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# Contents

## Thematic Articles:

*Integration – An Outline from the Perspective of the Sociology of Knowledge*
  by Hans-Georg Soeffner and Dariuš Zifonun  
  3

*Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Pragmatist Analysis of Persuasive Interchange*
  by Robert Prus  
  24

*Biography, Media Consumption, And Identity Formation*
  by Larry Strelitz  
  63

*Literary Field and the Question of Method – Revisited*
  by Jaroslava Gajdosova  
  83

*Social Risks and Challenges of the Post-Socialist Transition Period in Estonia: Analysis of Biographical Narratives*
  by Marina Grishakova and Margarita Kazjulja  
  106

## Software Reviews:

Software review: *QDA MINER – The Mixed Method Solution for Qualitative Analysis*
  by Provalis Research  
  Piotr Chomczynski  
  126

## Book Reviews:

  Piotr Bielski  
  130

## Contributors

133

## Author-Supplied Abstracts and Keywords

135
Integration – An Outline from the Perspective of the Sociology of Knowledge

Abstract

In this conceptual essay we argue that the study of migration can substantially benefit from an interactionist notion of integration. Basing our considerations on Berger’s and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge, we develop a differentiated understanding of integration as an ongoing process which comes to be institutionalized in characteristic forms. With regard to these forms of institutionalization, we focus our attention on the relatively stable spheres of social action characterized by Anselm Strauss as social worlds, structures that are continuously produced anew and altered through processes of segmentation, intersection and legitimation. Furthermore, we propose five ideal types of social worlds reflecting the perspective of migrants. In addition, we indicate the transnational scope of social worlds and the importance of personal coping strategies. We emphasize the significance of the conflicts occurring in and between social worlds as part of processes of integration and highlight a number of strategies that make symbolic integration within the public sphere possible. Furthermore, we list central institutionalized cultural forms and social modes which have a decisive impact on interaction between migrants and the autochthonous population: categorization, stereotyping and drawing boundaries, negotiating, conflict and permanent reflection. Finally, we explain the specific contribution our approach offers to the current theoretical discussion in the field of migration studies and close with a summary of our arguments.

Keywords

Sociology of knowledge; Migration; Integration; Social worlds; Arena; Conflict

To date, there has been little exchange between the sociology of knowledge and research on social integration. Neither have sociologists who adopt a knowledge-based perspective taken a great deal of notice of the issue of migration, nor have migration researchers made use of findings from the former field in their work. This state of affairs is remarkable, for each of these research areas stands to benefit from perspectives and thematic issues offered by the other. It is even more
astonishing, considering that in perhaps the most well-known theoretical contribution to the sociology of knowledge by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, “The Social Construction of Knowledge”, (“required reading” for students of sociology), the topic of integration is accorded a central role both conceptually and empirically.

Contemporary theoretical discussions within the field of migration research (Hirschman, Kasinitz and DeWind 1999; International Migration Review Special Issue 2004 38 (3)) have given little attention to interactionist approaches, that is, those which focus on interpersonal relationships. Although it is recognized that the interactionists of the Chicago School were the first to deal systematically with the consequences of migration in the “host country”, their analytical perspective is currently largely ignored. One of the reasons for this limited reception may be seen in the persistent recurrence of a certain “micro-sociological naiveté”, which maintains that the analysis of everyday processes of interaction and communication, primary concerns of studies within the sociology of knowledge, do not permit conclusions to be drawn regarding socio-structural phenomena, the reason that such approaches should supposedly be relegated to the domain of “micro-sociology”. The sociology of knowledge itself has contributed to this misrepresentation by limiting its focus to issues of “intercultural communication”.

We will argue instead that an approach to the topic of migration from the said perspective must by no means be restricted to „micro-research“. On the contrary, it offers a useful perspective for reconstructing socio-structural phenomena, as it has the capacity to reveal processes of social institutionalization. Veritably, we find the distinctions drawn between micro and macro, structure and interaction, as well as culture and society, which are still common in numerous debates in the social sciences, to be hardly productive.

In the following, adopting perspectives from the sociology of knowledge, we will explore theoretical and conceptual options for a concept of social integration that can be applied to the conditions of modern pluralized societies. To do so, we begin by recalling some of the initial considerations of the sociology of knowledge (1). Taking our initial cues from the work of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, we develop a differentiated understanding of integration as a continual process, which, moreover, is subject to characteristic forms of institutionalization. In our understanding of institutionalization processes we include the relatively stable spheres of action, which we conceptualize, drawing on the work of Anselm Strauss, as social worlds. These worlds are constantly reproduced and changed by processes of legitimation, segmentation and intersection (2). We propose five ideal types of social worlds as they are constituted from the perspective of migrants (2.1). Furthermore, (2.2) we draw attention to the transnational scope of social worlds as well as personal coping strategies. We stress the significance of conflicts as they are carried out in and between social worlds (2.3) and proceed to highlight some strategies of public symbolic integration and problems they contain (2.4). We enumerate central institutional cultural forms and social modes which play a decisive part in the life-world processes of interaction between migrants and the autochthonous population: categorization, stereotyping, stylization and drawing boundaries, negotiation, conflict and permanent reflection. Finally, (3) we elucidate what we see as the specific contribution of our approach to the current theoretical debate in migration research and summarize our arguments.
Knowledge, society and integration

In their “Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge” Berger and Luckmann framed their new formulation of the sociology of knowledge as a form of general sociology by taking up the complementary perspectives of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim: “How is it possible”, they asked, “that subjective meanings become objective faticities? Or, in [Weber’s and Durkheim”s terms […]]: How is it possible that human activity (Handeln) should produce a world of things (chooses)?” (Berger and Th. Luckmann 1966: 18; emphasis in the original). In the eyes of Berger and Luckmann, the answer to this question was to be found in the “Social Construction of Reality”.

Both the means and content of this construction process consist of knowledge. Because human beings are equipped with few inherent instincts, they must design devices to control their own behavior and create an order of their own. For this purpose, they draw on collective stocks of knowledge, which are produced and reproduced in interaction. Individuals acquire and incorporate knowledge – and therewith society – in the course of socialization, during which the personal identities of individuals are created. Hence, Alfred Schütz saw fit to distinguish between subjective and social stock of knowledge (see Schütz and Th. Luckmann 1973).

The subjective stock of knowledge “presents solutions to problems of my previous experience and acts” (Schütz and Th. Luckmann ibidem: 9). As such, it is oriented on the past. Yet I make continual use of its resources when confronted with new experiences, and this strategy works as long as new experiences range within the realm of my previous experiences. Knowledge is applicable to future situations when it is present in typified forms, i.e. it is detached from the original contexts in which it was created and applied. I acquire new knowledge as soon as I perceive that I am no longer able to deal with a new situation. Thus I do not acquire knowledge in an arbitrary manner, but pragmatically, i.e. only insofar as it is relevant to my orientation and actions. Life-world-specific knowledge is not necessarily optimal. It is, however, satisfactory as long as it presents an adequate basis for problem-solving. Moreover, knowledge in and of the life-world is not free of contradictions. Because pragmatically acquired knowledge stems from different areas of experience and is applied only within these limited areas, a collision between contradictory cognitive elements is prevented.

Although my knowledge is very much my own and thus subjective, to the same extent it is also influenced by the knowledge of others. To find solutions to problems I can draw on preexisting patterns of action developed by others before me which are deposited and available in the social stock of knowledge. This cognitive reservoir is divided into general knowledge, that which is relevant and accessible to all, and in special knowledge only important to certain “social types”. When the social distribution of knowledge exists on a simple level, there are no institutional barriers prohibiting access to stores of special knowledge. Moreover, knowing that specific forms of knowledge exist is itself a component of general knowledge. “Thus, in simple social distributions, reality and above all the social world still remain relatively surveyable by ‘everyone’” (Schütz and Th. Luckmann ibidem: 312). As the social distribution of knowledge grows in complexity, the situation changes. First, due to a greater differentiation and specialization of specific knowledge, it becomes impossible for an individual to maintain an overview of, let alone acquire, this knowledge in its entirety. “The fact that there are different provinces of special knowledge is a part of general knowledge. The factual social distribution of special knowledge is no longer a part of the supply of “equally” distributed general knowledge. Furthermore, in general, even the knowledge of the outlines of the
structure of the special knowledge and its basic content becomes more indistinct” (Schütz and Th. Luckmann ibidem: 315). Second, general knowledge becomes differentiated into different “versions” (see Schütz and Luckmann ibidem: 318).

Berger and Luckmann incorporated the distinction between subjective and social stock of knowledge into their theory of action and process. According to the authors, in the process of externalizing meaning, the social stock of knowledge can be solidified and reproduced as well as changed through subjective individual action. Objectified social knowledge emerges through the successive processes of habitualization, institutionalization and finally the legitimation of actions, imbuing the world with meaning and becoming the shared reality of a society’s members. With regard to social reality, this means that the form and perception of the social structure too must be comprehended as objectified knowledge. The construction of groups, social strata, positions and types of individual behavior (roles) is likewise based on preexisting knowledge. For their part, these constructions are simultaneously fundamental components of a society’s knowledge about itself. Conversely, different social segments have their own, typical forms of knowledge. In the process of (primary and secondary) socialization, these collective bodies of knowledge are internalized by individuals, i.e. incorporated into subjective stocks of knowledge utilized for coming to terms with individual experiences. Because, therefore, the construction and reproduction of reality emanates from the individual efforts of all participants who bring their situative interests and needs into the picture, this process may also be understood as a conflict over which perceptions of reality will dominate. In other words: the institutionalization of knowledge also involves the institutionalization of power relations, which as soon as they attain validity, are inherited by the next generation through the process of legitimation.

Integration, generally understood as participation in “society” and adaptation to societal orders, is a constitutive part of the human condition. According to Berger and Luckmann, integration must be comprehended as an overarching social phenomenon. It in no way represents a passive internalization of given structures (norms, values, etc.); rather it is carried out within the dual process of externalization and internalization of knowledge epi-processually with the construction of reality. With that, our definition of integration reframes Georg Simmel’s concept of Vergesellschaftung (sociation) ([1908] 1971: 24) from a knowledge-based sociological perspective\(^1\). Participation in a society is not the result of a process, but a process in itself. Following Berger and Luckmann, we define two levels of integration. Integration in and within the everyday world is achieved constantly in action: (1) Personal integration is achieved when individuals find solutions for their problems in the inventory of social knowledge and introduce their knowledge into that larger inventory. (2) Positional integration takes place when persons take on social roles provided by society. (3) Social integration occurs when individual action is coordinated with the action of others using shared knowledge.\(^1\)

Symbolic integration, on the other hand, lies largely beyond the sphere or scope of individual action. Symbolic knowledge serves to explain and justify the institutional social order and exists in differing degrees of abstraction and scopes. On a basic level it is found in “theoretical propositions in a rudimentary form”, for instance in proverbs, legends, and folk tales (Berger and Th. Luckmann 1966: 94). Situated above it are explicit theories of legitimation, comprising a larger section of the

\(^1\) We find sociation to be the most fitting translation of Vergesellschaftung (Wolff 1950: lxiii; see Berking 2003). The frequently used translations “socialization” as well as “associative relationships” (Weber [1921] 1968: 40) are both misleading.
institutional order. On that plane, special expert groups are established to formulate such theories and independent institutions emerge encharged with administering and transmitting this knowledge. From the previous levels we may distinguish the level of symbolic universes. A symbolic universe unites the different spheres of meaning and reinforces the institutional order as a “symbolic totality” (Berger and Th. Luckmann ibidem: 95). Symbolic integration organizes events in the lives of individuals as well as social facts into an overarching order: (1) the integration of my biography, my symbolic universe, allows my life to appear meaningful, from my participation in various divergent activities to the gaps in my biographical history. (2) The integration of society as a whole in a comprehensive system of meaning legitimates social differences and disparities between different social groups including the existence of specialized bodies of knowledge and institutionalized forms of limiting access to the latter.2

Central institutions of symbolic integration include politics (Zifonun 2004b), religion and the (mass) media, each with their own integrational modes. They all contain an integrative “surplus” compared to the level of everyday integration. In addition to their ability to resolve everyday problems on a “higher” plane, they construct or perpetuate problems that do not (really) exist in everyday life and provide definitions of reality that cannot (really) be used, but which nonetheless have an effect on that reality. As a general rule: the further these constructions are from the world of the everyday, i.e. as their interactive intensity decreases, the more their corresponding visions gain in an absolutist character.

Participating in the institutional order of a society not only means that individuals adopt patterns of action and interpretation and participate in institutionalized role play; they also take part in the society’s „affective household“. From this perspective, efforts aiming at integration are never-ending. This is because, for one, the individual is never completely absorbed by society – a difference will always remain between individual and society, between subjective and social stocks of knowledge (Berger and Th. Luckmann ibidem: 133f.). Secondly, symbolic universes always contain conflicting elements. Structural contradictions may experience a symbolic harmonization, but are not “eliminated” (Soeffner 1997). Thus, the tension between integration and disintegration is indicative of human coexistence. To speak of an “integrated society” is an impermissible reification of inherently dynamic processes of classification, and ultimately serves to abscond this tension.

