



Qualitative Sociology Review

Volume IV, Issue 2 – August 2008

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Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: A Pragmatist Analysis of Persuasive Interchange

Abstract

Approaching rhetoric as the study of persuasive interchange, this paper considers the relevance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for the study of human group life. Although virtually unknown to modern day social scientists, this text has great relevance for contemporary scholarship. Not only does Aristotle's text centrally address influence work (and resistance), identities and reputations, deviance and culpability, emotionality and deliberation, and the broader process of human knowing and acting in political, character shaping, and courtroom contexts, but Aristotle also deals with these matters in remarkably comprehensive, systematic, and precise terms. Attending to the human capacity for agency, Aristotle also works with a sustained appreciation of purposive, reflective, adjustive interchange.

Hence, whereas this text is invaluable of as a resource for the comparative transhistorical analysis of human interchange, it also suggests a great many ways that contemporary scholarship could be extended in the quest for a more adequate, more authentic social science.

Keywords

Aristotle; Rhetoric; Influence; Activity; Agency; Identity; Emotions; Justice; Culpability; Symbolic interaction; Pragmatism

The term rhetoric often is used in rather casual, dismissive terms to refer to words, phrases, or speeches intended to persuade others into accepting positions that are contrary to their interests. By contrast, this paper returns to the study of rhetoric as this was developed in the classical Greek era and engages rhetoric as a highly consequential facet of human interchange.

Approached thusly, it becomes apparent that rhetoric not only is relevant across all realms of human association but that the study of persuasive endeavor also is fundamental for comprehending the negotiated, practically accomplished nature of human group life.

Building on symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969; Prus 1996, 1997, 1999; Prus and Grills 2003) as a pragmatist and ethnographically informed approach to the study of human knowing and acting, this paper considers the relevance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for contemporary scholarship.

Following an introduction to this classical Greek text and a brief consideration of its neglect within, as well as its relevance for, the social sciences, this paper provides a highly compacted, chapter and verse synopsis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The paper concludes with a consideration of some ways that this text may be used to inform and vitalize the social sciences agenda.

The following quotation from the Roman orator and author Marcus Tullius Cicero (c106-43BCE) helps establish the broader context in which Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was developed:¹

Aristotle collected the early books on rhetoric, even going back as far as Tisias, well known as the originator and inventor of the art; he made a careful examination of the rules of each author and wrote them out in plain language, giving the author's name, and finally gave a painstaking explanation of the difficult parts. And he so surpassed the original authorities in charm and brevity that no one becomes acquainted with their ideas from their own books, but everyone who wishes to know what their doctrines are, turns to Aristotle, believing him to give a much more convenient exposition. He, then, published his own works and those of his predecessors, and as a result we became acquainted with him and the others as well through his work. His successors, although they devoted most of their attention to the noblest parts of philosophy, as the master whose principles they followed had done, nevertheless left us much instruction in rhetoric. (Cicero, *De Inventione*, II.ii:6-7 [Hubbel, trans.])

Demosthenes (c384-322BCE) may be the best known of all Greek rhetoricians, but it is Demosthenes' contemporary Aristotle (c384-322BCE) who "wrote the book on rhetoric." Aristotle was not the first Greek scholar to write about rhetoric but Aristotle's work is so comprehensive, astute, and philosophically informed that it is difficult to find another author in the pages of history to the present time who compares with Aristotle on these grounds.

Indeed, while Marcus Tullius Cicero is a most exceptional student of rhetoric and explicitly strives to maintain closer connections between philosophy and rhetoric, even the highly instructive texts that Cicero produced must be seen within the context of Aristotle's groundbreaking and still remarkably enabling text on rhetoric (also see Prus 2008).

Interestingly, although rhetoric as a scholarly subject matter has great relevance for the political, judicial, and ceremonial features of community life, the study of rhetoric has received very little attention from those in the social sciences.

In part, this may reflect the longstanding tendency to envision and dismiss rhetoric as a superficial, if not also despicable, linguistic device intended to dupe the more naive among us. The inference is that there would be no reason to study something so shallow on the one hand or so morally unworthy of the other. Nevertheless, even those pursuing religious and/or moralist agendas, frequently and intensively invoke rhetoric of condemnation in disparaging viewpoints and practices (including pluralist scholarship) that do not directly support their agendas as well as typically employ extended rhetorical enhancements of their own positions.

In part too, the neglect of rhetoric in the social sciences appears to reflect a broader positivist attempt to reduce human group life to sets of factors and quantitative equations. Failing to attend to the differences between humans and other subject matters as well as modeling themselves on rather limited conceptions of the

¹ The terms rhetorician (Greek) and orator (Latin) are used interchangeably to refer to those who assume roles as speakers in persuasive endeavors.

ways that the physical sciences are accomplished in practice, those adopting these viewpoints have disregarded, if not more overtly dismissed, matters of knowing, thinking, and acting as well as the broader sets of interchanges by which human community life is accomplished (see Blumer 1969; Prus 1996, 1999, 2007b,c; Puddephatt and Prus 2007; Grills and Prus 2008).

Still, even those adopting interpretivist viewpoints in the human sciences – most notably those who work with symbolic interactionist, reality constructionist, ethnomethodological, and associated approaches, also have neglected the literature on rhetoric.

In some ways, this seems particularly puzzling for this latter set of scholars not only emphasizes the centrality of language for knowing and acting but also attends more directly to the reflective, contrived, and negotiated nature of human association.

Relatedly, whereas the interactionists and some other scholars have explicitly focused on identities and reputations as highly consequential features of community life (see, for instance Mead 1934; Lemert 1951, 1967; Garfinkel 1956; Klapp 1962, 1964, 1971; Becker 1963; and Prus 1996, 1997), these works display little if any direct familiarity with rhetoric as an intellectual tradition. Indeed, the overall impression one would derive from this literature is that our contemporaries have envisioned themselves to have been among the first to conceptually address these understandings of the labeling, designating, or accounting process and the interchanges taking place therein.

I might reference my own ignorance of classical Greek and Latin scholarship as a case in point. Thus, although some of my later work (e.g., Prus 1999, 2003, 2004; Prus and Grills 2003) overtly addresses some of the classical literature that pertains to influence work and the development of identities and reputations, it was only in 1998 through examining the broader literature on power that I began to appreciate the fuller relevance of classical Greek scholarship for the social sciences.

Overtime, as well, I began to realize that the early Greek and Latin literatures had been much neglected in academia more generally. Much material from the Greek and Latin eras was lost or destroyed as the Greek and Roman empires, in turn, fell into states of disarray. Likewise, more texts were disregarded or destroyed by the early Christians. Still, scholarship was yet further decimated during the dark ages (circa 500-1000) and Western European scholars only began to reestablish some more minimal levels of competence in the 10th century.

Whereas the discovery of some of Aristotle's texts in the 13th century (represented most adequately in the works of Thomas Aquinas 1225-1275) offered the potential for Western European scholars to more fully reengage and sustain some of the major conceptual materials of the past, much of the analytic emphasis of Greek scholarship subsequently would be displaced amidst the 16th century Renaissance and the somewhat concurrent emergence of the Protestant Reformation.

As Durkheim (1904-1905) indicates at some length, the widely acclaimed 16th century Renaissance was much more consequential as an artistic, poetic, and expressive medium for revisiting the past than as a context in which the fuller array of the intellectual products of the classical Greek and Latin eras were astutely examined, screened, and gleaned for their scholarly contributions.

In addition to (a) the failure of the 16th century Renaissance authors (as Durkheim stresses) to attend to philosophy and the study of community life and (b) the Protestant disregard of philosophic matters (including Aristotle's texts) associated with Catholic theology, other 16th–20th century Western European developments also mitigated against a fuller revival of classical scholarship. More notably, this included

(c) French and German rationalism, (d) French, British, and American scientism, (e) Marxist socialism, and (f) the intrigues associated with the European contact and colonization of the “New world.” All of these emphases served to obscure, where they did not more overtly dismiss, classical Greek and Latin scholarship.

Thus, although one finds some scattered pockets of pluralist humanist / pragmatist thought from the Greek era to the present time in a variety of fields of endeavor (Prus, 2004), most of the more noteworthy instances of analysis of human knowing and acting were not sustained for extended periods of time.

Indeed, the accomplishments of the past (as Durkheim reminds us) are often taken for granted or displaced by the presentist (here and now) emphasis that characterizes community life. Thus, scholarly ventures often succumb to shifting arrays and tolerances of political and religious environments. As well, people often disregard the rigors of scholarship amidst concerns with entertainment and recreational motifs, technical innovations, and economic challenges as well as group and individual quests for prominence.

Moreover, many of those more explicitly adopting pragmatist or other interpretivist viewpoints appear to have been only vaguely aware of their intellectual roots and often had little direct fluency with the particular texts developed in the classical Greek tradition. Among the American pragmatists, for instance, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead evidence little sustained familiarity with Aristotle's texts and exhibit no direct awareness of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or other sustained analyses of rhetoric. This is particularly ironic, given the emphasis that language, communication, and situated definitions of reality assume in pragmatist scholarship.

Still, as Cicero (Cicero, *Brutus*; also see Rosenfield 1971; Vickers 1988) observes, most of the “philosophic brotherhood,” albeit often unwittingly, have accepted Socrates' (469-399BCE) and Plato's (420-348BCE) condemnations of rhetoric and sophism. As a result, most philosophers not only have distanced themselves from the study of rhetoric but (in stressing dialectic reasoning to the exclusion of overt inquiry into actual instances and associated activities) also have detached themselves from the study of “what is.”² Whereas the American pragmatists sought to reduce this latter tendency through their emphasis on studying human knowing and acting, they appear to have remained ignorant of the highly enabling classical Greek and Latin literature on rhetoric.

To place matters in a historical context, it is Plato's student Aristotle, who emerges as an extremely consequential exception to the division of philosophy and rhetoric. Not only does Aristotle reject the mind-body dualism, the idealism of forms, and the otherworld (divine, spiritual) emphasis of Socrates and Plato, but Aristotle much more directly and consistently addresses the enacted nature of human group life.³ Thus, in his work on ethics, politics, poetics, and rhetoric, Aristotle centrally focuses on activities, reflectivity, relationships and interchange as these take place in instances. Moreover, rather than presuming some pre-existing set of forms through

² Unfortunately as well, as Cicero observes, most rhetoricians have neglected the study of philosophy.

³ Still, despite Plato's other emphases, it is important to acknowledge consequential features of pragmatist thought found in Plato's texts. For some of the dialogues in which Plato addresses language, rhetoric, government, fiction, morality and regulation, and other associated features of human interchange, see *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Theaetetus*, and *Cratylus*, as well as *Republic* and *Laws*. Thus, even in condemning rhetoricians, sophists, poets, and politicians, all of whom commonly utilize rhetoric in their endeavors, Plato provides some highly instructive considerations of people's emphases and activities.

which things are known (Plato, following Socrates on this), Aristotle contends that things are known through comparative examinations of the instances, instruction, and a gradual accumulation of concepts.

In contrast to Socrates and Plato, who maintain a more fundamental divine, theological, or otherworld emphasis in developing their thoughts, Aristotle (c384-322BCE) focuses primarily on the humanly known and engaged (i.e., *sensate*) world.

Likewise, Aristotle does not share the intense disaffection with sophists and rhetoricians that one associates with Socrates and Plato (*Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*).⁴ Instead, Aristotle recognizes the *philosophic - analytical* and *practical - engaged* features of influence work and intends to examine the practice of rhetoric more specifically as an art (technique) of interchange.

As with another contemporary Isocrates (436-338 BCE), Aristotle is concerned that people use rhetoric for virtuous ends. However, both Isocrates and Aristotle also recognize that, virtuous or otherwise, people may very well use rhetoric in attempts to promote their positions over those of others. Thus, both Isocrates and Aristotle intend to focus on the ways that people generate and invoke rhetoric and its relevance for community life more generally. Still, compared to Isocrates, Aristotle emerges as the much more complete student of the human condition. Thus, *Rhetoric* constitutes only a portion of the work that Aristotle devotes to *rationality* as a reflective, humanly engaged process.

