, III:7-19) first turns to Balbus’ claims of divine essences. Cotta begins by emphasizing the difference between asserting that something exists and providing viable reasons for believing that it is so. Thus, Cotta asks if simply viewing the heavens can constitute proof that the gods exist. Likewise, Cotta asks Balbus if he can furnish anything more than unsubstantiated rumors to prove that gods actually have appeared to people.

Next, Cotta challenges the argument from divination. If things are destined to occur, Cotta asks, of what advantage is it to know the future and, relatedly, to forego human hope and discretion. Cotta also asks about the basis of divination, suggesting that the arts of prophecy or foretelling the future are little more than social fabrications, some of which clearly offer primary strategic advantage to those practicing divination (as opposed to their clients or others).

Cotta (NG, III:16-19) also attacks the Stoic scholar, Cleanthes (300-232 BCE), who Balbus had cited as providing four arguments for people’s belief in the gods. Having dispensed with (a) divination, Cleanthes’ first basis for belief, Cotta argues that (b) the human awe arising from the tremendous powers of nature offers no proof that the gods actually exist; neither does (c) the usefulness of the worldly things that humans enjoy establish a proof of the gods. Likewise, Cotta observes that (d) the apparent order and harmony of the universe does not constitute proof in any direct sense either.

Cotta (NG, III:20-64) next turns to the nature or qualities of the gods as depicted by Balbus. Contending that Balbus has failed to establish the nature of the gods, Cotta (III:20-22) first questions the Stoic’s claims that the gods are unparalleled in beauty, wisdom, and excellence and therefore must be unsurpassed in superiority and rational capabilities.

After observing that Balbus has failed to provide adequate terms of reference as well as evidence for his claims, Cotta cautions against drawing conclusions on the basis of questionable premises. Cotta, likewise, takes issue with Zeno (334-263 BCE), the founder of Stoicism, who argues for divine rationality. Using Zeno’s arguments, Cotta illustrates how one may use the very same logic to reach all sorts of absurd claims.

Cotta (NG, III:23-24) subsequently acknowledges the considerable regularity of the stars (cosmos), but then asks if this means that all other regularities that one finds in nature also are divine in essence. Cotta contends that attributing regularities of nature to the gods reflects Stoic inabilities to develop more rational (physical)
explanations for the things that naturally occur in the world. It is, Cotta contends, most inappropriate to invoke gods as a cover for human ignorance.

Cotta (NG, III:25-28) next challenges the value of the Stoic analogy that human rationality is an obvious manifestation of what the gods must possess in greater abundance (based on the more humble, but still impressive things that people have developed). Cotta also dispenses with Balbus’ claims that speech and other human abilities prove the existence of the gods. It is essential, Cotta contends, to distinguish the gifts of (physical) nature from imputations that human qualities are deliberate, minded handicrafts of the gods.

Attending to the Stoic arguments that the gods are living, immortal, and sensitive to the predicament of humans, Cotta (NG, III:29-38) asks how the Stoics would refute the arguments of Carneades (the Academician; 219-129 BCE) who argues that every living thing not only is mortal, but also is capable of experiencing sensation of some sort.

Positing that nothing that is living can be immortal, Cotta asks further whether anything that is immortal (and therefore nonliving) can experience sensation. Relatedly, he asks if nonliving (and non-sensing) things can comprehend notions such as wisdom or virtue. And, if not, would they be able to distinguish human notions of good and evil? But, says Cotta, from a Stoic standpoint, a god without reason and virtue would be inconceivable.

Cotta (NG, III:39-64) then directly asks if Stoic conceptions of deities actually are more rational than the superstitions of the ignorant or the popular (mythical) deities of the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans.

Subsequently, citing an argument that Carneades had developed, Cotta elaborates on a variety of problems that emerge when one tries to establish just who (or what) the gods may be. Thus, Cotta indicates, regardless of whom or what may be deified (images, animals, people, relatives of gods, stars, the sea, evil forces, abstract qualities) all sorts of peculiar (increasingly absurd) conceptual linkages (lineages, categories) result.

Concluding that it would be the task of philosophers to dispel the errors associated with any attempts to identify the gods, Cotta then turns to the question of whether the world is under divine control. [Part of the text is lost].

[Text resumes] Cotta (NG, III:66-93) is dealing with human reason, which Balbus had specifically defined as a gift from the gods. In response, Cotta observes that reason provides a means of doing evil as well as good. Further, given the comparative prevalence of evil in the human arena, it is difficult to argue that perfect gods would have given people the deliberative capacity to do wrong.

Cotta asks if this means, too, that the gods are ultimately responsible for the evil, harm, and suffering that results from people’s use of reason. If it is the people themselves who actually are to blame for their poor use of reason, would it not have been more appropriate for the gods, given their superior wisdom, to have provided people with a more viable form of reason than that which they possess?

Disregarding even this, Cotta continues, would it not at least be appropriate to expect that people who act more virtuously would be advantaged over the evildoers? But, judging from history, Cotta observes, this frequently is not the case. Indeed, the evidence indicates that when evil is punished, it is only because people (not the gods) punish other people.

Interestingly, Cotta notes, while the Stoics claim that the gods are not responsible for this state of injustice because the gods cannot be expected to oversee everything, the Stoics still claim that there is nothing the gods cannot do and that nothing is too small to escape their attention. It is ironic, Cotta adds, that the
same gods who do so little to insure justice with respect to good and evil would still
bother to give each person unique dreams and other means of ascertaining (divining)
the future.

Cotta (NG, III:93) concludes the extant part of his speech saying that his
intention is not to disprove the existence of divine essence(s), but rather to indicate
how difficult the question is and how limited are our theories that address such
matters. [The text ends somewhat abruptly with an expressed intent on the part of
those present to re-engage this topic].

Despite the remarkable range of theological issues that Cicero considers in On
the Nature of the Gods, he has still more to offer to students of divine and human
knowing and acting. Indeed, while NG constitutes an analytical centerpiece in
religious studies, several of Cicero’s other works significantly extend the subject
matters introduced in NG. Especially relevant in this sense are Tusculan
Disputations, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (On Ends of Good and Evil), De Fato
(On Fate), and De Divinatione (On Divination).

A fuller understanding of Cicero’s views of human knowing and acting would
require an extended consideration of Cicero’s highly compelling analyses of rhetoric
(several texts; also see Prus 2010) and other statements on philosophy (e.g., Cicero
[1951b] Academica [also see Prus 2006], Cicero [1923b] De Amicitia), but this would
take us well beyond our more immediate objectives.

Accordingly, the strategy adopted here is to address the texts that deal more
directly with the theological issues introduced in NG, indicating the additional insights
and resources that these other statements offer to scholars in religious studies,
philosophy, and the social sciences more generally.

**Tusculan Disputations**

After some remarks on Roman scholarship and the potential of Latin authors to
surpass the Greeks, Cicero uses the setting of his Tusculan Villa as the setting for
introducing five distinct theses that deal with human problems, failings, and
limitations. Thus, while Book I deals with death and human immortality (through a
suprahuman soul), Book II examines people’s encounters with pain. Book III focuses
on anxiety as a problem in human living. Book IV attends to other emotional
difficulties that people may experience. Book V examines the relationship of virtue to
happiness.

Although the first dialectic interchange (involving death and immortality) is most
obviously connected with theological considerations and represents an issue notably
neglected in On the Nature of the Gods, it should be appreciated that the matters
with which Cicero deals in Books II-V of Tusculan Disputations (TD) also are often
interfused with religious thought and Cicero examines these topics in both religious
(especially Epicurean and Stoic) and more secular, philosophic terms.

As well, because Cicero attempts to sort these matters out in ways that are
mindful of human lived experience, these discussions (as with Cicero’s writings
generally) should be of considerable interest to social scientists. At the same time,
readers are cautioned that it is possible to do little more than outline the issues that
Cicero examines in Tusculan Disputations and the other texts introduced here within
the present statement.

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11 This discussion has been developed from J. E. King’s English translation of Tusculan Disputations
first published in 1927.
The following extract from Book I of *Tusculan Disputations* not only frames the ensuing text, but also more specifically alerts readers to some of the very different notions of human contact with divinity that various philosophers have adopted:

[w]e must first then consider what death, which seems to be a thing well known to everyone, is in itself. Some consider death the separation of the soul from the body, some think there is no such separation, but that soul and body perish together and the soul is annihilated with the body. Of those who think that there is a separation for the soul some hold that it is at once dispersed in space, others that it survives a long time, others that it survives forever. Further, as to what the soul itself is in itself, or where its place in us, or what its origin, there is much disagreement… (Cicero 1945 [Tusculan Disputations], I, ix:18)

While acknowledging a commonplace human fear of death and the tendency to envision death as an inevitable evil that humans face, Cicero (*TD*, I:9-17) puts forth the proposition that death can be a positive end. Nevertheless, before discussing people’s experiences with death on a more comprehensive basis, Cicero deals with people’s conceptions of the soul (*de anima* in Latin; *psychē* in Greek).

Albeit seemingly intended to supplement his thoughts on divinity (*On the Nature of the Gods*), Book I of Tusculan Disputations has a notably different, somewhat less pluralist or skepticist emphasis.

As in his consideration of theological viewpoints in *NG*, Cicero acknowledges an assortment of views that philosophers have taken with respect to any suprahuman existence that transcends the mortal body in *TD*. Attending to the possibility that the soul may survive after the body perishes, Cicero (as suggested in the material following) considers the conditions of the soul’s survival as well as the essence, location, source, and development of human souls:

Plato imagined the soul to be of three-fold nature; the sovereign part, that is reason, he placed in the head as the citadel, and the other two parts, anger and desire, he wished to be subservient, and these he fixed in their places, anger in the breast and desire below the diaphragm…

Dicaearchus…represents Pherecrates…as arguing that the soul is wholly non-existent and the name quite meaningless, and that the terms «animalia» and «animantes» denoting «creatures and plants possessed of soul» are applied without reason; neither in man nor in beast is there a spiritual or physical principle answering to soul, and all the capacity we have of action or sensation is uniformly diffused in all living bodies and cannot be separated from the body, seeing that it has no separate existence and that there is nothing apart from one single body fashioned in such a way that its activity and power of sensation are due to the natural combination of the parts. Aristotle, who far excels everyone – always with the exception for Plato – in genius and industry, after grasping the conception of the well-known four classes of elements…which he held to be the origin of all things, considers that there is a special fifth nature from which comes mind; for mind reflects and foresees and learns and teaches and makes discoveries and remembers and a multitude of other things: mind loves, hates, desires, fears, feels pain and joy…descriptive of a sort of uninterrupted and perpetual movement. (Cicero 1945 [Tusculan Disputations], I, x:20–22)

Cicero (*TD*, I:26-81) examines an assortment of arguments from various Greek sources on the existence of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and the enabling...
aspects of death. Nevertheless, in contrast to the more questioning Academician stance that Cicero adopts in *On the Nature of the Gods*, Cicero seems intent on arguing for an immortal soul that corresponds more closely with the position that Plato articulates in *Phaedo*. Still, recognizing that not everyone would accept this viewpoint, Cicero develops a second set of arguments intended to reduce some of the anxiety (and negativity) that people commonly associate with death.

Cicero (*TD*, I:82-119) subsequently considers the positive features of death even should there be no immortality or afterlife in which people may find solace. Working with the sorts of assumptions and viewpoints adopted by those arguing for a totally biologically-limited human existence, Cicero acknowledges and tries to minimize the often substantial sense of loss that people associate with death. Further, as Cicero observes, death is a way to escape evil and suffering. He also emphasizes the restful, sleep-like quality of death and the borrowed time in which all humans live. Dismissing burial practices and funeral rites as inconsequential to the deceased, Cicero stresses the importance of the deceased having lived virtuous, honorable lives.

Book II of *Tusculan Disputations* affords Cicero the opportunity to examine human encounters with pain (and suffering) from an Academician (Platonic) philosophic stance. Among the other viewpoints that Cicero considers are Epicurus’ claim that genuine philosophers would remain happy while experiencing extended discomfort; the Stoics’ contention that pain is not an evil, but something one should try to endure; and the (Aristotelian) Peripatetics’ standpoint that pain is an evil, but a lesser evil than dishonor.

Cicero also defines pain as an evil and, like the Academicians and Peripatetics more generally, views virtue as the essential good. Ideally, by more extensively pursuing a virtuous life-style, one could develop sufficient self control to be able to disregard or neutralize an attentiveness to the agony or suffering that one might otherwise experience.

Focusing on anxiety and other troubles that people have managing their entities, Books III and IV of *Tusculan Disputations* are less central to the present statement. Still, some attention is given to the interlinkages of people’s religious viewpoints, emotional states, morality, and disgraceful behavior. As with people’s experiences with pain, Cicero encourages people to master one’s other emotional states in light of pursuing a virtuous life-style.

In Book V of *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero considers whether virtue is sufficient for a happy life (as suggested by Socrates and others). Drawing on a wide range of sources, Cicero assumes the Socratic position that virtue (combined with scholarly wisdom) is the most effective base for happiness. This topic receives further attention in *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (On Ends)*.

**On Ends (De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum)**

In developing *On Ends*, Cicero considers the most desirable ends or objectives to which people should orient themselves. While focused primarily on moral virtue, Cicero uses *On Ends* to confront various limitations of Epicurean, Stoic, and Academician thought. The statement also emphasizes the importance of scholarship.

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12 H. Rackham's (1914) English translation of *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum (On Ends of Good and Evil)* is the major source for this discussion, but I am also grateful to MacKendrick (1989:131-148) for his synopsis of this text.
as something integrally related to the pursuit of virtue. In some very consequential respects, then, On Ends presents a defense of scholarship within the context of religious and philosophical virtue.

Following an introductory statement in which Cicero emphasizes the importance of philosophic study for a virtuous life-style, Cicero devotes Books I and II of On Ends to Epicurean thought. Cicero begins by critiquing Epicurean atomic physics, but further denounces the Epicureans for disregarding logic (as in definitions, deductions) and for relying too exclusively on sense-based data. Cicero also finds fault with Epicurean emphases on pleasure and their disregard of learning.

Representing the Epicureans, the speaker Torquatus responds to Cicero’s critique. Torquatus reaffirms the centrality of pleasure as the essential good. Virtues, Torquatus states, are to be recognized as a means to pleasure and self control is to be exercised in the quest of more enduring satisfaction. Further, because their system is based on physics, Torquatus contends that, the Epicureans have no need of logic or other rationale to explain human thought and action. He points out, as well, that the Epicureans also are explicitly critical of the Academicians who claim not to have any criteria for knowing things.

Cicero replies to Torquatus in Book II of On Ends. Cicero chastises the Epicureans for their lack of clarity and for failing to distinguish human thought from the more instinctive, animal-like dispositions of lower life forms. In addition to neglecting the central role that reason assumes in human acts, Cicero contends, the Epicureans view people as self-serving, pleasure-seeking beings. Cicero also alleges that the Epicureans fail to recognize human virtue and duty, as well as genuine friendship and conventional morality.

In Books III and IV of On Ends, Cicero focuses attention on Stoic morality. Cicero begins by observing that the Stoics are more systematic, logical, and precise in their thought than are the Epicureans and, therefore, the Stoics are more difficult sources with which to dispense.

Cato the Younger, who represents the Stoics in Book III of On Ends, elaborates at length on Stoic philosophy. The Stoics strive to be one with nature. Viewing nature as rational, the Stoics expect humans to act (as in logic, learning, justice) in ways that are consistent with the objectives of nature. Philosophy, accordingly, is valued as a means of pursuing this objective.

In Book IV of On Ends, Cicero directly critiques Stoicism. Cicero accuses Zeno (founder of Stoicism) for obscuring philosophy in needless and misleading jargon. Cicero contends that Academician scholarship is sufficient to deal with the issues most central to philosophy (virtue, knowledge, community).

Likewise, although the Stoics practice logic, Cicero observes that they have added little that is new. Importantly, too, Cicero states, Stoic knowledge of the human world is deficient, notably inferior to that of their (Greek) predecessors. Cicero also emphasizes that because Stoic notions of virtue depreciate the human body, the Stoics disregard the relationship of the body to the mind and, therefore, misrepresent the more complete nature of human experience (and action).

Book V of On Ends provides a mixed (more obscure) Academician-Peripatetic vision of the most desired human ends. Building on Antiochus (an Academician who blends the writings of Plato and Aristotle), the speaker, Piso, references the three Peripatetic realms of philosophy: physics; rhetoric (and logic); and ethics (and politics). Piso also notes that later Peripatetic scholars have assumed stances that are somewhat distant from those of Aristotle.

The dialogue subsequently shifts focuses on practical wisdom. This is followed by a reference to Carneades (an Academician). Carneades alleges that practical
action may be motivated by (a) pleasure, (b) the avoidance of pain, or (c) concerns about things that allow one to achieve virtuous ends. The last option is considered most desirable and Cicero describes both the Academicians and the Peripatetics as attentive to concerns with (a) self preservation and (b) the perfection of human qualities through people’s activities.

Cicero (V:76-96) concludes On Ends as a skeptic of sorts. He accepts the Academician-Peripatetic position of people pursuing virtuous life-styles as the most viable of objectives, but notes that some related issues cannot be adequately resolved. Notably, this reflects the (problematic) relationship of virtue to happiness. This would involve yet further considerations of whether there are degrees of virtue and happiness; of the relationship of wisdom to happiness; and whether people’s involvements in some evil would preclude their happiness?

On Fate (De Fato)\textsuperscript{13}

Although only a partial text of Cicero’s On Fate exists, this statement assumes a heightened prominence because of its more direct considerations of fatalism, causation, and human agency.

Notions of determinism and free will are enduring themes in philosophy, but they are no less pertinent to theology (as in devotion, sin, and salvation), legal and judicial matters, and the social sciences. Still, in contrast to Cicero’s more extensive, grounded considerations of the production of human action in his works on rhetoric, Cicero’s On Fate focuses more directly on the task of dispelling fatalist thought.

As in On Divination (later), Cicero clearly is not opposed to scientific explanations of things or to predictions founded on this sort of wisdom. However, he is specifically opposed to notions of (teleological) predestination and to theories about the human condition that minimize intention, deliberation, and enterprise. Likewise, while the Stoics are the main targets of Cicero’s statement, his analysis is directed to conceptions of fatalist thought or predestination more generally.

On Fate [extant materials] begins in the midst of Cicero’s refutation of Stoic considerations of fatalism or predestination. Thus, we find Cicero (De Fato:5-6) making a distinction between the natural causes of things that people experience and the imputations of predestined forces.

Likewise, Cicero (De Fato:7-11) notes that the environments in which people live may affect their health, appearances, and abilities to learn and do things. However, this is not to be confused with people’s capacities for deliberative intention and focused enterprise.

Cicero (De Fato:11-12) also distinguishes divination (spiritually enabled predictions) from the predictions based on scientific inquiry or the systematic observation and study of things. After criticizing various Stoic arguments for their notions of fatalism, Cicero (De Fato:18-25) also observes that Epicurean thought (and swerve theory) offers no viable conceptual base for accepting human freedom of will.

Subsequently, Cicero (De Fato:26-30) explicitly delineates causal patterns in nature from fatalist assumptions. Cicero further observes that were people truly to yield to fate as the Stoics suggest, people would become inactive and simply wait for things to happen.

\textsuperscript{13} This discussion of On Fate has been enabled by the English translation of De Fato by H. Rackham (1942a). MacKendrick (1989:199-204) was helpful as well.
Cicero also emphasizes the folly entailed in invoking fate to explain any outcome someone might experience (i.e., if fate is invoked to explain any possible outcome, fate loses all value as an explanatory or causal element).

Cicero (De Fato:31-38) references Carneades (an Academician) who argues that if everything were fated or predestined, then nothing would be under the control of human agency. Relatedly, fatalist claims would assume a web of invariant connections between all events. This criticism, Cicero says, does not deny necessary lines of causation for certain (shorter term) things, but it still renders absurd the longer term connections implied by Stoic fatalism.

The remaining [partial] text (De Fato:39-45) considers the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus' (280-200 BCE) attempt to accommodate fate and human agency. By acknowledging that voluntary features of minded activity are contingent on different kinds of causes than other sequences of events, Chrysippus appears able to escape the more deterministic aspects of Stoic thought.

De Fato (46-48) ends with Cicero's further rejection of Epicurus' "swerve theory" (spontaneous motion of atoms) as an adequate basis for dispensing with fatalism.

**On Divination (De Divinatione)**

Although claims that people can foretell the future through extrasensory means are generally dismissed as untenable in scientific communities in present day Western society, popular interest in prophecy, spirituality, ESP (extra sensory perception), and other modes of foretelling the future remain widespread. As well, notions of religious prophecy and providence are often accorded extensive authenticity even where other modes of foretelling the future are dismissed as unfounded.

As Cicero, in On Divination (OD), makes abundantly clear, the beliefs and the associated practices of divination are deeply rooted in Western social thought. More importantly for our purposes, though, Cicero examines the philosophy that undergirds these claims and subjects these to dialectic scrutiny.

Cicero (OD, I:1-7) begins by acknowledging some ancient Greek and Roman beliefs that people can foretell or know future events. While the term divination is rooted in the Roman term divi, meaning gods, Cicero observes that all known peoples engage in some practices along these lines. Cicero also notes that some of the most esteemed philosophers, including Pythagoras, Socrates, Democritus, and some of the Peripatetics have condoned divination.

Cicero subsequently observes that the Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their students) have developed elaborate theories about divination. In contrast, Cicero notes that Carneades (an Academician) clearly and extensively opposes these claims.

Envisioning OD as a supplement of sorts to his On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero (OD, I:7-10) intends to examine divination with care. If divination has validity,

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14 I am very much indebted to the English translation of De Divinatione by William Armistead Falconer (1923a) and have built directly on his materials. MacKendrick’s (1989:185-198) summary statement also has been helpful in conceptualizing this material.

15 The Greek term is theos; as in theology.

16 Aristotle (On Divination) also acknowledges the popularity of this practice, but dismisses divination as coincidental at best. As with much of Aristotle’s written works, it is not apparent that Cicero has direct access to this text.
to deny it would be to offend the gods. However, if divination is unwarranted, then the people who attend to it are engaged in sheer folly.

**OD** develops as an interchange between Marcus Tullius Cicero (referenced here as Cicero) and his brother Quintus Cicero (referenced here as Quintus).

In developing the case for divination, Quintus builds centrally on Stoic philosophy, but supplements this with material from many other sources. Quintus also develops the viewpoint that an openness to divine sources (as in unusual events, dreams, and states of frenzy) allows the human soul to attain reason and knowledge that are normally and otherwise inaccessible to humans. By contrast, Cicero assumes the position of a scrutinizing Academician in Book II.

Further, although the two brothers assume roles as disputants, the text developed here should not be envisioned as an instance of sibling rivalry. The arguments, instead, centrally revolve around the integrity of fatalism as a philosophic position and divination as a realm of human knowing and acting.

Quintus (**OD**, I:vii) first argues for the integrity of divination by citing the long standing sets of cross-national beliefs and practices of divination (i.e., an argument from consensus). Quintus subsequently distinguishes two categories of divination: natural (people’s more direct personal experiences, including dreams, visions, trances, frenzies) and artificial (as in the interpretation of astrological signs, dreams, events, oracles, and signs such as lightening and other exceptional physical or physiological instances).

Quintus (**OD**, I:viii-xvii) proceeds to foster support for his case by providing illustrations of various kinds of divination by referencing a series of literary and historical cases. Quintus (**OD**, I:xviii-xix) then elaborates further on natural divination, alleging that the souls of the people who have experiences of this sort have achieved closer contact with the spirits of gods than have other humans.

Quintus acknowledges the derision that is often directed at oracles and other soothsayers, but still argues for the beneficial results of these predictions. Quintus subsequently argues for divination as this may be achieved through (a) dreams, (b) near death experiences, and (c) uncontrollable states of frenzy.

Turning first to dreams Quintus (**OD**, I:xx-xxviii) provides numerous instances of the prophesizing powers of dreams (including two of his own dreams).

Quintus (**OD**, I:xxix-xxxii) also deals with outsider objections that not all dreams are trustworthy or meaningful. To this end, Quintus quickly dismisses those dreams that have been adversely affected by food and drink. Referencing Socrates and Plato, Quintus argues that it is only during proper sleep that the soul is freed from lower-level bodily sensation and becomes more receptive to divine messages.

Likewise, Quintus contends, the souls of those who are closer to death are more amenable to the powers of prophecy. Thus, like the souls of those experiencing states of frenzy and dreams, those who have near death experiences also have greater capacities to be stimulated by divine sources since they are removed from normal human speech (and rationality) and the routine sensations of body.

Quintus (**OD**, I:xxxiii-xxxvii) then proceeds to consider artificial divination, wherein the emphasis is more completely on conjecture or deduction, as when people interpret the meanings of things that they encounter in person, in dreams, or through other signs.

The argument is that those possessing special knowledge of such things will make more trustworthy interpretations. These events or signs are viewed as mediums through which the gods converse with humans. As before, Quintus provides an array of examples from literature and history. These signs also are taken
as indications of the gods’ concern for humans, to help protect people from the consequences of otherwise limited human knowledge.

Quintus (OD, I:xxviii-xxxix) subsequently relates Stoic justifications for believing in divination. They argue that since the gods exist, are caring, are omnipotent, know the future, and can communicate with people, divination seems indisputable. As well, Quintus contends, the gods provide people with the means of understanding these signs. Otherwise, these messages would be of no value and the gods would know that.