Social worlds and processes of integration

The division made between everyday life and symbolic worlds of meaning, it must be emphasized, is an analytical one. The effective experience of human reality transpires within the “life-world”, taken as “the totality of universes of meaning” (Honer 1999: 64). The life-world is never grasped by the individual in its entirety. Instead people conduct their lives in different „social worlds“ (Anselm Strauss) or “small life-worlds” (B. Luckmann 1978: 282), in figurations of the everyday world and symbolic universes of meaning. It is this ensemble of figurations which is effectively experienced as reality. When speaking of social worlds (Strauss 1978; Strauss 1993:

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2 The differentiation between everyday and symbolic integration is a reformulation of the functionalist differentiation between social and system integration taken from the perspective of a theory of action. For a critique of functionalism, see e.g. Berger and Th. Luckmann ibidem: 63ff.
215ff.) we refer to “relatively permanent, ‘institutionalized’ spaces of perception and action, secured by relatively stable routines and a distribution of labor” (Soeffner 1991: 363), which manifest themselves as comparatively self-sufficient fields of specialized knowledge. Social worlds are not necessarily subject to a territorial organization, but can display a high degree of “geographical dispersion”. Decisive for their constitution is the participation of their members in a shared context of interaction, not the strict determination of territorial boundaries.

The Straussean concept of social worlds exhibits some overlap with the notion of milieu as the latter is used in phenomenological discussions (see Gurwitsch 1979; Grathoff 1989). From a phenomenological perspective, a social milieu is characterized essentially by a common stock of shared knowledge, routines and patterns of interaction, or in other words an agreement as to what is seen as “normal”. The actions of social actors in the milieu are founded on mutually held assumptions regarding normalcy. These common assumptions are based on reciprocal expectations regarding behavior that serve to reinforce characteristic patterns of action in the milieu, and which direct the action of both ego and alter. Integration in a milieu, i.e. the creation of shared, binding perceptions of rules and the world, constitutes a task with which the members of the larger milieu are continually faced. Milieu boundaries run along lines where common assumptions as to shared repertoires of cognition and action no longer hold, where typified behavioral expectations are not mutually fulfilled. Milieu borders can thus be empirically localized at the crossover between the “foreign” and “familiar”.

The members of – largely bygone – “simple” societies (conceived in terms of ideal types) resided in a single “social world”, with a common frame of reference and stock of knowledge. Modern societies, however, are composed of a multitude of social worlds, at the core of which usually lies an activity or a social role. “Instead of being a full-time member of one „total and whole“ society, modern man [sic] is a part-time citizen in a variety of part-time societies. Instead of living within one meaningful world system to which he owes complete loyalty he now lives in many differently structured „worlds“ to each of which he owes only partly allegiance” (B. Luckmann 1978: 282). Individuals usually opt for one social world as the “nucleus around which his other life-worlds can be arranged” (B. Luckmann ibidem: 285).

Hence integration is first of all a matter of being integrated in and into a social world, for instance the world of sports. Integration e.g. through sports, that is integration in the greater society by means of participation in the sports milieu, in contrast, is a highly demanding matter. It is only possible to the extent that the world of sports itself is integrated in the society as a whole and depends on the status of sports in the greater social structure. In highly differentiated societies with loosely coupled social subworlds, each with their own inherent logic, integration through sports is highly difficult to conceive.

Alfred Schütz proceeded from four basic assumptions generally guiding human coexistence: that everything will remain as it is; that we can rely on the knowledge passed down to us; that it is sufficient to possess knowledge of general types of events; and finally that there is a generally shared knowledge which incorporates the three previous assumptions (Schütz [1944] 1964: 96). Schütz viewed the position of

3 We use the terms “social world” and “milieu” synonymously, while we do prefer “social world” and adopt the associated conceptual distinctions set forth by Strauss (“subworld”, “arena”, etc.).
4 For a milieu concept with a different weighting in the field of social structure analysis, see e.g. Hradil 1992, Matthiesen 1998.
5 In Schütz’s work, “the social world” remains in the singular.
the “stranger” defined by the condition that these four fundamental principles do not retain validity for that individual. Modern “intercultural” societies, however, appear to break with Schütz’s concept, being characterized precisely by an explicit “generalization of the status of stranger” (Hahn 2000: 20). The stock of common knowledge utilized for routine interaction becomes increasingly precarious for all society members; “asymmetries of knowledge” occur with a greater frequency and present greater challenges (Günthner and Th. Luckmann 2001); the zones of my „unknowing“ expand, while I am presented all the while with practically (or at least potentially) diverse contingencies and complex relationships; my individual endeavors to scour the social stock of knowledge for solutions to my problems are met with decreased success, often turning out contradictory solutions. All in all, it becomes increasingly unclear what "my society" actually is and “normalcy” is found in a state of crisis. The segmentation of the social world into social subworlds and the emergence of multi-faceted everyday and symbolic patterns of social order as well as personal coping strategies within and at the margins of social worlds can be understood as a reaction to these experiences of disintegration triggered by modernization processes. Social worlds of modern societies each resolve – with varying degrees of openness and closure – the problem of integration in their own way.

In the following we propose to draw from the considerations and assumptions outlined above for the analysis of migration processes by distinguishing five ideal types of social worlds, as they present themselves from the perspective of migrants. We interpret these social worlds as typical institutionalized patterns of the integration processes, i.e. as social “solutions” to the problem of integration as it confronts migrants in the modern era (2.1). In a further step, we highlight the transnational scope of social worlds and the importance of personal coping strategies (2.2) and emphasize the significance of conflict for the continuing process of integration both within and between social worlds (2.3). Finally (2.4), we point out a number of attempts to achieve an overall integration at the symbolic level and the problems related to these attempts.

**Types of migrational social worlds**

The construction of ideal types such as those we propose in the following is a methodological prerequisite for the empirical reconstruction of social worlds processes, which Strauss (1993: 215ff.) identifies primarily as segmentation (in subworlds), intersection (of different social worlds) and legitimation (of social worlds with respect to their members and their environment). Existing typologies, e.g. by Castles (2000: 134ff.), Esser (2004: 1128) or Portes and Rumbaut (2001: 52), are problematic to the extent that they present static real types or models instead of ideal types. The latter are solely analytic constructions which, by virtue of the distance they maintain to empirical reality, allow the latter to stand out more clearly.6 Case studies represent an ideal possibility for the reconstruction of everyday constructs (Schütz [1953] 1962), since they use distinctions made by actors concerning social worlds to allow different forms of everyday (personal, positional, social) and symbolic participation in their perceived life-worlds to come to the fore. In our methodological framework, individual cases thus serve not only to illustrate the validity of analytical distinctions gained through deduction; they are themselves a central instrument for generating knowledge.

Migrant milieu

When migration occurs on a mass scale from the same region, and not individually, migrant milieus often function as a core world. They provide their residents with a means to cope with their situation and its implications for their lives. Therefore, migrant milieus differ in their structure both from the migrants’ society of origin as well as from all other social worlds constituting the surrounding society. In such relatively closed milieus traditional cultural patterns are transformed and adapted; newly acquired knowledge is reformed and adjusted. In these milieus migrants create new institutions; innate patterns of economic and social reproduction emerge, along with internal social distinctions with their own definitions of status and position, all of which act to stabilize these social worlds. Nonetheless, subsequent generations must decide if these transitional milieus are adequate to confront the new problems with which they are faced. Like all social worlds, migrant milieus possess a frame of reference that extends beyond their own borders (Soeffner 1991: 364ff.). Their participants are simultaneously members of other social worlds to which they also hold allegiance and for whose benefit they may decide to reduce or even end their milieu-specific activities. Through such exchange agents moving between different worlds, migrant milieus are constantly supplied with new knowledge. Social worlds can incorporate the dynamics inherent in the multiple affiliations of their members and act to induce change (ultimately transcending their own boundaries) or they can respond to those centrifugal forces by social closure.

Segregational milieu

When relationships and interdependencies arise between members of different groups, a minimum amount of knowledge must exist to coordinate these relationships. As such, migrants are, like Georg Simmel’s stranger, “an element of the group itself” (Simmel ([1908] 1950: 402), that is, not merely abstract figures. The autochthonous and migrant populations do however become “estranged” when they cease to be relevant for one another, i.e. if socio-structural differentiation has progresses to the point that no relationships are formed between the two sides. This extreme state could develop through a gradual process; however, it is in fact highly improbable. In reference to migrant groups, segregational processes tend to occur when the resolutely autonomous organization of migrant groups closes these groups from the outside world. Ethnic segregation is especially likely when „ethnicity“ and class membership go hand in hand and the group differs from the surrounding society both in terms of „ethnicity“ and its position in the larger social structure. The group’s attempt to anchor itself in such a social world consumed by sealing itself off from external influences can capsize into a search for an all-encompassing universe of meaning, resulting in the emergence of “ethnic minorities” (Castles and Miller 2003: 32ff.) or “parallel societies”.

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7 Particularly the exposure to other social worlds within the recipient society (school, work, etc.) may cause such a shift.

8 Hartmut Esser has repeatedly referred to the – empirically founded – fact that permanent ethnic differentiation is regularly linked to ethnic stratification, which can only be avoided through “structural assimilation” (see Esser 2000: 292-306).
Assimilatory milieu

In contrast to migrant and segregational milieus, actors in assimilatory milieus do not occupy themselves primarily with coping with the consequences of migration. In this milieu, assimilation occurs in the sense that migrants adopt the existing stock of knowledge of the social majority, while their knowledge does not enter or intermingle with that cognitive body. For assimilatory milieus to be established, the number of migrants who are permitted access must remain relatively small and effective defense and control mechanisms must be set up to prevent “foreign knowledge” from seeping into the general stock of knowledge. Even so, the stock of knowledge changes, since it must include the information on the forms of foreign knowledge and which migrants can be assimilated (e.g. “they are fundamentalists”, etc.). To participate in an assimilatory milieu, migrants must first shed everyday practices that are “ethnically” or “culturally” coded while at once being willing to adopt the cultural stereotypes held by the social majority.

Marginalization milieu

The marginalization milieu stands in contrast not only to the migrant milieu, but also to the assimilatory milieu. Like the segregation milieu, it is decidedly particularistic. In this case, however, segregational efforts proceed from the social majority. The milieu is shaped as to allow the autochthonous population to institutionalize migrants’ “ethnicity” as an indisputable deviant “master status” (Hughes [1945] 1971; Becker 1966: 32f.). In consequence, even when migrants are culturally assimilated they remain shut out from central points in the system of available positions in a society. Thus, cultural assimilation does not lead to structural assimilation, but to ethnic stratification. In contrast, in the case of assimilatory milieus, for migrants who have adopted the culture of the social majority the possibility of structural assimilation also arises, i.e. moving into higher positions and functions in the social hierarchy. Whereas migrant milieus and segregational milieus attempt to come to terms with migration and assimilatory milieus strive to minimize cultural differences, marginalization milieus are decidedly geared toward maintaining cultural patterns that are coded as belonging to the “social majority”. Hence they remain relatively closed to migrants.

Intercultural milieu

An additional possibility is the emergence of an “interculture” in more precise terms. We refer to the development of an “interculture” when cultural syncretism results in an equal distribution of social practices and cultural meanings among the members of a given milieu. Moreover, there are no enduring, long-term attributions of “ethnic” difference among members or social inequality traceable along “ethnic” categories. In other words, “ethnicity” holds no relevance in the milieu. This kind of cultural syncretism, however, is not only a result of migration, but a consequence of overall global cultural contact. Local appropriations of globally available styles and goods play a prominent part in this process. We will only begin to discern the extent to which the economic migration of the past fifty years will have lasting effects on the underlying institutional structures of social knowledge in host countries within another two decades at the earliest.

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9 This could be the case when hybrid linguistic constructions find their way into the everyday vocabulary and official language use.
Transnational and individual responses

Social worlds, and especially those which we have discussed as migrant milieus, are not necessarily part of a larger society (a state or nation). Instead, transnational social worlds participate in various societies transcending the territorial borders of nations. In addition to regular travel between the regions involved by members of such social worlds, the use of interactive media and mass media play a formative role. "Whereas the ‘old ethnicity’ was a ‘community of the ground’, a „place-defined group” linked by recurrent interaction, “new ethnicity” is based on different kinds of communication networks. Communication through different interactive media, such as the telephone or the use of mass media (television, radio, newspaper) makes it possible to contextualize ethnicity as a ‘community of the mind’" (Knoblauch 2001: 27) (see additionally Appadurai 1996; Portes et al. 1999: 229).

While, together with media in national languages, above all newspapers and the novel (Anderson 1983), institutions such as schools and armies were essential for the emergence of a national consciousness, as regards transnational consciousness, the weight has clearly shifted toward anonymous or indirect communication.