However, and much more importantly for our immediate purposes, Aristotle's consideration of rhetoric not only is informed by a more fundamental pragmatist attentiveness to the study of human knowing and acting but his analysis of rhetoric also more directly contributes to broader pragmatist informed considerations of community life, the interchanges people develop within, and their collectively generated senses of self and other.⁵

Acknowledging an [out there] in which people exist and act, Aristotle recognizes that people not only may *adopt different viewpoints* on [things] but they may also assume active roles in *shaping others' definitions* of things and, relatedly, have the potential to *affect the ways that others think about and act toward those things*.

Further, although Aristotle has a clear preference for careful, sustained dialectic reasoning and formal, logical deductions in judgments of fact over the more general practices of rhetoric, he recognizes that the persuasion process – and people's involvements therein -- cuts across a great many sectors of community life. Thus, there are many occasions in which judges would not be concerned with more

⁴ For those who are less familiar with the classical Greek literature, it might be observed that Socrates left no written text but is primarily known through his role as the central speaker in several of Plato's dialogues. Notably, too, Plato never speaks directly for himself in this text but appears sympathetic to the positions he represents through his central speaker(s). Aristotle, on the other hand speaks directly as the author of his texts. Further, whereas Plato typically leaves his considerations of all realms of human knowing in some state of suspension at the conclusions of his dialogues, Aristotle is intent in specifying all of the dimensions and contingencies of humanly experienced activities and realms of endeavor.

⁵ Particularly noteworthy in this broader sense are (a) Aristotle's depictions of scholarly practices of reasoning in *Categories*, *De Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics*; (b) his related, more generic considerations of mindedness or knowing in the human condition in *On the Soul*, *Sense and Sensibilia*, and *On Memory*; and (c) his more direct analyses of human interchange in *Eudemian Ethics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Poetics*, *Politics*, and *Rhetoric*. It is in *Sophistical Refutations* that Aristotle is most severe in his assessments of sophistry (as an appearance of wisdom without reality / facts - e.g., *SR*, 171b-172a). However, in contrast to the more extensive condemnations of rhetoric by Socrates and Plato, Aristotle's emphasis is almost entirely on the analysis of people's practices, misleading inferences, counter-strategies, and the like.

rigorous proofs (via more stringent notions of evidence, astute logical deductions, or sustained dialectic reasoning). Moreover even when specifically concerned with matters of these latter sorts, people may be diverted by the communications of others. Accordingly, the study of rhetoric assumes a broad, practical, enabling quality

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

In developing *Rhetoric*,⁶ Aristotle provides a remarkable philosophic analysis of *rationality in the making*. He presents readers with a comprehensive, highly instructive depiction of *image work* as a linguistically accomplished (and potentially contested) process.

Thus, while Aristotle discusses (1) the characters (reputations), abilities and tactical ploys of *speakers*, and (2) the contents of people's *speeches* and the ways in which speakers present their cases to judges, Aristotle even more centrally (3) focuses on the ways that speakers may appeal to (and alter) the viewpoints of the *judges* to whom messages are pitched.

Outlining an orientational frame and a set of operational tactics for embarking on influence work, Aristotle is highly attentive to the processual and problematic features of influence work.

Accordingly, Aristotle expects that speakers will not only try to *anticipate and adjust to the viewpoints of judges* on an emergent basis, but that speakers also would try to *anticipate and adjust to other speakers* (e.g., as competitors/opponents) whenever these other parties enter into the process.

The speakers involved in instances of persuasive interchange may vary greatly in backgrounds, initiative, preparations, presentations, and the like, but there is no doubt on Aristotle's part of people's capacities for deliberative, meaningful activity and adjustive interaction.

Still, if we are to appreciate Aristotle's work on rhetoric on a more consequential level, it is instructive to acknowledge his broader views of humans as biological and community-based beings. Aristotle does not deal with these matters directly in *Rhetoric*, but they denote a set of background understandings that not only further differentiate Aristotle's approach to rhetoric from that of Plato (and Socrates) and Isocrates, but also from the viewpoints of most subsequent rhetoricians to the present time.

In contrast to Socrates (via Plato) who contends that people (1) are "born knowing things" via their souls' familiarity with pre-existing forms and (2) cannot achieve genuine knowledge of the things of this world, Aristotle envisions people's knowledge of all things to be dependent on the human capacities for (a) *physiological sensation*, (b) *movement*, and (c) *memory*, along with (d) *linguistic interchange*, (e) *deliberative enterprise* and (f) *adjustive contact* with people and other objects of their awareness.

Thus, Aristotle clearly divests himself of a Socratic otherworld reality wherein the human sensate world is but a temporary or inconsequential realm.

Emphasizing the humanly known and engaged world, Aristotle rejects the body-mind dualism of Socrates and Plato. Instead, Aristotle stresses the necessity of

⁶ While building primarily on Rhys Roberts' and J.H. Freese's translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* [Barnes edition], this statement also benefits from Buckley's (1995) translation of *Rhetoric*. Interestingly, Thomas Hobbes' (1681) synopsis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was also found instructive (in comparative terms) in developing the present statement.

viewing humans as biologically-emergent, actively engaged, community-based, and linguistically-informed entities.

While placing supreme emphasis on human knowing (and acting) as a form of excellence, Aristotle also recognizes that, regardless of whether people's representations of things are accurate or otherwise, *rhetoric* (as persuasive communication) *becomes the route to a great many instances of human knowing, decision-making, and acting.*

More than a technique or procedure, thus, rhetoric is a medium or communicative process through which people share meanings of things with others in a most fundamental sense.

As well, since people may embark on influence work in any variety of settings, rhetoric is applicable to court-related proceedings, community celebrations, management practices, internal community policies and decisions, and intergroup (interstate, international) relations as well as interpersonal relations. It is because of this exceedingly broad base that the study of rhetoric is so important for comprehending community life.

Recognizing that most readers are apt not to be familiar with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the overall flow of this volume has been maintained. This should enable readers to establish more direct links with Aristotle's statement and, hopefully, encourage use of this material for their own studies of human relations. At the same time, though, readers are cautioned that, far from amplifying Aristotle's analysis, this statement only partially captures the depth, detail, and potency of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

In introducing *Rhetoric*, Aristotle (BI, I-II) states that *rhetoric represents the study of the available means of persuasion on any subject matter.* He also observes that his concern is not limited to matters of successful techniques but represents an attempt to discover the ways in which persuasion work may be engaged in the instances in which this takes place.

Largely disregarding Plato's intense condemnations of rhetoric, Aristotle notes that rhetoric (like other arts or technologies) may be used for variety of ends. Aristotle also observes that, in contrast to many realms of study (e.g., architecture, medicine) that have comparatively specific applications or parameters of operation, rhetoric (like logic) may be used in an unlimited set of contexts in the human community.

Whereas rhetoric relies primarily on linguistic communication, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* clearly attests to the *limitations of words* as persuasive elements in themselves. Thus, throughout this volume, Aristotle is highly attentive to (1) the *speaker* (interests, abilities, and images of the speaker), (2) the *speech* (contents, ordering, and presentation), and (3) the *audience* (dispositions, viewpoints, inferential tendencies, and resistances). He also is mindful of (4) the anticipatory, adjustive interchanges that oppositionary speakers may develop as they vie for the commitments of the auditors in the setting.

For Aristotle, rhetoric does *not* consist of sets of disembodied words, phrases, or even more sustained texts, but implies a distinctively comprehensive consideration of the ways that speakers might meaningfully *engage* others in order to encourage those people (individually or in groups) to embark on the lines of action desired by the speaker.

As a cautionary note to readers, it may be noted that while I have maintained the overall flow of Aristotle's text and have provided specific chapter references to particular materials, I have assumed some liberty in the headings I have used to organize this presentation.

Realms and Emphases of Persuasion

Aristotle divides rhetoric into three major primary categories (BI, III-IV), relative to their objectives. These are (1) deliberative, (2) forensic, and (3) epideictic rhetoric. *Deliberative* or political rhetoric is intended to encourage people to act or, conversely, to discourage them from acting in certain ways. Concerned with decision and commitment making process, deliberative speaking presumes a distinctively futuristic orientation.

Forensic or judicial rhetoric is used to charge others with offenses of some sort or, relatedly, to defend people from the charges of others. Whether these claims are invoked on behalf of individuals, groups, or the state, forensic speeches deal primarily with matters alleged to have happened in the past.

Referring to the praise or censure of people or things, *epideictic* or demonstrative rhetoric is notably more expressive in emphasis. It deals largely with celebrations or condemnations of some target or humanly-experienced circumstances. Demonstrative rhetoric is typically developed around some present (as in recent or current) occasion, event, or situation.

While acknowledging the time-frames characterizing each of these three oratorical themes, Aristotle also observes that rhetoricians focusing on any of these three objectives may make reference to *the past*, *the present*, and *the future* as these speakers present their positions to others.

Working across these three broader sets of rhetorical objectives, Aristotle (BI, III-VII) acknowledges a full range of persuasive arenas, varying from dyadic encounters to political practices and interchanges of all sorts. Approaching rhetoric, thusly, Aristotle provides a highly *generic* statement on the ways in which *people try to generate, shape, and resist other people's viewpoints, decisions, and activities within the human community*.

Further, while Aristotle gives greater attention to forensic oratory (given the typically greater complexities of court-related cases) than to deliberative or epideictic rhetoric, it should be appreciated that forensic cases also subsume decision-making dimensions (as definitions of activities, assessments of guilt, and assignments of penalties) and demonstrative features (as in condemnations or exonerations of the defendants).

Deliberative Rhetoric

Envisioning rhetoric as a community-based phenomenon, Aristotle (BI, IV) notes that deliberative or decision-oriented oratory focuses on the expediency or harmfulness of given lines of action.

Aristotle says the main things that people consider and contest *on a political level* revolve around (a) finances (revenues and expenditures); (b) war and peace; (c) national defense; (d) trade agreements; and (e) legislation (law, welfare, policy).

Positing that people (as purposive beings) generally are motivated by the pursuit of happiness (as a desired state of circumstances), Aristotle (BI, V-VI) outlines a series of advantages, goals, and conditions that he envisions as associated with *happiness* (both generally and more particularly).

Noting that people commonly define happiness with respect to one or more of (a) *virtue*, (b) *independence*, (c) *security*, or (d) *material advantages*, Aristotle elaborates on the constituents of these concerns, envisioning these as elements to which deliberative speakers may appeal in presenting their positions. Aristotle

proceeds to define the value of things (and actions) as they contribute to the pursuit and attainment of these objectives.

While some may take issue with various things Aristotle that associates with these aspects of happiness, his objective is one of establishing a broad set of parameters with which to *approach* deliberative oratory.

The broader implication is that those trying to influence other people's decisions would achieve greater success by *appealing to* the things that auditors consider relevant to their notions of happiness (and related objectives).

Social scientists might also appreciate that while Aristotle's depictions of happiness are attentive to both human biological essences and the variable aspects of luck or fortune, his notions of happiness are heavily interfused with social definitions, comparison points, and interchanges.

Subsequently, Aristotle (BI, VII) embarks on a consideration of greater goods or things (goals, objects, practices) thought superior to other matters.

While introducing a series of standpoints for judging some things to be more desirable than other things (as in health; as in the opposites of evil, dishonor, deprivation, or injury; as in greater accuracy of sensation; as in things that have greater uses; as in things appreciated by more people or things approved by more cultured people), Aristotle is also attentive to both the relativizing features of comparisons and the capacities of people to view and present notions of the greater good in different ways when dealing with the same objects.