Again, Quintus buttresses his arguments by reference to the widespread use of, and consensus on, divination. Why else, he continues, would certain signs be presented to people? Still, instead of being concerned about why these things happen, Quintus states, the central point is that they do happen.

Quintus (OD, I:xxxix-xlvi) refers to long standing accounts in the literature and cites the various sorts of expertise that different people have developed for divination both in other nations and in Rome. Quintus cites a wide range of instances and subsequent events, thusly signifying the role of divination experts in interpreting the signs presented to them.

Quintus (OD, I:xlvi-l) then puts the focus more directly on divination as a privileged form of knowing. He argues that a certain segment of the population will have the capacity, through the heightened receptivity of their souls, to commune more directly with the gods than will others.

Quintus also differentiates those who are wise in terms of (more mundane) human knowledge (and so may forecast aspects of the future on this basis) from those who are divinely-inspired through dreams, signs, and the like. Indeed, Quintus argues, no one naturally divines except through dreams or frenzies wherein the soul more completely dissociates itself from the body.

Next, Quintus (OD, I:li-lvii) discusses the wisdom that souls gather through eternity (as essences whose transmigration or recycled existence greatly transcends their immediate human bodily hosts) and through the souls’ communes with other souls. It is this more extensive expertise possessed by souls that allows divination by dreams to take place.

Quintus then elaborates on Stoic doctrine, arguing that it is the existence of the gods that enables divination. Quintus acknowledges that people sometimes make mistakes in their interpretations, but that this does not deny the accuracy or value of the great many important instances of divination.

Quintus (OD, I:lv-lvii) subsequently refers to the Stoic, Posidonius, who says that there are three sources of divination: god, fate, and nature. By being mindful of nature and watching the signs of things (particularly exceptional instances of things), people may be better able to predict the things that the gods have destined to happen. In addition, thus, to (a) natural instances of divination, wherein things are more directly revealed to specific individuals, and (b) divinely-enabled expertise in divination that certain privileged individuals may possess, people also may (c) study nature and record the implications of specific events so that they can better interpret any (unusual) signs presented to them.

In closing, Quintus (OD, I:lviii) reaffirms his earlier beliefs in divination, but stipulates that he does not believe in fortunetellers or other mediums who prophesize for money or entertainment.

Book II of On Divination represents Marcus Tullius Cicero’s reply to the position presented by his brother. In responding, Cicero (OD, II:I-lii) begins by reviewing the texts he has written on philosophy and locating his own pronounced interest in philosophy within the context of his present circumstances.
Cicero (OD, II:iii-v) then focuses more directly on divination. First, since divination does not involve phenomena amenable to the senses, Cicero argues that divination cannot be characterized as a science, nor should divination be presumed to substitute for the senses (e.g., can a blind diviner differentiate between colors?).

Cicero also points out the limitations of divining versus knowledge that people have acquired in other ways as well as and other things that people have learned to do in human forums. Quite directly, Cicero states, divination cannot be relied on to replace any realm of knowledge, dialectics, or ethics. Cicero contends that the best diviner is simply someone who conjectures or speculates better than other people.

Next, Cicero (OD, II:v-vii) considers the practical and logical relevance of divine prophecy. Cicero says that if the future were fated, then it would not matter what the results of any divination might be. Indeed, the results would only be viable if the future is not fated; and, if the future is not fated, then there would be no basis on which to expect divinations to predict what the future will be.

For those who still persist in beliefs of this sort, Cicero (OD, II:ix-x) asks what advantage there is to knowing the future (people’s futures often are not pleasant) if things will happen a certain way no matter what one might do. Likewise, Cicero observes, if all is fated, no evil would be avoided by knowing the future.

Next, Cicero (OD, II:xi) considers Quintus’ distinctions between natural and artificial divination. Noting that Quintus’ claims that natural divinations are based on communications of human souls with divine sources, Cicero observes that Quintus has included in artificial divination virtually every mode of conjecture about the future.

Cicero (OD, II:xii-xvi) acknowledges that artificial divination may offer people certain political and religious advantages (tactically, integratively), but sees little truth value in artificial divination. As an illustrative case, he asks about the entrails (inner parts of animals) that some use for divination. Cicero asks how knowledge of this sort came about and what sorts of observations, agreements, and sharing of knowledge might be involved. Cicero also asks whether differences in instances of animal physiology reflect the communicative efforts of the gods or simply more routine accidents of nature. Cicero then points out the sorts of inconsistencies and omissions in reasoning that would be required to accept arguments based on signs of this sort.

Cicero (OD, II:xvii) also questions the practice of people making sacrifices to the gods in hopes of obtaining signs more favorable to one’s interests. If all were fated, this would be pointless. Otherwise, it appears that both fate and the gods are fickle.

Cicero then questions the sincerity of both Stoic conceptions of the gods and Stoic philosophy, indicating that it is little wonder that the Epicureans ridicule Stoic prophecies.

In contrast to the Stoics who contend, “[i]f there are gods, there is divination; but there are gods, therefore there is divination,” Cicero (OD, II:xvii) proposes that a more accurate rendition would be, “[t]here is no divination, therefore there are no gods.” However, Cicero states, even if divination is destroyed, we must still acknowledge the gods.

Cicero (OD, II:xviii-xxv) then extends his argument against divination based on animal entrails, contending that similar reasoning also destroys the credibility of other signs (e.g., lightening, thunder, and other meteorological phenomena) as focal points for divination. Instead, Cicero insists, we need to learn more about the way these things are produced in nature.

Continuing his criticism of divination, Cicero also asks about the purpose of the signs that the gods are presumed to present. He asks why they are so obscure. And, if the gods had not intended for people to know things in more direct, reliable terms, would they bother to reveal things to them in riddles?
Cicero (OD, II:xxvi-xxvii) subsequently points out the parallels of divination with courtroom cases, whereby through conjecture people may create notably different, but still plausible accounts of the facts at hand.

Cicero goes on to ask, given the great many interpretations people may adopt on things, why it is that the gods would pick things as ambiguous as the various signs that the Stoics and others invoke to foretell (and presumably alter) some of the greatest events in history. Cicero also cautions Quintus and others from assuming that things are signs simply because they appear unusual in certain ways.

Accordingly, Cicero (OD, II:xxviii) summarizes his position along these lines. Instead of resorting to explanations based on mysterious forces, people would be better advised to explore the cause of each instance of things with the intention of uncovering the principles that account for manifestations of this sort.

Not only would this (scientific) investigative approach reduce people’s fears more generally, Cicero observes, but it also would allow people to better appreciate the fuller realms of (natural) possibilities. Cicero adds that nothing that can occur naturally should be construed as a (deliberate) sign from the gods. Cicero (OD, II:xxix-xxxii) then raises some other questions about the integrity of divination.

Continuing, Cicero (OD, II:xxxiii-xxxv) admits that it may seem odd that an augur (such as himself), whose task it is to interpret things in religious contexts, would argue against divination. Cicero explains that the practice of augury in Rome has changed over time.

Thus, although this religious office continues to have support of the masses and remains of great (integrative) service to the state and augurs maintain a (ceremonial) prominence in the public eye, Roman political and military figures currently operate (make decisions) quite independently of augury. Hence, while maintaining that the practice of augury entails an art more generally, Cicero can still deny the plausibility of divination.

Cicero (OD, II:xxxvi-xlvi) subsequently discusses a series of superstitions that are evident on both cross-cultural and historical levels. In addition to other unwarranted notions of causality, Cicero (xlii-xlvi) specifically denounces the validity of astrological claims about people’s fates and characters. Instead, Cicero argues for the viability of heredity and socialization for explaining variations in human behavior and for the importance of strategic medical intervention in offsetting some birth defects.

Cicero (OD, II:xlviii-lxvii) next turns to what Quintus has termed natural divination. After restating Stoic logic on natural divination, Cicero (OD, II:lv) questions the viability of divination through expressions of frenzy or mania. Cicero asks what weight ought to be given to people experiencing apparent states of insanity? How is it that these people are to be invested with the intelligence of gods? Cicero continues, observing (lvi) that some oracles have been so obscure that even interpreters need interpreters.

Cicero (OD, II:lviii-lxvii) then addresses dreams in more direct and extended terms. After acknowledging Quintus’ sources, Cicero (lviii-lxv) proceeds to cast doubts on dreams as viable sources of knowledge. Pointing to the misperceptions that are possible when people engage things in highly alert, sensory states, Cicero asks about the reliability of the images that people experience in dream-states.

After observing that people dream most nights, Cicero asks why some aspects of people’s dreams would not be expected to correspond with some features of people’s subsequent experiences on a chance basis alone.
Cicero also asks why people who ordinarily reject the rationale of conscious persons whom they deem insane would place their trust in dreams that so often are highly confused in essence.

Likewise, Cicero asks if it is feasible for people to wait for dreams before learning about or doing something. He observes, too, that although people dream extensively, people's dreams do not appear to have resulted in the development of any noteworthy science or skill.

After discussing some problems associated with the interpretation of dreams and various skepticisms regarding dreams as a basis for knowing and acting, Cicero further asks why the gods would pick such obscure and untrustworthy methods of communicating matters of importance to people.

Surely, Cicero suggests, the gods would recognize limitations such as these. Also, if the gods wished to send people particular warnings, would it not make greater sense to do so when people are most able (i.e., alert, sensible) to deal adequately with these messages?

A related set of issues pertains to the problems of discerning consequential from irrelevant dreams. Since people appear to have misleading or irrelevant dreams, Cicero asks, do the gods also send false dreams? Further, if people have difficulty distinguishing true from false dreams, of what value are these allegedly divine messages?

Subsequently, Cicero (OD, II:lxv-1xvii) dismantles the instances that Quintus has cited as proof of the viability of dreams. Cicero also questions the authenticity of historical accounts of dreams, noting that these cannot be tested. He asks, as well, how these practices were developed and popularized.

Then, sourcing Democritus, Cicero (lxvii) expounds on a natural theory of dreaming that reflects the great capacities of the soul (mind) through sensation, thought, and anticipation to maintain itself (i.e., a consciousness of sorts) even as the body relaxes:

> [t]he soul is of such a force and nature that when we are awake, it is active, not because of any extraneous impulse, but because of its own inherent power of self-motion and a certain incredible swiftness. When the soul is supported by the bodily members and by the five senses its powers of perception, thought, and apprehension are more trustworthy. But when these physical aids are removed and the body is inert in sleep, the soul then moves of itself. And so, in that state, visions flit about it, actions occur and it seems to hear and say many things. When the soul itself is weakened and relaxed many such sights and sounds, you may be sure, are seen and heard in all manner of confusion and diversity. Then especially do the «remnants» of our waking thoughts and deeds move and stir within the soul. (Cicero 1923a [De Divinatione], II:lxvii)

After disposing with more of Quintus' illustrations, Cicero (OD, II:lxv) states that dream interpretations provide more evidence of the ingenuity of the diviners than proofs of relationship between dreams and any particular laws of nature that would allow people to predict the specific outcomes associated with certain dreams. Cicero also raises questions about Quintus' claims that dream interpretation has developed through systematic observation and study. How, Cicero asks, is this possible? Cicero points to the uneven, fragmented, and highly diverse nature of dreams, even where people actually recall these.

Cicero then succinctly summarizes the position he has developed to this point:
[t]herefore, if God is not the creator of dreams; if there is no connection between them and the laws of nature; and finally, if, by means of observation no art of divining can be found in them, it follows that absolutely no reliance can be placed in dreams. This becomes especially evident when we consider that those who have the dreams deduce no prophecies from them; that those who interpret them depend upon conjecture and not upon nature; that in the course of the almost countless ages, change has worked more miracles through all other agencies than through the agency of dreams; and, finally, that nothing is more uncertain than conjecture, which may be led not only into varying, but sometimes even into contradictory, conclusions. (Cicero 1923a [De Divinatione], II:xxi)

After rejecting dreams, along with other claims about divination, as superstition, Cicero observes that anyone who could eliminate superstition would render a great service to their community. However, Cicero adds, his destruction of divination is not to be viewed as a denunciation of religion. Cicero considers it wise to retain the religious institution of his state. Likewise, Cicero acknowledges a personal awe of the cosmos that leads him to believe (not prove) that there exists a supreme being who merits human respect and appreciation.

With On Divination, we largely conclude our review of Cicero’s works on religion, at least those of a particularly scholarly nature. Thus, On the Nature of the Gods, Tusculan Disputations, On Ends, On Fate, and On Divination represent remarkably astute contributions to the study of humanly known and engaged lifeworlds. In contrast, another volume, Laws, which conventionally also has been attributed to Cicero stands notably at variance with the preceding set of works.

Laws (De Legibus)

Whereas Laws (Cicero 1928a) also addresses matters pertaining to religion in very direct terms, this text is of a very different analytic quality from those just considered. The text to which we have access is only a partial manuscript (and possibly was never fully developed). Quite directly, Laws evidences little of the conceptual depth that Cicero achieves in his other work on religion and rhetoric. While maintaining some noteworthy analytical emphasis on human reason (especially see Laws I:22-32), this volume seems primarily concerned about promoting a civil state or social order that is steeped in the ideology of natural, divinely inspired (vs. humanly constructed) law and maintained through a religiously focused and formally sanctioned code (especially Book II). The extant text of Laws concludes with a more general commentary on legal procedures and offices.

Like Plato, Cicero was very much interested in fostering social order and clearly envisioned religion as a tool to be used in pursuing that objective (i.e., generating dedication, integration, morality, and purpose among the citizens in general). However, Laws is much less analytically astute than Cicero’s other works.17 Interestingly as well (and in contrast to Cicero’s On Divination), the author of Laws

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17 I am not disputing the point that Cicero wrote a book entitled, Laws, or that some segments of the text to which we have access may have been written by Cicero. However, the version of this text that we have is substantially inferior (as in conceptual depth, comparative analysis, and relative intellectual detachment) to most of Cicero’s other works.
(II:30-33) considers divination to be a reasonable, viable line of action and claims privileged status for priests and augers.  
While some may claim that Laws depicts another, intensely religious side to Cicero, the author of Laws clearly is much more intent on establishing and maintaining a religious moral order as an integral component of civil society than pursuing an analysis of religion and law.  
By contrast, Cicero’s other texts on religion attest to the ambiguous, pluralist, relativist, and humanly engaged nature of people’s knowledge of, and beliefs about, and dispositions toward both the divinely and the humanly known world.

In Perspective

Although often overlooked as a philosopher and analyst of the human condition, Cicero’s works in religious studies provide contemporary scholars with a remarkably wide range of contextual, comparative-historical, and analytical materials. Cicero’s philosophy may lack some of the originality, depth, and playfulness that one finds in Plato’s writings, but Cicero brings together a great many of the most central issues pertaining to religious matters. He also does so in more direct and comparative manners than does Plato.

As well, whereas Aristotle may be seen to share much of the skepticism that Cicero expresses about religion, Aristotle does not debate Platonic (Socratic) religious viewpoints in a comparably sustained manner (at least in any of the works to which we have access.

Accordingly, it is not until Cicero’s on The Nature of the Gods that Socrates’ religious viewpoints (as represented by the Stoics) are subjected to a more sustained dialectic analysis.

Although people may approach Cicero’s writings on religion in many ways, one result of Cicero’s efforts is a comparatively early, but most valuable excursion into the sociology of knowledge, with a more particularized focus on religion.

18 As Augustine (1984 [City of God], IV:30) pointedly observes, Cicero’s position on divination and augury (see On Divination, II:xxiv) is such that two augers could barely encounter one another without laughing to themselves (about the pretenses of their role in divination).  
19 Indeed, somewhat like De Re Publica (Cicero 1928b) (which also is an incomplete and generally less adequate text attributed to Cicero). Laws could well have been written by another (possibly a very capable Stoic or Christian-motivated scholar rewriting parts of an incomplete statement under Cicero’s name).  
Although Augustine presumably would have found much in this version of Laws that would be conducive to the Christian mission, Augustine (see Against the Academicians [Augustine 1995], City of God, V:9 [Augustine 1984]) is intensely critical of Cicero for rejecting divine intervention in human activity and divinely known fatalism. Minimally, had Augustine viewed this text (Laws) as Cicero’s own, we may expect that Augustine would have taken particular effort to point out the contradictions in Cicero’s positions.

On another level, there is little evidence that someone as thorough, intensely detailed, and astutely comparative in his analysis of the law and its practice (see any of Cicero's several volumes on rhetoric; e.g., see De Inventione [1949a], Topica [1949b], Brutus [1962a], De Oratore [1942b], and Orator [1962b]) would produce such a limited and religiously-biased statement as one finds in Laws.

While Plato (Republic, BII-BIII [see Plato 1937]) is clearly critical of the poetic representations of the gods by Homer, Hesiod and others who depict these essences in ways other than suggest their purity, integrity, or virtuous essences, it is in Laws (BX:884-886 [see Plato 1937]) that Plato directly, but briefly, addresses the possibility that divine essences may (a) not exist, (b) need not care about people’s activities and injustices, or (c) be easily influenced by sacrifices and prayers. Plato (Laws, X:886-893) also briefly considers the possibility of (d) a spontaneous natural, physical versus a divinely ordered universe and (e) that religion is an entirely socially fabricated essence.

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As well as asking an extended series of fundamental questions about the existence of the gods, their essences, and how they might engage the world in On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero considers a much broader set of matters pertaining to human knowing and acting.

In Tusculan Disputations, Cicero considers the related matters of the soul’s existence, essence, and its (possible) immortality, as well as the ways that people deal with pain, anxiety, and other emotional difficulties within religious contexts. In On Ends, Cicero deals with the issues of good and evil and what these might mean in reference to people’s experiences with, and quests for, virtue, happiness, and wisdom.

Cicero’s On Fate and On Divination take readers into yet other realms of religious belief and human knowing. Focusing on fate, causation, human agency, and concerns with knowing the future, Cicero covers a wide range of matters such as prophesy, astrology, the interpretation of dreams, superstition, and scientific inquiry.

What is important is not just that Cicero examines this incredible array of materials pertaining to divine and human knowing, but he does so in analytic, comparative terms and in ways that are remarkably pluralist and directly attentive to human lived experiences (as is often done with respect to speech, objects, and action).

In addition to tracing many of the issues that he engages back to Plato and Aristotle, as well as the pre-Platonic philosophers, Cicero provides an invaluable service to scholarship both by (a) providing materials that link the viewpoints of the scholars of his day to the positions articulated by earlier Greek thinkers and (b) through the ways in which he explicitly, openly, and comparatively deals with so many features of human knowing and acting within the realm of religious studies.

Further, rather than talk about religion in more nebulous terms (as in historical eras, structures, variables, forces), Cicero focuses on the ways that people think about, talk about, and act toward one another and the objects to which they attend in the settings in which they find themselves.

Relatedly, because Cicero considers religion as an actively engaged feature of ongoing community life, there is much in Cicero’s analysis of religion that resonates with a symbolic interactionist approach to the study of divine and human knowing and acting.22

Acknowledging an ‘out there’ in which people live, act, speak and think, the interactionists are highly attentive to the multiple viewpoints that people may adopt with respect to all realms of knowing and the varying life-worlds that people develop around their notions of what is and what is not.

Adopting a pragmatist viewpoint, the interactionists clearly recognize that in order to act or do anything of a meaningful nature, people inevitably make claims about things; about the things that are and the things that are not. While people may make claims of more explicit and definite as well as more tentative and even implicit sorts – as well as shift or readjust their viewpoints on things – all meaningful activity presupposes some knowledge claims.

Insofar as it allows people to do something or pursue some outcome, any knowledge claim has an enabling quality. The question for the interactionists, thus, becomes one of asking how people do things or engage the world about them. This

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21 The earliest, highly sustained statements of record on the philosophy or sociology of knowledge are those of Plato (see Theaetetus, Sophist, Philebus, Phaedrus, Cratylus [see Plato 1997]) followed by those of Aristotle (see, for instance, Categories, Nicomachian Ethics, Rhetoric [see Aristotle 1984]).
means attending to when and how people develop, engage, sustain, adjust, and
discontinue the viewpoints and practices that constitute the basis of their life-worlds.

Further, recognizing the intersubjective or linguistic base of all human knowing,
the interactionists are acutely mindful of the symbolic features of human group life.
This encompasses all manners of people (a) sharing terms and meanings for all
(objects) of reference; (b) engaging in activity-related deliberations, assessments,
and adjustments; (c) participating in influence work, resistance, negotiation,
competition and the like; and (d) developing conceptions, assessments, and
interconnections of other and self.  

Thus, as researchers and analysts, the interactionists consider the meanings
that people assign to things and the ways in which people knowingly act toward or
engage all of the objects to which they attend.

From an interactionist viewpoint, nothing is inherently religious, sacred, mystical
or spiritual in nature. Rather, as Blumer (1969) observes, people give things
meanings as they act toward those things and may change the meanings that they
give things as they reflect on the situations under consideration and share their
experiences of these things with others.

While not subjecting specific instances of human group life (religious arenas or
other theaters of operation) to dialectic scrutiny (and the totalizing skepticism) of the
sort that Plato and the Academicians commonly employ, the interactionists (as a
scholarly community) still approach human knowing and acting in comparative
analytic ways.

This involves analysts defining terms and tentative parameters of analysis,
focusing on process, examining things in the instances in which they occur, engaging
in sustained, comparative analysis, developing generic concepts, and subjecting
existing formulations to subsequent examination in other settings at a more generic,
comparative level.

Cicero’s approach to human and divine knowing falls somewhere between
these two modes of analysis. While adopting viewpoints that resonate with Platonist
or Academician skepticism (in which all human knowing is doubted [especially see
Cicero’s Academica; also Prus 2006]), Cicero maintains somewhat more extended,
pragmatist claims to human knowing and acting than does Plato.

Clearly, Cicero has the greatest respect for Plato’s intellect. However, like
Isocrates and Aristotle, Cicero has engaged the study of rhetoric in notably more
direct, sustained terms and remains attentive to the enabling and limiting features of

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23 Approached thusly, notions of religion represent socially constructed and socially contestable
realms of reality. As with other areas of human endeavor, we may envision people’s religious
involvements as taking place within a subcultural arena or subcommunity (Prus 1997).
Effectively, this means attending to people’s perspectives or world views, the activities in which
they engage, their senses of “self and other” identities, the sorts of relationships or bonds that they
develop with others, the commitments that they make to particular realms of the activity, the ways in
which they express emotionality, and the linguistic fluency that they develop around this field of
behavior.

Although the interactionists have not developed a sustained comparative analysis of religion of
the sort that Cicero achieves in his works, some interactionist inquiries lend themselves to more
generic analyses of matters such as: (a) experiencing the supernatural (religious and secular
interpretations); (b) developing religious interpretations and associations; (c) obtaining cultic
dimensions of association; (d) recruiting and maintaining followers; (e) dealing with the insiders; and
(f) experiencing religious involvements as participants. For some related interactionist materials, see
the humanly known and engaged world in his analysis of religion (see *On the Nature of the Gods, Tusculan Disputations, On Ends, On Fate, and On Divination*).

Although Cicero does not engage in the sort of sustained ethnographic inquiry that is associated with the interactionist tradition, Cicero’s speakers represent Epicurean, Stoic, and Academician viewpoints in their own terms. Thus, he provides opportunities for readers to witness some ways in which scholars who assume differing perspectives on religion might, engage others within the community.

Cicero does not provide everything that one might desire from an interactionist/ethnographic standpoint, but his analysis of religious viewpoints in these texts (other than *Laws*) considered here is so conceptually encompassing, detailed, and comparative-analytic, that it would be unreasonable to ask him for more.

Indeed, those in the social sciences may be grateful to have the extended treasure chest of materials that Cicero has provided in the realm of religious studies. It is up to us to develop (and appreciate) its value for the broader analysis of human knowing and acting.

Given the vast array of materials that Cicero has developed in his considerations of religion, it has not been possible to give Cicero’s work on divine and human knowing the more sustained attention that it deserves. Still, by alerting contemporary scholars to these texts and providing more specific references to the matters that Cicero addresses within, it is hoped that the present statement may enable others to draw more extended linkages with Cicero’s works (and the authors that he references) and more contemporary scholarly endeavors.24

As Cicero observes in his introduction to *On the Nature of the Gods*, the issues are so enduring and intellectually challenging that they deserve attention from the very best minds.

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24 Although comparatively few sociologists appear to have examined Emile Durkheim’s *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915 [1912]) in sustained detail, this conceptually massive text displays many affinities with a pragmatist/interactionist approach to the study of human group life and would provide another extremely valuable set of reference points for developing comparisons with Cicero’s works on religion. For related considerations of Durkheim’s “sociological pragmatism,” see Prus (2009b, 2011).
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Narrating Memory: Weighing up the Testimony  

Abstract  
Memory is the ability to store, maintain and recall information and experiences. Although predominantly an individual attribute, memory coincides with the life-world, with consciousness and with the ability to define reality – all of which are shared with others. When analysing narratives the sociologist needs to situate individual memory within its broader context. The article follows the argument that individuals acquire their memories within a broader social context. They also recall and localise their memories within a broader social context. This article interprets a remarkable testimony: the story of a former political prisoner who circumcised a large number of young fellow inmates in the notorious prison on Robben Island, South Africa, during the period of Nelson Mandela’s incarceration.  