Personal models of integration can generate individualistic hybrid identities that “mirror” the large-scale model of cultural hybridization. The latter are not so much specific forms of new “patchwork identities” (Bastelexistenzen) (Hitzler and Honer 1994), which consist of the attempt to integrate and reconcile membership in divergent social worlds into a coherent personal biography (B. Luckmann 1978: 285), but rather a phenomenon that Georg Simmel considered to be characteristic of modern, pluralistic societies: the overlapping of different “social circles” of individual participation within the individual (see Simmel [1908] 1955). It is precisely this multiplication of internalized social worlds, which – in an apparent paradox – places the coherency of personal identity in doubt and triggers processes of individualization in response to this apparent “crisis” (Th. Luckmann 1979). Differently as the cliché would have it, children of migrants are not stranded between two cultures, but often (independently from their social status) cultivate an “ethnicized individualism”. Their experience of not completely being subsumed under one (national) culture feeds their distanced relationship to collective identities and can even initiate social processes of self-charismatization in which the subjective perception and the accentuation of extraordinary personal qualities and achievements play a central role.

Stylization must be cited as a further mode of constructing social order (Zifonun 2008). Modern lifestyles are expressive forms of self-presentation which individuals use to communicate their perspectives towards life and to demonstrate their social standing. They are not primarily employed as a vehicle for demonstrating membership in a “community”. Instead they are forms of individual ascription and distinction which individuals use to demonstrate an affiliation with or distance from certain social styles while simultaneously displaying their individual position within or attitude toward their own “group” (Soeffner 2005b: 20). Thus ethnic lifestyles are an expression of “symbolic ethnicity” (Gans 1979). They act as mechanisms of individual ascription and distinction, which can be tried on, discarded and replaced, and not as expressions of collective identity and “primordial” ethnicity.

For a discussion of the related concepts of transnational social spaces and transnational social fields, see Roudometof 2005: 119f.
Conflict and arenas

The typology presented above (2.1) might give the impression that social worlds create relatively frictionless responses to the cultural dynamics of a globalizing world. Yet in fact social processes in and between social worlds can be highly laden with conflict:

While direct distributional struggles typical of traditional modernity lose their significance [...], in many places, complex, indirect and unregulated struggles of various types are being fought over material goods, ideologies, collective identities, living arrangements and quality, social spaces, time and resources, opportunities, fundamental and specific questions [...]. I.e. that which is regarded as normal in a society is comprised of [...] a multitude of small, yet quasi permanent disputes, quarrels and compromises taking place in daily interaction, which inevitably arise from the meeting and confrontation of culturally diverse orientations and individual hierarchies of relevance. (Hitzler 1999: 479f.)

What might at first appear to be a tendency toward anomy, an apparently irreversible loss of social order, proves under closer inspection to be the initial formative phases of new orders, including new orders of conflict. The latter are not arbitrary and random, but emerge in areas of specific collisions of interest where participants are seeking solutions to these conflicts.

Problems related to action and meaning occurring at the intersecting interfaces of social (sub)worlds lead to the formation of what Anselm Strauss termed arenas (Strauss 1993: 225ff), spaces for addressing conflict. Such conflicts are often sparked in classic social world such as schools, workplaces or residential neighborhoods. They become the zones of contact where juxtaposing social worlds struggle to define their boundaries. Participants in these conflicts must permanently find new answers to the questions “Who am I?” and “Who are we?” At the same time, the presence of conflicts indicates the development of new forms of integration processes. They are an expression of the mutual relevance of the actors for one another. What is more: Norbert Elias pointed out that shifts in power relations between groups which benefit outsiders can generate conflict, but also new models of social order (Elias and Scotson 1994). Typical for such situations is, among other patterns, that the usual forms of ethnic categorization (Pierik 2004) and stereotyping (Allport [1954] 1979) are relinquished in favor of “stereotypes of interculturality” (Zifonun 2007). In contrast to the traditional “established vs. outsiders figuration”, in which the former remain largely unchallenged in expressing their stereotypes and the latter relatively voiceless (at least publicly); in the constellation described above, mutual stereotyping occurs. Furthermore, the stereotypes employed here constitute a difference between the interactive partners; yet they do not call into question the fundamental equality of interacting parties. They do not aim at the “categorical exclusion” (Sutterlüty and Neckel 2006) of the other groups. In order to take the last edge off these stereotypes, however, other prerequisites must be present: “Only when there is contact between persons of the same status in situations that are problematic for both sides and when these become a lasting experience of cooperative problem-solving do the (negative) stereotypes dissolve and make way for a new set of feelings of mutual friendship” (Esser 2000: 298f.).
In the broader public sphere, in the arenas that transcend the borders of individual social worlds, where conflicts over the validity of competing problem definitions are carried out and solutions for collective problems are negotiated, the characteristic traits of modern societies shaped by immigration become especially apparent. (Medialized) debates over the distribution of scarce resources, access to public positions, participatory rights and opportunities rarely approximate rational ideals for reaching consensus, e.g. those put forth by Habermasian discourse ethics (Habermas 1990). Instead they take the shape of (irresolvable) conflicts over symbols (e.g. „headscarf debates“ in Germany and France), emotionalized „foreigner debates“ or (academic) „discourses of identity“ (including unavoidable accusations of racism), thereby confirming their character as tokens of a garrulous culture of quasi-theatrical public enactment, which modern societies use to cope with the dubious, unfinished and broadly ambivalent nature of their models of social order and forms of social integration. These conflicts have often been idealized as forms of „resistance“ by scholars in cultural studies and as “reflexive modernity” by sociologists. Little attention, however, has been given to the fact that these conflicts are highly structured and played out along largely predetermined paths. In other words, these collective forms of permanent reflection (Dauerrreflexion) have experienced a veritable institutionalization (Schelsky [1957] 1965), lending a new form of security and order to society. However, in this type of public dispute, fundamental questions of the (re)distribution or safeguarding of power are transferred to the „cultural“ sphere and thus rendered invisible.

Moreover, these novel (medialized) ritualizations and structures of public exchange cannot obscure the fundamental difficulties of symbolic integration in highly modern societies: “It goes without saying that this multiplication of perspectives greatly increases the problem of establishing a stable symbolic canopy for the entire society” (Berger and Th. Luckmann 1966: 86). Nevertheless, attempts to create an overarching symbolic integration do exist; four of them should be named at this juncture.

The “imagined commonality or community” (M. Weber) of the nation was a product of the capitalist and bourgeois revolutions in Europe. Just as the nation state initially had to overcome widespread resistance (in particular on the part of local and religious centers of power and the „transnational“ aristocracy), the binding capacity of national integration is today once again subject to question. The consequences of transnational migration aside, it cannot be denied that present day society is structured according to lifestyle milieus that are no longer able to agree upon a single “collective identity” to which they might lay claim as a group. This condition becomes particularly apparent through the attempt to construct “national consciousness” with reference to history which presently enjoys popularity worldwide (Levy and Sznaider 2002). Current politics of memory stand in marked contrast to those of the past. Triumphant heroic narratives have been replaced by admission of nations” historic guilt. Discourses of guilt can play a role in constructing identities, as they enable nations to acquire an image of moral integrity and wisdom by displaying an awareness of their guilt on the international stage. National auto-stigmatization – often paired with discourses portraying the nation as a victim – can accordingly be interpreted firstly, as an attempt at neo-national closure through politics of memory (Soeffner 2005a; Zifonun 2004a). This reactive pattern appears capable of bringing about integration. We can, secondly, interpret radical religious acts and ideologies in a similar manner, which are by no means an expression of the further existence of...
traditional forms of faith. Instead, religious fundamentalism combines totalitarian religious claims with political claims to authority and with specific forms of social modernity, particularly in regard to the use of media, state organization and social structure (Kurzman 2002).

Together with national discourses of memory and religious proclamations of salvation, thirdly, the previously cited "immigrant debates" should be mentioned, which in their role as symbolic discourses of collective self-defense attempt to create unity and identity regardless of whether they do not (any longer) exist. The fictitious image of the "immigrant" thus facilitates the construction of a fictitious image of the "Nation", on which the society otherwise, i.e. without "foreigners" would not be able to come to agreement. Medial reification (e.g. of Islam) creates a symbolic surplus of stereotypes, which can hardly be overcome, corrected or countered in daily interactions. We rely accordingly to a large extent on the symbolic knowledge about "foreign" groups provided to us by the mass media. Fourthly, complementary problems arise from humanistic ideals proclaiming the general reconciliation of humanity as their goal. Concepts such as a "humane society", appeals for "tolerance and acceptance", for "humane conduct" and "solidarity among all peoples" (see e.g. Küng and Kuschel 1993) suffer from an enormous degree of abstraction. It is highly improbable that these vague and lofty goals of love for the "human family" can ever be realized within the bounds of everyday social existence. The invisible hand of the market appears to be more successful in this respect: the transnational symbols of a mass consumer culture frame participation as a question of taste and above all money.11

Process, crisis of meaning, life-world: The contribution of the sociology of knowledge to migration studies

The current theoretical debate in migration research is dominated by the theory of assimilation and the transnationalism thesis. Both schools argue in structuralist terms: concepts such as “ethnic community”, “ethclass” or “ethnic mobility trap”, just as “segmented assimilation” or “transnational social spaces” create relatively static images of social reality. In this image of society arranged with the aid of structuralist sociological concepts, society is portrayed as a clearly organized horizontal and vertical entity, in which groups, social strata or ethnicities are ordered alongside one another. Our approach takes a different perspective: instead of concentrating on changes in the social structure of the recipient society caused by migration thereby always proceeding from socio-structural phenomena, we propose the “life-world” perspective of active individuals as a basis for analysis. This would require an investigation of the structuring principles of integration processes in life-worlds which establish themselves as a consequence of migration. These processes include in particular the construction, maintenance and transformation of everyday cultural models and processes of ascription (classification, categorization, stereotyping, “othering”) as well as drawing symbolic boundaries during “intercultural” contact (e.g. through stylization). An interest in these processes and their structuring principles, however, is not solely theoretical. It is also oriented on the specific structural situation

11 It should have become clear at this point that the modes of symbolic integration discussed above – through their performative enactment – result in the very units and divisions of society which they then promise to integrate – be it the nation, the community of religious believers or the universal world society.
of modern societies in which social structures by no means enjoy the same stability, permanence and taken-for-grantedness as may have been the case in other societal forms. The modern “pluralization of social life-worlds” (Berger, Berger and Kellner 1973: 63ff.) and the concomitant “crisis of meaning” (Berger and Th. Luckmann 1995) – i.e. paradox and ambivalence experienced in the life-world – are countered by contemporary societies – both at the individual and the collective level – with an intensification of negotiation processes between separate and yet interdependent social spheres. Ultimately the diagnosis of social pluralization and its consequences led Max Weber and Georg Simmel to conceive of sociology as an analytical discipline concerned with social processes, observable in their preference for the term “sociation” (Vergesellschaftung) over “society” (Gesellschaft). The image of society ensuing from this perspective differs markedly from that suggested by traditional sociological terminology: society is not organized in clearly identifiable groups, social hierarchies, statuses, etc. Instead paradoxes and inconsistencies, multiple and contradictory loyalties, heterogeneity and contradiction become just as visible as do the everyday processes of construction and classification which we have discussed above.

In a recent study examining ethnicity and ethnic self-organization, Andreas Wimmer offered a striking presentation of the current explanatory problems faced by migration research (Wimmer 2004). Wimmer noted the highly controversial nature of ethnic membership as a seemingly “natural”, everyday category, along with the unresolved problem as to how and why everyday actors attribute any relevance to ethnicity at all as an act of symbolic ascription (see also Berking 2003).12 From a methodological stance, Wimmer criticizes both the thesis of ethnification and studies in assimilation and transnationalism. The former holds that ethnicity is merely a secondary effect of public discourses and thus “non-authentic”. The latter two perspectives often take the relevance of ethnicity for granted in their research (Wimmer ibidem: 3, 29). For his own study of the relevance of ethnicity for processes of group formation, he undertook a neighborhood study using a “research design that does not assume the existence of ethnic groups” (Wimmer ibidem: 26). Wimmer provides an impressive description of the complexity of group formation processes, while recognizing the necessity of going beyond a purely descriptive approach. Together with Nina Glick Schiller, Wimmer also raised awareness as to implicit nationalistic methodologies which are not only characteristic of assimilation studies, but also their counterpart, transnationalism research. In its conceptualization of “transnational communities” the latter school of thought transfers the assumptions of a homogeneous and discretely bound community from the nation-state onto these communities (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003: esp. 598). Here too, the authors emphasize that: “Going beyond methodological nationalism requires analytical tools and concepts not colored by the self-evidence of a world ordered into nation-states” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller ibidem: 599). The concept of social worlds provides such an analytical framework. Completely in line with Wimmer’s terms, Anselm Strauss developed this concept in order to dispose of an instrument to analyze social processes without preassuming an “asserted or presumed dominance of social class, race, gender, and other social units” (Strauss 1993: 210). Nor would it be necessary to pack these differences into a preassumed structure of differentiation and

12 By distinguishing between ethnicity as a quasi “natural” category and an act of symbolic ascription, we refer to the distinction made above between everyday and symbolic integration. This analytical distinction is similar to the one made between the symbolic and social aspects of the lines drawn between ethnic groups. For recent discussions, see Lamont and Molnár 2002, Alba 2005: 22.
stratification on a national scale and without analytically privileging any level of sociation.13

Meanwhile the debate between assimilation theory and transnationalism research seems to have run its course. Two major monographs have appeared (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The adversaries have integrated their opponents’ arguments into their own concepts; others have formulated broader theoretical models (Esser 2004; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Yet none of the parties involved have left behind the underlying structuralist consensus of the debate.