Having established, thus, a platform for deliberative or political rhetoric, Aristotle (BI, VIII) proceeds to delineate four *forms of government*: (a) democracy; (b) oligarchy (small decision-making group), (c) aristocracy (elite decision-making group); and (d) monarchy (kingdoms and tyrannies).⁷

Attending to the differing basis of each form of government, Aristotle suggests that speakers, intending to appeal to those in control of particular political arenas, would address matters of (a) freedom, (b) maintenance of wealth, (c) institutions of education and law, and (d) protection of the kingdom or ruler, respectively.

As well, Aristotle urges speakers attempting to define the utility of particular lines of action to attend carefully to the prevailing practices and historical institutions of any governmental forums they address.

Epidictic Rhetoric

Aristotle (BI, IX) focuses next on epideictic or demonstrative speeches, dealing more directly with matters of praise and blame or celebration and condemnation.

After listing a series of qualities that he considers as *more virtuous* in the community overall (things such as benefiting others, sharing possessions with others, attending to justice, exhibiting courage, attending to law, being thoughtful, and possessing wisdom), Aristotle comments on the variable *nobility of motives* (e.g., acting more exclusively on behalf of others versus seeking gains for oneself) that speakers might reference in presenting their cases to others.

Stressing the importance of attending to the viewpoints of the audiences one addresses, Aristotle then delineates four tactics for *amplifying praise*. These include: (a) highlighting people's distinctions and accomplishments; (b) maximizing the challenges that these people have had to overcome; (c) minimizing the relevance of

⁷ These forms of government and their transitions are given more attention in Aristotle's *Politics*.

any good luck in their situations; and (d) giving greater dignity to people's more mundane qualities.

Censure or condemnation, Aristotle observes, is developed in obverse manners. Although Aristotle's immediate treatment of demonstrative rhetoric is highly compacted, readers will find that Aristotle's analysis of forensic oratory also provides much material pertinent to the development of demonstrative as well as deliberative rhetoric.

Forensic Rhetoric

Given the comparatively extended and sophisticated legal system in effect at Athens,⁸ the rest of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* primarily deals with judicial or forensic rhetoric.

Focusing on matters of accusation and defense, Aristotle's consideration of forensic rhetoric is conceptually dense, sophisticated, and highly instructive. Thus, even as he frames the analysis at a more preliminary level, Aristotle provides readers with compelling insights into (1) wrongdoing, (2) justice, and (3) judicial contingencies.

On Wrongdoing

Whereas Plato (following Socrates; see *Laws* V, 731c; *Meno* 77c-78b; *Timaeus* 86e) denies that people truly intend to commit offenses against others or the state, Aristotle (BI, X-XI) adopts an entirely different stance.

While acknowledging people's inadvertent and unwitting *involvements in some instances of wrongdoing*, Aristotle approaches people's involvements in wrongdoing or deviance in ways that *directly parallel* his views on the ways that people engage in other [nondeviant] activities -- *as meaningful, deliberative, goal-oriented pursuits*.

In what clearly anticipates the position developed by twentieth century pragmatists (e.g., Mead 1934) and interactionists (Becker 1963; Blumer 1969), Aristotle does not require separate theories for the deviants and nondeviants, but rather presents one theory that enables scholars to examine all instances of meaningfully developed human behavior.

Attending to both written legislation *and* unwritten laws (or generalized understandings) in forensic arenas, Aristotle not only outlines (a) people's *motives for wrongdoing*, and (b) the various *states of mind* that people might adopt in pursuing these activities, but he also considers (c) those who are *targets* of these endeavors and the ways in which targets (e.g., as victims, precipitators) enter into the activities in question.

Addressing human action in judicial settings, Aristotle (BI, X) briefly delineates seven bases or causes of human behavior, including chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, and appetite (pursuit of pleasure).

⁸ Although we have no preserved legal codes from the classic Greek era, it is quite apparent (e.g., see Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, as well as Aristotle's writings on politics, ethics, rhetoric, and the Athenian constitution) that the early Greeks were highly attentive to various civil, state, political, religious, and legal technicalities. Also see Harris (1994 - in Worthington) on Greek law and oratory.

Aristotle does not sort these motivational themes out in much detail but instead focuses on the *voluntary, deliberative* activities associated with the *pursuit of pleasure* or other desired experiential states.

Then, using pleasure as a centralizing concept with which to comprehend the known, meaningful features of action, Aristotle (BI, X-XI) proceeds to illustrate how all of the voluntary aspects of the preceding set of causes involve the pursuit of pleasure (notions of happiness and the avoidance of discomfort).

Aristotle is attentive to people's capacities to experience bodily sensations, but it is inaccurate to envision Aristotle as a physiological hedonist or psychological reductionist. Pleasure and pain, thus, are defined in terms of people's *desired end-states*.

These could include people's quests for more direct physical sensations, but also would encompass the values people place on the development of the intellect, moral pursuits, or concerns about the well-being of others, for instance.

Beyond speakers ascertaining and pitching to audiences in terms of *things that these particular auditors value*, Aristotle deems it important that speakers *understand* the motivational and engaged features of *human agency*.

In addition to establishing in the relevance of *memory* (recollection) and *hope* (anticipation) for people's conceptions and pursuits of pleasures (and pains), Aristotle also discusses the *role of others* in these endeavors.

Hence, people's notions of and quests for, pleasure involve their participation with others in such things as friendships, persuasive endeavors, and instances of rivalry, amusement, learning, admiration, and beneficiary roles, as well as attending to others as reference or comparison points.

Having established an operational base, thus, Aristotle (BI, XII) asks when people are apt to engage in wrongdoing.

Assuming that people desire certain objectives and envision ways of achieving these ends, Aristotle states that people are more likely to actively assume agent or *perpetrator roles* when they (a) think they can accomplish the acts in question; and (b) will escape detection, or (c) if detected, would avoid punishment, or (d) if they expect to experience punishment, anticipate that the gains would offset the losses.

Among those whom Aristotle identifies as inclined to *assume higher levels of impunity* in reference to their own acts are people who (a) are more talented in circumventing culpability more generally; (b) envision themselves to have more friends and supporters; (c) anticipate greater influence with injured parties or judges; and (d) seem like inappropriate (unfitting) candidates for the activities in question by others by virtue of their personal qualities or situations.

As well, Aristotle also envisions people as more likely to presume immunity from penalty when they (e) have convenient ways of concealing activities or easy ways of disposing of things; (f) have the means of influencing judges or otherwise averting penalties; (g) feel they have nothing to lose; and (h) perceive the gains to be close at hand or greater, while losses seem distant or less consequential. As well, Aristotle notes, those who (i) think that certain activities would generate prestige among certain of their associates also seem likely to act with a greater sense of impunity.

After discussing both (1) the attractions that people may develop for various wrongdoings and (2) people's tendencies to assume roles as perpetrators, Aristotle (BI, XII) proceeds to (3) a consideration of *the targets* of these activities.

Acknowledging a wide range of targets, from friends (as easy, more trusting) and enemies (as more enjoyable), to those who are nearby (offering more immediate advantage) or distant (less prepared to resist), Aristotle observes that some people may be easier targets as a consequence of their tendencies to avoid pursuing

offenders. This includes those who: do not want to be bothered with such matters; wish to maintain current levels of dignity; have been harmed many times before; are held in disgrace; are visitors to, or temporary residents in, an area; and, themselves, are guilty of similar or related offenses.

Aristotle also notes that people may define others as more viable targets for negative behaviors when they: anticipate undesirable treatment from those targets; expect that they can compensate targets for their losses; or envision others as acting negatively toward those targets.

On Justice

Aristotle (BI, XIII) provides still more insight in the deviance-making process through his considerations of *written law*, *natural* (or transcendent) *law*, and *equity*.⁹

Continuing his elaboration of just and unjust actions (and judicial cases more specifically), Aristotle (BI, XIII) distinguishes (1) the particular laws developed by communities of people from (2) a universal (presumably divinely-inspired or naturally emergent) law that is taken to transcend particular or local notions of justice, and (3) the specific conceptions of equity (and inequity) that speakers or others may invoke.

Even though the prosecutions he discusses were based primarily on (a) written laws, he observes that speakers may invoke notions of (b) natural law and (c) equity (introduce "fairness" as a reference point) along with (d) other aspects of written law in pursuing and contesting the cases at hand.

Next, Aristotle (1) delineates injustices perpetrated against communities from those conducted against individuals, (2) qualifies people's activities in reference to degrees of intentionality; and (3) observes that perpetrators commonly define their acts in terms that are at variance from the definitions promoted by complainants.

Aristotle subsequently addresses *equity* as a concept of justice that speakers may use to challenge the formalities or technicalities of written law. When emphasizing equality or fairness, speakers endeavor to shift emphasis from (a) the legalistic concerns with the letter of the law and (b) the particular activities in question, to considerations of (c) the intent of the law, (d) the motivational principles of the agent, and (e) the willingness of the involved parties to pursue equitable arrangements through arbitration.

The next issue Aristotle (BI, XIV) addresses with respect to justice is the degree of *indignation*, blame or condemnation that audiences associate with people's instances of wrongdoing.

Among the acts apt to thought *more blameworthy* are those that (a) violate basic principles of the community; (b) are defined more harmful, especially if more flagrant and offer no means of restoration; (c) result in further (subsequent) injury or loss to victims; (d) are the first of their kind; (e) are more brutal; (f) reflect greater intent to harm others; (g) are shameful in other ways; and (h) are in violation of written laws. Thus, Aristotle lists a series of contingencies that he thinks are likely to result in someone's activities being seen as more *reprehensible* by judges.¹⁰

⁹ Aristotle also discusses justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* (especially Book V).

¹⁰ Readers familiar with Harold Garfinkel's (1956) statement on "degradation ceremonies" may be struck by the conceptual similarities of Garfinkel's analysis with the much more elaborate treatment provided by Aristotle.

On Judicial Contingencies

Aristotle (BI, XV) also addresses a set of *inartificial proofs* or matters of argumentation that are peculiar to *judicial oratory*. These revolve around (a) formalized laws, (b) witnesses, (c) contracts, (d) torture, and (e) oaths.

Returning to his earlier distinctions between written law, universal law, and equity, Aristotle indicates how speakers whose cases are at variance with the *written law* may appeal to notions of universal law and equity, while those whose cases are supported by written law may insist on the primacy of moral integrity and wisdom of the written law.

When dealing with *witnesses*, Aristotle acknowledges the wide variety of sources (including ancient poets and notable figures; contemporary characters, and proverbs) that speakers may use to provide testimonies for or against cases.

While noting that resourceful speakers have an endless set of witnesses on which to draw, Aristotle is also attentive to those witnesses who claim to have direct knowledge of the specific events at hand.

Relatedly, where speakers can provide direct witnesses to events, they may strive to enhance witness credibility, whereas speakers who do not have such witnesses would normally try to discredit the former and argue for the importance of the judge's independent wisdom. Aristotle urges speakers to adopt somewhat parallel enhancing and denigrating tactics when dealing with *contracts* involving courtroom adversaries, evidence gained through *torture*, and the use and avoidance of *oaths*.

Pursuing Favorable Decisions

Envisioning the preceding elements as more unique to forensic rhetoric, Aristotle (BII, I) turns to what he describes as the *art of rhetoric*. While not disregarding the context or the apparent matters of issue in particular instances, the focus is on presenting cases (on one side or the other) in strategically more effective manners.

Here, Aristotle focuses on the matters of developing emotional appeals, constructing cases, and presenting materials to judges. The emphasis, as well, shifts more directly to the task of *securing favorable decisions* in deliberative occasions and judicial cases.

Thus, before focusing on the more overtly enacted features of rhetoric, Aristotle addresses (1) the foundations of credibility, (2) people's experiences with an assortment of emotions pertinent to influence work; and (3) the development of generalized viewpoints.

While Aristotle is particularly mindful of the relevance of these matters for success in oratorical ventures, his analyses of trust, emotionality, and generalized standpoints provide particularly valuable reference materials for contemporary social scientists.