The article relates the narrative in question to the life-world of the narrator and to his experiences whilst serving his 18-year prison sentence. It reflects on the epistemological questions regarding memories. Memory as recollection, as reconstruction of events and information, and as process of re-membering come under the spotlight. Narratives that are often repeated start taking on a life of their own – particularly in the case of trauma memories. When analysing these narratives, the sociologist needs to distinguish between objective markers and subjective interpretation. Memory does not constitute pure recall by the individual. The article illustrates the effect of intersubjective and collective factors on the process of remembering. It calls for a reflexive process to identify, re-interpret and unpack the process of remembering.  

Keywords  
Memory; Experience; Consciousness; Life-world; Re-membering; Intersubjectivity; African National Congress; Circumcision; Robben Island.
Memory: experience, consciousness and the life-world

Memory refers to our ability to store, maintain and recall information that we encounter. It also refers to our ability to store, maintain and recall reflections on experiences that we had. Our experiences and the knowledge that we absorb make up our world. It constitutes the life-world of every individual – the world in which we live that provides the basis of our existence. Mary Rogers (1983:50) refers to this life-world as a “paramount reality” – a necessary stock of knowledge to deal with new experiences and activities. Our experience of our life-world begins at birth and the biography of each one of us is a story of our relations with others and with our world.

Our life-world is predominantly social; it involves other people. As a result of our involvement with and experience of other people, ‘the world’ gradually becomes ‘our/my world.’ The world of knowledge and actions that exists outside of the individual slowly becomes internalised in the child’s own consciousness.

Only by internalising the voices of others can we speak to ourselves. If no one had significantly addressed us from the outside, there would have been silence within ourselves as well. It is only through others that we can come to discover ourselves. Even more specifically, it is only through significant others that we can develop a significant relationship to ourselves. (Berger and Berger 1972:58)

As we learn to become members of society we gain more and more information on and experience of living together with other people. We take large parts of our life-world for granted and seldom question the ways in which we add to our knowledge and experience of this world. We also seldom question the ways in which our life-worlds expand. Because we assume that we’re familiar with our experiences, we have little doubt that our memories truly reflect what happened in the past. It is natural to suspend doubts about the existence of our life-world and about the presumed objective nature of everything connected to this life-world.

The world as we know it and as we experience it is our world because it coincides with our consciousness. “We cannot know reality independently of reality – to do so would be to meet the one and the other in isolation, which is an impossibility. We meet consciousness only as consciousness of something; and we meet reality only as a reality of which we are conscious” (Lauer 1965:5). William Luijpen (1966:33) phrases this principle somewhat differently when he states that: “[w]e cannot escape the simple truth that without human consciousness there is no world.” Consciousness and experience go hand in hand. We bestow meaning to our life-world and our concrete lived experiences become recorded in the internal consciousness of our world. These recordings constitute our memory.

Our consciousness is also directly related to our definition of reality. As individuals, we participate in social situations. We define what those situations mean. Although it is not always a structured and premeditated process, these definitions of reality provide a broader context within which we further experience the social world. In this way we start at an early age to attribute meaning to our life and to our experiences and to participate in this broader context known as social reality. An important implication of this process is that our lives are the culmination of a continuous dialectical relationship between the control elements constituted by the context within which we live and the creativity vested in ourselves. In terms of this dialectic, we often act against or resist our context, but even more often participate in it and collaborate with it.
The link between our consciousness and our ability to define our situation has been long held in sociology. In the early part of the twentieth century, W. I. Thomas already came up with the ‘Thomas theorem’ in terms of which he proclaimed that if somebody defines a situation as real, it is real to her in its consequences. Thomas (together with Znaniecki) was one of the first sociologists to define human attitude as “…the process of awareness determining the individual’s possible or actual activity in the social world” (as quoted in Podgórecki and Łoś 1979:150). This “awareness” refers to consciousness and encapsulates the entire spectrum of memories held by the individual. Memory is a practice and not an objective entity. It is produced out of experience and in turn reshapes experiences.

The context of this narrative

Narrative research has acquired a very prominent place in sociologists’ endeavours to understand social reality. This article focuses particularly on the narrative study of lives within the broader context of phenomenological and interpretative sociological analysis. I am not particularly concerned here with discourse analysis, but rather want to make some epistemological remarks about the use of narratives. These remarks need to be seen against the background of the conceptual map presented earlier, namely the linkages between experience, consciousness and the life-world.

The narrative on which this article is based is directly linked to the experience of one individual. The narrator was among those who defied the Apartheid system in South Africa during the height of this oppressive regime. Johnson Malcomes Mgabela was a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe (literally “The Spear of the Nation” and often referred to as MK) since its inception and later became Commander of MK in the Border region of the Eastern Cape. When MK started to carry out attacks against government installations he was organising the cells of the then banned African National Congress (ANC), was teaching his people, was recruiting mainly young men from the border area to go for military training in African countries such as Tanzania, and was actively involved in deeds of sabotage.

In July of 1963, he was captured and kept in detention for almost a year before being tried in Queenstown and later in Grahamstown. In April 1964, he started his 18-year sentence on Robben Island, one of the world’s most notorious penal institutions. He was one of several hundred who, unlike their leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu, were imprisoned in the anonymous general cells of the island prison. Here, in the communal cells a large number of men – up to 70 in a cell of hardly 140 square meters – were thrown together with only a sleeping mat and a blanket. Early in the morning the bell would ring and everyone had to clear his bed and rush to the few facilities of the small ablution block of the cell. After a rushed breakfast, had whilst sitting in the open in regimented rows, with no tables or chairs, they would go out to work in the stone quarry or elsewhere on the island. Back in the cells by late afternoon they would eat their food and wash themselves before being locked up in the communal cells for a 12 hour stint with their comrades.

The ANC Disciplinary Committee (DC) tried to avoid a situation where people were simply hanging around in the cells and the leaders helped to create a situation whereby the prisoners were involved in studies and political discussions. These discussion periods were taken seriously: the political prisoners appointed study officers from among themselves. The role of the study officers was to declare the
study and discussion periods and to close it afterwards. In the book *Fallen Walls: Prisoners of Conscience in South Africa and Czechoslovakia* (Coetzee, Gitfllan and Hulec 2004), I deal with this issue, describing how the Disciplinary Committee controlled life in the cells. They constantly emphasised that in prison the food of the politician is discussion – political, cultural and social issues were endlessly debated.

Every prisoner of conscience was made aware that he had an obligation to teach others. There even were societies such as a science society and a literature society. They discussed any topic imaginable. Is there such a thing as a flying saucer? What does it mean to have ‘flu?’ And after newspaper reports on sex-change operations: how can a man be changed to become a woman? Joseph Faniso Mati arrived on Robben Island at the same time as Johnson Malcomess Mgabela. They were tried together and both of them started their prison terms in 1964 (the same year their renowned leader, Nelson Mandela, started his long imprisonment). Mati shared for long periods a communal cell with Mgabela and other political prisoners. Having gone through so many things together (the same trial under The Sabotage Act, the same journey from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town in the back of large trucks of the Department of Prison Services, the same trip by ferry to Robben Island and the same treatment at the hands of the prison warders), Mati is in a good position to summarise life on Robben Island. His description of the everyday reality in the island prison gives a background against which we can read Johnson Malcomess Mgabela’s story:

[[if you were not constructively busy in prison, it was very dangerous, because you could become mentally deranged. You were sentenced, maybe to sixteen or twenty years, and it was no use thinking about your wife, or your girlfriend, or your children. There was nothing that you could do. So, in order to stay sane and to avoid worrying about your loved ones, you had to get busy in studies, in discussions, in sport, in reading...But, the one activity that dominated our stay on the island was the political discussions. No-one who spent time on the island can say that he hadn't been strengthened politically. It was as if we couldn't get enough. There were those who wanted to discuss politics every day. They discussed politics at lunch hour in the quarry, they discussed politics in the evening... At the same time under the Disciplinary Committee, they were able to change operations: how can a man be changed to become a woman? Joseph Faniso Mati arrived on Robben Island at the same time as Johnson Malcomess Mgabela. They were tried together and both of them started their prison terms in 1964 (the same year their renowned leader, Nelson Mandela, started his long imprisonment). Mati shared for long periods a communal cell with Mgabela and other political prisoners. Having gone through so many things together (the same trial under The Sabotage Act, the same journey from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town in the back of large trucks of the Department of Prison Services, the same trip by ferry to Robben Island and the same treatment at the hands of the prison warders), Mati is in a good position to summarise life on Robben Island. His description of the everyday reality in the island prison gives a background against which we can read Johnson Malcomess Mgabela’s story:

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Although politics dominated our discussions, it was only natural that we thought about our people outside. Sometimes, you know, that thing of being a man, longing for your wife and especially because most of us were still young, we felt: Hey! I am getting old here. Certain things I cannot enjoy because of my stay in prison...But then, through discussions with some of the others, we encouraged each other. When you fight for freedom these things have got to happen. Thinking and talking about our feelings and experiences...

Around the 1976 Soweto uprising, a new generation of political prisoners added to the flood of information. For some of us the days got longer and longer. It wasn't possible anymore to absorb and debate issues as they became available. In a way we missed the order and the discipline of our initial search to be in touch with the world on the mainland.

Talking about the younger generation of prisoners who joined us towards the middle ’70s reminds me of the need to introduce circumcision for some of them. It was all done clandestinely. We did not know when it would happen and the ANC pretended as if they did not know about it. There were no celebrations afterwards and we would only discover it the following day when we were going to play soccer and found that most of the youngsters were not there.
They had been circumcised by Mgabela – in small groups together. They would stay in the cell the following day or two – no water, their wounds being dressed by Mgabela, sometimes suffering from severe pain. All of this was done with the connivance of the person in charge of the hospital. (Coetzee et al. 2004:39-47)

The emphasis above is on on-going discussions among the prisoners of conscience over the entire period of three decades of political incarceration. It underlines the fact that any major event or happening on the island would have been discussed within the confined areas of the communal cells. Every political prisoner would have known about the circumcisions. The physical presence of the circumcised men, recovering from their wounds, inevitably lead to analyses, explanations and justifications. It speaks for itself that Johnson Malcomess Mgabela, who was the official ingcibi (the person who performs traditional male circumcision), would have been an active discussant with reference to this age-old rite to full manhood. He undoubtedly narrated at numerous occasions the way in which it had been performed as well as the deeper meanings of this tradition.

The narrative

The following is an exact transcription of a part of the life story of Johnson Malcomess Mgabela as related to me in East London, Eastern Cape Province, South Africa in January 1995. In this section Mr. Mgabela told me about the circumcisions that he performed on 361 young political prisoners on Robben Island. Circumcision forms part of traditional rites among many African communities. It marks the advent of adulthood and formalises the position of men within the power structures of adult society. A man who remains uncircumcised does not fall within the jurisdiction of adult authority. He can only be censored as a non-adult. Once circumcised, the man is regarded as an adult and has to abide by the disciplinary code set for adults. In the light of this, it was important for the Disciplinary Committee of the ANC that young, uncircumcised prisoners of conscience be circumcised. The South African Prison Services benefitted from the performance of this traditional rite – the impeccable way in which the DC kept order in the communal cells was widely accepted and praised.

It is not the purpose of this article to debate the significance and meaning of the requests for circumcision by young political prisoners of conscience on Robben Island. It might be that the young men merely desired a continuation of the traditional practice. It seems from Mr. Mgabela’s account as if there is more to this: a desire to be fully integrated into what was proudly regarded as the group of political prisoners. The purpose of this article is to illustrate that memory is related to the thought processes of a particular individual, but cannot only be analysed as an individual act. Memory is also related to how minds work together and how their operations are structured by social factors. The account that follows is the memory of an individual, but needs to be read in its collective context.

When the life story of Johnson Malcomess Mgabela was published in Plain Tales from Robben Island (Coetzee 2000) it contained the first written account of the circumcision on Robben Island. It is therefore of extreme importance as a historical document. Raymond Suttner (2005:86) wrote that no former Robben Island prisoner with whom he has spoken “...appears to have been unaware of this practice.” Those who shared a communal cell with Mr. Mgabela would undoubtedly have recognised his narrative:
JKC: No, how many did you circumcise?
JMM: Three hundred and sixty one.
JKC: Three hundred and sixty one, altogether?
JMM: Total number. Now the last – I said: “No, I am going to stop now because I am going out now.” These people were flocking here in 1976 – you see, all these school boys were arrested. They said they want to go and be circumcised by that old man. When they asked Mr. Hattingh, the Head of the jail, he said: “Look we can send you to hospital”. They said: “No, no.” He said: “Okay, I will change you this side – to there – you won’t tell us tomorrow who has cut you.”
JKC: So during all these years – did the prison authorities know that it was you?
JMM: They didn’t know that it was me, till late 1981. But, they suspected. The only chap that knew was Schoeman.
JKC: So did Schoeman know?
JMM: Schoeman knew this because he said: “Mgabela stop this thing because there was a leak somewhere. I heard these boys discussing somebody.” I said: “Stop.” But, Schoeman is a very, very kind somebody and he said: “Stop that nonsense. Luister hieros, ek gaan jou donder, sommer nou.” [Listen here, I’m gonna bash you right now.]
JKC: Did Schoeman say that to you?
JMM: I know him – he told all those warders there. Some of the warders would get information. They would discuss this in front of Schoeman. [There is somebody there who will cut – circumcise.] Schoeman said: “Luister hieros, fok jou man.” [Listen here, fuck you man.]
JKC: Schoeman told the other warders?
JMM: Yeah, the warders, he told them: “Stop that nonsense. You have got nothing to do with that. I am working in the hospital.” And then it was quiet because Schoeman is good this side. Then they stopped it. Schoeman came to me he said: “Hey! you must be careful. Somebody told the warders there is circumcision and they suspect you.” But, nobody could come and say: “You did this.” Yeah. So all that stuff came out because of this man. I helped him. The warder said [Mr. Hattingh is the Head]: “Well you must write down the report.” I started writing that report. Yeah, I made a political statement then in my report. Now in the morning, I met Captain Hattingh [he is the Head of the prison]. He said: “Kom saam.” [Come along.] He took me to the corner – where nobody was seeing me. He said: “Look, I wish – I want to see Pretoria penetrate your report.” That was the first day that I had seen him in a long time. “I will never penetrate your report.”
JKC: What did he mean by that?
JMM: He said: “You are not supposed to cut anybody in jail.” But, I saw trouble between prisoners and warders where the warder was carrying the gun and he wanted to shoot the prisoner. I know what the purpose of that was because this young boy never reported to anybody because he was supposed to be circumcised before time. It is the time now when he is supposed to be a man. By a certain time [when a boy reaches eighteen] he must be circumcised.
JKC: And if he is not circumcised?
JMM: He can’t think correctly.
JKC: So then he is not a man yet, not an adult, he can’t act like a grown up?
JMM: Correct.
JKC: And you pointed that out in your report?
JMM: I pointed that out in my report. The way it was heading I wanted that point to penetrate to Pretoria, but I wrote an accompanying report.
I said to him: “I know in jail there is only one committee to discipline the people. What I notice, parliament can’t stop this thing. It is our custom. Secondly, Pretoria is in trouble, when a warden is shooting people all over the world where South Africa is wrong in this and this and this, whereas I myself can secure this danger in time. That is why today, I said: «Let me circumcise these boys here to put them into the correct line. Because government can’t put them in the correct line because they don’t know that it is a question of circumcision.»”

The interpretation of the data contained in this narrative, will be related to the life-world of the narrator as well as to his experiences. These lived experiences became part of the narrator’s consciousness and played a role in the way reality is interpreted. The narrative that we’ll take as a point of departure in this article relates both to the experience of external social circumstances and to the way in which these external circumstances were internalised, and stored as personal and individual memory. Memory is not purely individual reflection – it is mostly shaped by a broader context and by other people. The article thus touches on memory as an intersubjectively constructed issue (cf. Coetzee and Rau 2009) and not merely as the reflection on a personally internalised matter.

The narrative referred to in this article was undoubtedly shaped by larger social, political and cultural narratives. It is not only an individualised, personal experience, but displays broader experiential richness and reflectiveness. Even though this is the case, it remains an incomplete story – experience, consciousness and subjectivity cannot be expressed in a final and perfect way. Having said that, it remains that language is the most important medium through which we bring forth our reflections on the past. The narrative study of lives and its continuous dependence on the recall of memory, is done through language. Memory does not bring forth an automatic and exact reproduction of events and experiences. The narrative account of events and experiences are negotiated and produced by language. Narrating memory coincides very closely with the ability to express oneself in language. And the ability to employ words, concepts and denominators will expand in proportion to the number of opportunities for recall – the more you relate a particular event, the easier it becomes to describe it in detail.

We can accept that the narrative above, conveyed to me by Johnson Malcomess Mgabela, was not merely an *imromptu* series of utterances, inspired by the moment. It is most likely that the narrative had grown and that it got its shape over time. A similar account as the one given to me undoubtedly had been repeated, discussed and elaborated on at numerous occasions. The very nature of the issue under discussion, namely the story of the involvement of the performer of the traditional rite that most of those arrested, tried, sentenced and incarcerated under the same charge went through, must have lead to forthright and frequent discussions. And, as pointed out above, the ethos of the Robben Island imprisonment invariably invited elaborate discussions.

**Constructing the text and constructing meaning**

In January 1995, shortly after the first democratically elected government came into power under the leadership of fellow former political prisoner Nelson Mandela, Johnson Malcomess Mgabela agreed to tell me his life story. At that point, his remarkable narrative of the circumcisions on Robben Island hadn’t been documented – and he might even have been regarded as an unlikely author in the history of his
country. Writing up his narrative is, however, a clear example of the democratisation of knowledge – particularly through the medium of oral history. The narrative study of lives allows for individual stories to be told, each with its own experience of reality, each portraying a unique profile of everyday life. Through the narrative study of lives an individual contributes a separate strand that can find its place in the broad tapestry of everyday life. Mr. Mgabela’s story was recorded and subsequently transcribed. Although the aural sounds were turned into words on a page, without the same tone, volume and rhythm of speech as the original narration, a window into the history of a period of repression was opened. This window might not be clear, but it opens the possibility for us to extract meaning and to make sense of his life experiences as well as the experiences of others.

Daniel Schacter argues that it is a myth that memories are snapshots of past life events, “...literally and passively recorded” (1996:5). Memories are not stored in our minds and therefore retrievable like exact data sets on a computer. Remembering is hardly ever a literal and exact reproduction of events or ideas. By recording the account of the eye-witness, the participant, the one who experienced the particular moment, we still only offer a partial rendering, a subjective portrait from a particular angle of vision (Pachter 1981:91). Yes, the aim is “...interviewing the eye-witness participants in the events of the past for the purposes of historical reconstruction” (Perks and Thompson 1998:x), but in reality, our reconstruction reflects the principle of selectivity inevitably present in both narrator and biographer. Cross-examining during legal court procedures often reveals that people tend to forget the context, exact features, exact words and exact factual surroundings. We mostly remember the gist of events and even when it comes to the gist of what we remember it may be that there is little coincidence in what different people would regard as the gist of a shared experience.

What people tell us in their narratives does not constitute an exact replication. So-called “objective,” factual elements of past experiences are often forgotten or re-arranged in our memories, or assessed in different ways at different times, or put aside, or ignored, or actively repressed; how much more will it happen in as far as those memories which have been closely mixed with ideology and political involvement. Some memories, in particular those that have been frequently repeated, do seem to obtain stability. The question remains, however: Should memories be accepted as true and accurate simply because they appear to be vivid and clear and often repeated?

Re-membering

From the above it is clear that memory consists of the recall and representation of information, events and experiences. Memory is therefore an attempt at recollection – literally an attempt at putting together bits of information. Memory as recollection implies a reconstruction of events and of information about events. It is in this sense that the verb ‘to remember’ is employed when we analyse the narrative above. John Malcomess Mgabela’s narrative re-members the shards of the past and put them together into a body of information and reconstructed events. When telling me about the circumcisions on Robben Island he takes the pieces of what happened and the bits of information available and he integrates them into a recollection or reconstruction of events. Although he is the main actor in his narrative, it is not his story (cf. history) only. Not only does an individual have a memory, his narrative is part of history. In addition to his memory of the information and experiences, there is
also a collective memory of Robben Island. It forms part of the culture of repression and the culture of liberation of South Africa. When Mr. Mgabela told me his life story he narrated and re-membered a part of the history of Robben Island and of South Africa.

The narrative above is therefore related to loyalty, to ideology and to culture. The way in which we evaluate events plays a role in our recollections. Johnson Malcomess Mgabela was exposed to, and carried the scars of powerful historical forces. Embedded in his story are broader socio-political struggles; a life dedicated to an ideal. Any greater sacrifice is hardly to be imagined: forced to leave school at the age of 12, humiliated by an unjust system, leading by example in various defiance campaigns, a liberation fighter and underground military commander enthusiastically hunted by the Security Police and 18 years incarcerated on an island 1000 kilometres from home (Coetzee et al. 2004:51-59). When, shortly after the long fought for political victory of 1994, he re-membered and re-collected the circumcisions of 361 young political prisoners on Robben Island, it is not possible to expect an objective reproduction of facts on events and experiences. Re-membering and re-collecting these events and experiences coincide with joy and sadness, sacrifice and victory, anger and reconciliation, forgiveness and revenge. Trauma memories bring forth a complex mixture of emotions. Trauma memories are likewise linked to various motives: rationalising and justifying one’s own choices and actions are not least of these.

When memory is closely linked to shared and collective experiences, it is not a single reflective process. The fact that it is shared contributes to the discourse on what is re-membered and how it is recollected. The close-knit society on Robben Island and the enforced sharing of even the most mundane happenings lead to a particular way of remembering. Johnson Malcomess Mgabela undoubtedly told his story of circumcision on Robben Island to very many before sitting down with me for our various meetings during the early part of 1995. It is the kind of story that cries out to be heard at any gathering where the experience of 18 years of incarceration on the notorious prison island was brought up. Jerome Bruner (1987:31) refers to this kind of narrative when he writes: “I believe that the ways of telling stories and the ways of conceptualising that go with them become so habitual that they finally become recipes for structuring experience itself, for laying down routes into memory…” The Durkheimian sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs (1992:43), talks about social frameworks for life stories, which help to organise these stories and make them more accessible. It is not as if a narrative develops or evolves that is “disconnected from actual thought processes of any particular person” (Fentress and Wickham 1992:1). But, one has to account for “…the different ways in which the ideas of individuals are influenced by the groups to which they belong” (Burke 1989:98). Jeffrey K. Olick (1999:334) also refers to the work of Halbwachs who goes as far as saying that it is impossible for individuals to remember coherently and persistently outside of their group contexts. Václav Havel describes in a similar way how the collective dimension of memory has an impact on the individual level when people recall life experiences:

[i]twenty or thirty years ago, in the army, we had a lot of obscure adventures, and years later we tell them at parties, and suddenly we realise that those two very difficult years of our lives have become lumped together into a few episodes that have lodged in our memory in a standardised form, and are always told in a standardised way, in the same words. But, in fact, that lump of memories has nothing whatsoever to do with our experience of those two years in the army and what it has made of us. (1990:43)
Given these ideas on the structuring of narrative, we can accept that it is no different in the case of J.M. Mgabela. After all those years, he related part of the story as a dialogue between him and Schoeman, the warder in charge of the hospital and between him and Hattingh, the Head of the prison. Part of his narrative was in the form of a dialogue during which he said: “Pretoria is in trouble, when a warder is shooting people…whereas I myself can secure this danger in time.” After having repeated his story (or, for that matter, history) a few times, recipes for structuring the narrative, for re-membering information and experiences, are constructed. Particular events are selected and these events start taking on a life of their own. The autobiographical dimension of his memory relates to those events that he experienced himself (the 361 circumcisions performed within the concrete environment of the Robben Island prison). But, the autobiographical part becomes entangled with the collective representations of the collective experiences gained through political discussions, strong solidarity and shared views on repression and liberation. The selected events consist of real people, real experiences, real occurrences, a real world – factually correct features. These objective facts are mapped and charted in the narrative and their validity can be tested.

When Johnson Malomess Mgabela tells me that he circumcised 361 young political prisoners on Robben Island I accept that as a fact. When he tells me that the circumcision puts “these boys here…into the correct line,” he refers to an opinion that comes from his assessment (an assessment that might have been shared by other leaders). Therefore, he adds a layer of meaning to the fact/truth of his narrative. His group membership (mainly based on political loyalty) provides an additional set of materials for memory, prodding him to include pronouncements and judgments that might not have been experienced in that specific way (cf. Olick 1999:335). As a sociologist using the biographical method, I strive to give the real and objective details of this real, objective person (J.M. Mgabela) as I’m presenting him as the author of the narrative, I’m referring the readers to a real person in terms of words that also relate to other dimensions of reality and therefore to other levels of truth and fact. The dividing line between objective markers and subjective interpretation is most of the time blurred. This is the case because when someone tells me their story, they dig over the past, they re-collect and re-member, they make sense of their past. Their life story is embedded in a broad environment of assumptions, experiences, structures and beliefs. Pierre Bourdieu refers to this broad environment as his habitus “…the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” (1977:72).