Our approach emphasizes that the interactive character of society, which is continually produced by its members in processes of social construction, must remain part of the analysis. Our suggestion is that of a theory of everyday action, which takes the experience of everyday actors seriously instead of conceiving of the actors as bearers of social positions in a hyperstable “system”.

In its original meaning, “integration” refers to the completion of an entirety, to recreating a whole through the insertion of its necessary parts. The term is used in this same sense by integration researchers; Hartmut Esser defines integration for example as “the relatively balanced coherence of the parts of a whole and its delimitation from unspecified surroundings” (Esser 2000: 285). Thus, in our theoretical considerations, if we propose to proceed neither from the society, nor from the isolated individual, this implies an inversion of the central question of integration research. This inversion enables us to depart from conceptualizing society as a totality and to ask instead in which specific instances of sociation the individual participates (at local, national or transnational levels, of temporary or enduring nature, etc.) and to conceive of this question as related to both the processes of sociation in life-worlds and integration mechanisms.14 The concept of social worlds remains analytically open to all levels of sociation (Unruh 1980). Thus, it may also prove helpful in resolving some of the theoretical difficulties around concepts like globalization and localization (Roudometof 2005). By no means do we seek to discredit the relevance of the research questions and results of integration studies. For example, Hartmut Esser’s structural analyses of ethnic inequality and ethnic differentiation (Esser 2004: 1147ff.) and his analytical distinctions and empirical findings are of great significance for a knowledge-based sociology of migration and should be integrated into a general account of social world processes. A life-world perspective on „integration“ can thus be seen as an analog to (quantitative) structural analyses of social integration – the two perspectives stand in a relationship of mutual complementarity.

Alfred Schütz and his students – despite their emphasis on the anonymization of social relations, the unequal social distribution of knowledge and the difficulties of symbolic integration – continue to work within the conceptual framework of the nation-state, thereby assuming an inherent “internal condition” of society, i.e. implying a discrete, contained social stock of knowledge. They do not question the validity of basic framework upon which they base their assumptions. However, once

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13 By restricting itself to a single level of sociation, transnationalism research merely reproduces the “monism” contained in methodological nationalism on a “higher” level. For an incisive exception, see Weiss 2005.

14 For a lucid critique of “holism” see Appadurai 1986.
this foundation is placed in doubt, a different perspective opens up. One result is that the extent of the problem clearly increases. At the same time, certain problems facing integration that Schütz noted disappear. The processes of transnational and local integration within social worlds fill the vacuum left behind as the nation ceases to be the ultimate point of reference for integration.

In summary, our outline offers a set of related “sensitizing concepts” that might “provide starting points for building analysis to produce a grounded theory” (Bowen 2006: 7), in our case: grounded theories of specific forms of immigrant incorporation. We have no intention to pinpoint a comprehensive, “definitive” framework for the study of the consequences of migration, since we do not believe that, at this point, this is feasible. However, as Herbert Blumer (1954: 8) put it: “Sensitizing concepts can be tested, improved and refined. Their validity can be assayed through careful study of empirical instances which they are presumed to cover. Relevant features of such instances, which one finds not to be covered adequately by what the concept asserts and implies, become the means of revising the concept”. In order to “test, improve and refine”, we argue that a student of integration should for a start choose a particular social world – by which we mean the issue-centered spheres of interaction the members of which more often than not have multiple, overlapping and changing memberships – he or she is interested in. In a second step, it might be useful to get a (intentionally static) descriptive understanding of the nature of the social world under scrutiny. In this, our typology of social worlds – migrant milieu, segregational milieu, assimilatory milieu, marginalization milieu, intercultural milieu – and the respective forms of everyday-life and symbolic integration of their members might be of some help. Thirdly, one can then move on to identifying the particularities of the processes of (internal) segmentation (into subworlds), intersection (with neighbouring social worlds) and legitimation (of both the social world’s existence and activities as well as its members’ attitudes and orientations) by which this social world is continuously reproduced and altered. This is where the cultural forms and social modes that we have identified come into play: An interest in the interaction between migrants and autochthonous populations will draw attention to the arena-processes of categorization, stereotyping, drawing of boundaries, negotiation, conflict and permanent reflection. These processes will regularly come into play where social worlds segment or intersect and their integrity is being questioned. An interest in the biographical ways by which migrants handle their ambivalent social position will benefit from examining personal coping strategies – here we have elaborated on ethnic individualism and stylization. Finally, an interest in the public representations of collective identity in (media) discourses will almost certainly direct ones attention to nationalism, religious fundamentalism, racism and humanism and the associated difficulties of the symbolic construction of unity in highly differentiated societies.

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Aristotle’s *Rhetoric:*
A Pragmatist Analysis of Persuasive Interchange

**Abstract**

Approaching rhetoric as the study of persuasive interchange, this paper considers the relevance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for the study of human group life. Although virtually unknown to modern day social scientists, this text has great relevance for contemporary scholarship. Not only does Aristotle’s text centrally address influence work (and resistance), identities and reputations, deviance and culpability, emotionality and deliberation, and the broader process of human knowing and acting in political, character shaping, and courtroom contexts, but Aristotle also deals with these matters in remarkably comprehensive, systematic, and precise terms. Attending to the human capacity for agency, Aristotle also works with a sustained appreciation of purposive, reflective, adjustive interchange.

Hence, whereas this text is invaluable of as a resource for the comparative transhistorical analysis of human interchange, it also suggests a great many ways that contemporary scholarship could be extended in the quest for a more adequate, more authentic social science.

**Keywords**

Aristotle; Rhetoric; Influence; Activity; Agency; Identity; Emotions; Justice; Culpability; Symbolic interaction; Pragmatism

The term rhetoric often is used in rather casual, dismissive terms to refer to words, phrases, or speeches intended to persuade others into accepting positions that are contrary to their interests. By contrast, this paper returns to the study of rhetoric as this was developed in the classical Greek era and engages rhetoric as a highly consequential facet of human interchange.

Approached thusly, it becomes apparent that rhetoric not only is relevant across all realms of human association but that the study of persuasive endeavor also is fundamental for comprehending the negotiated, practically accomplished nature of human group life.

Building on symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969; Prus 1996, 1997, 1999; Prus and Grills 2003) as a pragmatist and ethnographically informed approach to the study of human knowing and acting, this paper considers the relevance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for contemporary scholarship.
Following an introduction to this classical Greek text and a brief consideration of its neglect within, as well as its relevance for, the social sciences, this paper provides a highly compacted, chapter and verse synopsis of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. The paper concludes with a consideration of some ways that this text may be used to inform and vitalize the social sciences agenda.

The following quotation from the Roman orator and author Marcus Tullius Cicero (c106-43BCE) helps establish the broader context in which Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was developed:15

Aristotle collected the early books on rhetoric, even going back as far as Tisias, well known as the originator and inventor of the art; he made a careful examination of the rules of each author and wrote them out in plain language, giving the author’s name, and finally gave a painstaking explanation of the difficult parts. And he so surpassed the original authorities in charm and brevity that no one becomes acquainted with their ideas from their own books, but everyone who wishes to know what their doctrines are, turns to Aristotle, believing him to give a much more convenient exposition. He, then, published his own works and those of his predecessors, and as a result we became acquainted with him and the others as well through his work. His successors, although they devoted most of their attention to the noblest parts of philosophy, as the master whose principles they followed had done, nevertheless left us much instruction in rhetoric. (Cicero, De Inventione, II.ii:6-7 [Hubbel, trans.])

Demosthenes (c384-322BCE) may be the best known of all Greek rhetoricians, but it is Demosthenes’ contemporary Aristotle (c384-322BCE) who “wrote the book on rhetoric.” Aristotle was not the first Greek scholar to write about rhetoric but Aristotle’s work is so comprehensive, astute, and philosophically informed that it is difficult to find another author in the pages of history to the present time who compares with Aristotle on these grounds.

Indeed, while Marcus Tullius Cicero is a most exceptional student of rhetoric and explicitly strives to maintain closer connections between philosophy and rhetoric, even the highly instructive texts that Cicero produced must be seen within the context of Aristotle’s groundbreaking and still remarkably enabling text on rhetoric (also see Prus 2008).

Interestingly, although rhetoric as a scholarly subject matter has great relevance for the political, judicial, and ceremonial features of community life, the study of rhetoric has received very little attention from those in the social sciences.

In part, this may reflect the longstanding tendency to envision and dismiss rhetoric as a superficial, if not also despicable, linguistic device intended to dupe the more naive among us. The inference is that there would be no reason to study something so shallow on the one hand or so morally unworthy of the other. Nevertheless, even those pursuing religious and/or moralist agendas, frequently and intensively invoke rhetoric of condemnation in disparaging viewpoints and practices (including pluralist scholarship) that do not directly support their agendas as well as typically employ extended rhetorical enhancements of their own positions.

In part too, the neglect of rhetoric in the social sciences appears to reflect a broader positivist attempt to reduce human group life to sets of factors and quantitative equations. Failing to attend to the differences between humans and other subject matters as well as modeling themselves on rather limited conceptions of the

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15 The terms rhetorician (Greek) and orator (Latin) are used interchangeably to refer to those who assume roles as speakers in persuasive endeavors.
ways that the physical sciences are accomplished in practice, those adopting these viewpoints have disregarded, if not more overtly dismissed, matters of knowing, thinking, and acting as well as the broader sets of interchanges by which human community life is accomplished (see Blumer 1969; Prus 1996, 1999, 2007b,c; Puddephatt and Prus 2007; Grills and Prus 2008).

Still, even those adopting interpretivist viewpoints in the human sciences – most notably those who work with symbolic interactionist, reality constructionist, ethnomethodological, and associated approaches, also have neglected the literature on rhetoric.

In some ways, this seems particularly puzzling for this latter set of scholars not only emphasizes the centrality of language for knowing and acting but also attends more directly to the reflective, contrived, and negotiated nature of human association.

Relatedly, whereas the interactionists and some other scholars have explicitly focused on identities and reputations as highly consequential features of community life (see, for instance Mead 1934; Lemert 1951, 1967; Garfinkel 1956; Klapp 1962, 1964, 1971; Becker 1963; and Prus 1996, 1997), these works display little if any direct familiarity with rhetoric as an intellectual tradition. Indeed, the overall impression one would derive from this literature is that our contemporaries have envisioned themselves to have been among the first to conceptually address these understandings of the labeling, designating, or accounting process and the interchanges taking place therein.

I might reference my own ignorance of classical Greek and Latin scholarship as a case in point. Thus, although some of my later work (e.g., Prus 1999, 2003, 2004; Prus and Grills 2003) overtly addresses some of the classical literature that pertains to influence work and the development of identities and reputations, it was only in 1998 through examining the broader literature on power that I began to appreciate the fuller relevance of classical Greek scholarship for the social sciences.

Overtime, as well, I began to realize that the early Greek and Latin literatures had been much neglected in academia more generally. Much material from the Greek and Latin eras was lost or destroyed as the Greek and Roman empires, in turn, fell into states of disarray. Likewise, more texts were disregarded or destroyed by the early Christians. Still, scholarship was yet further decimated during the dark ages (circa 500-1000) and Western European scholars only began to reestablish some more minimal levels of competence in the 10th century.

Whereas the discovery of some of Aristotle’s texts in the 13th century (represented most adequately in the works of Thomas Aquinas 1225-1275) offered the potential for Western European scholars to more fully reengage and sustain some of the major conceptual materials of the past, much of the analytic emphasis of Greek scholarship subsequently would be displaced amidst the 16th century Renaissance and the somewhat concurrent emergence of the Protestant Reformation.

As Durkheim (1904-1905) indicates at some length, the widely acclaimed 16th century Renaissance was much more consequential as an artistic, poetic, and expressive medium for revisiting the past than as a context in which the fuller array of the intellectual products of the classical Greek and Latin eras were astutely examined, screened, and gleaned for their scholarly contributions.

In addition to (a) the failure of the 16th century Renaissance authors (as Durkheim stresses) to attend to philosophy and the study of community life and (b) the Protestant disregard of philosophic matters (including Aristotle’s texts) associated with Catholic theology, other 16th–20th century Western European developments also mitigated against a fuller revival of classical scholarship. More notably, this included
(c) French and German rationalism, (d) French, British, and American scientism, (e) Marxist socialism, and (f) the intrigues associated with the European contact and colonization of the “New world.” All of these emphases served to obscure, where they did not more overtly dismiss, classical Greek and Latin scholarship.