Maximizing Credibility

Succinctly outlining a theory of trust or credibility, Aristotle (BII, I) posits that audiences are likely to place greater faith or confidence in those speakers (as characters) who are thought to (1) display good sense in judgment, (2) possess

excellence of capacity (competence, honor), and (3) act in ways consistent with the audience's (advantageous) viewpoint in mind.¹¹ The implication is that those who achieve credibility on the part of others will be heavily advantaged in their subsequent communications with others.

Focusing on Emotionality

Recognizing people's general tendencies to define and act toward situations in terms of their *emotional states* (e.g., anger, indignation, pity, pride, fear), Aristotle (BII, II-XI) explicitly addresses a series of emotions to which speakers may attend in their attempts to deal more affectively with the audiences at hand.

Those who examine this material will find in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the foundations of a *theory of emotions*.¹² Defining emotions or passions as feelings or dispositions pertaining to pleasure (and pain) that have a capacity to affect people's judgments, Aristotle intends to establish the relevancy of people's emotions for influence work.

Thus, as a prelude to speakers doing "emotion work" within the context of persuasive communication, wherein one knowingly and deliberately attempts to intensify or minimize certain emotional viewpoints, Aristotle discusses people's experiences with various emotions in a more generic sense.

In what follows, Aristotle deals with (1) anger and calm, (2) feelings of friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, (7) envy, and emulation.¹³

In addition to providing (a) instructive definitions of these emotional states, Aristotle considers (b) the foundations of these emotional states, (c) the ways that these emotions are experienced (by whom, in what ways, and with what behavioral consequences), and (d) how speakers may enter into and shape the emotional sensations, viewpoints, and actions of others.¹⁴

¹¹ Prus' (1989a: 102-130) ethnographic examination of attempts on the parts of vendors to generate trust on the parts of customers provides a more recent, empirical testimony to the viability of Aristotle's analysis of trust.

¹² Although Aristotle's material on emotions in *Rhetoric* is predated by his earlier consideration of emotions in *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Poetics*, Aristotle also appears to have benefited extensively from Plato's work on emotions (e.g., *Laches* on courage, *Philebus* on pleasure, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Lysis* on love) as well as from many other emotive themes expressed throughout Plato's dialogues). Notably, too, although not intended as such, Aristotle's materials on emotion in *Rhetoric* also may be seen as providing supplementary material for a theory of interpersonal relations as well as some additional foundational concepts for better understanding character as an ongoing process of self and other definition beyond that which Aristotle provides in *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Prus, 2007a).

¹³ Aristotle does not address the complete range of emotions that people may experience. Thus, notions of (a) euphoria and depression, (b) fascination and distancing and (c) excitement (as in entertainment) and boredom are notably absent. Still, given his more central oratorical emphasis, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is remarkably comprehensive and enabling.

¹⁴ Focusing on the generation of pathos or emotional experiences on the part of audiences within the context of fictionalized tragedy (the analysis of comedy and humor has been lost), Aristotle's *Poetics* adds further insight into the socially constructed features of emotionality. Aristotle also gives attention to emotionality and people's styles of relating to others in *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Anger and Calm

Aristotle (BII, II) defines anger as a focused desire for revenge that reflects an unwarranted slight or injustice directed toward oneself or one's friends by some other.¹⁵

Aristotle distinguishes three types of slights or senses of mistreatment associated with anger: (1) instances of contempt, in which others (as agents) are seen to disparage things that targets deem important; (2) spite, wherein others obstruct target from achieving their objectives, not as rivals for the same objects but more singularly to prevent targets from achieving those ends; and (3) insolence, wherein others denigrate targets through word or deed, with the apparent intention of achieving agent superiority through the ill treatment of the target.

Relatedly, Aristotle contends, people (as targets) are more apt to *become angered with others* (as agents) when they see these others as: (a) preventing targets (directly or indirectly) from obtaining things targets are eager to have; (b) promoting effects contrary to those that targets desire; (c) ridiculing, despising or denigrating targets, including their interests and talents, in some way; or (d) depreciating people for whom targets have affection.

Likewise, while denigrations seem more distasteful when they are (e) produced by those to whom targets view as inferiors (vs. equals or superiors), Aristotle also notes that slights also are more hurtful when they arise from (f) people that targets had envisioned as friends or (g) people whom targets have treated well in the past.

As well, Aristotle observes that people (as targets) are apt to direct anger toward people who (h) delight in, or fail to sympathize with, target misfortunes; (i) present bad news to targets; and (j) readily listen to and talk about target failures with others.

Aristotle is also attentive to people's tendencies to become variably incensed with others (agents), *depending on those who witness* particular agent slights. Thus, perceived mistreatment tends to generate heightened anger on the part of targets when it takes place in front of (a) targets' rivals, (b) people whom targets admire, (c) those from whom targets desire admiration, (d) those whom targets respect, and (e) those from whom targets desire respect.

People (agents) may *also encourage anger* on the part of others (targets) when: (a) targets feel obliged to defend others (third parties) whom agents have slighted; (b) agents fail to settle debts with targets or do not return favors; (c) agents ridicule target interests or otherwise fail to respect concerns with target sincerity; (d) agents fail to treat targets as favorably as agents treat comparable others; and (e) agents forget or otherwise disregard particular things that targets consider important.

Aristotle explicitly *reminds speakers* that these are the themes they may use to bring their auditors into appropriate frames of mind; to generate anger in the minds of their audiences and to direct this anger toward their opponents so as to encourage auditor decisions that are more favorable to speaker objectives.

Still, Aristotle's treatment of anger is not complete. Thus, Aristotle (BII, III) enters into a related consideration of *calm* or placitude; how this emotion is experienced by people, and how speakers may calm, pacify, or reconcile themselves with audiences who may otherwise be disposed to anger (via the circumstances, the

¹⁵ For some contemporary ethnographic considerations of anger and its relationship to violent activity, see Keiser (1969), Athens (1974, 1977, 1980, 1997), Prus, (1978), and Wolf (1991). Aristotle's conceptual scope and precision adds notably to these present day analyses.

case at hand, or the negativizing effects of the opposing speaker) with respect to speakers or their positions.

Addressing the conditions under which people become calm, Aristotle observes that *anger is apt to be minimized* when people (as targets): (a) view incidents involving agents as involuntary, unintended or beyond their control; (b) realize that agents treat them the same the way they treat themselves; (c) encounter agents who admit their faults and sincerely express regret for target injuries; (d) face agents who are humble and accept roles as inferiors to targets in the matters at hand; (e) share target senses of seriousness on matters of importance to targets; (f) exhibit greater kindness toward targets than vice-versa; and (g) generally do not direct slights toward others.

Aristotle also contends that people are less likely to become angry with (h) those whom they fear (as concerns with fear are more paramount) and are less likely to remain angry with (i) those who are thought to have engaged in undesired acts while in states of anger (having acted passionately rather than deliberately).

As well, Aristotle notes that people are less likely to be disposed to anger when (j) they (targets) are better spirits (as in the midst of enjoying amusements, celebrations, or other pleasurable states); (k) some time has passed since the slight occurred; (l) targets recently have extracted some vengeance or exercised their anger on another source; (m) perpetrators (agents) have suffered other noteworthy setbacks; and (n) offended persons have had opportunities to inflict preliminary (even if much less) punishments on perpetrators.

Finally, Aristotle notes that people's anger is apt to dissipate when (o) those with whom they are angry are thought unable to acknowledge target anger (as with those who are absent, incapable of comprehending the events at hand, or deceased).

Friendship and Enmity

Engaging the topics of friendship and enmity as affective states of mind,¹⁶ Aristotle (BII, IV) explicitly defines a *friendly feeling* toward another as both (a) wishing for good things for another and (b) attempting to bring these things about for the other.

Aristotle posits that people (herein targets) *feel affection for those* (agents): (a) who have treated targets well (also those people and other things that targets value); (b) whom targets anticipate will treat them (targets) well in the future; and (c) who devalue target enemies and other sources of target disaffection.

Relatedly, people (as targets) tend to value those (agents) who: (d) are generous toward targets, (e) are courageous in defending targets, (f) more independently look after their own affairs, (g) are fair-minded, and (h) tend not to pry into target affairs.

Similarly, people tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who (i) have pleasant dispositions and a sense of humor, and (j) assume an understanding, accepting orientations toward targets.

Among those more appreciated, as well, are people who (k) praise target qualities, (l) minimize target-directed criticisms, (m) do not maintain grievances

¹⁶ Aristotle gives considerably more attention to friendship as a humanly engaged essence in *Nicomachean Ethics* (Books VIII-IX). Still, the material presented here notably supplements, in behavioral terms, Aristotle's discussion of friendship in *Nicomachean Ethics*.

against targets, and (n) do not oppose targets when targets are angered or otherwise are sincere in their efforts.

Aristotle also pointedly notes that affections more readily develop among people who (o) share various affinities or common circumstances, interests, and activities, provided that these matters do not put them in oppositionary (as in competitive) terms.

Aristotle further observes that people (targets) develop friendly feelings toward those: (p) in front of whom targets still feel accepted should targets make mistakes; (q) who willingly cooperate in pursuing target objectives; (r) who act as friendly toward targets in target absences as in target presence; (s) who are supportive of targets' friends; and (t) who are open with targets, sharing agents' own weaknesses and failings with targets.

After noting that it is difficult for people to experience friendly feelings in the midst of fear and other discomforts, Aristotle concludes that friendship is apt to be generated when (u) people do things intended to benefit the other; especially when they do so willingly, without being asked, and without expectation of compensation.

Aristotle's (BII, IV) treatment of *enmity* or hatred is much less developed than his analysis of friendship. While observing that enmity may arise from instances of anger, Aristotle also notes that people may hate others more arbitrarily and diffusely for what they take to be other people's characters, activities, or group (or category) affiliations.

In contrast to angered states, which can be more readily neutralized, Aristotle sees hatred as much more totalizing, enduring, and intense than anger. Instead of seeking revenge, thus, the emphasis in enmity, more completely, is on the destruction of the other.

Fear and Confidence

Aristotle (BII, V) defines *fear* as the discomfiture or anxiety associated with some impending injury or loss. Fear, thus, is an anticipatory state, one that is intensified by concerns with more potent and immediate destructive forces (sources).

Among those that people (as prospective targets) are *apt to fear* (assuming agent *capacities* to do harm), Aristotle identifies those (agents) who: (a) are angry or appear to hate targets; (b) are seen as unjust in their dealings with others; (c) earlier had been insulted by targets; (d) believe themselves to have been harmed by targets; (e) are rivals; (f) invoke fear among those whom targets consider superior to themselves; (g) have injured people thought advantaged over targets; (h) have begun attacking those who are weaker than targets (thereby developing greater agent ambitions and resources); and (i) appear quiet, but are thought to be unscrupulous.

Aristotle also contends that people are more apt to be fearful of others more generally, when (j) they (as prospective targets) have made mistakes that they are not able to undo (leaving themselves vulnerable to others). Aristotle notes, too, that people are apt to experience fear (k) around the things that invoke their pity when they witness others in those situations.

Observing that people's fears are apt to intensify when (l) they believe that something specific is likely to befall them (through particular agents, in particular ways, and at particular times), Aristotle emphasizes the importance of *speakers* who wish to invoke fear on the part of their audiences making dangers appear as direct and imminent to these audiences as they are able.

Defining *confidence* as the opposite of fear, wherein people anticipate that they are safe or far removed from destructive elements, Aristotle (BII, V) subsequently endeavors to specify the conditions under which people are apt to feel invulnerable.

Among the *circumstances inspiring confidence* are (a) the apparent remoteness of dangerous matters; (b) the greater proximity of elements of safety; (c) people's abilities to absorb or avert losses; (d) people's inexperience with difficult times; (e) an apparent lack of rivals or enemies; (f) the powerless states of any (agents) who may be disaffected with them (targets); and (g) the possession of powerful and helpful friends.