Something happens to experiences on their way to becoming memory. Memory does not constitute pure recall. When J.M. Mgabela recalls the events during which the circumcisions were performed his memory is refracted, or gradually being added to, through layer upon layer of personal experiences, shared realities, ideologies and political developments. It is unlikely that he would have had the discussion with the Head of the Prison (Hattingh) in the way he described it. But, it takes nothing away from his narrative and from the fact that the circumcisions took place and contributed to the maintenance of discipline among the predominantly ANC aligned political prisoners and contributed to order between the prison authorities and prisoners.
Conclusion

The narrative discussed in this article illustrates the effect of intersubjective and collective factors on the process of remembering. The intersubjective dimensions refer to the patterns of meaning that developed between the prisoners of conscience on Robben Island. They shared political convictions, were experiencing similar deprivations and developed a collective discourse of liberation and moral victory. The example of memory that I used in this article is an individual's account of events and experiences. But, it is at the same time based on a collective consciousness and a shared reality. The work of Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2006) illustrates how the politics of commemoration comes about. When trauma is experienced collectively it becomes a socially mediated attribution. An individual’s memory of the shared trauma is seldom a representation in individual terms – it contains significant elements of collective consciousness.

The very close contact between these former Robben Island political prisoners provided opportunities to exchange ideas and to relish their loyalty to a shared cause, a shared culture and the belief that they actively contributed to the liberation of their people. The close contact between them over such a long period of time brought about that their memories of the years spent together can not only be a personal recollection. Memory also exists through what has been shared with others. When claimed by individuals as their own, shared memories become integrated into their personal narratives. Yes, each individual will remember in a unique way, but in remembering “…we are re-fashioning the same past differently, making it to be different in its very self-sameness” (Radstone 2000:13).

In the unique memory of each individual are shared influences that we, as researchers, need to identify, re-interpret and unpack. In this regard this article supports an approach to research on memory where links are made between the particularities and the generalities of each context within which memory takes place. This idea is elaborated on in a book edited by Jeffrey K. Olick (2003). As researchers, we should not underestimate the role of social context. Neither the researcher nor the research subject are entirely objective in the research process. The text at our disposal is not an exact copy reflecting information and knowledge. An important way in which we can improve the quality of qualitative research is by employing the principle of reflexivity.

References


Citation
CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL ‘WARS WITHOUT END’:  
Vocabularies of Motive and the Structure of Permanent War

Abstract
My purpose in this paper is to link the larger social context that structurally necessitates ‘wars without end’ perpetrated by the U.S. elite with the rhetoric that legitimizes them so as to sociologically situate the rhetoric, the vocabularies of motive within a historically formed war-centric social structure that reveals an easily discernible pattern in the use of language. I consider Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech of December 8, 1941 announcing U.S. entry into World War II to be the rhetorical “Master Frame,” the blueprint in this regard that was subsequently incorporated by later presidents to justify all wars without end. I compared dissected components of this rhetorical Master Frame to war speeches made by different U.S. presidents in the pre- and post-World War II era to reveal the qualitative difference between war rhetoric of a peace-time social structure where war is an aberration and the permanent war based social structure of the post-World War II U.S., when war became the taken for granted norm.

Keywords
Military Industrial Complex; Permanent War; Rhetoric.

But now that war has become seemingly total and seemingly permanent...Every man and every nation is either friend or foe, and the idea of enmity becomes mechanical, massive, and without genuine passion... (C. Wright Mills 1956:206)

Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists... (President George Bush 2001a)

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The U.S. power elite\(^2\) never settled after World War II to the idea of converting their booming war-time, war-footing economy into a peace-time economy (Mills 1956; Melman 1974). War had been the ultimate rescuer of the capitalist system from collapse. The Great Depression had forced the political economy to incorporate socialist props (of the New Deal)\(^3\) into a capitalist system to manage its contradictions. The thirties therefore, according to C. Wright Mills, were a ‘political decade’ (Mills 1956:273), in that the power of industry was supplemented through need, by the state that forced itself into the hitherto economic power structure. Despite such “socialistic” state intervention in the economy, the economy remained sluggish and unemployment in the pre-war period was around 19% (“United States Unemployment Rate”). War time production reduced unemployment drastically, to slightly over 1% (“United States Unemployment Rate”), which was a record low.\(^4\) Not only were the unemployed given jobs, but previously largely unemployable groups (women and racial minorities) were for the first time incorporated into non-traditional segments of the labor force. As the post-war economic boom revealed, the New Deal that was distasteful as a long term solution to the power elite (Mills 1948) could be successively done away with, having no relevance to system survival anymore given the direct injection of government Keynesian spending to the military industrial sector through war based spending (Baran and Sweezy 1966). Domestic growth could be sustained at a much higher level, compared to the New Deal, through internationalized war production and spending, provided war would be more than a short term affair. The enhanced power of the state and the resulting New Deal bureaucracy was relatively easily converted to manage a ‘permanent war economy’ (Mills 1956; Melman 1974; Hooks 1991), with the added benefit of the U.S. dominating the post war industrial market, its industry emerging unscathed and largely expanded due to the war effort. It was this emphasis into internationalized war production, which started before the entry of the U.S. into World War II (WWII henceforth), admitted by President Roosevelt in his speech on December 9, 1941\(^5\) (Silberstein 2002:34), which is the key to understanding the sociological significance of not only U.S. entry into that war, but the cultural legitimation sought thereafter for every ‘war without end’ conducted by the U.S. After initially reducing military spending by 90% in the first two years after WWII, war time production began again with the Cold War shortly thereafter. U.S. entry into WWII also marks the key to understanding the new role of the military and civilian “warlords” as they were incorporated into the power equation that describes the current U.S. power structure (Mills 1956: 273).\(^6\)

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\(^2\) From C. Wright Mills’s *Power Elite* (1956) where those at the pinnacles of the economic, military and political institutions rule America through an uneasy alliance post-World War II, involving interchangeability of position and the resulting social cohesion and ‘class consciousness,’ in an economic structure defined by ‘permanent war’ and a militaristic ideology, “The Military Metaphysic.”

\(^3\) For a summary of New Deal programs see: [http://home.earthlink.net/~gfeldmeth/chart.newdeal.html](http://home.earthlink.net/~gfeldmeth/chart.newdeal.html), retrieved September 30, 2009.

\(^4\) Helped in part by the military absorbing a large percent of the labor force, around 12 million (Higgs 1992:43).

\(^5\) The significant quote from the speech reads, “[p]recious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression. Our policy rested on the fundamental truth that the defense of any country resisting Hitler or Japan was in the long run the defense of our own country” (Silberstein 2002:34).

\(^6\) Mills writes, “[i]n so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the enlarged and military state, the clue becomes evident in the military ascendency. The warlords have gained decisive political relevance, and the military structure of America is not in considerable part a political structure” (Mills 1956:275).
It is my purpose in this paper to link the larger social context that necessitates wars without end with the rhetoric that legitimizes them so as to sociologically situate that rhetoric into easily discernible patterns that are “institutionally determined and institutionally embedded” (Reisigl 2008:254). Given its political nature, presidential war rhetoric is associated with themes involving justice or injustice as well as honor or reprehensibility (Reisigl 2008:244). Call-to-arms speeches, that I analyze in this paper, involve moral panics, the politics of fear (involving the potential for random violence), and a marked separation between victim and perpetrator (the positive-self and negative-other presentation [van Dijk 1993]). They make extensive use of metaphors, which are most effective when presented in “semantic relations of contrast” (Charteris-Black 2005:197). As a result, war related rhetoric is built upon images of the dangerous outsider, images that are drawn from the exiting cultural repertoire that typify the villain to supplement an originating shocking event. It is a form of ideological struggle with “the enemy” that takes on a linguistic form (Charteris-Black 2005:57). The use of moral shocks by the elite through visual and verbal rhetoric, networked through the media, is extremely effective in getting grass roots support for their cause. This is done through “framing mechanisms that drive the questions, interests and values that shape a society” (Giroux 2011). It is in the non-availability of other social networks of the kind that exist between the elites of different countries, for example, that the media becomes an indispensable tool that manufactures consent for elite initiated agendas (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). The prognosis that follows the various grounds and warrants for war involves a linking of U.S. domestic concerns with international events and wars, a formula that is qualitatively different (as I demonstrate below) to the rhetoric associated with wars before WWII. The focus of a permanent war economy is linked to international events, to enemies abroad and therefore, in a militarized social structure, foreign enemies and affairs related to them predominate national consciousness in the affairs of the state.

Using this formula, war in the post-WWII era, unlike past wars, was converted into an end by itself rather than a means to an end (in other words, wars ceased to be instrumental and became ends by themselves through socio-structural precedent) and involved what can be described as ‘total war.’ Total war involves not only the use of the military in the traditional sense, it involves what is best described as “the economics of a military state” (Spiegel 1940:718) as well as a ‘nation at arms,’ in that the entire social structure is militarized and no longer limited to combatants only (Janowitz 1975; Lowry 1970:4-5). The journey metaphor (Charteris-Black 2005) in political war speeches attempts just such a totalizing of war by taking the public as a “fellow traveling companion” (Charteris-Black 2005:57) in the war effort.

A permanent war economy involves fostering private investment together with a continual preparation for war (Spiegel 1940:718). The laissez faire economy is replaced by a centrally planned economy (Higgs 1992:55) where several motivating emotions, including “fear, obedience and patriotic enthusiasm” (Spiegel 1940:718), supplement the workings of an accumulations regime. It is the cultural legitimation sought due to structural precedent that defines what Benford (1993) refers to as ‘collective action frames’ that build consensus and therefore serve as tools for mobilization, in this case mobilization of the citizenry for wars without end. It is my claim that those frames, based upon which war rhetoric is structured, have remained consistently uniform post-WWII, and that they are qualitatively different to the pre-WWII rhetorical schemata. This reveals to us indirectly that the social structure defined by permanent war has in fact remained intact in the post-WWII era, which
marked a significant structural break from the previous Keynesian welfare based system.

The ongoing militarized nature of the U.S. political economy can be discerned objectively by noting the historical trend of discretionary government spending on defense post WWII, which has been greater on average than the amounts spent by the government, both Democratic and Republican regimes in the U.S. on all other programs combined for most of that period. President Obama’s (discretionary) budget proposal for defense (in 2010) sought $663.7 Billion ($533.7 Billion plus $130 Billion supplemental), which was higher than what was approved by Congress for 2009 (Gershon 2009). Therefore, regardless of the individual who occupies the office of the executive or the peace rhetoric following unpopular wars that might win elections, the structure of permanent war continues. The militarization of the political economy can also be accessed through the concentration of scientific research and development in the military sector (“One-third of all scientists and technicians work on Department of Defense projects”) as well as the penetration of military men to high level positions within the aerospace defense industries (Silverstein 1998) as well as the state.

In order to maintain a permanent war economy as the new structural reality, post WWII, the military metaphysic (Mills 1956), or the military definition of reality became hegemonic and was objectively mainstreamed using the cultural repertoire already available (Williams 1995; Charteris-Black 2005:10). The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and its eventual institutionalization after the events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. was similarly achieved using master symbols (Gerth and Mills 1964:277), religious, moral and patriotic, within the same ‘vocabularies of motive’ (Mills 1940) that legitimized the entry of the United States into WWII. The use of these master symbols forms the substance of the theme of phraseology in discourse analysis. These phrases are often used and reused in speeches to create ‘cross-speaker cohesion’ (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:37). Language, according to the critical discourse analysis perspective, is a vehicle for “establishing differences in power in hierarchical social structures” (Wodak and Meyer 2009:10). Since vocabularies of motive, according to C. Wright Mills (Mills 1940), can be located within specific histories and societal structures (see Figure 1), if I can demonstrate that the WWII vocabularies of war rhetoric have remained consistent, based on what I describe as the rhetorical ‘Master Frame’ (based on Snow and Benford 1992), for

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7 Non-discretionary (mandatory) spending increase over the years reflects pre-WWII formulas and is due to population/demographic issues. It is not subject to annual review and should not be added to discretionary spending to show a deflated amount of military spending, in order to keep comparisons valid. See: “A People’s Guide to The Federal Budget” (2011).

8 Mother Jones reviewed the remaining files, located in seven large storage boxes at the National Archives, and found that between 1992 and 1995, 3,288 people from the Pentagon and the armed forces went to work for the defense industry. Of those, 2,482 were officers with the rank of colonel or higher (Silverstein 1998).

9 Denoted as 9/11 henceforward.

10 Gerth and Mills wrote, “[t]hose in authority within institutions and social structures attempt to justify their rule by linking it, as if it were a necessary consequence, with moral symbols, sacred emblems, or legal formulae which are widely believed and deeply internalized (by the masses)” (1964:277).

11 Mills wrote: “[m]otives are of no value apart from the delimited societal situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies. They must be situated...Motives vary in content and character with historical epochs and societal structures” (1940).


12 A frame, according to Snow and Benford, is “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the «world out there» by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environments” (1992:137).
constructing wars without end ever since, it would be *prima facie* evidence that the military dominated economic structure of the U.S. has remained more or less intact. It is because these vocabularies are associated with those in positions of power within the U.S., they are war speeches by the political elite. Their purpose is to stress continuity and stability and "an essential component of sameness" (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:73) in a societal structure.

Several theoretical perspectives, at various levels of analysis lend credibility to this mode of research. For example, such research is termed as ‘sociology proper’ by Niklas Luhmann in his *General Systems Theory* (Ritzer 2008:209). Semantics, according to Luhmann, being ‘socially available sense that is generalized on a higher level and relatively independent of specific situations’ (quoted by Moeller 2006:51).

Socio-linguistic discourse analysis can help us look at “the complex dialectical relations between semiotic (cultural) and non-semiotic (structural/institutional) elements” (Wodak and Meyer 2009:183), since language is, in the final analysis, the symbolic representation of the social ecology of people’s existence. This type of research is also legitimated by the Symbolic Interactionists’ study of claims as ‘formula stories’ (Loseke 2003) that are based on public narratives in that changing plots and changing morality evaluations (deciphered via historical/comparative studies), which can quite possibly reveal altered underlying structures and social forces (Loseke 2000:47, 2003:89). Restated in the language of Mertonian structural functionalism (Merton 1968:73-138), I am implying that the latent content of the narrative is distinct from its manifest content and can be deciphered by its functions located in the concrete action that follows thereafter. It can therefore be potentially “translated” after the action has taken place.

Figure 1: The Socio-Structural anchoring of Vocabularies of Motive

Source: self-reported data (based on Mills [1940:904-913])

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13 According to Luhmann, a sound knowledge of society can be obtained by “observing the semantics of the self-descriptions of society” (Ritzer 2008:210).
Perspective

The history that accompanies the rhetorical frames of wars without end typically prologues with what is described to the public as a pointless horrific event (“suddenly and deliberately attacked” as in the WWII presidential rhetoric). The pointlessness of the event is revealed by such official questions as, “Why do they hate us?” (President Bush after 9/11 regarding what Americans must be wondering [Bush 2001e]). The horrific event is presented as being perpetrated by dangerous outsiders (“bandits” [WWII presidential rhetoric] or “outlaw regimes” [9/11 presidential rhetoric]). The horrific event itself stands out in the narration as a world-changing event (“a date which will live in infamy” [Roosevelt 1941a]) or “the night fell on a different world” [Bush 2001a]). The horrific event is clearly depicted in the official rhetorical script of all wars without end starting with WWII: Pearl Harbor, later the Gozenko Affair14 or the 1947 Polish elections (that resulted in communist control of Poland) in the case of the Cold War, and 9/11 that began the GWOT. Even though relatively minor incidents by themselves in the history of global warfare (and politics), these horrific events are presented as world changing in an ethnocentric manner, part of the elite discourse of (coded) racism (van Dijk 1993). The frame delineated above is in stark contrast to the rhetorical frames that justified U.S. entry into wars before WWII. The clear separation between domestic and foreign concerns that was evident in previous wars is absent in the promotion of wars without end (the U.S. assumed hegemony in the global system post-World War II). Also evident is the absence of an instrumental need to conduct war for a specified end (the end is generalized not specified in the WWII frame) and the precipitating horrific event that marks the U.S. entry into the war.

U.S. Entry into World War II

America’s entry into WWII was preceded by the Great Depression of the 1930s in which the country’s focus was on domestic affairs. Most Americans were anti-war, preferring individual responsibility, non interference and self-preservation over sending their children abroad to fight foreign wars. According to Stinnett (2001:7), “[o]pinion polls in the 1940s indicated that a majority of Americans did not want the country involved in Europe’s wars.”15 Isolationism seemed to be the dominant ethos with good contextual reasons. Many believed that the U.S.’ entry into World War I was a mistake, a view reflected by the U.S. Congress. A Senate committee headed by Gerald P. Nye investigating the reasons for entering World War I, concluded that bankers and munitions makers, for their profit motive, pushed America to war (Whitfield 2004:22). It was thus recognized by the U.S. Senate that World War I was instrumental, a means to an end, the end being the profit motive of the “bankers and munitions makers.” It was because of such anti-war sentiments, overshadowed by the Great Depression, that the Neutrality Act of 193516 was passed, which banned

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15 According to Stinnett, “[a] Gallup Poll taken in early September showed that 88 percent of Americans agreed with the views of an isolationist bloc, led by aviation hero Charles Lindbergh and industrialist Henry Ford that advocated staying away from Europe’s wars” (Stinnett 2001:17).

shipment of war materials to belligerent ships and forbade U.S. citizens from travelling on belligerent ships. The Act was amended in 1936 to prohibit loans to belligerents and in 1937 to include participation in belligerent “civil wars.” Gerald P. Nye writing in 1939 reflected this isolationist sentiment when he wrote:

[a]s between a so-called «collective security,» the terms of which have never yet been clearly defined..., I prefer the policy of neutrality – the planned intention of keeping out of other people's wars. (1939)17

A drastic change from this ethos of isolationism began with the passage of the 1939 revision of the Neutrality Act, which allowed weapons to be delivered on a “cash and carry” basis to belligerents (Douglas and Rubel 2003:99). Worded neutrally, it favored Britain and France who had easier access to American weapons. In fact, the initial lobbying by Franklin D. Roosevelt for the repeal of the requirements of the Neutrality Act followed the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.18 This move was considered by Germany to be an entry of the U.S. into war against it, a point later reflected in Germany’s declaration of war on the U.S. (Stinnett 2001).

**Constructing World Wars**

In describing wars without end as World Wars based on the ‘diagnostic frames’ (Loseke 2003) that were used by the elite to mark the U.S.’ entry into WWII as well as the objective global arena in which they play out, we can possibly conceptualize, in my opinion, that almost immediately after WWII ended (1945), World War III began.19 World War III (which ended in 1989 with the Malta Summit) (“1989: Malta Summit Ends Cold War”) was mostly a cold war or a series of proxy wars, limited warfare and counterinsurgency where not only the U.S., but the world was militarized and divided into warring camps. Smaller skirmishes between these warring camps involved ‘terrorists versus freedom fighters,’ where one side’s terrorist was another’s freedom fighter (Heiner 2005), the scope of war however was global. The Cold War (World War III) was a continuous war, a war without end or a total war. When World War III ended (or fizzled out with the collapse of the Soviet Union), World War IV was required through structural precedent in order to reproduce a war-time economy, as previously noted. Therefore, in the interim period itself, the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, saw the largest collection of U.S. forces for a war with an enemy that wasn’t presented as a communist. This war, which built up Saddam Hussein as a formidable threat to the United States and its allies, aimed at countering the pressure to reduce military budgets post-Cold War (Gordon 1990).20 However, this

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19 As early as March 1946, Winston Churchill was talking about an Iron curtain descending over Europe. The Soviets didn’t want a hostile regime in Poland because they were twice attacked by Germany through the Polish Corridor, which became a point of contention for the U.S/Britain. See: “Cold War,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm, retrieved February 16, 2009.
20 The Pentagon’s blueprint for United States military strategy in the 1990’s was released in August 1990 and mentioned new threats from Iraq (Gordon 1990).

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stage-setting war, picked upon the earlier construction of terrorist versus freedom fighters in structuring a “new world order,” as claimed by President Bush (1991).  

The same networks that had bled the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the so-called Mujahedeen, a group that was made victorious through U.S. military support at great human cost (“Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century”) and their associated foreign faction (the Arab Afghans), were constructed as the new enemy. It is worth noting here that these so-called Arab-Afghans who were imported from foreign lands into Pakistan by the U.S.-Saudi alliance during this proxy Cold War and who later assumed “ownership” of the conflict, in Gusfieldian terms (Gusfield 1984:13), even though they never amounted to more than 3000 fighters, were then given by the U.S., a constructed grievance as well as a moral victory as resistors among their local populations by the setting up of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia (“U.S. Pulls Out of Saudi Arabia” 2003). During the Afghan-Soviet war, other than the fact that what became Al Qaeda was a U.S.-Saudi creation for channeling arms, money and at the most 3000 Arab volunteers (that became the infamous Arab Afghans in the Afghan-Soviet war), it had little recognition or military value with the local Mujahedeen, according to most experts on the issue.  

As late as September 24, 2001, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Pentagon in its report stated that Al-Qaeda had neither integrated with the Afghans or the Taliban (Raman 2003). Similarly, post 9/11 caricature of what became the symbolic representation of the villain, the suicide bomber, was given by the U.S. media to those motivated by Islamic religious ideology, even though such a representation of the suicide bomber, while culturally popular, is inaccurate according to sociologist Robert Pape, who states:

> [t]he data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions...what nearly all suicide attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland... (2005:2)

With no major enemies in sight that could challenge the military might of the United States, and a permanent war economy deeply pressured to dismantle, an enemy with global reach had to be constructed (Fromkin 1985; Schoenfeld 1996).  

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21 George Bush (senior), announcing Gulf War I to the American public, January 16, 1991: “This is an historic moment…We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order – a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations…” See: http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush-war.htm, retrieved February 13, 2009. Also see: Jenkins (2006:284-291).


23 How Bin Laden and his Arab Afghans claim victory over the Soviet Union reveals this ownership they have assumed over that war, which was to prove very useful to the U.S. power elite in constructing Bin Laden as a formidable foe.

24 Sageman writes, “[c]ontemproaneous accounts of the war do not even mention the Afghan Arabs. Many were not serious about the war…Very few were involved in actual fighting” (2004:57–58).

25 The report states “[e]ventually, the Taliban and al-Qaeda will war with each other. The weakness of both is in the minds of the individuals that belong to the groups and in the power that is given to them by their names...” Raman (2003).

26 As creator and director of the policy planning staff of the Department of State in 1947, George Kennan designed the U.S. Cold War containment policy against the Soviet Union. In 1987 he said: “[w]ere the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial establishment would have to go on, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary
Here, we see that a similar ‘collective action frame’ (Benford 1993; Loseke 2003) was used: just like in World War III (the Cold War), an ally with a preexisting caricature of otherness, like the Soviet Union who were allied fascist fighters in WWII, were transformed into the communist menace with an Iron Curtain threatening the liberty and freedom of the “civilized world,” so also the Mujahedeen “freedom fighters” (“Charlie Wilson’s War” 2007) were now converted to the terrorist Al-Qaida and their Taliban sympathizers. Once constructed, there was a deliberate escalation and mainstreaming of “the enemy” through discursive and material provocation (as in the case of the 2003 Iraq war) to build them up by giving them major enemy status (and implying that Iraq was “Al Qaeda central,” when it hardly had any Al Qaeda presence in the territory controlled by Saddam Hussein). The corresponding self-fulfilling prophecy of moral support of the populations of the countries they operate in was accomplished through advertising events like the Abu Ghraib prison atrocities, and disregard for the religious sensitivities of deeply religious populations, supposedly leaked by the mainstream media. Once the opponent was built up (the Soviet Union in the case of World War III, and Al Qaeda [and the Taliban] in case of World War IV), this factory-made World War developed a momentum of its own, helping to maintain the economic structure of continuous war, processed and nurtured through cultural legitimacy, moral panics and the politics of fear (Altheide 2006).

Methodology

For the purpose of this study, I analyzed presidential State of the Union addresses, presidential war announcements and other war related presidential speeches. The audience of these speeches is either the American public or U.S. members of Congress. I began by analyzing President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s December 8, 1941 speech announcing U.S. entry into World War II, against the “Empire of Japan.” I consider this speech to be the rhetorical Master Frame (Snow and Benford 1992) that was subsequently utilized in form by later presidents to justify all wars without end. I then compared dissected components of this Master Frame speech to the rhetorical frames used by President Harry Truman regarding the Cold War and that used by President George W. Bush to justify the GWOT as well as Winston Churchill’s famous call-to-arms speech of May 13, 1940. I also compared this Master Frame with Woodrow Wilson’s 1917 World War I speech to show the qualitative difference between the ‘war to end all wars’ (as World War I was framed) and ‘wars without end’ that signify the post WWII era. The data was limited to publicly available U.S. presidential speeches and addresses as stated above. The framework for analyzing claims-making rhetoric for constructing wars without end was the one outlined by Joel Best (1987:101-121), based on Toulmin’s categories of argumentation involving grounds, warrants and conclusions. Toulmin outlined his schema of argument analysis through claims, grounds, warrants, backing, modal qualifications and possible rebuttals (1984:25).

Together with Toulmin’s schema, I also rely on positive-self and negative-other presentations in these speeches as outlined by van Dijk (1993) regarding elite discourse and racism involving immigrants and refugees in which he states:

could be invented. Anything else would be an unacceptable shock to the American economy.” See: Fromkin (1985) and Schoenfeld (1996).