Thus, although one finds some scattered pockets of pluralist humanist / pragmatist thought from the Greek era to the present time in a variety of fields of endeavor (Prus, 2004), most of the more noteworthy instances of analysis of human knowing and acting were not sustained for extended periods of time.

Indeed, the accomplishments of the past (as Durkheim reminds us) are often taken for granted or displaced by the presentist (here and now) emphasis that characterizes community life. Thus, scholarly ventures often succumb to shifting arrays and tolerances of political and religious environments. As well, people often disregard the rigors of scholarship amidst concerns with entertainment and recreational motifs, technical innovations, and economic challenges as well as group and individual quests for prominence.

Moreover, many of those more explicitly adopting pragmatist or other interpretivist viewpoints appear to have been only vaguely aware of their intellectual roots and often had little direct fluency with the particular texts developed in the classical Greek tradition. Among the American pragmatists, for instance, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead evidence little sustained familiarity with Aristotle’s texts and exhibit no direct awareness of Aristotle’s Rhetoric or other sustained analyses of rhetoric. This is particularly ironic, given the emphasis that language, communication, and situated definitions of reality assume in pragmatist scholarship.

Still, as Cicero (Cicero, Brutus; also see Rosenfield 1971; Vickers 1988) observes, most of the “philosophic brotherhood,” albeit often unwittingly, have accepted Socrates’ (469-399BCE) and Plato’s (420-348BCE) condemnations of rhetoric and sophism. As a result, most philosophers not only have distanced themselves from the study of rhetoric but (in stressing dialectic reasoning to the exclusion of overt inquiry into actual instances and associated activities) also have detached themselves from the study of “what is.”16 Whereas the American pragmatists sought to reduce this latter tendency through their emphasis on studying human knowing and acting, they appear to have remained ignorant of the highly enabling classical Greek and Latin literature on rhetoric.

To place matters in a historical context, it is Plato’s student Aristotle, who emerges as an extremely consequential exception to the division of philosophy and rhetoric. Not only does Aristotle reject the mind-body dualism, the idealism of forms, and the otherworld (divine, spiritual) emphasis of Socrates and Plato, but Aristotle much more directly and consistently addresses the enacted nature of human group life.17 Thus, in his work on ethics, politics, poetics, and rhetoric, Aristotle centrally focuses on activities, reflectivity, relationships and interchange as these take place in instances. Moreover, rather than presuming some pre-existing set of forms through

16 Unfortunately as well, as Cicero observes, most rhetoricians have neglected the study of philosophy.
17 Still, despite Plato's other emphases, it is important to acknowledge consequential features of pragmatist thought found in Plato's texts. For some of the dialogues in which Plato addresses language, rhetoric, government, fiction, morality and regulation, and other associated features of human interchange, see Phaedrus, Sophist, Statesman, Theaetetus, and Cratylus, as well as Republic and Laws. Thus, even in condemning rhetoricians, sophists, poets, and politicians, all of whom commonly utilize rhetoric in their endeavors, Plato provides some highly instructive considerations of people's emphases and activities.
which things are known (Plato, following Socrates on this), Aristotle contends that
things are known through comparative examinations of the instances, instruction, and
a gradual accumulation of concepts.

In contrast to Socrates and Plato, who maintain a more fundamental divine,
theological, or otherworld emphasis in developing their thoughts, Aristotle (c384-
322BCE) focuses primarily on the humanly known and engaged (i.e., sensate) world.

Likewise, Aristotle does not share the intense disaffection with sophists and
rhetoricians that one associates with Socrates and Plato (Gorgias, Phaedrus). 18
Instead, Aristotle recognizes the philosophic - analytical and practical - engaged
features of influence work and intends to examine the practice of rhetoric more
specifically as an art (technique) of interchange.

As with another contemporary Isocrates (436-338 BCE), Aristotle is concerned
that people use rhetoric for virtuous ends. However, both Isocrates and Aristotle also
recognize that, virtuous or otherwise, people may very well use rhetoric in attempts to
promote their positions over those of others. Thus, both Isocrates and Aristotle intend
to focus on the ways that people generate and invoke rhetoric and its relevance for
community life more generally. Still, compared to Isocrates, Aristotle emerges as the
much more complete student of the human condition. Thus, Rhetoric constitutes only
a portion of the work that Aristotle devotes to rationality as a reflective, humanly
engaged process.

However, and much more importantly for our immediate purposes, Aristotle’s
consideration of rhetoric not only is informed by a more fundamental pragmatist
attentiveness to the study of human knowing and acting but his analysis of rhetoric
also more directly contributes to broader pragmatist informed considerations of
community life, the interchanges people develop within, and their collectively
generated senses of self and other. 19

Acknowledging an [out there] in which people exist and act, Aristotle recognizes
that people not only may adopt different viewpoints on [things] but they may also
assume active roles in shaping others' definitions of things and, relatedly, have the
potential to affect the ways that others think about and act toward those things.

Further, although Aristotle has a clear preference for careful, sustained dialectic
reasoning and formal, logical deductions in judgments of fact over the more general
practices of rhetoric, he recognizes that the persuasion process -- and people’s
involvements therein -- cuts across a great many sectors of community life. Thus,
there are many occasions in which judges would not be concerned with more

18 For those who are less familiar with the classical Greek literature, it might be observed that
Socrates left no written text but is primarily known through his role as the central speaker in
several of Plato's dialogues. Notably, too, Plato never speaks directly for himself in this text but
appears sympathetic to the positions he represents through his central speaker(s). Aristotle, on
the other hand speaks directly as the author of his texts. Further, whereas Plato typically leaves
his considerations of all realms of human knowing in some state of suspension at the
conclusions of his dialogues, Aristotle is intent in specifying all of the dimensions and
contingencies of humanly experienced activities and realms of endeavor.

19 Particularly noteworthy in this broader sense are (a) Aristotle's depictions of scholarly practices
of reasoning in Categories, De Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations,
Physics, and Metaphysics; (b) his related, more generic considerations of mindedness or
knowing in the human condition in On the Soul, Sense and Sensibilia, and On Memory; and (c)
his more direct analyses of human interchange in Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics,
Poetics, Politics, and Rhetoric. It is in Sophistical Refutations that Aristotle is most severe in his
assessments of sophistry (as an appearance of wisdom without reality / facts - e.g., SR, 171b-
172a). However, in contrast to the more extensive condemnations of rhetoric by Socrates and
Plato, Aristotle's emphasis is almost entirely on the analysis of people's practices, misleading
inferences, counter-strategies, and the like.
rigorous proofs (via more stringent notions of evidence, astute logical deductions, or sustained dialectic reasoning). Moreover even when specifically concerned with matters of these latter sorts, people may be diverted by the communications of others. Accordingly, the study of rhetoric assumes a broad, practical, enabling quality

Aristotle’s Rhetoric

In developing Rhetoric, Aristotle provides a remarkable philosophic analysis of rationality in the making. He presents readers with a comprehensive, highly instructive depiction of image work as a linguistically accomplished (and potentially contested) process.

Thus, while Aristotle discusses (1) the characters (reputations), abilities and tactical ploys of speakers, and (2) the contents of people’s speeches and the ways in which speakers present their cases to judges, Aristotle even more centrally (3) focuses on the ways that speakers may appeal to (and alter) the viewpoints of the judges to whom messages are pitched.

Outlining an orientational frame and a set of operational tactics for embarking on influence work, Aristotle is highly attentive to the processual and problematic features of influence work.

Accordingly, Aristotle expects that speakers will not only try to anticipate and adjust to the viewpoints of judges on an emergent basis, but that speakers also would try to anticipate and adjust to other speakers (e.g., as competitors/opponents) whenever these other parties enter into the process.

The speakers involved in instances of persuasive interchange may vary greatly in backgrounds, initiative, preparations, presentations, and the like, but there is no doubt on Aristotle’s part of people’s capacities for deliberative, meaningful activity and adjustive interaction.

Still, if we are to appreciate Aristotle’s work on rhetoric on a more consequential level, it is instructive to acknowledge his broader views of humans as biological and community-based beings. Aristotle does not deal with these matters directly in Rhetoric, but they denote a set of background understandings that not only further differentiate Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric from that of Plato (and Socrates) and Isocrates, but also from the viewpoints of most subsequent rhetoricians to the present time.

In contrast to Socrates (via Plato) who contends that people (1) are "born knowing things" via their souls' familiarity with pre-existing forms and (2) cannot achieve genuine knowledge of the things of this world, Aristotle envisions people's knowledge of all things to be dependent on the human capacities for (a) physiological sensation, (b) movement, and (c) memory, along with (d) linguistic interchange, (e) deliberative enterprise and (f) adjustive contact with people and other objects of their awareness.

Thus, Aristotle clearly divests himself of a Socratic otherworld reality wherein the human sensate world is but a temporary or inconsequential realm.

Emphasizing the humanly known and engaged world, Aristotle rejects the body-mind dualism of Socrates and Plato. Instead, Aristotle stresses the necessity of

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20 While building primarily on Rhys Roberts' and J.H. Freese’s translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric [Barnes edition], this statement also benefits from Buckley’s (1995) translation of Rhetoric. Interestingly, Thomas Hobbes' (1681) synopsis of Aristotle's Rhetoric was also found instructive (in comparative terms) in developing the present statement.
viewing humans as biologically-emergent, actively engaged, community-based, and linguistically-informed entities.

While placing supreme emphasis on human knowing (and acting) as a form of excellence, Aristotle also recognizes that, regardless of whether people’s representations of things are accurate or otherwise, rhetoric (as persuasive communication) becomes the route to a great many instances of human knowing, decision-making, and acting.

More than a technique or procedure, thus, rhetoric is a medium or communicative process through which people share meanings of things with others in a most fundamental sense.

As well, since people may embark on influence work in any variety of settings, rhetoric is applicable to court-related proceedings, community celebrations, management practices, internal community policies and decisions, and intergroup (interstate, international) relations as well as interpersonal relations. It is because of this exceedingly broad base that the study of rhetoric is so important for comprehending community life.

Recognizing that most readers are apt not to be familiar with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the overall flow of this volume has been maintained. This should enable readers to establish more direct links with Aristotle’s statement and, hopefully, encourage use of this material for their own studies of human relations. At the same time, though, readers are cautioned that, far from amplifying Aristotle’s analysis, this statement only partially captures the depth, detail, and potency of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In introducing Rhetoric, Aristotle (BI, I-II) states that rhetoric represents the study of the available means of persuasion on any subject matter. He also observes that his concern is not limited to matters of successful techniques but represents an attempt to discover the ways in which persuasion work may be engaged in the instances in which this takes place.

Largely disregarding Plato’s intense condemnations of rhetoric, Aristotle notes that rhetoric (like other arts or technologies) may be used for variety of ends. Aristotle also observes that, in contrast to many realms of study (e.g., architecture, medicine) that have comparatively specific applications or parameters of operation, rhetoric (like logic) may be used in an unlimited set of contexts in the human community.

Whereas rhetoric relies primarily on linguistic communication, Aristotle’s Rhetoric clearly attests to the limitations of words as persuasive elements in themselves. Thus, throughout this volume, Aristotle is highly attentive to (1) the speaker (interests, abilities, and images of the speaker), (2) the speech (contents, ordering, and presentation), and (3) the audience (dispositions, viewpoints, inferential tendencies, and resistances). He also is mindful of (4) the anticipatory, adjustive interchanges that oppositionary speakers may develop as they vie for the commitments of the auditors in the setting.

For Aristotle, rhetoric does not consist of sets of disembodied words, phrases, or even more sustained texts, but implies a distinctly comprehensive consideration of the ways that speakers might meaningfully engage others in order to encourage those people (individually or in groups) to embark on the lines of action desired by the speaker.

As a cautionary note to readers, it may be noted that while I have maintained the overall flow of Aristotle’s text and have provided specific chapter references to particular materials, I have assumed some liberty in the headings I have used to organize this presentation.
Realms and Emphases of Persuasion

Aristotle divides rhetoric into three major primary categories (BI, III-IV), relative to their objectives. These are (1) deliberative, (2) forensic, and (3) epideictic rhetoric. Deliberative or political rhetoric is intended to encourage people to act or, conversely, to discourage them from acting in certain ways. Concerned with decision and commitment making process, deliberative speaking presumes a distinctively futuristic orientation.

Forensic or judicial rhetoric is used to charge others with offenses of some sort or, relatedly, to defend people from the charges of others. Whether these claims are invoked on behalf of individuals, groups, or the state, forensic speeches deal primarily with matters alleged to have happened in the past.

Referring to the praise or censure of people or things, epideictic or demonstrative rhetoric is notably more expressive in emphasis. It deals largely with celebrations or condemnations of some target or humanly-experienced circumstances. Demonstrative rhetoric is typically developed around some present (as in recent or current) occasion, event, or situation.

While acknowledging the time-frames characterizing each of these three oratorical themes, Aristotle also observes that rhetoricians focusing on any of these three objectives may make reference to the past, the present, and the future as these speakers present their positions to others.