People also seem apt to experience greater confidence when they (h) have been successful in their undertakings or (i) have encountered risk but escaped suffering.

People appear more assured, too, when they (j) observe that the circumstances in which they find themselves do not cause any particular concerns among their associates who are in similar circumstances to themselves.

People's senses of confidence also seem enhanced when they (k) believe that they are advantaged over any rivals (as in wealth, friends, territory, preparations, and the like); (l) are angry with others; (m) are in positions to attack first; or (n) fully expect to succeed in the end.

Shame and Shamelessness

Aristotle (BII, VI) defines shame as a feeling of pain or discomfort associated with things in the *present, past, or future* that are likely to discredit or result in a loss of one's character.¹⁷

By contrast, shamelessness or impudence is envisioned as a disregard, contempt, or indifference to matters of disrepute. Shame, according to Aristotle, revolves around things envisioned as disgraceful to oneself or to those for whom one has regard.

Among the kinds of things around which people more *commonly experience shame*, Aristotle references: (a) cowardice; (b) treating others unfairly in financial matters; (c) exhibiting excessive frugality; (d) victimizing those who are helpless; (e) taking advantage of the kindness of others; (f) begging; (g) grieving excessively over losses; (h) avoiding responsibility; (i) exhibiting vanity; (j) engaging in sexually licentious behaviors; and (k) avoiding participation in things expected of, or lacking possessions generally associated with, equals.

Further, while noting centrally that shame is *apt to be intensified* in all discreditable matters when (a) these things are deemed voluntary and, thus, *one's fault*, Aristotle also observes that (b) people also may feel shame about dishonorable things that have been done, are presently being done, or seem likely to be *done to them by others*.

Acknowledging the anticipatory or imaginative *reactions of others*, as well as actual instances of experiencing disgrace, Aristotle subsequently *identifies the witnesses* or others in front of whom people (as targets) are apt to experience greater shame.

¹⁷ Those familiar with Goffman's (1963) *Stigma* will find a great many themes in Goffman's statement that parallel Aristotle's analysis of shame.

Most centrally, these witnesses include people whom targets hold in higher esteem (respect, honor) and admire (friendship, love) as well as those from whom they (targets) desire respect and affective regard.

People (as targets) also are likely to experience heightened senses of shame when they are disgraced in front of those who have control of things that targets desire to obtain, those whom targets view as rivals, and those whom targets view as honorable and wise.

Observing that targets are particularly susceptible to shame when dishonorable things occur in more public arenas, Aristotle also posits that people (as targets) are likely to feel greater shame when the witnesses include people who: are more innocent of things of this sort; adopt more intolerant viewpoints; and generally delight in revealing the faults of others.

Another set of witnesses or audiences in front of whom people (as targets) are more likely to experience disgrace include: those before whom [targets] have experienced success or been highly regarded; those who have not requested things of [targets]; those who recently have sought [target] friendship; and those likely to inform other people of [target] shame-related matters.

As well, Aristotle states that people (as targets) also are apt to experience shame through things associated with the activities or misfortunes of their relatives and other people with whom targets have *close connections* (i.e., experience an extension of the stigma attached to their associates).

Shame also seems intensified when people anticipate that they will remain in the presence of those who know of their losses of character. Conversely, Aristotle suggests that people are less apt to experience embarrassment among those who are thought inattentive or insensitive to such matters.

Relatedly, while Aristotle notes that people may feel comfortable with certain [otherwise questionable circumstances or practices] in front of intimates versus strangers, he also states that people (as targets) are apt to experience intensified shame among intimates with respect to things that are regarded as particularly disgraceful in those settings.

However, among those that they encounter as strangers, discredited people tend to be concerned only about more immediate matters of convention.

Aristotle ends his analysis of shame with the observation that shamelessness or the corresponding insensitivity to stigma will be known through its opposite.

Kindness and Inconsideration

Aristotle (BII, VII) next deals with *kindness* or benevolence and, by contrast, a disregard for the other. Aristotle defines kindness as benefits that one person confers on another, without anticipation of any compensation, but with the intention of helping the other.

Although observing that acts of kindness are more apt to be appreciated by those in more desperate conditions, Aristotle also posits that people's generosity become more noteworthy when the benefactors (a) do things more exclusively on their own, (b) are the first to offer assistance, or (c) provide the greatest amount of help.

Conversely, Aristotle observes, speakers attempting to discredit particular benefactors may encourage auditors to view these people as *inconsiderate* of others by alleging that the benefactors: (a) acted primarily for their own advantage; (b)

helped others inadvertently (versus intentionally); or (c) felt obligated to act in these manners for other reasons.

Likewise, kindness may be discredited when (d) benefactors' assistance is defined as comparatively insignificant within their overall capacities to help others.

Pity and Indignation

In addressing *pity* or the sense of sorrow that people feel on behalf of others, Aristotle (BII, VIII) provides another highly instructive analysis of emotionality. Aristotle defines pity as the feeling of pain associated with the actual or impending injury or loss experienced by someone who is thought not to deserve conditions of this sort.

Because pity assumes that people can anticipate or experience the viewpoint of the other, Aristotle contends that this feeling is premised on the recognition that a similar, unfortunate fate could befall oneself or one's close associates. Somewhat relatedly, Aristotle claims that pity is unlikely to be felt by people who are completely ruined (have nothing left to lose), as well as by people who view themselves as highly privileged (and invulnerable).

Instead, he posits that pity is more *likely to be experienced* by those who: (a) have encountered and survived related difficulties; (b) are older and wiser (recognizing human frailties); (c) are weaker and inclined to cowardice; (d) are better educated and can anticipate fuller consequences; and (e) have stronger family ties and can imagine misfortunes befalling their loved ones.

Conversely, Aristotle envisions pity as *less likely* from those: (a) experiencing anger or confidence; (b) who care little about others; or (e) who think people generally are of little worth or basically deserve misfortune.

Aristotle also states that (d) people in heightened states of fear or horror have little capacity for feeling pity because they are so preoccupied with their own precarious circumstances. Likewise, when people's close associates are in great danger and people experience intense fears for them, people are unlikely to feel compassion for third parties who are further removed from themselves.

Among *the things* that more compellingly *encourage pity* on the part of others Aristotle not only references things that are (a) directly destructive (as in death, injury, disease) but also cites (b) debilitating chance events and (c) undeserved circumstances.

The latter two elements include things such as friendlessness, the loss of close friends, deformity, evil treatment from those who should treat those people better, the repeated occurrence of misfortune, and help arriving too late to offset a great loss.

While stating that people often feel pity for others with respect to (d) matters for which they themselves have fears (albeit not of an highly imminent or intense sort), Aristotle also observes that people feel sorrow for others when: (e) the unfortunates are more like themselves in character, age, or other circumstances; (f) the sympathizers could more readily experience the particular sorts of misfortunes that have happened to others; and (g) the unfortunate people are closer to themselves (as in time, location).

Focusing attention more directly on speakers, Aristotle states that those who wish to invoke pity on behalf of their audiences should strive to present their materials in more vivid and dramatic fashions (through their gestures, tones, and appearances) so that their audiences might achieve greater, more immediate senses of pity-related emotion.

Aristotle (BII, IX) then addresses *indignation* or resentment, an emotional state that he defines in oppositionary terms to pity; namely, the pain of witnessing unwarranted good fortune on the part of others. Aristotle differentiates indignation or resentment from envy (discussed later), reserving the term envy to refer more precisely to unmerited good fortune that befalls others who are (or were) more equal to ourselves.

People's experiences of indignation revolve rather centrally around their definitions of justice and *injustice*. Accordingly, people may rejoice at the misfortunes of those whom they see as less deserving, just as they may experience resentment at the good fortune of the undeserving.

Observing that indignation is less apt to be felt when people of greater abilities or longer standing advantages are the ones who do well, Aristotle states that those who are more recent recipients of unwarranted advantages are apt to be viewed with heightened resentment, especially should these same people gain further from these undeserved advantages.

In addition to the newly wealthy, Aristotle notes that indignation is often felt toward those who benefit undeservedly from office, friends, or family connections, particularly when they overtly display the effects of these advantages.

Among those who are most *inclined to become indignant* at the unwarranted good fortune of others, Aristotle identifies those who: (a) deserve and have acquired similar advantages; (b) insist on justice as a matter of practice; (c) desire the things that these others now possess; and (d) consider themselves deserving of the sorts of things these others now have.

By using these themes to invoke resentment on the part of auditors, Aristotle contends that speakers may render ineffective or redirect their opponents' pleas for pity.

Envy and Emulation

Aristotle (BII, X) envisions *envy* as a painful feeling or resentment associated with the good fortune of one's equals. By equals, Aristotle means those who are comparable to oneself in ways deemed consequential (as in position, age, character, activities) by the person feeling envy.

Among those particularly *inclined to be envious*, Aristotle references (a) those who already have experienced considerable success, but have not attained all relevant successes in some area; and (b) those who are ambitious in the more specific respect (including wisdom, fame, finances or other advantages) in which comparisons are made. Aristotle also observes that, for some people, (c) virtually anything thought desirable in some way may become a focus of their envy.

After stating that people *commonly envy* (c) those who are closer to themselves in circumstances, time, and location (notably family members, neighbors, associates, rivals), Aristotle also suggests that people may be envious of equals who, when compared to themselves, succeed with (d) less difficulty, (e) in shorter periods of time, or (f) with less expense or other sacrifices. On some occasions, too, people may be envious of (g) those who possess or acquire things they, themselves, once had.

Recognizing that people do not pity those whom they envy, Aristotle indicates that speakers who are able to generate and direct auditor envy (as with indignation) toward speakers' opponents will neutralize auditor sympathy for their opponents.

Next, Aristotle (BII, XI) turns to *emulation*. For Aristotle, emulation is characterized not by any resentment or envy of things that others have but by a longing for these things to *also belong to oneself*.

In contrast to envy, Aristotle describes emulation as a generally virtuous emotion. In emulation, one strives to be more like those who possess admirable things (typically things thought to be within one's eventual reach). Extending these notions still further, Aristotle also notes that those who emulate or wish to be like certain people in the things these people possess also are apt to be *contemptuous* of third parties who fail to exhibit, pursue or respect desirable qualities of these sorts.

Although this concludes the most directly focused of Aristotle's analyses of emotions, his consideration of emotionality is far from exhausted. Indeed, the preceding material (and the subsequent depiction of variations of people's generalized emotional viewpoints) represents only a partial account of Aristotle's statement on emotion work within *Rhetoric*.

Acknowledging Generalized Viewpoints

Noting that people may view situations differently depending on their situations and experiences, Aristotle (XII-XVII) next considers some consequential variations in people's *orientational frameworks* relative to their ages (youth, mid-life, elderly), circumstances, and fortune. Although Aristotle's discussion seems directed to those (predominantly male) involved in the oratorical arenas of his day,¹⁸ readers may appreciate the applicability of much of Aristotle's observations to people more generally.

In discussing *the young*, thus, Aristotle (BII, XII) observes that they are particularly prone to desire, sensate experiences, and diversity of change. Observing that they also tend to be earnest and insistent, but easily become indignant and offended, Aristotle characterizes the young as impulsive, arrogant, and reckless.

Noting that young people generally have not experienced extended want or depravity, Aristotle further describes them as optimistic, inattentive to financial matters, and desirous of superiority.

Acknowledging their limited life-experiences, Aristotle also envisions the young as poor judges of circumstances, character, and concepts, as well as being presumptive about knowing all things.

Likewise, observing that they have not been more fully humbled, he contends that the young are excessively hopeful, brave, idealistic, and persistent in their desires. They also are fond of diversion, entertainment, and playful associations, vastly preferring these to more serious matters.