27 Winston Churchill’s March 5, 1946 speech following the end of World War II in which he talks of an Iron Curtain to describe the new division between the West and the Soviet Union. See: Churchill (1946).
combination of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation may regularly be read about in debates about immigrants and refugees where conflicting ideologies of humanitarianism and political pragmatism find their expression...[through] invoking what might be called the Fake Refugee Schema...This schema features evaluative propositions... (p. 78-79)

Based on Toulmin’s elements of argumentation, after making a basic claim, grounds involve broad definitions of the problems that ground the claim usually through a horrific, attention grabbing example. Grounds involve definitions, which are domain statements that name the phenomenon and establish phenomenon range through including and excluding behavior, people or countries. They usually include a ‘representative anecdote’ (Benford 1993:195), used as a form within which vocabularies of motive are constructed. In addition to domain statements, orientation statements involve interpreting an existing problem in new ways so as to discover it. Orientation statements are associative statements. Behind such associative moments of discovery are interests shaped by the larger socio-historical context. Grounds also define the scope of the perceived problem, which involves official statistics, severity and growth potential. Warrants, in Toulmin’s scheme involve ‘fields of arguments’ (Best 1987:108), the different types, that is rational, legal or geometric that are used together with values, and provide the reasons to justify the conclusion (or prognosis) involving a call-to-arms (Benford 1993:199). Warrants take the form of “laws of nature, legal principles and statutes, rules of thumb, engineering formulas, and so on” (Toulmin 1984:26).

The values that are used in warrants are picked from a preexisting ‘cultural repertoire’ (Williams 1995:125) and often involve the victim being viewed as blameless (positive-self presentation), but having agency (Dunn 2004) in being able to retaliate and present the villain’s actions (negative other presentation) being “pointless and without pattern” (Best 1999:10). The values used (in the U.S. context) involve historical continuity (old time culture) to appeal to conservative members of the audience, while talking about rights and freedoms to appeal to liberals. Conclusions wrap up the identified problem, take note of qualifiers, which outline the degree of certainty of the argument in various scenarios, and adjust for possible rebuttals (Toulmin 1984). The conclusion establishes the justifications for seeing the condition as a problem with a call to action, for instance, what can be done to alleviate the problem. For conclusions to be effective they must be presented with urgency (i.e., needing immediate action), be efficacious (i.e., intervention will produce the desired effect), and proper (i.e., must not violate the values used in the warrants) (Benford 1993:195).

In the period leading to and after WWII, presidential rhetoric made use of moral panics. Moral panics are defined by Eric Goode and Ben-Yehuda as:

the behavior of some members of a society (or World System) is thought to be...so wounding to the substance and fabric of the body social that serious steps must be taken to control the behavior, punish the perpetrators, and repair the damage. (1994:31)

Social indicators like a heightened level of concern for the problem (objectively displayed in the GWOT by Homeland Security Advisory System’s multicolored Terror Alert Scale), an increased level of hostility towards the perpetrators of the behavior, widespread consensus of the threat being real and disproportionality, meaning that
the problem is considered much wider than it actually is, can reveal that a moral panic has taken hold in a particular society. Moral panics are also volatile, that is they have a tendency of suddenly erupting and subsiding, while becoming institutionalized over time (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:33-41). In addition to indicators, we need to be careful of the timing of moral panics, which depends on micro level interests ultimately connected to macro-level moral/value universes. It is possible by use of moral panics to create 'collective delusions', described by Goode and Ben-Yehuda as the "belief aspect of mass hysteria" (1994:111, 185), similar to the collective delusion that made a vast majority of the U.S. population believe that Saddam Hussein was linked to the events of 9/11, or that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that were a threat to the U.S. 29 In short, the purpose of moral panics is to show that a morally intolerable condition exists and something must be done to fix it (Loseke 2003:70).

The structural clue as to how moral panics and collective delusions are made possible is because of value ambivalence due to the public's "social, political and moral fragmentation" (Loseke 2003:10-11). Rapid structural change starting with the Great Depression and thereafter the militarization of the economic structure resulted in a lagging culture that couldn't keep pace with such changes. Grafted atop the "lag" was objectively produced culture, a kind of "system integration" (Habermas 1975) through the corporatized cultural apparatus involving the mass media and formal education. 30 This means that old ways of doing things are no longer valid, new norms have not ossified yet and so there is apathy and anxiety, what C. Wright Mills described as an 'unspecified malaise' (1959:11). This gives the elite fertile ground not only to manipulate using the repertoire of a lagging culture, but also to create moral panics by giving specificity to that malaise through their domination of the media of mass communication (see Mills 2002:16); a kind of uneasy peace is constructed at the individual level that is mirrored by the uneasy peace that is characteristic of wars without end, a peace that is always in danger of being breached by the well-advertised horrific consequences in case of potential inaction. These moral panics can then be evoked upon need to launch wars as a solution to all ills, individual and collective.

Emotions also serve as catalyzing supplements to rally mass support. As the U.S. social structure has become increasingly bureaucratized, impersonality, which is a trait of functional rationality, is institutionalized and made universal (Mills 2002:252). This means that the domain of human emotionality shrinks in the mainstream, most emotions get discredited as irrational and therefore, do not produce the desired outrage, in other words a blasé attitude predominates (Simmel 1950). 31 Emotions form the unconscious mythological counterpart of the conscious ideological component of narratives and are deployed using the metaphor that mediates between the conscious and the unconscious (Charteris-Black 2005:11).

28 A September 2003 poll revealed that nearly 70% of Americans believed that Saddam was personally involved in the 9/11 attacks. See: "Poll: 70% believe in Saddam, 9-11 link" (2003).
29 Snow's analysis of media culture suggest that by linking fear and 'moral panics' to a form of entertainment by the mainstream media, part of the conditioning of which is the periodic 'suspension of disbelief' for the purpose of enjoyment, media culture normalizes belief in the absurd (Snow 1983 in: Altheide 2006:74).
30 Post 9/11, many courses related to terrorism have been incorporated by educational institutions into their curricula and related jobs have been created.
31 Simmel wrote, "[t]he same factors which have thus coalesced into the exactness and minute precision of the form of life have coalesced into a structure of the highest impersonality..." See: http://www.altruists.org/static/files/The%20Metropolis%20and%20Mental%20Life%20%28Georg%20Simmel%29.htm, retrieved December 3, 2011.
The main emotion associated with the higher institutional orders, the economic, military and political domains, dominated by men is anger, which usually emerges with a perceived loss of power. A loss of status on the other hand results in sadness, an emotion linked with weakness and therefore, by default, relegated to the feminine in a gendered society (Stets and Turner 2008:74-78). We should, as a result in our analysis of the rhetoric, find emotive appeals that evoke both sadness and anger in order to cut across gender lines to a broader cross section of the population since the mobilization of the entire population is required for total war. Similarly, fear, which is the only emotion that evokes instinctual biological survivability in the case of war and terrorism, gives discourse managers great manipulation potential if they are successfully able to link cultural content with it. The ‘politics of fear’ tries to locate fear within socially situated contexts, a kind of implicit conclusion that guarantees the desired response (Altheide 2006:37).  

Also, identity and integration are an important component of political speeches (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:72). Without emphasizing a common identity through nation, mobilization for war is not possible. Such an integrating identity is conventionally constructed in political speeches through a narrative of community involving well known events from a common political past and a celebration of past achievements (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:135), understood and respected by the audience. Through communicating a ‘common symbolic universe,’ the micro biographical “sincerity” (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:185) and macro sociological “credibility” are established in political speeches.

Analysis

**WWII Rhetorical “Master Frame” and the Attack on Pearl Harbor**

*Franklin D. Roosevelt, Declaration of War Speech. December 8, 1941*

In diagnosing the problem for his audience, the American people, President Roosevelt defines the problem as an unprovoked and “deliberate” attack by “the Empire of Japan.” Stating that the U.S. “was at peace” with Japan and pointing to the deceptive nature of the enemy (the morally suspect villain, negative-other presentation) in misleading the United States (the morally pure victim, positive-self presentation), he defines the scope of the initial horrific event as vast and growing:

[t]he attack…has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces and I regret to tell you that many American lives have been lost, and in addition… (Roosevelt 1941a)

The escalation is emphasized after detailing the list of Japanese atrocities in addition to Pearl Harbor that have extended “throughout the Pacific region.” After defining the problem, he provides warrants for it to be considered an “existing” condition by his audience that needs immediate attention. He states his warrant as a

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32 The social situatedness of rhetoric can also be discerned by the varying effects it has on audience members based on location. Situated in a connected though varying social structure, international audiences interpreted Bush’s Iraq war rhetoric in a markedly different way to U.S. audiences (Altheide 2006:157).

33 See: Roosevelt (1941a). Note that the time claim of “absolute victory” in the speech is deliberately vague in terms of instrumental objectives that will end the war. What does absolute victory mean when not elaborated upon? The ends are generalized not specified.
foregone conclusion based on “facts,” (“the facts speak for themselves”), which is a kind of ‘disembodiment of interaction’ (Best 1995:23), that detaches the facts leading up to the incident from the actual incident, which is then presented as a “provocative grabber.” The president then adds the cultural theme of nationalism stating that the very life of the nation is at stake. This fits in well with an audience that is morally fragmented: when an appeal to the life of a nation is made, everyone in the audience can interpret the nation based upon their own personal scripts of what America means to them as their country. Nationalism, when symbolically developed, is an equal-opportunity appeal strategy that unites people otherwise divided based on gender, race, class and ideology.

Urgency is emphasized by stating that “our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.” Moral purity and appeal to the righteousness of the cause as against the premeditated deception of the enemy and its “unprovoked” attack is emphasized through use of the cultural theme of fair play (Loseke 2003:65). Blamelessness of the U.S. to garner sympathy from the audience is managed carefully with agency, which is emphasized by promising a fitting response to the enemy ensuring victory (“the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory”). This management of the relationship between emotional and cultural requirements therefore creates a positive image of a victim who is wronged, but nonetheless possesses agency, thereby ensuring a form of ‘political empathy’ (Dunn 2004:236). Decontextualizing events (by presenting blame as a foregone conclusion through a horrific example) also accomplishes the maintenance of victim purity in order to prevent any chance of victim blaming or ambiguity about victim precipitation by the audience, in that victims need to meet cultural stereotypes and manage their ‘presentation of self’ (Dunn 2001). Finally, it is claimed that “hostilities exist” meaning a condition is at hand, it threatens the life of the nation, and the prognosis is a war without a foreseeable (nonetheless victorious) end (“[n]o matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory”). An analysis of the rhetoric also reveals that there is an appeal made to evoke anger, through loss of power (“[t]he attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces”), as well as to evoke sadness (“I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost”). As a result, through evoking varied emotions, both men and women are being addressed for support according to the gendered structure of how emotions are “accomplished” (or “done”) (West and Zimmerman 1987) in U.S. society.

In summarizing the above Master Frame speech, the grounds used for U.S. entry into WWII involved a clear identification of a villain (the Empire of Japan) and examples of its many atrocities (that are imaged as random and escalating), a righteous, morally pure victim (the United States), with warrants established through moral panics, a condition that is intolerable, involving threat to the life of the nation (without details that might divide the public), using cultural themes of nationalism and fair play, with a prognosis or conclusion of a war (without any predetermined end) being a necessity to fix the intolerable condition and neutralize the villain (the Empire of Japan), via “absolute victory” or “inevitable triumph.” It should be noted, however, that this declaration of war was not without significant preparation of the American public for war long before the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and that this case-closing speech merely represented a culmination of the earlier indirect preparation.34

34 Robert Stinnett writes in Day of Deceit, “[a]n audience in Great Smoky Mountain National Park in Tennessee cheered and applauded when FDR asked for American preparedness against, the
Analysis of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s address broadcast nationally from the White House and over a World-Wide Hookup\textsuperscript{35} on December 9, 1941.\textsuperscript{36}

In the section of this “fireside chat”\textsuperscript{37} with the American People (referenced in the endnotes), President Roosevelt summarizes the grounds for the U.S.’ entry into WWII, identifies a villain (“criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese”) and reminds the audience that the initiating event was not the doing of the United States (“the challenge has now been flung at the United States”), which is the morally pure victim of the attacks. The attack by Japan is described as random, immoral and potentially escalating (“sudden criminal attacks,” “decade of international immorality,” “powerful and resourceful gangsters”). There is an appeal to the emotion of sadness (involving loss of life) and to anger due to loss of power in instrumental terms (ships and airplanes destroyed). There is a use of cultural themes of nationalism (“all that this nation represents”) and fair play (“which would be fair and honorable to every nation”).

It is worth noting that the initial event is used by the president as justification for expanding the war to a war not only against Japan, but against Germany and Italy as well (“if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini”). Similar expansion using the initial events of September 11, 2001 within a similar rhetorical frame was used by George Bush to launch the Iraq war in 2003, as well as by Harry Truman earlier to expand the Cold War beyond the Korean War theatre. Also, the merging of international and domestic causes in the chat are noteworthy (“but, in representing our cause, we represent theirs as well”), this, as I will show later was a major shift from the rhetorical frames of U.S. wars before WWII. It involved the deployment of a new metaphor, that of the U.S. as ‘moral leader’ (Charteris-Black 2005:177).

\textsuperscript{35} See: Silbertein (2002:30).

\textsuperscript{36} “My Fellow Americans: The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality. Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race. Their challenge has now been flung at the United States of America...Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American ships have been sunk; American airplanes have been destroyed. ...We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini. So we are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows...we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side...” (Roosevelt 1941b).

In this 1947 *State of the Union* address (referenced in the endnotes), President Harry Truman presents similar grounds for maintaining military strength, as were used by President Roosevelt in the rhetorical Master Frame above, for instance, the possibility of a “sudden” attack, with warrants established through moral panics of again inviting attack through weakness, an implicit reference to Pearl Harbor, if nothing was done (similar to the post 9/11 officially provided imagery of a “mushroom cloud” in reference to nuclear attack in one of America’s cities if nothing was done about Iraq [see Bush 2002]). What is notable in this speech is that even though the Soviet Union is identified as a belligerent, no direct reference is made to starting a war against it. The focus of attention, as in WWII, is international (“our goal is collective security for all mankind”). We can conclude from this that the nation was being prepared for another international war without end, though not yet explicitly declared. That declaration had to wait for the war in Korea.

*President Harry Truman's speech on the Korean War, April 11, 1951*

In this speech (referenced in the endnotes), there is a clear identification of a villain (“the Communists in the Kremlin”), the grounds for U.S. entry into WWII similarly identified a villain (“criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese”). President Truman reminds the audience that to do nothing would be to invite “foreign attack,” in other words, similar to President Roosevelt’s claim that the initiating event (Pearl Harbor) was not the doing of the United States (the victim of aggression) that had to respond (“the challenge has now been flung at the United States”) for the sake of its survival. The war in Korea is plugged by Harry Truman as a war of aggression by the Soviet Union that wants to make the U.S., its “principal victim.” The war in Korea is described as immoral and potentially escalating (“monstrous conspiracy”), which is quite similar to how President Roosevelt described Japan (“international immorality,” “powerful and resourceful gangsters”). There is an appeal to the emotion of anger due to loss of power (“picked off one by one”) similar to the appeal to anger in instrumental terms by President Roosevelt in the WWII rhetorical Master Frame (“ships and airplanes destroyed”). The initial war in Korea is used as justification for expanding the war to Indochina and beyond (“helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries”), similar to how President Roosevelt used
Pearl Harbor to advocate an expansion of the war against Japan to war with Germany and Italy. This escalation is emphasized after detailing a list of Soviet atrocities, in addition to Korea that include “all of Asia,” similar to how Roosevelt listed Japanese atrocities, “[extending] throughout the Pacific region.”

President Harry Truman, State of the Union Address January 8, 1951

The WWII rhetorical Master Frame is again evident in this 1951 State of the Union address (referenced in the endnotes) where the nation is introduced to similar grounds used for the U.S.’ entry into WWII, that is the possibility of a “sudden” attack, with warrants established through moral panics, the focus is internationalized and the threat is presented as “total” in scope and horrific in consequence. The use of the cultural theme of individualism/freedom is also evident (“and above all, we cherish liberty”). The part about the “good start” seems to be the exact same as Roosevelt’s December 9, 1941 speech that talks about a good start before the official U.S. entry in World War II, in the initial war material supplies that were made for Great Britain:

[p]recious months were gained by sending vast quantities of our war material to the nations of the world still able to resist Axis aggression...

(Roosevelt 1941b)

President Truman in the 1951 State of the Union address clearly identifies the villain as “the Soviet dictatorship” and its sinister aim of “world conquest.” War is given preference to domestic concerns by the president; international affairs are translated as being crucial to U.S. national security (Truman states, “the gun that points at them points at us, also. The threat is a total threat and the danger is a common danger”).

Comparison with World War I
Qualitative difference in war rhetoric: The pre-World War II rhetorical frame

On December 6, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th president of the United States, while commenting on expanding the Monroe Doctrine, incorporating “international police power” for the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, stated in an address to Congress the grounds for international intervention implying a preference for U.S. interests in instrumental terms. While not ignoring intervention where such

41 “As we meet here today, American soldiers are fighting a bitter campaign in Korea...The threat of world conquest by Soviet Russia endangers our liberty and endangers the kind of world in which the free spirit of man can survive. This threat is aimed at all peoples who strive to win or defend their own freedom and national independence...[break]...In the months ahead the Government must give priority to activities that are urgent-like military procurement and atomic energy and power development. It must practice rigid economy in its non defense activities. Many of the things that we would normally do must be curtailed or postponed...” See: Truman (1951b).


44 “Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them...We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States..."
interests might not be properly discernable, it severely limits them to a case by case analysis based on "degree of atrocity and upon our power to remedy it," rather than a generalized war without end or a deliberately vague claim of war until absolute victory. Not only is there an element of instrumentalism involved in foreign intervention ("our interests," "prosperity," etc.), there are also barriers and limits placed upon having power to remedy it (unlike the post-World War II claim of "we will spare no effort"). The value of freedom at risk of being lost, as warrant is not highlighted, rather possessing freedom extends to moral outrage regarding foreign atrocities ("give expression to its horror"). Domestic concerns with human rights are given preference to foreign concerns ("own moral and material betterment"), unlike in the WWII rhetorical Master Frame, that assumed moral leadership.

The clear separation in the above speech between domestic and foreign concerns is also absent in the new era of wars without end (involving the WWII rhetorical Master Frame): not only would specific interests (including oil and resources) not matter in the framing of wars, no limit would be placed on the exercise of power in war, and the intervention premise explicitly stated above, "in some cases action may be justifiable and proper," was altered to action justified and considered proper and urgent or the very survival of the nation would be threatened! In other words, WWII and post, the rhetoric of war involved a moral catastrophe requiring urgent action. What is also notable in Theodore Roosevelt's speech is the relatively meticulous reasoning that accompanies the pre-WWII war rhetoric as opposed to the more cut and dry, and quite mechanical (memo type) WWII rhetorical Master Frame, which gives the impression that emotive appeals are merely plugged in as slogans without any attempt at contextual elaboration that might reveal genuine concern.

Another example consistent with this analysis is President Woodrow Wilson's speech to Congress on the 2nd of April, 1917, declaring war with Germany, which signified the U.S.' entry into World War I." In presenting the U.S. as a single champion of right, and not intimately or exclusively threatened, Woodrow Wilson presents the U.S. as just one among many equal players. He does not establish the U.S. as a righteous victim, nor is the enemy presented as a dangerous outsider. This "presentation of the self" (Goffman 1999) is markedly different to the World War II rhetorical Master Frame where international issues take precedence over domestic affairs, the U.S. becomes the keeper of international affairs, and victim status for the U.S. is established with agency to achieve victory, the villain is clearly identified and devalued as worthy of contempt and moral outrage evoked at its actions. There is mention of other nations in this World War I speech, but only as standing by the

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or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations...[break]...Yet it is not to be expected that a people like ours, which in spite of certain very obvious shortcomings, nevertheless as a whole shows by its consistent practice its belief in the principles of civil and religious liberty and of orderly freedom..." See: Roosevelt (1904).

45 "It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness for judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion." See: Wilson (1917).

46 War was declared by Congress on the 6th of April, 1917, which marked an end to the isolationism and Wilson's promise to keep the nation out of war which was the reason for his reelection in November 1916. The campaign slogan was "He kept us out of war." See: "World War I Timeline: 1916," http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/timeline/time_1916.html, retrieved February 13, 2009.
United States as equal partners, not falling behind it as cheerleaders of its righteousness, there is therefore no assumption of U.S. moral leadership. The cultural theme of fair play that is clearly evident in the WWII rhetorical frame is amorphous in the above quote since actions are delineated, which the U.S. must be careful of, so as not to transgress, in other words, moral purity is not firmly established (“the choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness”).

Compared to President Bush’s statement on 9/12/2001 stating “[f]reedom and democracy are under attack,” which gives the impression of a mechanized passion where master symbols are plugged into a speech without contextualizing their appeal to reveal any kind of genuineness of such evocation, there is context in this World War I speech that seeks implicitly to evoke emotions rather than mere mechanical plugging in of “buzz words.”

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): 9/11 and the World War II ‘Master Frame’

What follows is a comparison of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 12/8/1941 and 12/9/1941 speeches with President George W. Bush’s 9/11/2001 (see Bush 2001b) and 9/20/2001 (see Bush 2001a) speeches to reveal the use of the WWII rhetorical Master Frame by President Bush to introduce and promote the GWOT. Following FDR’s words, WWI comparison is presented as criterion together with Winston Churchill’s May 13, 1940 call-to-arms speech.

Claims and Grounds


FDR 12/8/1941: Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date that will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked..."

In the 9/11/2001 speech, GWB makes the claim that the way of life of U.S. citizens and their freedom has come under attack, grounding his claim in terrorist attacks that are described as “deliberate and deadly.” Similar in form to the infamy that FDR claims in his 12/8/1941 speech, grounding it in the Japanese attack, which is described as “sudden and deliberate.”

GWB 9/11/2001: The victims were in airplanes or in their offices: secretaries, business men and women, military and federal workers, moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.

FDR 12/9/1941: Many American soldiers and sailors have been killed by enemy action. American Ships have been sunk; American airplanes have been destroyed.

In continuing to establish grounds for the claim, GWB details the victims as belonging to a cross section of American society and lists the magnitude of the “evil” in terms of lives lost, which makes it an act of infamy. This is similar to the WWII rhetorical Master Frame where FDR talks about many “soldiers and sailors” killed and
to establish the magnitude of the destruction lists ships being sunk and airplanes destroyed. The link to the cross section of American society is also noticeable in the repeated emphasis on “American” in the speech by FDR. This is consistent with the journey metaphor discussed earlier and its use for mobilization for total war.

**Comparison Criterion**

**Woodrow Wilson 4/2/1917**: American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination.

In this WWI speech, the grounds for war are markedly different since the grounds are more global rather than local, the attacks more externalized than internalized with exclusive reference to the U.S. and therefore the infamy element is markedly missing as the “[t]here has been no discrimination” part of the speech clearly illustrates.

**GWB 9/20/2001**: The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime.”

**FDR 12/9/1941**: The sudden criminal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the Pacific provide the climax of a decade of international immorality. Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race.

In establishing grounds to back up the claim of infamy GWB points to previous crimes of al Qaeda, associating it with the mafia. This is an almost exact replica of the FDR speech in which grounds are established through calling the Japanese “gangsters” and referring to their previous crimes as a “decade of international immorality.” The negative-other depiction of the enemy is clearly discernable.

**Comparison Criterion**

**Theodore Roosevelt 12/06/1904**: Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to war against.

Once again in this WWI speech, the infamy part is markedly missing while there is greater self-reflection compared to establishing the immorality of the enemy.

**Winston Churchill 05/13/1940**: We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what is our policy? I can say: It is to wage war...to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime.
Winston Churchill’s famous call-to-arms speech (13th of May, 1940) compares well to the WWII rhetorical Master Frame in establishing grounds for the war claim. Britain having attained a permanent war footing in 1939 before the U.S. officially entered the war, this similarity between Churchill’s speech and FDR’s speech makes structural sense. The claim that a “most grievous” ordeal is at hand is grounded through establishing infamy by claiming “a monstrous tyranny” that in its criminal nature has not been surpassed in human history. This parallels the grounds like the listing of past crimes of the Japanese by FDR or of al Qaeda by GWB.

Warrants

**GWB 9/20/2001**: Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen...The civilized world is rallying to America's side....We're in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them...

**FDR 12/9/1941**: We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this nation, and all that this nation represents, will be safe for our children...we will know that the vast majority of the members of the human race are on our side.

GWB establishes warrants for war claiming that “civilization” is on America’s side (civilization being a Eurocentric code word for racial superiority [van Dijk 1993]) that this “war” is about principles, which must trump all other concerns about it. This is identical to the WWII rhetorical Master Frame where FDR talks about principles (“all this nation represents”) and that the majority “of the human race” are on America’s side. Moral leadership is assumed in both speeches.

**Comparison Criterion**

**Woodrow Wilson 4/2/1917**: Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and temperateness of judgment.

In stark contrast to FDR and GWB, Woodrow Wilson in this WWI speech does not warrant war as an absolute necessity, rather it is a “choice,” nor does he claim that all the nations are on America’s side.

**Winston Churchill 05/13/1940**: …let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal…I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men.