Working across these three broader sets of rhetorical objectives, Aristotle (BI, III-VII) acknowledges a full range of persuasive arenas, varying from dyadic encounters to political practices and interchanges of all sorts. Approaching rhetoric, thusly, Aristotle provides a highly generic statement on the ways in which people try to generate, shape, and resist other people's viewpoints, decisions, and activities within the human community.

Further, while Aristotle gives greater attention to forensic oratory (given the typically greater complexities of court-related cases) than to deliberative or epideictic rhetoric, it should be appreciated that forensic cases also subsume decision-making dimensions (as definitions of activities, assessments of guilt, and assignments of penalties) and demonstrative features (as in condemnations or exonerations of the defendants).

Deliberative Rhetoric

Envisioning rhetoric as a community-based phenomenon, Aristotle (BI, IV) notes that deliberative or decision-oriented oratory focuses on the expediency or harmfulness of given lines of action.

Aristotle says the main things that people consider and contest on a political level revolve around (a) finances (revenues and expenditures); (b) war and peace; (c) national defense; (d) trade agreements; and (e) legislation (law, welfare, policy).

Positing that people (as purposive beings) generally are motivated by the pursuit of happiness (as a desired state of circumstances), Aristotle (BI, V-VI) outlines a series of advantages, goals, and conditions that he envisions as associated with happiness (both generally and more particularly).

Noting that people commonly define happiness with respect to one or more of (a) virtue, (b) independence, (c) security, or (d) material advantages, Aristotle elaborates on the constituents of these concerns, envisioning these as elements to which deliberative speakers may appeal in presenting their positions.
proceeds to define the value of things (and actions) as they contribute to the pursuit and attainment of these objectives.

While some may take issue with various things Aristotle that associates with these aspects of happiness, his objective is one of establishing a broad set of parameters with which to approach deliberative oratory.

The broader implication is that those trying to influence other people's decisions would achieve greater success by appealing to the things that auditors consider relevant to their notions of happiness (and related objectives).

Social scientists might also appreciate that while Aristotle's depictions of happiness are attentive to both human biological essences and the variable aspects of luck or fortune, his notions of happiness are heavily interfused with social definitions, comparison points, and interchanges.

Subsequently, Aristotle (BI, VII) embarks on a consideration of greater goods or things (goals, objects, practices) thought superior to other matters.

While introducing a series of standpoints for judging some things to be more desirable than other things (as in health; as in the opposites of evil, dishonor, deprivation, or injury; as in greater accuracy of sensation; as in things that have greater uses; as in things appreciated by more people or things approved by more cultured people), Aristotle is also attentive to both the relativizing features of comparisons and the capacities of people to view and present notions of the greater good in different ways when dealing with the same objects.

Having established, thus, a platform for deliberative or political rhetoric, Aristotle (BI, VIII) proceeds to delineate four forms of government: (a) democracy; (b) oligarchy (small decision-making group), (c) aristocracy (elite decision-making group); and (d) monarchy (kingdoms and tyrannies).21

Attending to the differing basis of each form of government, Aristotle suggests that speakers, intending to appeal to those in control of particular political arenas, would address matters of (a) freedom, (b) maintenance of wealth, (c) institutions of education and law, and (d) protection of the kingdom or ruler, respectively.

As well, Aristotle urges speakers attempting to define the utility of particular lines of action to attend carefully to the prevailing practices and historical institutions of any governmental forums they address.

Epideictic Rhetoric

Aristotle (BI, IX) focuses next on epideictic or demonstrative speeches, dealing more directly with matters of praise and blame or celebration and condemnation.

After listing a series of qualities that he considers as more virtuous in the community overall (things such as benefiting others, sharing possessions with others, attending to justice, exhibiting courage, attending to law, being thoughtful, and possessing wisdom), Aristotle comments on the variable nobility of motives (e.g., acting more exclusively on behalf of others versus seeking gains for oneself) that speakers might reference in presenting their cases to others.

Stressing the importance of attending to the viewpoints of the audiences one addresses, Aristotle then delineates four tactics for amplifying praise. These include: (a) highlighting people’s distinctions and accomplishments; (b) maximizing the challenges that these people have had to overcome; (c) minimizing the relevance of

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21 These forms of government and their transitions are given more attention in Aristotle's Politics.
any good luck in their situations; and (d) giving greater dignity to people's more mundane qualities.

Censure or condemnation, Aristotle observes, is developed in obverse manners. Although Aristotle’s immediate treatment of demonstrative rhetoric is highly compacted, readers will find that Aristotle’s analysis of forensic oratory also provides much material pertinent to the development of demonstrative as well as deliberative rhetoric.

Forensic Rhetoric

Given the comparatively extended and sophisticated legal system in effect at Athens, the rest of Aristotle’s Rhetoric primarily deals with judicial or forensic rhetoric.

Focusing on matters of accusation and defense, Aristotle’s consideration of forensic rhetoric is conceptually dense, sophisticated, and highly instructive. Thus, even as he frames the analysis at a more preliminary level, Aristotle provides readers with compelling insights into (1) wrongdoing, (2) justice, and (3) judicial contingencies.

On Wrongdoing

Whereas Plato (following Socrates; see Laws V, 731c; Meno 77c-78b; Timaeus 86e) denies that people truly intend to commit offenses against others or the state, Aristotle (Bl, X-XI) adopts an entirely different stance.

While acknowledging people’s inadvertent and unwitting involvements in some instances of wrongdoing, Aristotle approaches people’s involvements in wrongdoing or deviance in ways that directly parallel his views on the ways that people engage in other [nondeviant] activities -- as meaningful, deliberative, goal-oriented pursuits.

In what clearly anticipates the position developed by twentieth century pragmatists (e.g., Mead 1934) and interactionists (Becker 1963; Blumer 1969), Aristotle does not require separate theories for the deviants and nondeviants, but rather presents one theory that enables scholars to examine all instances of meaningfully developed human behavior.

Addressing human action in judicial settings, Aristotle (Bl, X) briefly delineates seven bases or causes of human behavior, including chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, and appetite (pursuit of pleasure).

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22 Although we have no preserved legal codes from the classic Greek era, it is quite apparent (e.g., see Plato’s Republic and Laws, as well as Aristotle’s writings on politics, ethics, rhetoric, and the Athenian constitution) that the early Greeks were highly attentive to various civil, state, political, religious, and legal technicalities. Also see Harris (1994 - in Worthington) on Greek law and oratory.
Aristotle does not sort these motivational themes out in much detail but instead focuses on the voluntary, deliberative activities associated with the pursuit of pleasure or other desired experiential states.

Then, using pleasure as a centralizing concept with which to comprehend the known, meaningful features of action, Aristotle (Bi, X-XI) proceeds to illustrate how all of the voluntary aspects of the preceding set of causes involve the pursuit of pleasure (notions of happiness and the avoidance of discomfiture).

Aristotle is attentive to people’s capacities to experience bodily sensations, but it is inaccurate to envision Aristotle as a physiological hedonist or psychological reductionist. Pleasure and pain, thus, are defined in terms of people’s desired end-states.

These could include people’s quests for more direct physical sensations, but also would encompass the values people place on the development of the intellect, moral pursuits, or concerns about the well-being of others, for instance.

Beyond speakers ascertaining and pitching to audiences in terms of things that these particular auditors value, Aristotle deems it important that speakers understand the motivational and engaged features of human agency.

In addition to establishing in the relevance of memory (recollection) and hope (anticipation) for people’s conceptions and pursuits of pleasures (and pains), Aristotle also discusses the role of others in these endeavors.

Hence, people’s notions of and quests for, pleasure involve their participation with others in such things as friendships, persuasive endeavors, and instances of rivalry, amusement, learning, admiration, and beneficiary roles, as well as attending to others as reference or comparison points.

Having established an operational base, thus, Aristotle (Bi, XII) asks when people are apt to engage in wrongdoing.

Assuming that people desire certain objectives and envision ways of achieving these ends, Aristotle states that people are more likely to actively assume agent or perpetrator roles when they (a) think they can accomplish the acts in question; and (b) will escape detection, or (c) if detected, would avoid punishment, or (d) if they expect to experience punishment, anticipate that the gains would offset the losses.

Among those whom Aristotle identifies as inclined to assume higher levels of impunity in reference to their own acts are people who (a) are more talented in circumventing culpability more generally; (b) envision themselves to have more friends and supporters; (c) anticipate greater influence with injured parties or judges; and (d) seem like inappropriate (unfitting) candidates for the activities in question by others of virtue of their personal qualities or situations.

As well, Aristotle also envisions people as more likely to presume immunity from penalty when they (e) have convenient ways of concealing activities or easy ways of disposing of things; (f) have the means of influencing judges or otherwise averting penalties; (g) feel they have nothing to lose; and (h) perceive the gains to be close at hand or greater, while losses seem distant or less consequential. As well, Aristotle notes, those who (i) think that certain activities would generate prestige among certain of their associates also seem likely to act with a greater sense of impunity.

After discussing both (1) the attractions that people may develop for various wrongdoings and (2) people’s tendencies to assume roles as perpetrators, Aristotle (Bi, XII) proceeds to (3) a consideration of the targets of these activities.

Acknowledging a wide range of targets, from friends (as easy, more trusting) and enemies (as more enjoyable), to those who are nearby (offering more immediate advantage) or distant (less prepared to resist), Aristotle observes that some people may be easier targets as a consequence of their tendencies to avoid pursuing
offenders. This includes those who: do not want to be bothered with such matters; wish to maintain current levels of dignity; have been harmed many times before; are held in disgrace; are visitors to, or temporary residents in, an area; and, themselves, are guilty of similar or related offenses.

Aristotle also notes that people may define others as more viable targets for negative behaviors when they: anticipate undesirable treatment from those targets; expect that they can compensate targets for their losses; or envision others as acting negatively toward those targets.

**On Justice**

Aristotle (BI, XIII provides still more insight in the deviance-making process through his considerations of written law, natural (or transcendant) law, and equity.\(^{23}\)

Continuing his elaboration of just and unjust actions (and judicial cases more specifically), Aristotle (BI, XIII) distinguishes (1) the particular laws developed by communities of people from (2) a universal (presumably divinely-inspired or naturally emergent) law that is taken to transcend particular or local notions of justice, and (3) the specific conceptions of equity (and inequity) that speakers or others may invoke.

Even though the prosecutions he discusses were based primarily on (a) written laws, he observes that speakers may invoke notions of (b) natural law and (c) equity (introduce “fairness” as a reference point) along with (d) other aspects of written law in pursuing and contesting the cases at hand.

Next, Aristotle (1) delineates injustices perpetrated against communities from those conducted against individuals, (2) qualifies people’s activities in reference to degrees of intentionality; and (3) observes that perpetrators commonly define their acts in terms that are at variance from the definitions promoted by complainants.

Aristotle subsequently addresses equity as a concept of justice that speakers may use to challenge the formalities or technicalities of written law. When emphasizing equality or fairness, speakers endeavor to shift emphasis from (a) the legalistic concerns with the letter of the law and (b) the particular activities in question, to considerations of (c) the intent of the law, (d) the motivational principles of the agent, and (e) the willingness of the involved parties to pursue equitable arrangements through arbitration.

The next issue Aristotle (BI, XIV) addresses with respect to justice is the degree of indignation, blame or condemnation that audiences associate with people’s instances of wrongdoing.

Among the acts apt to thought more blameworthy are those that (a) violate basic principles of the community; (b) are defined more harmful, especially if more flagrant and offer no means of restoration; (c) result in further (subsequent) injury or loss to victims; (d) are the first of their kind; (e) are more brutal; (f) reflect greater intent to harm others; (g) are shameful in other ways; and (h) are in violation of written laws. Thus, Aristotle lists a series of contingencies that he thinks are likely to result in someone’s activities being seen as more reprehensible by judges.\(^{24}\)

\(^{23}\) Aristotle also discusses justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* (especially Book V).

\(^{24}\) Readers familiar with Harold Garfinkel’s (1956) statement on “degradation ceremonies” may be struck by the conceptual similarities of Garfinkel’s analysis with the much more elaborate treatment provided by Aristotle.
On Judicial Contingencies

Aristotle (BI, XV) also addresses a set of *inartificial proofs* or matters of argumentation that are peculiar to *judicial oratory*. These revolve around (a) formalized laws, (b) witnesses, (c) contracts, (d) torture, and (e) oaths.

Returning to his earlier distinctions between written law, universal law, and equity, Aristotle indicates how speakers whose cases are at variance with the *written law* may appeal to notions of universal law and equity, while those whose cases are supported by written law may insist on the primacy of moral integrity and wisdom of the written law.

When dealing with *witnesses*, Aristotle acknowledges the wide variety of sources (including ancient poets and notable figures; contemporary characters, and proverbs) that speakers may use to provide testimonies for or against cases.

While noting that resourceful speakers have an endless set of witnesses on which to draw, Aristotle is also attentive to those witnesses who claim to have direct knowledge of the specific events at hand.