When considering the emotions and practices of *the elderly*, Aristotle (BII, XIII) finds many points of divergence with the dispositions of the young. Aristotle describes people who are past their prime and in their waning years as lacking in confidence and approaching things in notably skeptical, cautious, indecisive manners.

Relatedly, he characterizes the elderly as fearful and timid, as frugal (knowing both the difficulty of acquiring property and the ease with which things may be lost), and as placing much greater emphasis on expediency than ideals.

¹⁸ It might be acknowledged that those involved in judicial, deliberative and epideictic rhetoric, as targets (defendants), claimants, speakers (and speech writers), instructors and authors, and judges were predominately male.

Aristotle also notes that where the youth very much live for the future, the elderly live through the past. The elderly, thus, dwell in memories, recollections, and reminiscences of their former lives. They resist pretensions and myth, and are skeptical of the optimistic emphases or claims of others. They also become highly concerned about maintaining what they have (as in health and finances).

Likewise, while the elderly may be quick to anger, they seldom sustain this viewpoint or pursue situations more intensively. They also lose interest in the more immediate, sensate features of human experience.

The elderly, too, commonly experience pity. However, in contrast to the young who may pity others without comprehending people's situations more fully, the elderly more readily anticipate, and identify personally with, wide ranges of calamity.

Still focusing on age-related passions and activities, Aristotle (BII, XIV) next addresses people in their *prime*. Viewing people as achieving their physical primes around thirty to thirty-five and their optimal mental capacities around fifty years of age, Aristotle suggests that it is the mid-lifers who are most likely to display the most balanced viewpoints.

Thus, Aristotle sees those in their prime as much more moderate than the young or the elderly with respect to fear and confidence, optimism and cynicism, honor and expediency, frugality and extravagance, anger and desire.

While encouraging speakers to attend to the emotional viewpoints of their auditors in ways that are mindful of characteristic age differentiations, Aristotle (BII, XV-XVII) subsequently, but more briefly, deals with variations in emotional emphases commonly associated with people's (a) advantages of birth, (b) accumulations of wealth, (c) positions of power, and (d) encounters with good fortune.

Further preparing speakers for the audiences they may encounter, Aristotle describes those of *noble birth* as not only inclined to be ambitious but also contemptuous of others who do not share comparable heritages.

Aristotle characterizes the *wealthy* as insolent and arrogant, assuming that all things can be had at a price and insisting that all honors are due them as a consequence of their wealth. Aristotle further observes that the newly rich are more disposed to arrogance and display than are those whose fortunes have more traditional roots.

Aristotle claims that those in *positions of power* are much like the rich in overall disposition but that the powerful tend to be more courageous and are less inclined to focus on petty matters.

Those encountering *good fortune* also are seen (like the wealthy) to be presumptive and inconsiderate in their dealings with others, but Aristotle suggests that these people maintain a particular (although not readily apparent) sensitivity or vulnerability to the gods or other sources of their good fortune.

Aristotle then ends this discussion of people's advantaged circumstances by stating that somewhat opposite emotions would be expected of people disadvantaged in these same regards.

Enacted Features of Influence Work

After this instructive analysis of emotionality, Aristotle (BII, XVIII) focuses more directly on the enacted or engaged features of persuasive activity. Briefly commenting on deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle addresses the more general construction of speeches:

The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions...This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do something, as when we advise a man about his conduct or try to change his views: the single person is as much your judge as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that anyone is your judge whom you have to persuade. Nor does it matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition; in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow the opposing arguments, and we attack these as we should attack an actual opponent...

We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. All orators are bound to use the topic of the possible and impossible; and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in the future. Again, the topic of size is common to all oratory; all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making deliberative speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in the law-courts. (Aristotle [Barnes]: BII, XVIII)

Attending to the more overtly engaged aspects of rhetoric, Aristotle subsequently deals with (1) *generating and refuting proofs*; (2) *amplifying and diminishing* the images of things; and (3) *arranging and deploying the components* of the speech.

Even here, however, readers will recognize the ways in which anticipatory, contemplative and adjustive features of speaker activities, permeate the more situated features of oratorical performance and interchange.¹⁹

Generating and Refuting Proofs

As a means of introducing the matter of proofs (i.e., claims, arguments, cases) and challenges that speakers normally present in forensic cases, Aristotle embarks on a consideration of (1) possibilities and probabilities prior to discussing (2) the formulation of proofs and (3) their points of vulnerability for challenge.

Possibilities and Probabilities

Focusing first on *possibilities* or potentialities of a highly generic sort, Aristotle (BII, XIX) argues that things *are possible* under the following conditions: (a) if one can develop a contrary, then the opposite is possible (e.g., if one could be ill or do good, then being well or doing evil are possible); (b) if one thing is possible, so is another of a similar sort; (c) if something more excellent can be achieved, a lesser version is possible; (d) if something has a beginning, an end is possible; (e) if something has an end, a beginning is possible; (f) if something subsequent appears, the antecedent condition is possible; (g) if someone loves something, that thing is possible, (h) if we can influence others, the things under their control or production are possible; (i) if the parts are possible, so is the whole possible, and vice-versa; (j) if a category exists, so may its members, and vice-versa; (k) if things can be made

¹⁹ Aristotle is a behaviorist, but a behaviorist very much in the human agency sense of G. H. Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969). Aristotle's behaviorism (i.e., conceptualization of activity) thus, is centrally predicated on human language, reflectivity, choice, intentionality, and meaningful interchange.

without talent, so it may be possible to improve it with technique; (l) if less capable people can do something, it is possible that more competent people can do it as well.

Since possibilities do not insure that things will happen, Aristotle next asks about *probabilities*; whether something likely took place.

Here, Aristotle states that (a) if less likely things have occurred, then more common things probably have also taken place; (b) if subsequent things have occurred, then their antecedents likely have taken place; (c) if people were willing to do something, they likely did that unless some obstacle was encountered; (d) if people who are inclined to act in certain way are angry, they are more likely to act in those manners; (e) if people are on the verge of acting in certain ways, they likely will act in those fashions; (f) if people have made preparations to act or have engaged in antecedent acts, they are likely to pursue those acts through to completion.

In developing these materials on possibilities and probabilities Aristotle establishes some lines along which proofs or arguments may be developed.²⁰

Proofs, Examples, and Enthymemes

Aristotle (BII, XX-XXVI) follows his consideration of possibilities and probabilities with *arguments* (or proofs) generated by (1) example and (2) enthymeme.

As with matters possible and likely, examples and enthymemes may be used by speakers in their attempts to establish the greater plausibility of their positions. The viability of any argument or proof, thus, ultimately rests on audience viewpoints or definitions of the competing claims made by the speakers.

Whether based on actual past events or inventions of events (as in *Aesop's Fables*, which Aristotle references), any sorts of *examples* or other things that speakers relate to the case of hand may be used to illustrate (and dramatize) points, set interpretive frames for audiences, or to supplement the arguments developed in enthymemes.

The value of any examples (as in fictional or authentic, sustained or fleeting) in establishing or contesting cases, as with other aspects of the art of rhetoric, is contingent on (a) the ways that speakers deploy these comparison points and ultimately (b) on audience receptivity to the materials presented to them.

Enthymemes (BII, XXII) are arguments intended to provide deductions or reasoned conclusions about the specific matters under consideration, such that things become more notably affirmed or refuted through the claims, applications, and inferences developed within.

Normally, the speaker makes a claim for the validity of a specific principle and then attempts to show that some noteworthy features of the case under consideration (via connecting statements or rationale of some sort) would be subsumed by, or exists in opposition to, the principle invoked at the outset.

Insofar as the proofs thusly generated are accepted as evidence of the guilt or innocence of the defendants involved in particular cases, these arguments (even if highly presumptive and logically suspect) may be pivotal to the overall disposition of the case.

²⁰ Interestingly, Cicero (*De Inventione* Book I xxiv-xxviii; Book II iv-xvi) more adequately focuses analysis on what actually happened in particular instances; i.e., attending to the situated flows of the events under consideration. This may reflect Cicero's greater involvements in prosecuting and defending (versus observing) actual cases.

Enthymemes are often employed in conjunction with *maxims* (BII, XX-XXI). Denoting variants of moralist standpoints and/or folk wisdoms, maxims may be (a) introduced to specify principles as well as (b) used to *justify* speaker viewpoints or conclusions.

Regardless of the tactics and materials with which speakers work, though, Aristotle recognizes that people's concerns with, and notions of, proofs (and refutations) can be expected to vary relative to *judges'* (a) educational backgrounds and (b) the particular sources that judges accept as authorities regarding the cases at hand.

Aristotle (BII, XXII-XXIV) subsequently provides an extended list of enthymemes that speakers may invoke in establishing deductions or fostering other inferences that members of the general public *might find convincing*.²¹

Here, Aristotle considers such tactics as (a) considering the opposite of a thing in question, arguing that if the opposite thing lacks the opposite quality, then the thing in question may also lack the quality attributed to it; (b) taking key words in the case and displaying their problematic quality, showing that things do not always have the quality assumed in the instance at hand; (c) focusing on things that normally occur with one another, positing that if the one occurs the other is to be expected; (d) arguing *a fortiori*, that if greater things (e.g., gods) do not possess particular qualities, then one should not expect these qualities of lesser things (e.g., people); and (e) attending to time considerations, wherein one insists on acknowledging priorities and consequents in appropriate sequences.

Other enthymemes may be generated by speakers: (f) making use of opponents' claims to contradict opponents' positions; (g) defining the terms of reference more precisely so that cases may be built more decisively within these restricted contexts of understanding; (h) eliminating alternative explanations in the case at hand so that the only option remaining becomes entirely feasible; (i) using induction, whereby one argues from a specific instance to a general principle; and (j) invoking the authority of previous decisions or referencing the viewpoints of more revered sources.

Still other enthymemes may be developed by (k) breaking accusations into specifics so that the limitations of these accusations might be more apparent; (l) recognizing that any act can usually have good and bad consequences, speakers may focus selectively on the good or bad features in developing their cases; (m) because the things that people approve of openly are often not the things that they desire secretly, one may emphasize the viewpoint (public display or private advantage) opposite to that one's opponent has taken; and (n) arguing that the results produced by some antecedent would occur when that antecedent condition occurs again.

Other arguments may be pursued by (o) noting that the same people do not always adopt the same standpoint in doing the same things; (p) asserting that a possible motive is the effective motive; (q) invoking (selectively) an array of motives or standpoints that people may assume in doing (or avoiding) certain things;²² (r) focusing on any inconsistencies in opponents' positions; and (s) when defending someone who has been charged or denigrated by another, one may allege that these false claims are motivated by other motives.

²¹ As with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* more generally, this listing tries to preserve the overall flow of his material (as opposed to attempts to reorder his presentation). The breaks introduced here are simply to allow reader to more easily digest a massive array of tactics.

²² Here, Aristotle (BII, XXII) notes that both Pamphilus and Callipus had developed volumes on rhetoric centrally around considerations or inferences of motives (i.e., a vocabulary of motives).

Tacticians may also develop enthymemes by (t) arguing (after the fact) that opponents should have selected the better course of action; (u) using people's past mistakes as a basis for accusation or defense; (v) insisting that what is true of the whole is true of the parts or vice-versa; (w) using indignant language to enhance one's position; (x) using consequences (or practices) to argue for motives; and (y) representing things as causes because they happened to occur before particular events.

Contesting Cases

Although observing that the preceding tactics (and others) may encourage auditors to develop certain viewpoints regarding the cases at hand, Aristotle is clearly aware of the problematic and negotiable nature of forensic definitions. Thus, referring to some of his earlier work (*Topics*), Aristotle subsequently deals with the matter of people *raising objections* to the cases being developed and the forms that these may assume (BII, XXV).²³

Refutations of enthymemes, Aristotle contends, are developed through (a) counter-deductions or (b) objections. First, since the deductions of enthymemes reflect reasoned opinions, other reasoned opinions may be developed to oppose the conclusions reached by one's opponent.