Winston Churchill’s famous call-to-arms speech is materially close to FDR’s speech (and GWB’s speech based on the same rhetorical Master Frame). War (and victory in war) as solution is presented as a necessity for survival and for the sake of everything that “the British Empire has stood for.” In building warrants for war, the world is assumed to be on Britain’s side when Churchill equates what the British Empire “has stood for” as the “urge and impulse of the ages” (once again Eurocentric racist code words much like “civilization,” which assumes superiority of the Anglo Saxon way) and “I feel sure that our cause will not be suffered to fail among men.” There is a clear assumption of moral superiority and leadership.
Conclusions

**GWB 9/20/2001**: We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.

**FDR 12/8/1941**: As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense...The American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory.

**GWB 9/20/2001**: And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists...

**FDR 12/8/1941**: We expect to eliminate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accomplished that and found that the rest of the world was dominated by Hitler and Mussolini.

In establishing conclusions both GWB and FDR commit to total war (“direct every resources at our command...and every necessary weapon of war” and “all measures to be taken for our defense”) for total victory (“destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network” and “win through to absolute victory”). Both also establish the pursuit of other nations (Hitler and Mussolini) deemed to be similar to “you are with us or with the terrorists.”

**Comparison Criterion**

**Woodrow Wilson 4/2/1917**: Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

In contrast to FDR and GWB, Woodrow Wilson in his WWI speech neither talks about total war or total victory, but a limited engagement (“the vindication of right”) and that limited engagement makes America a single participant and not one that divides the world up into a dichotomy of “you are with us or with the terrorists,” but “only a single champion.”

**Winston Churchill 05/13/1940**: You ask, what our policy is? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us...You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be...I feel entitled to claim the aid of all.

Winston Churchill’s call-to-arms speech is closer in content to FDR and GWB compared to Woodrow Wilson's WWI speech. Like FDR and GWB, a promise is made to deploy all resources for war, “with all our might and all our strength,” for the sake of “victory at all cost.” The world is similarly dichotomized with the statement at the end, “I feel entitled to claim the aid of all,” much like GWB felt “entitled” to have everyone on his side in the GWOT.

On 9/12/2001, President Bush summarized implicitly the World War II rhetorical Master Frame using the word “war” a day after 9/11 to mark the beginning of the GWOT:
The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war...The American people need to know we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced...This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. (Bush, 2001c)

On 9/20/2001, President Bush summarized explicitly, his use of the World War II Master Frame:

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th Century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies... (Bush 2001d)

President Bush (on 9/20/2001) stated quite explicitly that these “terrorists” are nothing new (“we have seen their kind before”), which is a direct contradiction to the 9/12/2001 speech in which he stated; “the American people need to know we are facing a different enemy than we have ever faced.” World War II is evoked when the president states that the “terrorists” follow in the path of “Fascism, and Nazism and totalitarianism” a reference to Japan, Italy, Germany and Soviet “totalitarianism.” In other words, (decoded) the president is acknowledging that this latest war without end, the GWOT is a natural extension of World War II, and the Cold War. Devoid of the moral rhetoric, it confirms my claims about structural requirements and uniformity that necessitates wars without end.

The “New Pearl Harbor” that the practical war faction (as against the ‘sophisticated war faction’47 of the power elite, the Project for the New American Century were looking for long before the events of September 11, 2001, presented itself in the form of 9/11 and the war script that described U.S. entry into World War II, which was mainstreamed a day after the events of Pearl Harbor, achieved mainstream circulation again. Such a “translation” of Japan, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union directly to the Jihadists was unarguably way out of proportion in material and manpower terms, yet given the WWII rhetorical Master Frame, it was “logical.” However, giving the Jihadists worldwide media coverage and presenting them as an equal opponent and granting them major enemy status, gave them a stature they not only did not deserve, but could never have managed by themselves regardless of the horrific events that were attributed to them.

Conclusion

The key to understanding the structural causes of wars without end lies in the intersection of history, biography and social structure (Mills 1959). The high manipulation potential of biographies enacted within a rationalized, bureaucratized society is successfully exploited by the elite through use of the media of mass communication to which they have amplified access, within a structure of permanent war that evolved in the U.S. post-WWII. It is in this intersection of history, biography and social structure that we can locate the sociological key to uncovering the causes

of wars without end. Further, its link to a global structure cannot be ignored, the “you are with us or with the terrorists” mentality, when it assumes a reality in the global arena plunges poor (so-called) underdeveloped countries in a cycle that ensures that they go from one humanitarian crisis to another, from one dictator to the other, and from one military coup to the next and their priorities are geared towards fighting U.S. wars and ignoring domestic needs as they construct a national security state to reflect the demands of these wars. The politics of fear, as Althide writes, is paid for, “in blood and sacrifice by the weakest members of society” (2006:207), both intra-nationally, that is within the U.S., and internationally in the underdeveloped countries, and as Charteris-Black concludes, “[l]anguage-like the siren’s song can possess a magical quality that woos us to disaster against our will” (2005:212).

Further research is needed on rhetorical analysis of fear related presidential speeches in the interim period between wars, this needs to be explored together with a decoding of the war time speeches to fully uncover the structural connections that underwrite popular war constructions and describe the military metaphysics (Mills 1956) of the U.S. power elite. I have, in this paper, offered a starting direction for inquiry that unites various paradigms within sociological analysis; it is a beginner’s attempt at developing a methodology of using rhetorical analysis to uncover elite managed structural stasis or change and warrants further investigation and development.

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Citation
A Dyadic View on the Post-separation Network of Single Mothers

Abstract

Many empirical studies have focused on the quantitative changes in the social networks of divorced and separated people. In this qualitative study, we use interviews with dyads to construct a two-sided view of the support network after separation. The aim of the study is to gain insight into the needs for support after a relational breakup. Including a network member in the analysis enables a more detailed view on the interaction at hand in the bond between these women and their supportive network members. The results show that personal coping resources are left untouched. Giving advice on one’s daily activities is counter-productive. This is better understood by non family members compared to the women’s parents (especially the mother). With respect to the reciprocity in these relationships, network members do not expect a return in the period after the separation.

Keywords
Divorce; Social Network; Social Support; Grounded Theory; Dyadic Analysis.

‘Till death do us apart’ is a promise that nowadays seems difficult to keep. Separation has become common in our society. Nevertheless, it remains a complex issue affecting many people’s lives and potentially causing a lot of stress for both the partners and their children. Splitting up joint accounts and household goods does not necessarily bring an end to this stress. It is possible that other matters and developments will arise (e.g., assuming sole responsibility for the care of the children.

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and the loss of social support), thereby disturbing the emotions and behaviour of the people involved.

In this article, we focus on a divorce’s or a separation’s social consequences for mothers. By ‘social’ we mean changes in their social network and their social participation. Studies have shown that a separation significantly reshapes the social environment of a man and a woman in various ways (Milardo 1987; Hurlbert 1990). We are interested in how mothers experience their social life after the breakup. Since previous research has demonstrated that due to several reasons (financial drawback, increased working hours, childcare), it is difficult for women to have a social life (Munch et al. 1997; Miller et al. 1998; Poortman 2000; Poortman and Fokkema 2001).

Research has already turned its attention to the amount and the kind of support being attributed to separated persons. Therefore, we focus on the different types of support (financial, instrumental, emotional, etc.) available, as well as, on how mothers (in our sample) perceive their post-separation network. We interviewed both mothers and network members so as to enlarge our understanding of the situation of mothers after a breakup and the extent to which their social network functions as a coping resource.

We chose to focus on the situation of recently separated women because the immediate aftermath of a breakup is a stressful period during which mothers face a range of pressing problems, such as a radically reduced income, increased parenting responsibilities, and the loss of mutual friends. This period is characterised by reorientation; therefore, it is a time of life in which support is needed. Before elaborating on the two research questions, we give a short overview of the literature on post-separation social networks, social participation, and on how being part of contributes to the adjustment and well-being of divorced women.

**Separation and its social consequences**

It is important to look at the relationship that precedes the breakup, since this influences the post-separation social life. According to Gerstel (1988), marriage is a “greedy institution” for women. During the wedded life, personal networks shrink, network-overlap arises, and networks grow as the relationship develops. This phenomenon is known as ‘dyadic withdrawal’ (Kalmijn 2003; Sprechter et al. 2006). Women appear to have far less contact with their friends than their husbands do (Milardo 1987; Albeck and Kaydar 2002). This is partly due to the presence of children. As Fisher (1982) puts it, marriage and family involves “restrictive commitments.” Next to having fewer contacts with friends, women’s social participation levels change. After marriage, people take part in fewer, rather couple- and family-oriented, activities (Munch et al. 1997). Most friendships are based on ties with other couples (Rands 1988; Kalmijn and Bernansco 2001). This raises the “exit costs,” especially for women (Kalmijn 2003).

Another interesting finding is that women are more involved in maintaining contact with both family sides and with mutual friends (O’Donnell 1985). As women seem to invest more in their familial social life, one could question whether or not this has an effect on the female post-separation social life.
Network changes after a breakup

As mentioned earlier, a divorce is a stressful event in life, having far-reaching consequences. It does not only affect the emotions and the lifestyle of the split-up family, but also alters the social network of which both partners are part. A relationship unifies two families and two circles of friends. What happens to this unit after a breakup? Is a division inevitable or will friends keep in contact with both of the divorced partners? Keeping in mind that women invested more in their and their partners' social life during the marriage, one might expect a positive effect after the separation.

Research on the link between separation and isolation is not univocal. Some researchers point out that contact with kin becomes less frequent after a breakup (Milardo 1987; Gerstel 1988; Rands 1988; Hurlbert 1990; Sprecht et al. 2006). Others found no significant differences between divorced and married people in terms of contacts with family members (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005). It even seems relatively easy for men and women to intensify contacts with their own friends and acquaintances or to strike up a new friendship after the separation (Albeck and Kaydar 2002; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005).

In their meta-analysis, Krumrei and others (2007) point to the fact that new relationships are built with people who have gone through a similar experience, people who “understand.” Separated people therefore prefer the company of unattached individuals (Albeck and Kaydar 2002). Leigh and Grady (1985) state that divorced mothers have close-knit networks that are primarily composed of kin and co-workers who they have known for a long period of time. Gerstel (1988) also found that women mainly tighten the bonds of old friendships. Further research on why they rely on old friends leads to the next question: which factors influence the composition of and integration in a social network of divorced women?

According to Gerstel (1988), there are two important elements affecting women’s networks after a breakup: child custody and income reduction. These two influences could explain why women’s post-separation activities are housebound: near the children and less expensive than going out. Apparently, separated mothers are less likely to engage in recreational activities and social clubs than their male counterparts. However, in comparison to women, they are twice as likely to participate in new age activities (Kaydar 2001; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005; Kalmijn 2007).

The worsened financial position makes it less easy for women to go out. Next to a reduced income, women have to deal with time reduction since they have to combine various roles (sole parent, housekeeper, provider of family income). This role management has an effect on leisure time (social activities and outdoor contact with friends). In other words, divorced women are constrained from maintaining or rebuilding a social life (Milardo 1987). Their free time is scarce, especially when the children are young. Another reason for this shortage is the fact that mothers tend to do everything in their power to spare their children (Munch et al. 1997).

A major role of divorced mothers is that of income provider. This can be translated into going back to work or increasing work activities. Earlier research showed that coping through work is experienced in different ways. Some mothers describe their job as a distraction, an opportunity to meet new people, or a source of social support. According to others, a job causes a lot of stress as it goes together with time restrictions (Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005).

Next to income and labour, the consequences of a separation also extend to the social network of the women. Women who are fully or mainly dependent on the
network of their partners experience more damage in their social network after a divorce (Albeck and Kaydar 2002). This is reinforced by not having a job. In their qualitative research, Verheyen and Mortelmans (2008) found that women who had lived for their family and children during their marriage, and who had given up their own careers, not only suffered financially but also socially. These findings correspond with the research results of Marks and MacDermid (1996) – individuals who keep their roles in balance will have a lower level of depression, higher self-esteem, and a more positive level of well-being.

In summary, we need to point to the influence of one’s personal coping resources or personal characteristics, which play an important role when dealing with stressors. The two personal coping resources that have been studied most often are self-esteem and a sense of control or mastery (Pearlin and Schooler 1978). Individuals with high self-esteem and a sense of control or mastery have better social skills, which in turn should enhance the likelihood of their having a network on which they can rely (Thoits 1995). For someone with low self-esteem, it is more difficult to go out and meet new people; for example because one is afraid of being rejected by others (Terhell, Broese van Groenou and Van Tilburg 2004).

**Social support and doping**

In addition to personal coping resources, social support also serves as a buffer against the negative consequences of a separation (Flowers 1996). According to Briggs (1998), ties offering social support help individuals to get by and cope with the demands of everyday life and other types of stress. Social support is most often associated with ‘strong ties’ (kin, friends, neighbours). Some studies stress that social support has a positive influence on women’s adjustment to the post-separation situation (Samson 1997; Duran-Aydintug 1998). Social support facilitates role changes, provides critical information, and enhances the coping behaviour. Other studies point to the fact that close personal relationships can both promote and undermine one’s psychological health in the (immediate) aftermath of a divorce (Kunz 1995; Miller et al. 1998; Hetherington and Kelly 2003). Lu (1997) found that being helped can lead to negative reactions, especially when the aid threatens one’s own idea of self-management, damages one’s self-esteem, or does not match the needs of the recipient.

The most frequently used typology for social support is: instrumental, financial, and emotional support (Leigh and Grady 1985; Flowers 1996; Smerglia 1999). Albeck and Kaydar (2002) found that the family mainly offers practical help and gives information. Expressive support and feedback are the forms of support given by friends. Numerous studies have revealed that separated women are most in need of someone who listens to them, someone whom they can socialize with, and someone who is emotionally supportive (Duffy 1993; Miller et al. 1998; Smerglia 1999). Apparently, offering emotional support is the task of close friends. They seem to be more objective and empathic, whereas family members do offer support but are also critical of the separation process (Milardo 1987; Flowers 1996). Thoits (1995) found that women, more than men, seek social support, and turn first to friends and then to their parents (especially mothers). Women also rely on their siblings more often than men do (Duffy 1993; Duran-Aydintug 1998).

This study focuses on the mothers’ attitudes and feelings towards the assistance they receive. Support can cause more distress, feelings of inadequacy, and loss of autonomy (Kessler et al. 1995; Cohen and Deken 2000). Miller and
others (1998), for instance, found that widows and divorcees receiving more material support (i.e., gifts, money, etc.) experienced an increased distress level after one year.

Research Questions

The foregoing literature review shows that many researchers have already focused on the social consequences of separation. They paid attention to women’s ‘losses,’ the composition of their post-separation network, and the kind of support they received. Little is known, however, about how women experience the consequences of a divorce and how their possibly changed social environment affects them.

This study has two main purposes. First, we want to widen our understanding of how separated mothers perceive their post-separation social life, how they experience the received support, and what they consider to be helpful and not. The actual reception of support as well as the amount of support may be irrelevant if the recipient is ambivalent or negative about it. Flowers (1996) found that it is the satisfaction derived from the support that has the greatest impact on the mother’s adjustment. Concerning the goal of this study, it is not important to know how many talks a mother has had with her best friend; we are merely interested in how she feels about these talks. Do they encourage her or do they have a negative effect on her? We want to give as thorough a view as possible on what is needed by and helpful to women, and therefore we also involve the network members of the separated women in the study. How do the latter observe their ‘giving,’ and what is their opinion on what is important in the process of giving support? Secondly, we want to shed light on the social processes taking place between the support givers and receivers. Do the ones who are supportive long for something in return or not? Do the women, for instance, ‘refund’ their supportive network members, and if so, how do they do it? Before discussing the results of our study, we will elaborate on the methodology: how did we build up this study, who participated, and how did we analyse the data?

Method

Participants’ recruitment

Separated women

It was not easy to find divorcees willing to collaborate with this research. Therefore, the search for respondents was divided into three phases. First, we contacted community centers, self-help groups, and welfare services in the province of Antwerp to find out whether or not they knew women who would qualify for our research. This first round resulted in 10 respondents.

Secondly, we focused on the interviewers’ social network. This way the group of respondents was enlarged to 48 separated mothers. We made sure that the divorcees were not interviewed by the member of their social network who recruited them. An interim analysis revealed a bias towards mothers with a higher socioeconomic status (SES) and education level. This is why, in the final phase, we
searched for women with a lower SES. We found four divorcees by contacting poverty organizations. In total, our group consisted of 52 separated mothers.

**Network members**

After interviewing the separated mothers, we asked for an interview with one of their supportive network members. The women were free to choose a network member. Some of the network people were contacted at the time of the interview itself; other divorcees preferred to ask someone later on, or they gave us the telephone number of these people so we could contact them ourselves. Twenty-three mothers refused to contact one of their network members; for instance, because they did not want to bother their network with an interview. In the end, 29 network people were willing to collaborate.

**Data collection**

The interviews were conducted by a research team from the University of Antwerp from April until July 2008. The separated mothers were contacted by telephone, which gave them the opportunity to ask questions and sometimes led to the immediate planning of the interview. As mentioned above, the network members were contacted by the mothers at the time of the interview or at a later time by the researcher who would conduct the interview.

Opting for in-depth interviews is a matter of course, since this method enables us to discover the context in which these respondents attach significance to their feelings and experiences. The interviews were conducted in an environment familiar to the respondent, which contributed to our aim to get a grip on the social world in which the respondents act. Open and non-suggestive questions were asked to enable us to enter their habitat. At the end of each interview, the separated mothers were asked to fill out a drop-off questionnaire on socio-demographic background information (e.g., date of birth, child(ren)’s birthday(s), income before and after breakup).

A topic guide was used to structure the interviews. By doing so, the interviewers were not focused on a questionnaire (more freedom) and the respondents were given the opportunity to tell their story instead of responding to a list of fixed questions (more flexibility). The use of a topic list, however, did not just have advantages. Although the interviewers received interview training, one cannot assure that the interviews were conducted in the exact same way. It is important to note that all the interviewers had to complete a contact summary sheet in which they reflect on the interview, point to certain circumstantial disturbances, and think about their own strengths and weaknesses (Miles and Huberman 1984). These memos were taken into account during the analysis. Regarding the open-ended nature of the survey, the participants’ responses cannot be approached as being exhaustive. Nevertheless, we can assume that the respondents focused on themes that keep or kept them busy; and this interests us most.


**Participant characteristics**

**Separated women**

Fifty-two divorced mothers, with a mean age of 38 (range 24–55), participated in this study. All the women have been separated for less than 1,5 years. ‘Separated’ in this article means that the relationship (marriage or cohabitation) has ended. The married women had not necessarily gone through a legal separation at the time of the interview. The mothers in our sample had lived with their ex-partners for 14 years on average (range 1 year–30 years). Fifteen women reported having a new relationship, but only 5 of them live with their new partner. All the women have children (average: 2), and the mean age of the children is 14 (range 3,5 months–29 years old). Although our aim was a broad sample, we need to mention that only 9 out of the 52 mothers have a low education level (occupational training). Nineteen mothers had already been working full-time during their marriage and maintain this work scheme. Fourteen have started working more hours after the breakup. The remaining 19 are either unemployed, work part-time, or work in a 70% work regime.

**Network members**

This respondent group consists of 29 participants. The separated mothers could choose which network member we interviewed as long as he or she was appreciated for being very supportive to her at the time of the divorce. The majority of the network participants were friends of the mothers (15 female, 1 male). Nine close family members were interviewed (3 mothers, 1 parent couple, 1 daughter, and 4 sisters). Three mothers mentioned their new partners as their most important network persons and one of the separated mothers stated that the social worker of the public welfare service was most supportive to her. Eight of the network members we interviewed were also separated, and 4 respondents were single (never married). The others were married, had a relationship, or lived together with their partner. Thirteen participants had a job with a social character (e.g., nurse, social worker, and therapist).

**Analysis procedures**

The interviews with the separated women, as well as with their network members, were recorded on tape and transcribed verbatim for the analysis. Structuring the recorded material into text offers an overview and is in itself a beginning analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1990). We used the grounded theory approach and its principal technique, inductive analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and analyzed the transcripts in accordance with the methods of Miles and Huberman (1984). Names and personally identifiable details were altered for reasons of confidentiality. Atlas.ti was used to analyze the transcripts.

In the first phase, we read and reread the interviews with the separated mothers. Important concepts and themes related to the women’s social situations after the breakup, as well as their experiences and feelings, were identified. During this phase of getting familiar with the data, theoretical and methodological reflection memos were written. Every story was compared and contrasted with the other stories in order to specify similarities and differences among the women. The analyses of the interviews with the network people were performed similarly. Special attention was
given to how they perceived giving support and what they felt was important in doing so. The extent to which the give-and-take balance concerned them was another focus.

The final stage of the analysis was a comparison between the kind of support that is and is not helpful according to the separated mothers and the aid their ‘support givers’ mentioned as being important. This is an important issue, since it can contribute to the knowledge of social services and of other interested persons or organizations working with separated mothers.

Results

In the next section, we start by giving information about the post-separation context of the women (network changes, types of support). This information is necessary to understand the mothers’ personal experiences with the received support, which will be discussed next. This section is completed with a look at what the support givers perceive as being important in giving help. We wind up the results section by taking note of the motives for giving support and whether or not these motives (altruistic, reciprocal) correspond with the experiences of the women.

The post-separation social context

Ending a relationship does not only mean the end of a partnership between two people and a reorganization of the family life, it also brings with it other far-reaching financial, as well as social, consequences. Friends either take sides against one of the partners or try to steer a middle course. In this paragraph, we present an overview of the judgements of the 52 mothers in our sample. What are their social losses, or perhaps, ‘gains?’ We also give an outline of the different types of support they receive and whom they receive it from.

The magnitude of the network

The analysis of the interview transcripts indicates that a breakup has several social consequences. On the one hand, there are women who report that some friends ditched them:

Yes, yes. There are people I considered to be real friends. I don’t hear anything from them anymore, while others are surprisingly supportive. (Josephine, 49 years)

…it is difficult for them to take sides for me, since they went to the same school Luke did. They know him much longer than they know me. (Shelley, 33 years)

On the other hand, there are also women whose networks have expanded since the divorce. Half of the mothers who mentioned having made new friends have taken up courses such as meditation, yoga, and other social-minded classes. It is as if they take these courses to get to know themselves better, to get a grip on their lives, and to deal with the breakup. At the same time, taking a class is an opportunity to widen their network and, perhaps, to meet fellow sufferers.
Due to me starting these courses and developing quite an alternative lifestyle, my circle of friends has changed... And, now I'm surrounded by people, peers, whom I can talk to. (Mary, 48 years)

Others have come in contact with peers by joining self-help groups for separated people. Again, being part of such a group can have multiple benefits: acting as a sounding board, having social contact, et cetera.

The women who say their network of friends has expanded seem to be able to undertake activities, and to invest time in new hobbies and people, but for most of the other mothers this is out of the question. Their social life and the possibility of meeting (old or new) friends is hindered by different factors, such as a decreased income, which forces them to cut down on activities that cost money (e.g., sports), and lack of time, due to an increase in roles (sole earner, 'sole parent,' housekeeper). Most mothers meet friends or take some time off for themselves when the children are with their father. Spending time with friends during these 'weekends off' is a way of dealing with their loneliness. Other inner hindrances are shame and grief over the breakup and its consequences. These make it difficult for these mothers to go out and meet new people.

Besides changes in their circle of friends, some women report changes in family contact. It is remarkable that not all mothers lose contact with their family-in-law after the breakup. There are some who state that their relationship with their own parents became worse or that they have lost all contact because of different reasons: some mothers mention that their parents are not able to accept their decision to separate, others want to spare their parents and therefore avoid contact as much as possible. One woman mentioned that her parents have a rather negative attitude. As this demoralizes her, she keeps them at a distance.

Functions of the social network

In the current section we will focus on the role of the network on an emotional as well as on a financial, material, and social level when having to cope with a divorce. We start by giving an overview of the kinds of support mothers receive and of the support givers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical help</th>
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<th>Financial help</th>
<th>Instrumental help</th>
<th>Social support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>‘being there’</td>
<td>money donations</td>
<td>furniture</td>
<td>activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>housing</td>
<td>listening, sounding</td>
<td>buying things</td>
<td>clothes</td>
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<td>household chores</td>
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<td>administration</td>
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Table 1. Overview of support/help given
Source: self-reported data

A general look at the kind of support given to the mothers clearly shows that the mothers themselves as well as the network members (mainly friends) report receiving or giving a lot of emotional support, and underline the importance of this support type.
A divorce is a complex event not merely accompanied by emotional losses. One who separates does not only lose a companion but also a pair of extra hands, helping hands in raising the children, cleaning the house, keeping the yard in order, administering the home, and so on. The persons that most often assist the mothers in managing these daily hassles are parents, neighbours (chores around the house), and friends (helping to move).

I can always rely on my parents and, if necessary, also on my brothers. Thank god I can count on them, otherwise I would not be able to manage it. For them this is an extra burden; my parents are not the grandparents but the co-parents of my children. Yeah, I’m really glad they are around. (Diane, 40 years)

Nevertheless, the group of ‘parent-supporters’ is quite diverse. On the one hand, there are separated women, like Diane, who state that their parents mainly help them financially and/or practically. On the other hand, some mentioned also receiving emotional support from their parents.