Relatedly, where speakers can provide direct witnesses to events, they may strive to enhance witness credibility, whereas speakers who do not have such witnesses would normally try to discredit the former and argue for the importance of the judge's independent wisdom. Aristotle urges speakers to adopt somewhat parallel enhancing and denigrating tactics when dealing with *contracts* involving courtroom adversaries, evidence gained through *torture*, and the use and avoidance of *oaths*.

Pursuing Favorable Decisions

Envisioning the preceding elements as more unique to forensic rhetoric, Aristotle (BII, I) turns to what he describes as the *art of rhetoric*. While not disregarding the context or the apparent matters of issue in particular instances, the focus is on presenting cases (on one side or the other) in strategically more effective manners.

Here, Aristotle focuses on the matters of developing emotional appeals, constructing cases, and presenting materials to judges. The emphasis, as well, shifts more directly to the task of *securing favorable decisions* in deliberative occasions and judicial cases.

Thus, before focusing on the more overtly enacted features of rhetoric, Aristotle addresses (1) the foundations of credibility, (2) people’s experiences with an assortment of emotions pertinent to influence work; and (3) the development of generalized viewpoints.

While Aristotle is particularly mindful of the relevance of these matters for success in oratorical ventures, his analyses of trust, emotionality, and generalized standpoints provide particularly valuable reference materials for contemporary social scientists.

Maximizing Credibility

Succinctly outlining a theory of trust or credibility, Aristotle (BII, I) posits that audiences are likely to place greater faith or confidence in those speakers (as characters) who are thought to (1) display good sense in judgment, (2) possess
excellence of capacity (competence, honor), and (3) act in ways consistent with the audience's (advantageous) viewpoint in mind. The implication is that those who achieve credibility on the part of others will be heavily advantaged in their subsequent communications with others.

Focusing on Emotionality

Recognizing people's general tendencies to define and act toward situations in terms of their emotional states (e.g., anger, indignation, pity, pride, fear), Aristotle (BII, II-XI) explicitly addresses a series of emotions to which speakers may attend in their attempts to deal more affectively with the audiences at hand.

Those who examine this material will find in Aristotle's Rhetoric the foundations of a theory of emotions. Defining emotions or passions as feelings or dispositions pertaining to pleasure (and pain) that have a capacity to affect people's judgments, Aristotle intends to establish the relevancy of people's emotions for influence work.

Thus, as a prelude to speakers doing "emotion work" within the context of persuasive communication, wherein one knowingly and deliberately attempts to intensify or minimize certain emotional viewpoints, Aristotle discusses people's experiences with various emotions in a more generic sense.

In what follows, Aristotle deals with (1) anger and calm, (2) feelings of friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, (7) envy, and emulation.

In addition to providing (a) instructive definitions of these emotional states, Aristotle considers (b) the foundations of these emotional states, (c) the ways that these emotions are experienced (by whom, in what ways, and with what behavioral consequences), and (d) how speakers may enter into and shape the emotional sensations, viewpoints, and actions of others.

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25 Prus' (1989a: 102-130) ethnographic examination of attempts on the parts of vendors to generate trust on the parts of customers provides a more recent, empirical testimony to the viability of Aristotle's analysis of trust.

26 Although Aristotle's material on emotions in Rhetoric is predated by his earlier consideration of emotions in Nicomachean Ethics and Poetics, Aristotle appears to have benefited extensively from Plato's work on emotions (e.g., Laches on courage, Philebus on pleasure, Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis on love) as well as from many other emotive themes expressed throughout Plato's dialogues. Notably, too, although not intended as such, Aristotle's materials on emotion in Rhetoric also may be seen as providing supplementary material for a theory of interpersonal relations as well as some additional foundational concepts for better understanding character as an ongoing process of self and other definition beyond that which Aristotle provides in Nicomachean Ethics (see Prus, 2007a).

27 Aristotle does not address the complete range of emotions that people may experience. Thus, notions of (a) euphoria and depression, (b) fascination and distancing and (c) excitement (as in entertainment) and boredom are notably absent. Still, given his more central oratorical emphasis, Aristotle's Rhetoric is remarkably comprehensive and enabling.

28 Focusing on the generation of pathos or emotional experiences on the part of audiences within the context of fictionalized tragedy (the analysis of comedy and humor has been lost), Aristotle's Poetics adds further insight into the socially constructed features of emotionality. Aristotle also gives attention to emotionality and people's styles of relating to others in Nicomachean Ethics.
Anger and Calm

Aristotle (BII, II) defines anger as a focused desire for revenge that reflects an unwarranted slight or injustice directed toward oneself or one's friends by some other.29

Aristotle distinguishes three types of slights or senses of mistreatment associated with anger: (1) instances of contempt, in which others (as agents) are seen to disparage things that targets deem important; (2) spite, wherein others obstruct target from achieving their objectives, not as rivals for the same objects but more singularly to prevent targets from achieving those ends; and (3) insolence, wherein others denigrate targets through word or deed, with the apparent intention of achieving agent superiority through the ill treatment of the target.

Relatedly, Aristotle contends, people (as targets) are more apt to become angered with others (as agents) when they see these others as: (a) preventing targets (directly or indirectly) from obtaining things targets are eager to have; (b) promoting effects contrary to those that targets desire; (c) ridiculing, despising or denigrating targets, including their interests and talents, in some way; or (d) depreciating people for whom targets have affection.

Likewise, while denigrations seem more distasteful when they are (e) produced by those to whom targets view as inferiors (vs. equals or superiors), Aristotle also notes that slights also are more hurtful when they arise from (f) people that targets had envisioned as friends or (g) people whom targets have treated well in the past.

As well, Aristotle observes that people (as targets) are apt to direct anger toward people who (h) delight in, or fail to sympathize with, target misfortunes; (i) present bad news to targets; and (j) readily listen to and talk about target failures with others.

Aristotle is also attentive to people's tendencies to become variably incensed with others (agents), depending on those who witness particular agent slights. Thus, perceived mistreatment tends to generate heightened anger on the part of targets when it takes place in front of (a) targets' rivals, (b) people whom targets admire, (c) those from whom targets desire admiration, (d) those whom targets respect, and (e) those from whom targets desire respect.

People (agents) may also encourage anger on the part of others (targets) when: (a) targets feel obliged to defend others (third parties) whom agents have slighted; (b) agents fail to settle debts with targets or do not return favors; (c) agents ridicule target interests or otherwise fail to respect concerns with target sincerity; (d) agents fail to treat targets as favorably as agents treat comparable others; and (e) agents forget or otherwise disregard particular things that targets consider important.

Aristotle explicitly reminds speakers that these are the themes they may use to bring their auditors into appropriate frames of mind; to generate anger in the minds of their audiences and to direct this anger toward their opponents so as to encourage auditor decisions that are more favorable to speaker objectives.

Still, Aristotle's treatment of anger is not complete. Thus, Aristotle (BII, III) enters into a related consideration of calm or placitude; how this emotion is experienced by people, and how speakers may calm, pacify, or reconcile themselves with audiences who may otherwise be disposed to anger (via the circumstances, the

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case at hand, or the negativizing effects of the opposing speaker) with respect to
speakers or their positions.

Addressing the conditions under which people become calm, Aristotle observes
that *anger is apt to be minimized* when people (as targets): (a) view incidents
involving agents as involuntary, unintended or beyond their control; (b) realize that
agents treat them the same the way they treat themselves; (c) encounter agents who
admit their faults and sincerely express regret for target injuries; (d) face agents who
are humble and accept roles as inferiors to targets in the matters at hand; (e) share
target senses of seriousness on matters of importance to targets; (f) exhibit greater
kindness toward targets than vice-versa; and (g) generally do not direct slights
toward others.

Aristotle also contends that people are less likely to become angry with (h)
those whom they fear (as concerns with fear are more paramount) and are less likely
to remain angry with (i) those who are thought to have engaged in undesired acts
while in states of anger (having acted passionately rather than deliberately).

As well, Aristotle notes that people are less likely to be disposed to anger when
(j) they (targets) are better spirits (as in the midst of enjoying amusements,
celebrations, or other pleasurable states); (k) some time has passed since the slight
occurred; (l) targets recently have extracted some vengeance or exercised their
anger on another source; (m) perpetrators (agents) have suffered other noteworthy
setbacks; and (n) offended persons have had opportunities to inflict preliminary (even
if much less) punishments on perpetrators.

Finally, Aristotle notes that people's anger is apt to dissipate when (o) those
with whom they are angry are thought unable to acknowledge target anger (as with
those who are absent, incapable of comprehending the events at hand, or deceased).

*Friendship and Enmity*

Engaging the topics of friendship and enmity as affective states of mind, Aristotle (BII, IV) explicitly defines a *friendly feeling* toward another as both (a) wishing for good things for another and (b) attempting to bring these things about for the other.

Aristotle posits that people (herein targets) *feel affection for those* (agents): (a) who have treated targets well (also those people and other things that targets value); (b) whom targets anticipate will treat them (targets) well in the future; and (c) who devalue target enemies and other sources of target disaffection.

Relatedly, people (as targets) tend to value those (agents) who: (d) are generous toward targets, (e) are courageous in defending targets, (f) more independently look after their own affairs, (g) are fair-minded, and (h) tend not to pry into target affairs.

Similarly, people tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who (i) have pleasant dispositions and a sense of humor, and (j) assume an understanding, accepting orientations toward targets.

Among those more appreciated, as well, are people who (k) praise target qualities, (l) minimize target-directed criticisms, (m) do not maintain grievances

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30 Aristotle gives considerably more attention to friendship as a humanly engaged essence in *Nicomachean Ethics* (Books VIII-IX). Still, the material presented here notably supplements, in behavioral terms, Aristotle's discussion of friendship in *Nicomachean Ethics*.
against targets, and (n) do not oppose targets when targets are angered or otherwise are sincere in their efforts.

Aristotle also pointedly notes that affections more readily develop among people who (o) share various affinities or common circumstances, interests, and activities, provided that these matters do not put them in oppositionary (as in competitive) terms.

Aristotle further observes that people (targets) develop friendly feelings toward those: (p) in front of whom targets still feel accepted should targets make mistakes; (q) who willingly cooperate in pursuing target objectives; (r) who act as friendly toward targets in target absences as in target presence; (s) who are supportive of targets’ friends; and (t) who are open with targets, sharing agents’ own weaknesses and failings with targets.

After noting that it is difficult for people to experience friendly feelings in the midst of fear and other discomforts, Aristotle concludes that friendship is apt to be generated when (u) people do things intended to benefit the other; especially when they do so willingly, without being asked, and without expectation of compensation.

Aristotle’s (BII, IV) treatment of enmity or hatred is much less developed than his analysis of friendship. While observing that enmity may arise from instances of anger, Aristotle also notes that people may hate others more arbitrarily and diffusely for what they take to be other people’s characters, activities, or group (or category) affiliations.

In contrast to angered states, which can be more readily neutralized, Aristotle sees hatred as much more totalizing, enduring, and intense than anger. Instead of seeking revenge, thus, the emphasis in enmity, more completely, is on the destruction of the other.

Fear and Confidence

Aristotle (BII, V) defines fear as the discomfiture or anxiety associated with some impending injury or loss. Fear, thus, is an anticipatory state, one that is intensified by concerns with more potent and immediate destructive forces (sources).

Among those that people (as prospective targets) are apt to fear (assuming agent capacities to do harm), Aristotle identifies those (agents) who: (a) are angry or appear to hate targets; (b) are seen as unjust in their dealings with others; (c) earlier had been insulted by targets; (d) believe themselves to have been harmed by targets; (e) are rivals; (f) invoke fear among those whom targets consider superior to themselves; (g) have injured people thought advantaged over targets; (h) have begun attacking those who are weaker than targets (thereby developing greater agent ambitions and resources); and (i) appear quiet, but are thought to be unscrupulous.

Aristotle also contends that people are more apt to be fearful of others more generally, when (j) they (as prospective targets) have made mistakes that they are not able to undo (leaving themselves vulnerable to others). Aristotle notes, too, that people are apt to experience fear (k) around the things that invoke their pity when they witness others in those situations.

Observing that people’s fears are apt to intensify when (l) they believe that something specific is likely to befall them (through particular agents, in particular ways, and at particular times), Aristotle emphasizes the importance of speakers who wish to invoke fear on the part of their audiences making dangers appear as direct and imminent to these audiences as they are able.
Defining confidence as the opposite of fear, wherein people anticipate that they are safe or far removed from destructive elements, Aristotle (BII, V) subsequently endeavors to specify the conditions under which people are apt to feel invulnerable.

Among the circumstances inspiring confidence are (a) the apparent remoteness of dangerous matters; (b) the greater proximity of elements of safety; (c) people’s abilities to absorb or avert losses; (d) people’s inexperiences with difficult times; (e) an apparent lack of rivals or enemies; (f) the powerless states of any (agents) who may be disaffected with them (targets); and (g) the possession of powerful and helpful friends.

People also seem apt to experience greater confidence when they (h) have been successful in their undertakings or (i) have encountered risk but escaped suffering.