Speaker objections to opponents' enthymemes may assume four dimensions. Thus, challengers may (a) attack opponents' principle statements, (b) replace opponents' statements with more advantageous but similar premises; (c) introduce premises that contradict opponents' principles; or (d) quote previous judgments that are at variance from the stances adopted by opponents.

Further, Aristotle states, because enthymemes are built from *probabilities, examples, evidence, or signs*, these are precisely the points at which these proofs may be contested. As with deductions more generally, Aristotle is highly cognizant of the distinction here between accurate deductions (as in rigorous evidence, logically sound inferences) and those that may be deemed credible by auditors.

Amplifying and Diminishing Images

Book III of *Rhetoric* deals with *linguistic style* and *delivery*. While Aristotle has comparatively less regard for these matters, he states that because rhetoric is so steeped in images, the subject of expressivity has considerable importance for understanding the persuasion process more broadly.

Although observing that the poets were the first to establish expressivity as communicative feature, and win fame accordingly, Aristotle (BIII: I) counsels skepticism regarding the value of poetic expression for communicative clarity. Thus, after referencing his volume, *Poetics*, in which he deals with the matters of delivery, expressivity, and audience experiences in some detail, Aristotle (BIII, II) emphasizes the importance of *clarity* and *authenticity* for achieving a greater sharedness of meanings in oratory (particularly in forensic and deliberative rhetoric).

²³ Aristotle also distinguishes amplifications and diminution from enthymemes, observing that statements attempting to magnify or minimize things should not be confused with arguments developed through deduction.

Relatedly, Aristotle encourages orators to use words that are familiar to auditors and convey things as these are known. He also suggests that speakers employ metaphors that (strategically) represent the viewpoint adopted by the speaker in ways that are clear, charming, and pointedly distinctive.

Conversely, Aristotle (BIII, III) contends that prose is rendered ineffective when speakers: misuse compound words; use words that seem strange to auditors; develop long or frequent poetic descriptions (artificial eloquence); and generate inappropriate metaphors (as in extensively theatrical, far fetched, or obscure).

In contrast, Aristotle (BIII, V) proposes that those wishing to be more effective as communicators be attentive to the matters of connecting words more completely; using terms distinctively, precisely, and in ways that minimize ambiguity; and respecting typical rules of grammar.

Aristotle (BIII, VI) also discusses ways of enhancing and minimizing *eloquence of style*. Thus, he considers the options associated with (a) descriptive statements vs. more concise referents; (b) poetic vs. more direct metaphors; (c) more abstract or pluralized vs. concrete or singular references; (d) disrupting typical prose by emphasizing certain components; (e) dropping usual connecting words; and (f) drawing on contrasts or opposites.

More generally, Aristotle (BIII, VII) encourages speakers to be mindful of the *advantages of style* in rhetorical settings. Thus, he reminds speakers to (a) adjust their style to the sincerity and dignity of the occasion; (b) employ emotional language to convey speaker viewpoints to audiences; (c) relate to audiences in ways that intensify speaker sincerity; (d) speak in ways that are both readily understood by the audiences at hand and attentive to audience circumstances (as in age, gender, locale, education, life-style); (e) present speaker positions as representing the broader or more generalized viewpoints (knowledge, values) of people beyond their immediate audiences.

Likewise, Aristotle observes that (f) speakers who have stated things too strongly may correct these overstatements showing (tactically) that they also critically consider their own words. He also cautions speakers (g) about appearing to be too careful or overly prepared, lest this be taken as a sign of insincerity by auditors.

Aristotle (BIII, VIII) next comments on *rhythm* (stating that prose should be neither metrical nor void of tempo), before considering the *flow and division of prose*. Here, Aristotle (BIII, IX) distinguishes text that is more continuous in its development (as in Herodotus' *The Histories*) from that which is divided into parts of various sorts.

Noting that divisions may generate a greater sharedness of direction and comprehension, Aristotle considers a number of variations (e.g., simple flowing divisions vs. thesis and antithesis) and some limitations of divisions in prose.

From here, Aristotle (BIII, X) focuses on the use of *metaphors*. Envisioning metaphors as offering something entertaining to auditors by virtue of the novel or insightful comparisons speakers may invoke, Aristotle is particularly attentive to (a) the proportionalizing effects (as in amplifying or diminishing things) that speakers may generate through metaphors, (b) the capacities of metaphors to convey action to auditors; (c) the stimulating and entertaining (as in surprising) potential of metaphors; and (d) the abilities of metaphors to express folk wisdoms, ironies, and paradoxes of thought.

Subsequently, Aristotle (BIII, XII) considers some distinctions between *written and spoken* rhetoric.

While noting that written oratory is typically more precise and is designed to generate its primary effect through reading, Aristotle emphasizes that spoken oratory is intended to be presented. He cautions that when spoken rhetoric is recorded as

text and read apart from its enacted content, it is apt to appear amateurish, if not absurd.

Likewise, various spoken devices such as disjunctures of words and phrases, repetitions, and amplifications may have compelling effects in live presentations but appear poorly configured in written text.

Aristotle further likens the oratory pitched to public assemblies with that of scene painting, arguing that greater detail and complexity may render these speeches ineffective.

By contrast, judicial rhetoric generally requires more precision, especially when a single, more astute judge is involved. However, when dealing with larger crowds, Aristotle observes, a dramatic delivery and a strong voice may be particularly effective.

Arranging and Deploying the Components

The last topic with which *Rhetoric* deals is *arrangement*. Arrangement focuses on the parts of a speech and the ways the materials in each part may be organized.

After stating that speeches revolve around two major parts (1) the statement or claim and (2) the related proof or demonstration of speaker claims, Aristotle (BIII, XIII) rounds these off by adding (3) an introduction and (4) a conclusion. Thus, in order, he introduces (1) *the proem*, (2) *the narration*, (3) *the proof(s)*, and (4) *the peroration*.

While reminding readers of the differing ways that speeches may be presented (both across deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative speeches and within instances of these more specifically), Aristotle discusses these four components in turn.

Representing a more formal or systematic introduction to the speech, the *proem* or *exordium* parallels the prologue in theatrical productions or the prelude to musical selections. It is here that the speakers set equivalents of the scene and characters or the tone and tempo for the auditors.

Still, the introduction has differing relevancies with respect to deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial rhetoric.

Observing that introductions are apt to be used in *deliberative* oratory only when auditors do not know the situation at hand or when two or more speakers assume oppositionary positions, Aristotle assigns has a decidedly different quality to the introduction in *epideictic* or demonstrative rhetoric. Here, he notes, the proem serves more like a musical prelude to the ensuing expressions of praise or condemnations.

In *judicial* cases, the proem or exordium is typically used to set the stage for the ensuing drama. However, instead of keeping judges in suspense about the direction of the case, Aristotle encourages speakers to state their positions in clear and direct terms (the suspense will be in the adequacy of the proofs and challenges thereof).

Further, whereas plaintiffs conventionally use the introduction to vilify or condemn defendants, defenders typically employ their introductions to neutralize negativities directed toward the targets of the accusations.

Aristotle also envisions exordiums as places in which judicial speakers attempt to (a) pursue the good-will of judges, (b) encourage disaffections with their opponents, and (c) focus auditor attention on certain matters while distracting them from other concerns. Thus, speakers may encourage auditors to define certain matters as important, admirable, or pleasing; or, conversely, as irrelevant, shameful, or disgusting.

Aristotle then further observes that the task of selectively focusing auditor attention on particular aspects of the situation is by no means unique to the introduction. It is relevant to all parts of the speech.

Aristotle also notes that speakers who have weaker cases may spend proportionately more time on the introduction in hopes of diverting attention from other aspects of the case.

By contrast, again, speakers involved in *deliberative* or political oratory are likely to employ exordia or more extended introductions only when speakers intend to (a) establish their own relevancies to the situations at hand; (b) address their opponents in some way; (c) deal with anticipated audience resistances; or (d) redefine the context through embellishments (make things appear more or less consequential than presently seems).

Aristotle (BIII, XV) then indicates how *defenders* may use introductory statements to neutralize objections or negative opinions that auditors may have about their cases. Thus, defenders may (1) openly deny the viewpoints or claims of prosecutors, (2) contend that little or no harm was done to the other, or (3) reject any disgraceful features of the case.

Likewise, defenders may (4) admit acts, but argue that these: (a) were done honorably or had redeeming qualities; (b) were matters of mistake, misfortune, or necessity; or (c) involved acts or outcomes that were unintended by the defendant.

Defenders may also (5) direct aspersions toward accusers, claiming that the plaintiffs (a) have done similar things themselves, (b) had earlier accused others (found innocent) of similar things, or (c) otherwise are suspect of motive and tendencies to portray things in the worst possible manners.

Narrations or statements of the case (Aristotle, BIII, XVI) also vary by the three types of rhetoric. As well, in many deliberative cases and some instances of judicial oratory, speakers may forego an introduction as such and proceed more directly to the issue or statement of the facts in the case at hand. Aristotle subsequently delineates and compares speakers' narratives or accounts of the three major types of oratory.

Because of its expressive qualities, *demonstrative* oratory is notably less constrained by matters of chronological sequence, clarity, or completeness.

In *judicial* oratory, Aristotle counsels speakers to be clear and direct, as well as selective in the ways in which they present materials to judges. Typically, too, while claimants are apt to be more detailed in building their cases, defenders are likely to be comparatively brief (as in denouncing claims, asserting innocence).

Further, since the emphasis in judicial narratives is generally not only on the things done but also commonly reflects on the characters of the people involved, Aristotle observes that these statements allow speakers to pursue appropriate modes of emotional response by the ways in which speakers depict the people involved.

In *deliberative* oratory, Aristotle notes that speakers may reflect on past events but they cannot provide actual narrations or statements of fact regarding the future (since these things have not yet happened). Still, Aristotle contends that speakers attempting to convince others should speak with great certainty about impending events and should be prepared to provide detailed explanations for their claims.

In *judicial* cases, narratives or statements of facts revolve around **proofs** (and refutations). Aristotle (BIII, XVIII) observes that judicial arguments focus on (a) whether the act has been done; (b) whether it was harmful; (c) whether the acts and outcomes were intended; and (d) what sort of justice is appropriate.

In *epideictic* or demonstrative oratory, speakers typically develop their statements around things that honor or condemn the case at hand. Speaker

amplifications (as "proofs"), thus, generally involve enumerations, elaborations, and evaluations of the features of the people or situations that speakers wish to emphasize.

In *deliberative* rhetoric, the emphasis is on establishing (or questioning) (a) the likelihood of some future situation, (b) the practical nature of the action proposed, (c) the virtuous qualities of this undertaking, and (d) the utility or viability of the action in question.

While viewing examples (denoting comparison points) as representing the primary forms of proof in deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle identifies enthymemes or deductive proofs as most appropriate to *judicial* cases.²⁴ Even here, however, he cautions speakers against using enthymemes: (a) in extended series; (b) on all subject matters; (c) to invoke emotionality on the part of judges; and (d) to convey character.

Addressing judicial oratory further, Aristotle states that speakers who are unable to formulate viable enthymemes (in confirmation or refutation) should strive to establish the integrity of speakers' own characters so that auditors might view speakers as more virtuous and, therefore, credible sources.

As well, while noting that the enthymemes developed in refutation are generally more compelling (situated and responsive) than those developed in accusation (planned, initiatory), Aristotle observes that claimants may offset some challenges likely to be presented by defenders by anticipating and neutralizing these before hand.

When responding to prosecutors, Aristotle states that defenders should speak more directly against claimants. Aristotle also deems it important that defenders dispose of any major negativities (as in claims, reputations) introduced by claimants, in an attempt to minimize auditor hostility. Somewhat relatedly, Aristotle observes, where speakers may feel vulnerable to audience disaffection, speakers may present their own viewpoints as representing those of some third (more esteemed) party.