My parents supported me a lot. They were not judgemental and they listened to me. I discovered my mother’s strength and her will not to give up. I am very thankful for that. There were moments on which I couldn’t see the light at the end of the tunnel. For instance, I lacked the energy to paint my new house. In moments like that, my mother would come around and motivate me to do things. (Vicky, 47 years)

Those mothers who did not receive any emotional support from their parents state that they do not have such an emotional relationship with them or that they did not want to bother their parents with their misery. In other words, their bond seems rather functional and less emotional.

The mothers do not only lose a pair of hands to share the practical responsibilities with but also to bring money in. Financial help appears to be donated solely by the parents. A more indirect way to alleviate the financial burden is through instrumental help, such as clothes, fresh vegetables, and furniture given by close kin, neighbours, and friends.

Another important need of the women in our sample is having a social life, meeting their friends, going out, et cetera. We noticed that their network – especially their friends – plays an important role in stimulating outdoor activities and keeping mothers out of social isolation.

A minority of the women mention finding it sometimes difficult to contact friends because it feels as though they are a bother. They think they are intruding into their friends’ lives, especially when these friends have children.

...when the children are with their father and I am alone,…it is difficult…you can’t just go to wherever you want because people have their own lives, their households, children, and so on … (Vera, 43 years)

These doubts often have a lot to do with one’s personal coping resources. A lack of self-confidence or a low sense of control may be the source of these kinds of reactions. A mother who is not feeling well runs the risk of shutting herself in, thereby diminishing the opportunity to meet people and to talk about her experiences. This in turn may intensify negative feelings and lead to a vicious circle that is hard to break out of.
Few women express the desire to have more single friends. Often, Sunday is a family day, during which the women’s friends make trips with their husbands and children. Joining them on their day trip makes the single mothers feel like the odd one out. The barrier to making contact with single friends is less high, since in one way or another these singles are companions.

Lastly, there is the role of the children in giving support. Most women mention receiving some kind of support from them, but in a rather indirect way. Younger children, for instance, cuddle their mothers more often. Their presence alone can be very important as well since they animate their mothers. Older children, for instance, make an effort by eating at home instead of at their friends’ houses. Thanks to the children’s attendance, the divorced mothers feel significant because they feel their children need them.

This was a brief overview of the different types of help. The next question to be answered is: What is important in giving help to recently separated women, according to themselves and their network? The contribution of the network members will provide insight into the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ of giving support.

Giving and receiving support: important themes

During the interviews, the women, as well as their network persons, were asked what they considered important in giving support. We also asked the network person why he/she thinks woman X chose him/her as the one most supportive to her. In the following section, the results of the analysis will be discussed. First, the experiences of the separated women will be examined, after which focus will be given to what is important in giving help, according to those who have a supportive role.

The perception of the received support

As mentioned earlier, separated women long for someone who listens to them, someone with whom they can share their worries and fears. They neither expect their network to be omnipotent, nor do they want the network to be giving answers freeing them from the feelings and questions they are struggling with:

…she is all ears and actually I don’t long for anything else. I don’t need other people’s advice; I’ll sort things out for myself. Nevertheless, having somebody close to you who listens to what I have to say… (Hanna, 44 years)

Nobody told me what to do or what not to do. Other people can’t and may not tell me what to do, as I am the one to make the decision. But, someone who understands you and is all ears, that, I think, is the most important thing. (Lydia, 49 years)

A separation is a disruptive life event and people going through the process need to overcome a range of obstacles. They face quite an insecure period. One might think that giving good advice or taking care of a few things lightens the burden, but this does not seem to be the case. Divorced women state not wanting any advice unless they explicitly ask for it. A separation disrupts their daily life and goes together with loss of control in one way or another. Therefore, it is comprehensible that they want to maintain a firm grip on things. Giving advice is perceived as an attack on their autonomy, which is very precious to them. Other people’s advice potentially
increases their vulnerability, and lessens their personal strength and self-esteem. Instead of someone telling them what to do and how to do it, they are in need of acceptance, meaning they want to be listened to without any intrusion on their autonomy. Not respecting their self-determination equals not respecting who they are or how they feel at that moment.

This ‘being there for them’ is one of the important features of giving support that is mentioned by all the network members. In the next paragraph, we explore this issue in depth.

The perception of the support given

It is remarkable how the stories of the network members about the do’s and don’ts of giving support correspond with those about the needs of the women. Next to being there for them, words like ‘standing by them’ and a ‘safety net’ express the willingness of the network to support the mother whenever she needs it. The following quotation makes it clear how serious network members are about this:

…the feeling that she can count on me day and night, and I take that very literally. There was a time when I always had my cell phone on me, even when I went to bed. I wanted to give her the feeling that she could rely on me, day and night, no matter where I was, even when I was at work.

(Chrissy, 38 years)

What is more, the network members’ opinions about what is not helpful match the separated mothers’ expressions about what they do not need, namely, good advice. Another no-no to keep in mind is taking over chores. It appears this kind of aid is not appreciated by the women, but especially supportive mothers and new partners mention being guilty of violating this rule now and then.

According to the network members the words ‘things will get better’ are considered a stopgap and are therefore to be avoided. The mothers indeed regard this sentence as a makeweight. Although these kinds of expressions are well-meaning, they do not seem to lighten the women’s feelings of sadness or fear. By saying such words, one simply bypasses the mothers’ feelings. The women are given the impression that they (or their difficulties) are not taken seriously.

Apparently, giving a call or paying a visit once in a while does not come across as interference or mothering. The ‘friend-supporters’ report doing a lot of ‘outreaching,’ meaning they do not always wait until their separated friend, for instance, calls them to talk about her problems. Instead, they pay her a visit or call her once a week. By doing this they want to show her they care, give her the opportunity to talk about her feelings or concerns, and try to help her avoid social isolation.

Next to determining what is perceived as important in giving support, it is necessary to go more deeply into why these network members are so giving. This question arose during the analyses of the data, as ‘unconditional’ giving caught our attention.

The support network: motives and consequences

In this section we do not only discuss the network members’ motives for helping their separated friend. We also look at how the women feel about this. Do they feel guilty about receiving so much help, or do they take the efforts for granted?
Motives for helping

Capturing the motives of the network respondents is a difficult task. As Vaisey (2009) points out, people have difficulties in articulating their motives in substantive, propositional terms. There is often a distinction between the behaviour and the discourse on certain actions people undertake (Giddens 1984). In exchange relationships, we are most likely to encounter basic scripts our network participants draw upon (Swidler 1986). The most elementary one involved in this situation is undoubtedly the norm of reciprocity. Already according to Mauss (1970), who studied gift-giving in a primitive context, the guiding principle was do ut des – I’ll give so that you will give. This moral obligation is at the basis of social relations between people (Ekeh 1974). But in a more modern context, the same rule was set out by Gouldner (1960, 1973), explicitly as ‘the norm of reciprocity.’ As we will see, this basic script of the balance of debt and the issue of being altruistic or not (Schwartz 1967, 1993) reappears as a guiding principle in the answers. Since a lot of the network people describe themselves as a giving person or as someone who is very helpful to a lot of people, many found it difficult to answer the question: What was the last thing you did for somebody else? Most of them are socially engaged and active in various organisations.

People contact me very often; I think I attract people with difficulties – I don’t know. For instance, I was late for this appointment because a woman from the dog school needed to pour out her heart about her daughter. Although I didn’t have time to listen to her since you came, I did because these things are important. Everyone comes to me or calls me, whereas I myself never turn to other people for help. (Gerda, 48 years)

These kinds of quotes made us wonder: Is there a form of reciprocity in the relationship, or do network members act on a merely altruistic or rather egoistic basis? Some participants asked themselves:

...Helping others...I do it because it gives me a good feeling, it enriches me and I do not desire anything in return...Egoism?...Because of the fact that it makes me happy?...That is a difficult question. Perhaps everybody is selfish in one way or the other?...I think my helping is rather based on altruism... (Bert, 73 years)

The analysis leads to a clear distinction between the giving of two groups: kin and non-kin. In the following section, we first describe the similarities and differences within the group of ‘kin-givers.’ We also focus on issues that struck us during the interviews. Secondly, we give an overview of the motives of ‘friend-givers’ for supporting their friends in need.

Family support: no tit for tat

‘That is what family is for’ is the logical reasoning of the interviewed parents (mainly mothers) and sisters of the divorced mothers for helping their daughter or sister. It caught our eye that some of the ‘sister-givers’ are not very concerned or emotional when it comes to their separated sister. The sisters seem driven by inner duty or moral obligation.

In contrast to them, the parents mention that the separation upsets them. Seeing their children and grandchildren suffer hurts them, and may have an effect on their way and ability to love all over them. One parent (female) told us that the self-
help group offers her daughter more emotional support than she herself can, since
she mothers too much and tends to lecture her daughter more than, for instance,
friends or fellow sufferers do. For this mother, being her daughter’s emotional safety
net does not correspond with her role as a parent.

A form of support that does match the parent role is offering financial aid and
practical support (e.g., childcare).

What helps her the most?...Well, I don’t know that, actually. I should ask
her. You know, I think us being their for her children means a lot to her.
That way she can do her work without being disturbed. (Anna, 61 years)

Most parents do not question their giving help; they consider it their duty as a
parent. They are concerned about their daughter and grandchildren and do what is in
their power to moderate the consequences of the breakup. Some parents state that
their grandchildren are their main motivation for helping, since their separated
daughter is more or less able to cope, but the future of the little ones worries them.
The grandchildren are part of the separation and the grandparents feel sorry for them
and want to spare them from pain as much as possible. One thing that is important to
the parent-givers is steering a middle course between their children. They make sure
that there is a balanced giving to all their children.

Based on these findings, we can state that the supportive family members are
rather altruistic. They do not put a price on the assistance they offer. The separated
mothers show a lot of gratitude, and apparently, this kind of refund satisfies parents
and other family members.

Non-kin helping hand

The analysis of the interviews reveals that only close kin (mainly parents) offer
financial help. Friends all state that they help the separated mothers in every possible
way except financially. Financial help appears to be something that is confined to the
family. ‘Non-kin givers’ are very generous in giving the separated mothers every kind
of non-financial help.

Remarkably, the analysis of the interviews with friend-givers indicates that these
persons are best at offering emotional and social support. Another striking issue,
which was already mentioned earlier, is that friends do not only find it important to be
available 24/7, they also give the impression that this is normal. Nevertheless, further
analysis shows that their motives are not as altruistic as they seem. The following
quotations make this clear:

To me it is an enrichment. You know, sometimes I compare my own
experiences and feelings with those of others and that can be very
instructive.

I’m glad I can do such a thing. The fact that she has financial problems and
I can help her, not by donating money, but in another way...that satisfies
me.

I think it’s normal. Whenever someone I know is in trouble, I want to help
him as much as possible. It actually gives me a good feeling...a
benefactress.

On the one hand, most of the helpers feel the need to give to those who are in
need; but on the other hand, the quotations make it clear that they always receive
something in return, for example satisfaction and a good feeling. Thus, one might ask oneself whether or not the givers’ intentions are as altruistic as those of the family, since giving enriches them in one way or another.

Due to these findings, the following questions arose: Is it possible to be purely altruistic? Does one not always long for something in return for an effort made? Some of the friends state that their giving is an answer to what their separated friend has done for them in the past. Others assume that their friend would also help them if the need arose. This reciprocity seems to be the underlying motivation of many of our respondents. Apparently, they do not long for anything in return right away as they are not the ones who are in need. However, they feel comfortable about receiving repayment for their time and diligence whenever they would need it. Obviously, they are confident that the other person will make it up to them, and this expectation – in one way or another – might be the motive of non-kin for helping their friend. Another important issue is trust. A lot of our non-kin respondents have known their separated mother-friend for a long time. There is mutual trust; they know what they can and cannot expect from each other. At the time of the interviews, their giving may be encouraged by the fact that it does good to the receivers, and these show gratitude for all their effort. This gratitude can be seen as a payoff for the received support and may suffice to balance the relationship (Schwartz 1967; Mauss 1970).

In the next section, we shed light on the separated women. Again, we differentiate between how the separated women perceive the help they receive from kin and non-kin and whether or not the help creates certain expectations.

**The experience of being helped**

*It is family business*

Close kin like parents and brothers or sisters are very supportive, especially practically, financially, and instrumentally. The assistance offered in childcare is indispensable to the women, who appreciate this kind of aid a lot and literally state that they would be lost without help from their family. Thanks to the help of close kin, the separated women are able to, for instance, continue working or even increase their working hours.

Repaying family support is not one of the mothers’ major concerns, as this was not mentioned during the interview. Due to the breakup, their spare time has become a scarce good (being sole parent, sole earner, and sole housekeeper), which makes it almost impossible to repay their parents, for instance, by mowing the lawn or getting the groceries. The separated women do show a lot of gratitude and do their best to cause the least bother to their close family. Dianne, for instance, does not go out during the weekend because this would again mean having to ask her parents for help watching the children.

They do not only want to spare them practically but also emotionally:

> The bond with my parents is very good. Yeah, I tell them a lot, sometimes too much...personal stuff. Afterwards, I think: “Oh no, now they will brood over it or they will start interfering...” (Anna, 27 years, 2 children: 1 year and 3 months)

As mentioned earlier, financial aid is only given by the parents of the separated women. The way this kind of help is perceived varies. Some women point out that the
money donation is not a gift, but an inheritance advance. Others find it normal that parents also help their children financially.

My parents always told me that they would give the same to all their children. I find this quite logical. In the past, my brother was faced with financial problems and my parents supported him. At the same time they gave an equal amount of money to me and my sisters. They reason: “We have four children and we treat them equally.” (Cindy, 45 years)

Asking for or accepting money is not as easy as having a chat or receiving fresh vegetables. It attacks the separated women’s independence more. They want to justify these financial gifts; they want to point out that they are not profiteers. Clarifying the donations helps them to be proud of oneself and remain self-sufficient.

The importance of “real” friends

The support given by friends varies from a chat or an intense conversation to doing activities together. All mothers stress the value of having (a) good friend(s):

...It’s very important. Much more important than money. Comforting words are more helpful and make it possible to save on antidepressants and doctors. (Cathy, 41 years)

...I have a lot of good friends and acquaintances and some of them invite me for dinner with a nice bottle of wine and a good chat. It does me a world of good. (Rosemary, 46 years)

The majority of the separated women are not deeply indebted to their supportive social network; some of the mothers seem to take their help for granted. The analysis of the interview transcripts show that most of the women have a rather long and intimate relationship with their close friends. This ‘shared history’ most likely explains why immediate restitution of what was received is not necessary, assuming that equivalence or reciprocity will eventually be achieved. The relationship appears to be rather communal and is not based on exchange, meaning the persons in the relationship are mutually responsive to each other’s needs regardless of a balance sheet, so to speak. Apparently, they share the same definition of their role as friends and the support giving that goes along with it. This is why offering emotional support can be seen as a logical form of assistance: ‘That is what friends are for.’ The same goes for social support. Going out together is considered part of their relationship.

A comparison between the support received from friends and that from colleagues reveals that the role relation can determine the kind of support and the way in which this support is perceived. Some women mention that in the beginning, their colleagues were concerned and frequently asked how they were doing, but these concerns gradually faded. They do not expect their colleagues to remain interested in their personal life. Others report still receiving a lot of support from their colleagues, but they do mention having become friends with these colleagues. Interestingly enough, most of the co-workers who eventually became friends have gone through a similar experience (divorce or single parenthood). The transition from colleague to friend goes together with more intense contact and more open conversations. This behaviour fits the friend-friend role relation better.

The foregoing discussion shows that the receiver’s biggest gift in return is gratitude for and appreciation of what their family and friends do or did for them. Repaying them is not their, or their network’s, primary concern. This enables the
separated mother to “use” these people as a coping resource, a way to overcome their grief and troubles.

Discussion

Previous studies show that social support can act as a buffer against the negative consequences of a separation and has a positive influence on the post-separation adjustment (Flowers 1996; Samson 1997; Duran-Aydintug 1998). This study’s aim is to gain insight into how supportive this network actually is according to the ‘experience experts,’ namely, the separated women and their network members. Separation is a stressful event in life; therefore, it is important to broaden our view on what kind of help divorced women do and do not need, who is best fitted to offer it, and whether or not this giving is unconditional. If giving support is associated with a particular expectation of something that has to be done in return, one might wonder: is this truly helpful or rather stressful for the separated women? We start this discussion by focussing on the impact of the separation on the single mothers’ social network.

A first finding confirms the results of previous research: a separation has an effect on the size and the composition of a person’s social network (Milardo 1987; Gerstel 1988; Rands 1988; Hurlbert 1990; Sprechtet et al. 2006). Some women mention losses (e.g., friends, family-in-law), but what comes to the forefront is the expansion of the network or the development of a new circle of friends (Albeck and Kaydar 2002). For some mothers a breakup means a fresh start. Apparently, new hobbies as well as new friends are part of a new beginning. Noteworthy is the alternative character of their new hobbies, which confirms the findings of previous studies (Kaydar 2001; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005; Kalmijn 2007). It also appears that these new hobbies come to meet various needs – rebuilding a social life, personal growth, and getting over the divorce.

Not all women have the money or the time to engage in hobbies or to go out since they are restricted by role overload (Gerstel 1988). Being a single parent, a sole earner, and a sole housekeeper limits their quality time or, in other words, the time they can spend with their friends or in a sports club. A lot of the separated mothers find it hard. Having some kind of social life would make them feel better. This finding corresponds with the results of a study by Hughes and others (Hughes Good and Candell 1993): being involved in social activities is strongly related to the well-being of separated mothers. Socializing can be seen as a way to respite other responsibilities.

How friends and family supplement each other

A second finding also backs up the results of previous studies on the kind of help given by the different network members. Emotional and social (e.g., going out) support is mainly offered by close friends (Albeck and Kaydar 2002). Words like ‘being there,’ ‘listening,’ and ‘safety net’ are often mentioned by the single women as well as by their network members and underline the fact that emotional support was an urgent need at the time of the interviews.

Next to emotional support, practical assistance is indispensable to these women, especially childcare assistance. This kind of aid, as well as financial and instrumental help, is mainly given by close family (Milardo 1987). Whereas friends
seem to play an important role in helping the women cope emotionally with the breakup, family support seems to contribute to the management of the practical and financial consequences of a separation. Due to the fact that parents turn into co-parents, the women are able to keep working or even to increase their working hours, which is an important coping strategy in dealing with the financial consequences of a breakup.

Some women report that their relationship with their parents, especially with their mothers, is based on more than just functional solidarity (Mc Chesney and Bengston 1988). They describe their mother as a warm and generous person, someone who does not judge and is not intrusive. These characteristics seem very important to the separated women. What is more, this finding is confirmed by other women, who mention finding it difficult to be mothered or to be overloaded with good parental advice.

Apparently, being given advice and being taken care of are not what the separated women need. Previous studies focusing on the negative impact of social support given to separated people confirm this finding (Kunz 1995; Miller et al. 1998; Hetherington 1999). Divorced women are happier when they are active in their network and they do not want to be reduced to mere support receivers (Leigh and Grady 1985). Bawin-Legros and Stassen (2002) state that family solidarity in general (not only in case of a separation) does not necessarily correspond with the needs of the receiver, but is often organized as a function of the needs and desires of the givers. The desire of the parent-givers is to see their daughter happy. They want to limit the negative consequences their daughter has to face, and in pursuing this aim, parents become blind to their daughter’s needs. Our analysis shows that these good intentions are considered a potential threat to the separated women’s idea of self-management. It may damage their self-esteem and self-confidence and possibly evoke feelings of helplessness (Coates, Wortman and Abbey 1979; Williams and Williams 1983; McLeroy et al. 1984). The separated women want to manage their (confusing) situation themselves as much as possible. In the light of the coping theory, this can only be encouraged since it shows that these women want to establish their inner locus of control, an important coping resource for dealing with their difficulties in a problem-focused way (Pearlin and Schooler 1978).

The importance of holding on to one’s own potential is also the core principle of the ‘empowerment paradigm.’ “Empowerment is viewed as a process: the mechanisms by which people, organizations, and communities gain mastery over their lives” (Zimmerman 2000: 43-44).

The occasional disempowerment attitude of the parent-givers could explain why most women suggested a good friend when we asked for an interviewee who is very supportive to them. Good support equals being there for someone and listening, rather than taking over matters and giving advice.

A comparison between the stories of the women and those of their friends shows that these persons connect very well. They seem to speak the same language. A lot of friendships go back a long way. Because of this shared history, there is a profound basis of trust; they both know what to expect from one another. Unlike the parents, the good friends do not seem to give unwanted advice. A possible explanation is that the friends are less emotionally involved in the divorce process and are thus better able to listen to the women’s stories with an open mind (Milardo 1987; Flowers 1996). They seem to come only as close as necessary.

A striking finding is the fact that there seems to be a tacit agreement when it comes to financial support: friends giving money to separated mother-friends is not done. This kind of aid fits the parent-child relationship best. It is important to mention
that these grown-up children find it hard to accept such financial support and in one way or another try to make it clear that they are not profiteers. To them, accepting money violates their independence and their self-confidence, another important coping resource (Pearlin and Schooler 1978). We found that they tended to gloss over this kind of help, which can be seen as a way to cope with their dependence and therefore attempt to stick to a personal coping resource (self-esteem).

What goes around comes around?

After a first reading of the interviews, all the network members seemed to be benefactors. Most of them state that they are giving persons, and to them helping others is something natural. They do not explicitly mention longing for something in return. Nevertheless, further analysis showed that the giving of a particular group of network members is not entirely unconditional or altruistic.

Although the friend-supporters state that they do not want anything in return, they also mention that the separated women have helped them in the past or would do so, if needed, in the future. This points to some kind of reciprocity in the relationship. The fact that the friendship has an intimate character and goes back a long way allows the receiver some leeway in returning the aid. This finding can be linked to Gouldner's theory of reciprocity – the stability of social relationships is based on the expectation that the help will be reciprocated at an adequate time period and in a contingent way (1960). The relationship can be seen as a communal one wherein the partners are mutually responsive to each other's needs. They do not seem to keep a hypothetical balance sheet. If the friendship were not that close, it would rather be based on exchange (Mendelson and Kay 2003).

Another element showing that a friend's help is not completely altruistic is the fact that the intangible efforts are rewarded with intangible compensation (gratitude, good feeling). According to Simmel, people are tied by gratitude since it functions as a motive to give in return (1987). This perceived gratitude intensifies the network members' confidence that their commitment will be paid for sooner or later. The good feeling experienced by the friends is positively associated with their own psychological well-being. They get the feeling that they matter to the divorced mother and that they are significant (Schieman and Taylor 2001; Marshall and Lambert 2006). Thus, one might state that the helping process is beneficial to both the giver and the receiver.

Can we see this exchange of help in kin and non kin as a pure gift (Parry 1986; Eisenberg 1993; Donati 2003)? Even though many network members saw their help outside the chains of reciprocal giving and receiving, the mother's not always had the exact same experience. Some have expressed feelings of shame and indebtedness towards their benefactors. Especially when the exchange of goods is involved (e.g., money or groceries), the idea of the inalienable gift (Mauss 1970; Gregory 1982) is visible in the answers. Financial help is not offered by friends since this kind of tangible help is more loaded or, in other words, is a less unconditional form of aid. As separated women are often faced with financial problems, it is less likely that they would be able to repay this gift or loan in a short period of time. Gratitude or a good feeling does not seem to suffice as 'repayment' when it comes to money (Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974).

The network members who are prepared to help these separated women financially are close kin. The family members we interviewed did not seem to question their financial assistance at all, since 'that is what family is for' (family...
Parents who offer financial help do not long for anything in return. To them, equal giving to all their children is more important. The stories of the separated women confirm this – the money received is either an advance of the inheritance or an amount owed to them (women). The fact that receiving money is less unusual in a family context makes it easier to accept the financial assistance.

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to gain a better insight into how the process of social support is perceived by separated women. We gave an overview of the support types and which people offer it. The study enabled us to disentangle the most important needs of the women and their perception of the aid given by close kin and close friends. What is more, we were able to look into the dynamics at the root of such supportive processes.

Involving network members in the study also made it possible for us to shed a different light upon the influence of social support on coping with a breakup. Previous studies pointed to the contribution of social support in handling a separation (Flowers 1996; Samson 1997; Briggs 1998; Duran-Ayrintug 1998). In some of those studies, it is stated that support also has a negative influence on the well-being of separated people (Kunz 1995; Miller et al. 1998; Hetherington and Kelly 2003). The results of our study complement these findings. The experience experts point to the fact that giving advice and mothering is not done. If the social support equals this kind of help, the social network cannot function as an effective social coping resource. What is more, the social network can have a detrimental effect on one's personal coping resources (sense of control, self-confidence) (Pearlin 1989). The immediate aftermath of a breakup is characterized by uncertainties, fear, and so on. For the women to cope with this difficult period of time, it is very important that their personal coping resources are left untouched or, even better, are reinforced.

Close kin often lapse into giving advice. The close friends we interviewed have a better appreciation of what their separated female friend needs. It also appears that the separated women themselves know best who to call upon for their different needs. We can thus state that a diverse network can take care of the different needs of separated mothers.

The supportive relationship itself was also examined. Apparently, the divorced women (the receivers) are not pressured to immediately refund the support they have received. Indirectly, they do give something in return – gratitude. Although, objectively, the repayment is not in balance with the help given, it suffices for the supportive network members. A decisive answer about whether or not this feeling is permanent can only be obtained through a longitudinal study. It would be interesting to study these women’s as well as their network’s perception of the social support in one or two years. What are the separated women’s needs by that time, and how supportive will their network still be? Some women mentioned that they have joined a self-help group. We did not pursue this matter since it would have led us too far. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to research how this kind of support is perceived and what the strengths of such a group are.
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**Citation**

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Book Review:  

Contemporary interest in yoga in the West is for sure one of the reasons for Marc Singleton to write this book. This is a very important book because it fights the stereotype concerning origins of contemporary hatha-yoga practiced in the West.

The book is a marvelous historical analysis of contemporary hatha-yoga development, the one we know in the West from popular hatha-yoga schools, commercials, celebrity images (i.e., Madonna, Sting, Jennifer Aniston, Drew Barrymore, Matthew McConaughey, etc.). After reading this book, yoga will no longer be the same, as we have perceived it earlier on as being an original Indian spiritual or physical practice. It turns out, that the West had a strong influence on the development of contemporary yoga, also the same as practiced in India. Contemporary yoga is also our, western and modern, invention.

Yoga, especially the practice of asanas, has become a very popular activity in the western world. Yoga, focused on doing certain positions and physical exercises, has also become a huge business. Hatha-yoga styles and positions are often patented and protected by ownership and franchised. Equipment useful in yoga practice is sold and yoga positions are used in mobile phone commercials, yoghurt commercials and other commercials. According to Singleton, in 2008, only in the USA, practitioners spent 5.7 billion dollars on yoga lessons, holidays with yoga and products connected with practicing yoga, which is about half of Nepal’s gross national income (p. 3). Also, in Poland, hatha-yoga businesses flourish; beginning with hatha-yoga schools, yoga retreats and on to the production and selling of accessories.

Marc Singleton is mostly interested in the problem: how does it happen that contemporary yoga, practiced in the western world, and the original one, from XIX century India (a British Colony), do not seem very alike. He is mostly interested in the period between the year 1896 (the year of publication of Swami Vivekananda’s Raja Yoga – a book criticizing an asana focused yoga) and the year 1966 (the year B.K.S. Iyengara published Light on Yoga – in which there were presented asanas and the rules of practicing them). This has been the most creative period for the form of hatha-yoga, as we know it today in the western world. In the second half of the XIX century, yoga revives in India, thanks to Vivekananda (1883-1902). But, even then asanas (positions in yoga, the physical side of yoga practice) as we know it today, did not exist in Vivekananda’s system. For him, yoga was mostly about obtaining
spiritual knowledge, self-awareness and practicing either knowledge and self-awareness in everyday life.

Generally, the physical side of yoga practice was rejected by Vivekananda and his followers. Where then does contemporary yoga come from? (Anglophone, transnational yoga; p. 4).

Singleton writes a rather provocative and controversial thesis. He states that in the West in the XIX century there had been established and developed an international movement of physical culture, which influenced Indian youth between the XIX and XX centuries. Europe has also developed quasi-religious forms of physical culture, which have influenced a reinterpretation of yoga.

Nationalistic Hinduism, which at that time started developing, had also influenced the understanding of hatha-yoga as a traditional form of physical and spiritual practice from Indian origins. 1 Western physical culture has developed well in India. It was also completed with the practice of asanas and then it returned to Europe and mixed with Western esotericism and "esoteric gymnastics," which had developed in Europe and America without earlier contact with yoga tradition.

Posture-based yoga, as we know it today, is the result of a dialogical exchange between para-religious, modern body culture techniques developed in the West and the various discourses of «modern» Hindu yoga that emerged from the time of Vivekananda onward. Although it routinely appeals to the tradition of Indian hatha yoga, contemporary posture-based yoga cannot really be considered a direct successor of this tradition. (Singleton 2010:5)

Singleton’s important contributions are his very careful studies on yoga literature from the beginning of the XX century. In resources, from the Cambridge University Library and in the India Office of the British Library in London, asanas and hatha-yoga did not exist as a subject. The same conclusions emerged from the review of American literature up to 1930. It was not until after the Second World War that popular English yoga handbooks started to put a strong accent on yoga postures (p. 5-6).

Asanas in English handbooks were compared to gymnastics. Well-known schemes of interpretation enabled it to incorporate yoga into the Western physical culture. Yoga’s philosophical frames were repressed and replaced with a modernist discourse of health and fitness. The analysis of handbooks on gymnastics lets us suppose that English authors of yoga handbooks have inscribed achievements of physical culture of those times into the orthodoxy of yoga practice and rejected those parts which were difficult to combine with the uprisng discourse of health and fitness (p. 7). One may agree with this thesis, even when referring to hatha-yoga popularizing handbooks by B.K.S. Iyengar, in which he rather avoids references to practices of organism purification (satkarma) and traditional ascetic yoga practices (tapas), where the notion of asceticism, in a classical sense, is not used even once.

1 We could observe similar uses of yoga practice in Poland, where the Hindu tradition was inspiring for a spirit of Polish patriotism: "...Słowacki stressed the Indian sources of his belief as being a part of a larger doctrine, which «presents a peculiar amalgamation of the Upanishadic doctrine of the psycho-cosmic salvation through evolution with the hetero-soteriological conception proper to Buddhism»... Some of his ideas were put into practice in the «Elusia» movement established in 1903 by Wincenty Lutosławski (1863-1954) who continued the Romantic tradition, believing that Poland was a cultural intermediary between oriental and Western spiritual traditions and for whom Hindu yoga exercises were to be an element in the physical and spiritual renewal of the Polish nation...” (Doktór 1997:349-350).
(see: Iyengar 1979:38). Especially influential were Scandinavian gymnastics deriving from P.H. Ling and E. Sandow’s bodybuilding training and methods of teaching physical culture used by the YMCA (also in India). We should mention that Pehr Ling also learned martial arts and Chinese massage techniques from his friend “Ming.” It becomes clear that the world of international physical culture is mixed with other traditions of both body culture and philosophical tradition. The combination of Indian yoga with western physical culture in Singleton’s analyses is evident. There are many controversies concerning diverse plots of this combined tradition. An arena in the social world of yoga emerges when it comes to interpreting the inheritance of one of the main early gurus of contemporary yoga – T. Krishnamacharya (1888-1989). There is also a dispute about who represents a “pure” yoga practice system (orthopraxy). There are three main Krishnamacharya followers who used to take lessons in the Mysore Palace. They are: Śri K. Pattabhi Jois, B.N.S. Iyengar and T.R.S. Sharma.

His other famous follower, well-known in the West, the most popular propagator of hatha-yoga in Poland, is B.K.S. Iyengar (p. 9). Yoga, according to Singleton, is a cultural Anglophone phenomenon, created as a result of a dialogical relation between India and the West through the English language. That is why he calls this phenomenon “a transnational Anglophone yoga” (p. 10). The domination of the English language in the Western world caused this kind of yoga to become the most known type among western practitioners.

The phenomenon of yoga, as it is described by Singleton, should not be analyzed from a point of view, which concerns closeness or distance from so-called original roots of yoga. Searching for gymnastic positions in classical yoga books like Yajur or Rg Vedas is unjustified from a historical and philological point of view. Śri K. Pattabhi Jois, when describing a set of asanas called surja namaskara, looks for their roots in ancient India (2002:33-34). However, from historical and philological points of view, it is hard to find evidence for a description of a set of positions in the classical texts. Contemporary yoga, according to Singleton, should be analyzed in its own terms rather than through its resemblance of a traditional Indian practice (p. 14). Yoga originating from India has transformed many times just as it has in India itself for the last 150 years because of an influence of the Western world and a modernist philosophy.

In the world of hatha-yoga there also exists an arena, which concerns a controversy about the origins of positions in contemporary yoga. Singleton refers to Norman Sjoman’s book The Yoga Tradition of the Mysore Palace, written in 1996, where its author suggests that the “godfather” of contemporary hatha-yoga, T. Krishnamacharya, has developed his system of asana based on a gymnastic tradition of the Mysore Palace where he used to live and teach. In the book, he compares yoga positions, taught by Krishnamacharya followers (B.K.S. Iyengar and Śri K. Pattabhi Jois), with the ones present in the Palace exercise handbook. They turned out to be similar. Sjoman’s work was either ignored or strongly criticized by those who would rather look for origins of asanas in ancient India as it has probably ruined their system of beliefs about the origins of contemporary hatha-yoga.

Why do we pay so much attention to the practice of asanas today? Well, in the XX century fifty practical handbooks were published, they were a contemporary secularized and medicalized version of yoga. It has also been associated with sports and physical exercise. In the 60’s, in the USA, there were popularized, together with the youth revolution, Indian philosophies including yoga. On TV, there were presented such shows as “Yoga for Health.” Bringing yoga closer to the New Age movement was also important for its popularization. It was a rediscovery of a
relationship between yoga and the XIX century esotericism. In the 90's, yoga had become a commercial enterprise in many western cities and states. It has been commoditized and commercialized.

The search for asanas in ancient Hindu texts or images is quite controversial. There is no proof that postures, which we know today, were practiced in ancient India. According to Singleton, it is possible that reading ancient texts and images is inscribing our perspective of yoga practice into ancient texts.

The book presented is incredibly important for everyone interested in contemporary yoga, especially hatha-yoga. It undermines stereotypes concerning the origins of hatha-yoga practice (especially positions in yoga exercise). It shows an astonishing complication of mutual inspiration of West and East. The simple explanation of the origins of contemporary transnational yoga as deriving from old Indian tradition is no longer justified. The West has also created contemporary yoga and has influenced the physical culture of XIX and XX century India. So, the dialogical transmission of information, knowledge of physical and spiritual yoga practice has created contemporary hatha-yoga.

However, one might have some reservations to Singleton's story. He himself accuses others of including contemporary perspectives of hatha-yoga practice into the interpretation of texts and images of hatha-yoga in ancient documents. But, he does the same, for example, when introducing an interpretative context of physical culture on understanding contemporary hatha-yoga. Apart from this perspective, one may see more hatha-yoga in the context of Pantanjali's philosophy of hatha-yoga or in the context of Hindu religion.

Vivekananda in the beginning of the XX century did not associate the practice of asanas with physical culture. He'd rather write about a clear mind than about physical exercises, about immortality of the self, cognition and liberation. What Singleton does is a spectacular search for bonds between discourses and contexts of power production. It is visible especially when he compares K. Rammamurties's asanas, who rejects western ideas and accents, the “ancient tradition of ashram,” but also the “competition and elegance” and masculinity. The last two features remind Singleton of a system of education focused on military discipline of public schools of XIX century England. However, it is only a similarity, which lacks grounding of those connections in the data, so that it could be stated as a deeper relation or influence. That's only a similarity. Despite the fact, the effects of this speculation were based on similarities that are incredibly interesting, and deriving conclusions may be controversial for some, however, for others they could be innovative and help to change a perspective of perceiving contemporary hatha-yoga.

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Citation

It is generally beyond dispute that great historical episodes are the province of historians. Less intuitive, however, are the challenges posed to contemporary research in the social sciences and humanities by the objective of analyzing near-term history. With few exceptions, we approach the last generation’s controversies differently than we do the issues dominating our current news cycle. Many of today’s news items, in fact, are simply left to be made sense of by journalists. The events of 9/11, however, create an uncomfortable scenario for researchers. Here we have a subject too grave to delay studying, even if it means that the research produced can by no means escape unblemished from the politics that characterize our current historical moment.

Rubin and Verheul’s (2011) edited volume, “American Multiculturalism after 9/11: Transatlantic Perspectives,” (AM911 hereafter) wades into this predicament with impressive delicacy and passion. To make things tractable, the collection focuses on the impact of 9/11 on American multiculturalism, described as a particular perspective on difference, plurality and citizenship mainstreamed during the 1980s after decades of struggle. A frequent point made by the volume’s contributors is that multiculturalism has itself become the enemy in the aftermath of 9/11, as a national closing of ranks against the worst of Islamic extremism has become a basis of exclusionary nationalist politics. Although a debate about multiculturalism has raged for more than 20 years before 9/11, contributors to the volume agree that multiculturalism had after 2001 become a stage for political projects more closely linked to US foreign policy and the interests of global capital.

The articles in AM911 hang well together, their cohesion aided in large part by an introduction chapter by Rubin and Verheul that usefully outlines and sets the tone of the volume. The authors observe that work done in the American studies tradition has focused too much on the global context of American culture, while political scientists have tended to the more nationally-anchored subject of multiculturalism, generally treating it as a political more than a cultural matter. AM911 fills this gap by emphasizing how 9/11 has impacted the particularly cultural elements of the ongoing debate about American multiculturalism.

The collection is divided into three sections. The first situates American multiculturalism into theoretical and geopolitical context. Paul Lauter delivers a strong leading article contending that the events of 9/11 exacerbated a shift in national politics that had already been set into motion at least a decade earlier: from one...
based on ethnic identity to one rooted in the problem of immigration. For Lauter, legal citizenship rather than “integration” has become the central dilemma of multiculturalism and, “unless the West takes major steps to...bring about change in the...conditions of people in the impoverished world, it will increasingly face the problem of finding ways to deal with the growing tide of immigration at home” (p.27). Richard Alba pursues a comparative-historical approach to examine the degree to which multicultural tolerance has become endangered post-9/11 in the US and Europe. He finds that when Muslims are numerous among low-status immigrants, multiculturalist institutions are at the most risk of being dismantled (a dynamic that surprisingly has been more prevalent in Europe than the US). Ed Jonkers packs into his short essay an ambitious history of the longstanding tensions between “human universalism” and “cultural particularism” in social and cultural theory, of which “multiculturalism and social pluralism are fairly recent additions” (p.51). He warns that “when every tradition becomes an invention, distrust has run wild,” though he doubts that solidarity founded on nationalism can ever be inclusive.

The following section – by far the largest – adopts a more empirical approach, exploring the impacts of 9/11 on American multiculturalism through an examination of cultural texts. A broad assortment of empirical materials are here on display, and some work better than others. Rob Kroes has some smart things to say about the role of photography in the processes of collective memory, but his attempt to explain ethnic variation in reactions to 9/11 photography is vexed by problems of evidence. Rachel Hutchins-Viroux is more successful in her examination of how history textbooks have changed after 9/11, even if her findings are unsurprising: she discerns a rightward shift since 9/11, but argues that the most important gains of multiculturalism (such as the inclusion of previously taboo topics) have generally endured. Philip Wegner and Michael Andrew Connor each deconstruct films – “United 93” and “Armageddon” respectively – and both illustrate how the events of 9/11 expose how America’s global economic domination rests in part on the need for American citizens to see themselves as “innocent” in global affairs. To the extent that Islamic terrorists could claim some moral legitimacy for their cause via the tropes of “victimhood” and “sacrifice,” the American sense of innocence erodes and films like “United 93” do the repair work. Other contributors explore the cultural texts – such as Amiri Baraka’s poetry and John Updike’s novels – that do just the opposite.

If articles from the earlier sections compare and contrast the impact of 9/11 on the US and Europe respectively, the final section documents how 9/11 has shaped cultural dialogues between American and European states. Patrick Hyder Patterson illustrates Europe’s explicit rejection of the “assimilationist” model of American multiculturalism – which both offers and imposes “American-ness” – in favor of a European one that “perpetuate[s] a relationship of hosts and guests” (p.150). Patterson argues that the relatively laissez-fare American approach helps to minimize religious difference in the construction of national identity, Ironically aiding in the social and political inclusion of foreign nationals. Joanna C. Kardux traces the ways that US and Dutch multiculturalisms confront colonialist pasts through memorialization. Finally, Jaap Kooijman shows how Dutch artists draw on the tragedy of 9/11 to both denounce and defend Dutch multiculturalism, while Jaap Verheul flips the directionality of the US-Europe cultural dialogue to show how the American media used high-profile Dutch political assassinations to discredit the European approach to multiculturalism (in which the public sphere is less open to expressions of minority religions). This juxtaposition adds an extra layer of insight to an already engaging section.
Generally, the lessons imparted by this volume’s contributors elaborate on how the cultural impacts of 9/11 are more complicated than they seem. We learn about the theoretical and geopolitical contexts that precede 9/11, as well as the cultural texts and international dialogues that mediate our collective experience of it. In its eagerness to show that culture matters, however, the volume mostly fails to draw precise conclusions about how exactly culture and politics interrelate and precisely what mechanisms are at play. To be sure, these concerns may fall outside of the editor’s aims, but the better articles seem to demystify more than complicate. Nevertheless, all of AM911’s pieces are smart and well-crafted, and together they move us closer toward being able to answer perhaps the most pressing question of our age: how has 9/11 changed our world?

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Why Don’t They Hate Us More?

The book in question has been published within the series edited by the IMISCOE program (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe), which had been established in 2004 as a Network of Excellence and became “an independent, self-funding endeavour open to qualified researchers and research institutes worldwide” in 2009.¹ Liza Mügge is a political scientist from Amsterdam and she has focused on three groups of migrants in the contemporary Netherlands: the Surinamese, Turkish and Kurdish ones. Her research questions are concerned with the emergence of transnational migrant politics, the evolution of political participation of migrants over time (especially the “coming of age” of a second generation, which grew up entirely or almost entirely in the country of settlement and, well, the third question is unintelligible because of poor English and minimalist editing effort (see p. 22) third bulleted point, but we may guess that she is interested in cross-influences between the social response to migrants’ political activism and their willingness to continue transnational politics.

The author mentions all relevant literature, including Kearney, Vertovec, Granovetter and an Erasmus University colleague, Engbersen, or a Surinamese colleague of mine from Tilburg University, Gowricharn, but her strength is in empirical studies of three selected minorities in the contemporary Kingdom of the Netherlands. The topic is not entirely of a theoretical and methodological interest to me. I share some of the dilemmas with the subjects of her study. As a Polish migrant to the Netherlands, I participate in both Dutch and Polish national politics, by voting in respective national elections, though I have to choose between the two on those days when elections to the European Parliament are held (I usually vote for the Polish representatives with my wife and my children vote for the Dutch ones). What did the author find out?

First, that there were significant differences between the three groups of migrants. The Surinamese went mostly for the homeland-directed activities (they were the only group of migrants, who came from the former Dutch colony, with a painful record of corrupt deals between the postcolonial Surinamese and Dutch political elites). The Turks and the Kurds shared their focus on transplanted homeland politics (revived in a foreign setting), but they differed in that the Turks

¹ See Mügge (2010, International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe).
complemented these transplanted homeland politics with country-of-residence directed activities, while the Kurds added the diaspora politics (not so surprising considering the fact that their homeland is divided between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria). The transnational ties of the Turks had an institutional setting (the Turkish state or political parties acting from Turkey) while the Kurds were rallied by influential political leaders in exile. The Surinamese ran the highest risk of being considered renegades (migration as an act of treason – leaving homeland behind), Turks were subjected to the most systematic guidance from the country of origin and the Kurds were most open for chances for political participation in their host country (having been denied this chance in their country of origin – for instance, by a repressive Turkish state, which is why the Dutch parliament granted the Kurds a right to establish a Kurdish Parliament in exile on Dutch territory).

She concludes, using the twin concepts of ‘ties’ and ‘activities’:

[t]he significance of transnational politics lies in the existence of transnational ties through which collectivities can be mobilized. Once established, they can be used for social-cultural, economic or political purposes. Ties have the broadest scope when they are collective and are more highly institutionalized. Such ties will more likely survive and evolve among second and third generations. (Mügge 2010:201)

Perhaps, this would suggest that the Turkish migrants are most active, involved and politically motivated. However, as the author herself admits in a methodological appendix, at least some of the 298 Turkish respondents might have been ethnic Kurds, since, if they came from Turkey, they were automatically registered as Turks, and self-identification as Kurdish was a political decision, easier in the Netherlands than in Turkey where it would have been punishable by anti-Kurdish laws. When she started identifying Kurds, she finally located them in Kurdish organizations and through Kurdish websites, but this made her sample of 21 interviewed Kurds much more educated and politically engaged than 28 Turks or 23 Surinamese who had also made it to the in-depth interviews.

Nevertheless, this is a promising beginning of a more empirical and pragmatic approach to the sociological and political study of migrant communities and it might contribute to the lifting of scapegoat stereotypes, which are often evoked by the populist parties, especially in times of crises.

References


Citation

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Robert Prus, University of Waterloo, Canada

Religion, Platonist Dialectics, and Pragmatist Analysis: Marcus Tullius Cicero’s Contributions to the Philosophy and Sociology of Divine and Human Knowing

Abstract
Whereas Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Augustine are probably the best known of the early Western philosophers of religion, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) also played a particularly consequential role in the development and continuity of Greco-Latin-European social thought.

Cicero may be best known for his work on rhetoric and his involvements in the political intrigues of Rome, but Cicero’s comparative examinations of the Greco-Roman philosophies of his day merit much more attention than they have received from contemporary scholars. Cicero’s considerations of philosophy encompass much more than the theological issues considered in this statement, but, in the process of engaging Epicurean and Stoic thought from an Academician (Platonist) perspective, Cicero significantly extends the remarkable insights provided by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Although especially central to the present analysis, Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (1972) is only one of several texts that Cicero directs to a comparative (multiparadigmatic and transhistorical) analysis of divine and human knowing.

Much of Cicero’s treatment of the philosophy of religion revolves around variants of the Socratic standpoints (i.e., dialectics, theology, moralism) that characterized the philosophies of Cicero’s era (i.e., Stoicism, Epicureanism, Academician dialectics), but Cicero also engages the matters of human knowing and acting in what may be envisioned as more distinctively pragmatist sociological terms.

As well, although Cicero’s materials reflect the socio-historical context in which he worked, his detailed analysis of religion represents a valuable source of comparison with present day viewpoints and practices. Likewise, a closer examination of Cicero’s texts indicates that many of the issues of divine and human knowing, with which he explicitly grapples, have maintained an enduring conceptual currency.

This paper concludes with a consideration of the relevance of Cicero’s works for a contemporary pragmatist sociological (symbolic interactionist) approach to the more generic study of human knowing and acting.

Keywords: Religion; God(s); Cicero; Plato; Philosophy; Pragmatism; Symbolic Interaction; Dialectic Analysis; Knowing; Epicureanism; Stoicism; Fatalism; Divination.

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Narrating Memory: Weighing up the Testimony

Abstract
Memory is the ability to store, maintain and recall information and experiences. Although predominantly an individual attribute, memory coincides with the life-world, with consciousness and with the ability to define reality – all of which are shared with others. When analysing narratives the sociologist needs to situate individual memory within its broader context. The article follows the argument that individuals acquire their memories within a broader social context. They also recall and localise their memories within a
broader social context. This article interprets a remarkable testimony: the story of a former political prisoner who circumcised a large number of young fellow inmates in the notorious prison on Robben Island, South Africa, during the period of Nelson Mandela's incarceration.

The article relates the narrative in question to the life-world of the narrator and to his experiences whilst serving his 18-year prison sentence. It reflects on the epistemological questions regarding memories. Memory as recollection, as reconstruction of events and information, and as process of re-membering come under the spotlight. Narratives that are often repeated start taking on a life of their own – particularly in the case of trauma memories. When analysing these narratives, the sociologist needs to distinguish between objective markers and subjective interpretation. Memory does not constitute pure recall by the individual. The article illustrates the effect of intersubjective and collective factors on the process of remembering. It calls for a reflexive process to identify, re-interpret and unpack the process of remembering.

**Keywords:** Memory; Experience; Consciousness; Life-world; Re-membering; Intersubjectivity; African National Congress; Circumcision; Robben Island.

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**CONSTRUCTING GLOBAL ‘WARS WITHOUT END’: Vocabularies of Motive and the Structure of Permanent War**

**Abstract**

My purpose in this paper is to link the larger social context that structurally necessitates ‘wars without end’ perpetrated by the U.S. elite with the rhetoric that legitimizes them so as to sociologically situate the rhetoric, the vocabularies of motive within a historically formed war-centric social structure that reveals an easily discernible pattern in the use of language. I consider Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech of December 8, 1941 announcing U.S. entry into World War II to be the rhetorical “Master Frame,” the blueprint in this regard that was subsequently incorporated by later presidents to justify all wars without end. I compared dissected components of this rhetorical Master Frame to war speeches made by different U.S. presidents in the pre- and post-World War II era to reveal the qualitative difference between war rhetoric of a peace-time social structure where war is an aberration and the permanent war based social structure of the post-World War II U.S., when war became the taken for granted norm.

**Keywords:** Military Industrial Complex; Permanent War; Rhetoric.

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**Wendy Verheynen**, University of Antwerp, Belgium

**A Dyadic View on the Post-separation Network of Single Mothers**

**Abstract**

Many empirical studies have focused on the quantitative changes in the social networks of divorced and separated people. In this qualitative study, we use interviews with dyads to construct a two-sided view of the support network after separation. The aim of the study is to gain insight into the needs for support after a relational breakup. Including a network member in the analysis enables a more detailed view on the interaction at hand in the bond between these women and their supportive network.
members. The results show that personal coping resources are left untouched. Giving advice on one's daily activities is counter-productive. This is better understood by non-family members compared to the women's parents (especially the mother). With respect to the reciprocity in these relationships, network members do not expect a return in the period after the separation.

Keywords: Divorce; Social Network; Social Support; Grounded Theory; Dyadic Analysis.
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