It is conjunction with proof and refutation that Aristotle (BIII, XVIII) also considers the topics of interrogation, answers, and humor.

Aristotle states that *interrogation* may be employed productively when the opponents' answers would: (a) render the opponent's earlier claims absurd; (b) serve to establish the speaker's conclusion; (c) contradict the opponent's earlier position; or (d) require an opponent to adopt an ambiguous or an evasive position on a point that the opponent formerly insisted was central to the case.

Aristotle discourages speakers from asking questions that may generate effective objections from opponents as well as from embarking on extended sets of questions (since auditors may have difficulty following arguments of this latter sort).

When *faced with interrogation*, especially equivocal questions in which speakers deliberately restrict respondent choices, Aristotle suggests that respondents answer questions more fully. Likewise, when questions appear to lead respondents to unfavorable answers, Aristotle proposes that respondents answer in ways that more directly establish objections or qualifications to the questions asked.

Making reference to a fuller (but unfortunately now lost part of Aristotle's) *Poetics* in discussing the role of humor, jest or ridicule in oratorical settings, Aristotle observes (citing Gorgias) that speakers may nullify seriousness with humor and

²⁴ Aristotle posits that deliberative oratory is generally more difficult than judicial because deliberative speaking (a) depends on the uncertainty of the future, (b) lacks the structure of the law as a basis for dealing with cases, and (c) offers comparatively fewer opportunities for tactical digression.

displace humor with seriousness. At the same time, Aristotle cautions speakers to be mindful of their situations and suggests that people of higher stations generally rely on irony rather than buffoonery or more base forms of humor (again, mindful of audience receptivities).

Aristotle (BIII, XIX) then concludes *Rhetoric* with a discussion of the **peroration** or conclusion to the speech. Whereas the purpose of the conclusion in deliberative rhetoric is to prompt a desired decision, and demonstrative speeches may be concluded with expressive sentiments of various sorts, Aristotle identifies four objectives that speakers may pursue in the epilogue in judicial rhetoric.

The first task is to reaffirm the moral characters of the participants, whereby speakers commend their clients (and/or selves) and vilify their opponents.

The second objective is to selectively magnify or minimize the facts as the speaker earlier established these in the case.

The third goal is to intensify appropriate emotional responses (as in anger, pity, envy) toward the various participants on the part of auditors.

The fourth concern is to review of the case, indicating directly, clearly, and emphatically how one's case is superior to one's opponent.

Then, simultaneously concluding (a) his consideration of the epilogue, (b) his advice to speakers, and (c) his volume on rhetoric, Aristotle directly *addresses his auditors*:

I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgement. [Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, BIII, XIX [Barnes]]

In Conclusion

Given the scope and depth of the conceptual material that Aristotle presents on rhetoric, it may be useful to highlight some of the more central emphases in his text. As before, I will follow the overall flow of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Whereas Aristotle approaches rhetoric as the study of all means of persuasive communication and places great emphasis on words, Aristotle also is quick to remind us that influence work needs to be examined well beyond the particular words that constitute the text of the speech. Thus, Aristotle is explicitly attentive to (a) the qualifications, preparations, and tactics of the speakers, (b) the fuller, developmentally engaged nature of the speech, and (c) the viewpoints and dispositions of those attending to these interchanges as auditors or judges. Rhetoric, thus, is to be understood as purposive, reflective, enacted, adjustive realms of interchange, the outcome of which is always dependent on audience receptivities, definitions, and decisions.

Distinguishing deliberative, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle not only is attentive to the relevance of rhetoric for political, judicial, and honorific contexts but he also specifies the sorts of concerns and challenges that typify the practices of rhetoric in each of these settings. Although his text clearly has been developed mindfully of the complexities of forensic rhetoric, Aristotle also makes it apparent that the study of persuasive endeavor is of great importance relative to decisions, policy, and practices across the broader political spectrum. Likewise, rhetoric also is relevant to public acclamations and denunciations of particular people, events, or other objects.

Aristotle's analysis of forensic rhetoric is remarkably comprehensive. Thus, he directly addresses wrongdoing, justice, and the contingencies of cases handled in the

courts. Notably, in contrast to those who might endeavor to explain crime and deviance as the products of cosmological, physiological, psychological, demonological, or other matters acting upon or from within particular individuals, Aristotle approaches wrongdoing as meaningful, reflective, purposive activity. He also posits that the same elements and processes used in explaining other human activity would be applicable to explanations of wrongdoing.²⁵ Accordingly, Aristotle is explicitly attentive to perpetrator abilities, viewpoints, interests, and definitions of self; perpetrator definitions of the targets of their ventures; and perpetrator definitions of the situations (and the contingencies thereof) in which their activities are developed.

In discussing justice, Aristotle considers the differences between, and respective implications of, written law, natural law, and conceptions of equality as these notions might be applied to the particular cases at hand. In addition to addressing these three aspects of justice in both relativist and situated terms, Aristotle considers the related matters of indignation and the assignment of blame.

Still, while framing matters at a broad level, Aristotle also details some of the central conceptual implications of formal laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths in judicial cases.

In Book II, Aristotle focuses more directly on the art or technique of rhetoric. Attending to the eventual goal of rhetoricians obtaining favorable judgments in the cases they represent, Aristotle provides a highly compacted analysis of the ways in which rhetoricians may (a) try to maximize their credibility as speakers, (b) attend to, engage, and shape the emotional viewpoints and experiences of their audiences, and (c) selectively adjust their presentations mindfully of the broader orientational frameworks that are likely to characterize audiences in particular life circumstances.

In sections xviii-xxv of Book II, Aristotle deals more pointedly with (d) the matter of generating and refuting proofs. Mindful of the objective of encompassing all modes of rhetoric, Aristotle not only addresses the more technical features of judicial rhetoric but also writes mindfully of the typically less complex interchanges that one encounters in other settings. In this section of *Rhetoric*, Aristotle (i) provides an extended consideration of possibilities and probabilities, (ii) specifies the major ways that proofs (i.e., evidence to substantiate claims) may be established, and (iii) more specifically indicates the specific points at which various kinds of proofs may be challenged.

Then, attending to the idea that people know things through the images that they have of these matters, Aristotle begins Book III of *Rhetoric* by discussing the ways that speakers may try to emphasize and/or diminish particular images of the matters under consideration. Here he deals more specifically with style and delivery.

While stressing the value of clarity and authenticity in developing one's position, Aristotle also considers the nature and implications of "eloquence of style" for rhetorical effect. Relatedly, he considers the ways that rhetoricians may recast the images that their auditors have of specific things through instances of deception, metaphors, more pointed object references, selective focusing, and the specific contrasts they invoke. Aristotle also is mindful of the ways that speakers may contextually alter the images of particular things by highly situated changes in the styles in which they relate to their audiences (i.e., by adjusting and readjusting the images of things the speakers convey) at specific points in time.

²⁵ Those familiar with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* will see that he pointedly invokes a singular analytic (pragmatist) frame in explaining the entire range of virtues and vices (also see Prus 2007a).

Having established the broader frame as well as the more central, enacted features of rhetoric in highly compacted but analytically detailed terms, Aristotle concludes *Rhetoric* with a more explicit consideration of the ways in which the major components of rhetoric may be organized and adjusted as situations develop. Thus, he attends to the *proem* or introduction, the *narration* or the account of the case (the events, speaker positions, and associated matters), *the proof* (including evidence and refutations) of cases, and the *peroration* or conclusion. Even as he concludes this text, Aristotle not only describes the purposes of each of these components but also reengages earlier aspects of his analysis as he indicates the ways that people more strategically may engage these features of the encounter.

Because speech (and speech-related influence work) is so fundamental to the *lived* human community, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* not only provides us with a base for comprehending wide ranges of human interaction but also generates vital insights into the processes by which people propose, articulate, emphasize, and contest the particular meanings assigned to humans and/or other matters.

In addition to its relevance for identity work and persuasive endeavor, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provides remarkable insight into the ways in which people engage activity in collective arenas as well as develop their activities in more solitary contexts (as in making preparations, reflective deliberations, assessments, and personal adjustments). This statement also indicates with remarkable clarity and depth how people's experiences with emotionality can be shaped and resisted by others.

Despite its overall coverage, this paper understates the relevance of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (as well as his other works) for the social sciences more generally and sociological analysis more specifically. For Aristotle (also see *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Poetics*), community life revolves around sets of meaningful, deliberatively engaged, and actively constructed processes (activities and interchanges).

Aristotle is fully aware of people's capacities for learning and intentional recollection; deliberative, sequenced activity; knowingly attending to the past, present, and future; anticipating the viewpoints of single and multiple others; managing the impressions they give off to others; strategizing and invoking deceptions; and making all sorts of assessments of, and adjustments to, others within the contexts of cooperation, competition, conflict, alliances, and so forth. Indeed, Aristotle's rhetoric is pertinent to the study of all manners of group and intergroup associations.

Beyond Aristotle's related (1) pragmatist position on humans as biologically-enabled, linguistic, deliberative, active agents, Aristotle has much to offer social scientists with respect to (2) the matter of intersubjectivity or the extended centrality of language in human interchange; (3) an explicit appreciation of what Erving Goffman (1959) would term "impression management;" (4) the study of influence work in a more direct and engaged sense; and (5) an extended analysis of emotionality as a feature of influence work.

Unfortunately, most of those in philosophy and rhetoric have failed to sustain Aristotle's emphases on (1) the importance of studying rhetoric as dynamic fields of activity (and interchange) and (2) envisioning rhetoric as a thoroughly fundamental feature of community life. For Aristotle, thus, rhetoric as a realm of study not only contributes to a more viable understanding of human group life but, interrelatedly, a more adequate appreciation of rhetoric presupposes the broader study of the human

condition (i.e., biological and behavioral capacities, language, images, relations, values, goals, mindedness, emotionality, and deliberative, strategic interchange).²⁶

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43BCE) will emerge as the most competent scholar of rhetoric after Aristotle (Prus, 2008). Although highly insightful and extremely valuable for the articulating many aspects of the practice of rhetoric and providing some sustained historical-comparative analysis of Greek and Roman rhetoric even Cicero was not able to sustain Aristotle's concerted philosophic viewpoint on human knowing and acting. Nor, relatedly, was Cicero able to span the divide between philosophy and rhetoric that Socrates and Plato had earlier generated (also see Cicero, *Brutus*; Rosenfield, 1971; Vickers, 1988).

Thus, while there is much to be learned from Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine and other rhetoricians who followed after Aristotle, it is Aristotle who "wrote *the* book on rhetoric" and to whom we may most productively return if we intend not only to bridge the academic gulf between philosophy and rhetoric (or, to paraphrase Cicero, "maintain the connection between thinking and speaking") but also to develop a more sustained and comprehensive understanding of ways in which human group life is accomplished in practice. For those in the interactionist (and broader pragmatist) tradition, Aristotle's rhetoric is a treasure chest waiting to be accessed and productively applied in comparative and adjustive terms to the study of human knowing and acting.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Beert Verstraete for his extended discussions of classical thought with me as well as his thoughtful reading of an earlier draft of this paper.

²⁶

Although Aristotle does not provide a distinctive methodology for studying human interchange, contemporary scholars may appreciate Aristotle's emphasis on examining things in the instances in which they occur so that one might arrive at more adequate conceptions of the essences of things they are taken to represent. Aristotle also insists that people arrive at the meanings of things through comparative analysis, in which instances are examined with reference to the similarities and differences that one observes in the instances one examines (i.e., inductive reasoning). Those familiar with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Blumer (1969) will recognize the more basic affinities of their positions on research and analysis with those of Aristotle on these matters.

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Citation

- Prus Robert (2008) "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*:A Pragmatist Analysis of Persuasive Interchange." *Qualitative Sociology Review* Vol. IV Issue 2. Retrieved Month, Year (http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org/ENG/archive_eng.php)