People appear more assured, too, when they (j) observe that the circumstances in which they find themselves do not cause any particular concerns among their associates who are in similar circumstances to themselves.

People’s senses of confidence also seem enhanced when they (k) believe that they are advantaged over any rivals (as in wealth, friends, territory, preparations, and the like); (l) are angry with others; (m) are in positions to attack first; or (n) fully expect to succeed in the end.

Shame and Shamelessness

Aristotle (BII, VI) defines shame as a feeling of pain or discomfort associated with things in the present, past, or future that are likely to discredit or result in a loss of one’s character.\(^{31}\)

By contrast, shamelessness or impudence is envisioned as a disregard, contempt, or indifference to matters of disrepute. Shame, according to Aristotle, revolves around things envisioned as disgraceful to oneself or to those for whom one has regard.

Among the kinds of things around which people more commonly experience shame, Aristotle references: (a) cowardice; (b) treating others unfairly in financial matters; (c) exhibiting excessive frugality; (d) victimizing those who are helpless; (e) taking advantage of the kindness of others; (f) begging; (g) grieving excessively over losses; (h) avoiding responsibility; (i) exhibiting vanity; (j) engaging in sexually licentious behaviors; and (k) avoiding participation in things expected of, or lacking possessions generally associated with, equals.

Further, while noting centrally that shame is apt to be intensified in all discreditable matters when (a) these things are deemed voluntary and, thus, one’s fault; Aristotle also observes that (b) people also may feel shame about dishonorable things that have been done, are presently being done, or seem likely to be done to them by others.

Acknowledging the anticipatory or imaginative reactions of others, as well as actual instances of experiencing disgrace, Aristotle subsequently identifies the witnesses or others in front of whom people (as targets) are apt to experience greater shame.

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\(^{31}\) Those familiar with Goffman's (1963) *Stigma* will find a great many themes in Goffman's statement that parallel Aristotle's analysis of shame.
Most centrally, these witnesses include people whom targets hold in higher esteem (respect, honor) and admire (friendship, love) as well as those from whom they (targets) desire respect and affective regard.

People (as targets) also are likely to experience heightened senses of shame when they are disgraced in front of those who have control of things that targets desire to obtain, those whom targets view as rivals, and those whom targets view as honorable and wise.

Observing that targets are particularly susceptible to shame when dishonorable things occur in more public arenas, Aristotle also posits that people (as targets) are likely to feel greater shame when the witnesses include people who: are more innocent of things of this sort; adopt more intolerant viewpoints; and generally delight in revealing the faults of others.

Another set of witnesses or audiences in front of whom people (as targets) are more likely to experience disgrace include: those before whom [targets] have experienced success or been highly regarded; those who have not requested things of [targets]; those who recently have sought [target] friendship; and those likely to inform other people of [target] shame-related matters.

As well, Aristotle states that people (as targets) also are apt to experience shame through things associated with the activities or misfortunes of their relatives and other people with whom targets have close connections (i.e., experience an extension of the stigma attached to their associates).

Shame also seems intensified when people anticipate that they will remain in the presence of those who know of their losses of character. Conversely, Aristotle suggests that people are less apt to experience embarrassment among those who are thought inattentive or insensitive to such matters.

Relatedly, while Aristotle notes that people may feel comfortable with certain [otherwise questionable circumstances or practices] in front of intimates versus strangers, he also states that people (as targets) are apt to experience intensified shame among intimates with respect to things that are regarded as particularly disgraceful in those settings.

However, among those that they encounter as strangers, discredited people tend to be concerned only about more immediate matters of convention.

Aristotle ends his analysis of shame with the observation that shamelessness or the corresponding insensitivity to stigma will be known through its opposite.

**Kindness and Inconsideration**

Aristotle (BII, VII) next deals with kindness or benevolence and, by contrast, a disregard for the other. Aristotle defines kindness as benefits that one person confers on another, without anticipation of any compensation, but with the intention of helping the other.

Although observing that acts of kindness are more apt to be appreciated by those in more desperate conditions, Aristotle also posits that people's generosities become more noteworthy when the benefactors (a) do things more exclusively on their own, (b) are the first to offer assistance, or (c) provide the greatest amount of help.

Conversely, Aristotle observes, speakers attempting to discredit particular benefactors may encourage auditors to view these people as inconsiderate of others by alleging that the benefactors: (a) acted primarily for their own advantage; (b)
helped others inadvertently (versus intentionally); or (c) felt obligated to act in these manners for other reasons.

Likewise, kindness may be discredited when (d) benefactors' assistance is defined as comparatively insignificant within their overall capacities to help others.

**Pity and Indignation**

In addressing *pity* or the sense of sorrow that people feel on behalf of others, Aristotle (BII, VIII) provides another highly instructive analysis of emotionality. Aristotle defines pity as the feeling of pain associated with the actual or impending injury or loss experienced by someone who is thought not to deserve conditions of this sort.

Because pity assumes that people can anticipate or experience the viewpoint of the other, Aristotle contends that this feeling is premised on the recognition that a similar, unfortunate fate could befall oneself or one's close associates. Somewhat relatedly, Aristotle claims that pity is unlikely to be felt by people who are completely ruined (have nothing left to lose), as well as by people who view themselves as highly privileged (and invulnerable).

Instead, he posits that pity is more *likely to be experienced* by those who: (a) have encountered and survived related difficulties; (b) are older and wiser (recognizing human frailties); (c) are weaker and inclined to cowardice; (d) are better educated and can anticipate fuller consequences; and (e) have stronger family ties and can imagine misfortunes befalling their loved ones.

Conversely, Aristotle envisions pity as *less likely* from those: (a) experiencing anger or confidence; (b) who care little about others; or (e) who think people generally are of little worth or basically deserve misfortune.

Aristotle also states that (d) people in heightened states of fear or horror have little capacity for feeling pity because they are so preoccupied with their own precarious circumstances. Likewise, when people's close associates are in great danger and people experience intense fears for them, people are unlikely to feel compassion for third parties who are further removed from themselves.

Among *the things* that more compellingly encourage pity on the part of others Aristotle not only references things that are (a) directly destructive (as in death, injury, disease) but also cites (b) debilitating chance events and (c) undeserved circumstances.

The latter two elements include things such as friendlessness, the loss of close friends, deformity, evil treatment from those who should treat those people better, the repeated occurrence of misfortune, and help arriving too late to offset a great loss.

While stating that people often feel pity for others with respect to (d) matters for which they themselves have fears (albeit not of an highly imminent or intense sort), Aristotle also observes that people feel sorrow for others when: (e) the unfortunates are more like themselves in character, age, or other circumstances; (f) the sympathizers could more readily experience the particular sorts of misfortunes that have happened to others; and (g) the unfortunate people are closer to themselves (as in time, location).

Focusing attention more directly on speakers, Aristotle states that those who wish to invoke pity on behalf of their audiences should strive to present their materials in more vivid and dramatic fashions (through their gestures, tones, and appearances) so that their audiences might achieve greater, more immediate senses of pity-related emotion.
Aristotle (BII, IX) then addresses *indignation* or resentment, an emotional state that he defines in oppositionary terms to pity; namely, the pain of witnessing unwarranted good fortune on the part of others. Aristotle differentiates indignation or resentment from envy (discussed later), reserving the term envy to refer more precisely to unmerited good fortune that befalls others who are (or were) more equal to ourselves.

People’s experiences of indignation revolve rather centrally around their definitions of justice and *injustice*. Accordingly, people may rejoice at the misfortunes of those whom they see as less deserving; just as they may experience resentment at the good fortune of the undeserving.

Observing that indignation is less apt to be felt when people of greater abilities or longer standing advantages are the ones who do well, Aristotle states that those who are more recent recipients of unwarranted advantages are apt to be viewed with heightened resentment, especially should these same people gain further from these undeserved advantages.

In addition to the newly wealthy, Aristotle notes that indignation is often felt toward those who benefit undeservedly from office, friends, or family connections, particularly when they overtly display the effects of these advantages.

Among those who are most *inclined to become indignant* at the unwarranted good fortune of others, Aristotle identifies those who: (a) deserve and have acquired similar advantages; (b) insist on justice as a matter of practice; (c) desire the things that these others now possess; and (d) consider themselves deserving of the sorts of things these others now have.

By using these themes to invoke resentment on the part of auditors, Aristotle contends that speakers may render ineffective or redirect their opponents’ pleas for pity.

**Envy and Emulation**

Aristotle (BII, X) envisions *envy* as a painful feeling or resentment associated with the good fortune of one’s equals. By equals, Aristotle means those who are comparable to oneself in ways deemed consequential (as in position, age, character, activities) by the person feeling envy.

Among those particularly *inclined to be envious*, Aristotle references (a) those who already have experienced considerable success, but have not attained all relevant successes in some area; and (b) those who are ambitious in the more specific respect (including wisdom, fame, finances or other advantages) in which comparisons are made. Aristotle also observes that, for some people, (c) virtually anything thought desirable in some way may become a focus of their envy.

After stating that people *commonly envy* (c) those who are closer to themselves in circumstances, time, and location (notably family members, neighbors, associates, rivals), Aristotle also suggests that people may be envious of equals who, when compared to themselves, succeed with (d) less difficulty, (e) in shorter periods of time, or (f) with less expense or other sacrifices. On some occasions, too, people may be envious of (g) those who possess or acquire things they, themselves, once had.

Recognizing that people do not pity those whom they envy, Aristotle indicates that speakers who are able to generate and direct auditor envy (as with indignation) toward speakers’ opponents will neutralize auditor sympathy for their opponents.
Next, Aristotle (BII, XI) turns to *emulation*. For Aristotle, emulation is characterized not by any resentment or envy of things that others have but by a longing for these things to *also belong to oneself*.

In contrast to envy, Aristotle describes emulation as a generally virtuous emotion. In emulation, one strives to be more like those who possess admirable things (typically things thought to be within one’s eventual reach). Extending these notions still further, Aristotle also notes that those who emulate or wish to be like certain people in the things these people possess also are apt to be *contemptuous* of third parties who fail to exhibit, pursue or respect desirable qualities of these sorts.

Although this concludes the most directly focused of Aristotle’s analyses of emotions, his consideration of emotionality is far from exhausted. Indeed, the preceding material (and the subsequent depiction of variations of people’s generalized emotional viewpoints) represents only a partial account of Aristotle’s statement on emotion work within *Rhetoric*.

**Acknowledging Generalized Viewpoints**

Noting that people may view situations differently depending on their situations and experiences, Aristotle (XII-XVII) next considers some consequential variations in people’s *orientational frameworks* relative to their ages (youth, mid-life, elderly), circumstances, and fortune. Although Aristotle’s discussion seems directed to those (predominantly male) involved in the oratorical arenas of his day, readers may appreciate the applicability of much of Aristotle’s observations to people more generally.

In discussing *the young*, thus, Aristotle (BII, XII) observes that they are particularly prone to desire, sensate experiences, and diversity of change. Observing that they also tend to be earnest and insistent, but easily become indignant and offended, Aristotle characterizes the young as impulsive, arrogant, and reckless.

Noting that young people generally have not experienced extended want or depravity, Aristotle further describes them as optimistic, inattentive to financial matters, and desirous of superiority.

Acknowledging their limited life-experiences, Aristotle also envisions the young as poor judges of circumstances, character, and concepts, as well as being presumptive about knowing all things.

Likewise, observing that they have not been more fully humbled, he contends that the young are excessively hopeful, brave, idealistic, and persistent in their desires. They also are fond of diversion, entertainment, and playful associations, vastly preferring these to more serious matters.

When considering the emotions and practices of *the elderly*, Aristotle (BII, XIII) finds many points of divergence with the dispositions of the young. Aristotle describes people who are past their prime and in their waning years as lacking in confidence and approaching things in notably skeptical, cautious, indecisive manners.

Relatedly, he characterizes the elderly as fearful and timid, as frugal (knowing both the difficulty of acquiring property and the ease with which things may be lost), and as placing much greater emphasis on expediency than ideals.

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32 It might be acknowledged that those involved in judicial, deliberative and epideictic rhetoric, as targets (defendants), claimants, speakers (and speech writers), instructors and authors, and judges were predominately male.
Aristotle also notes that where the youth very much live for the future, the elderly live through the past. The elderly, thus, dwell in memories, recollections, and reminiscences of their former lives. They resist pretensions and myth, and are skeptical of the optimistic emphases or claims of others. They also become highly concerned about maintaining what they have (as in health and finances).

Likewise, while the elderly may be quick to anger, they seldom sustain this viewpoint or pursue situations more intensively. They also lose interest in the more immediate, sensate features of human experience.

The elderly, too, commonly experience pity. However, in contrast to the young who may pity others without comprehending people’s situations more fully, the elderly more readily anticipate, and identify personally with, wide ranges of calamity.

Still focusing on age-related passions and activities, Aristotle (BII, XIV) next addresses people in their *prime*. Viewing people as achieving their physical primes around thirty to thirty-five and their optimal mental capacities around fifty years of age, Aristotle suggests that it is the mid-lifers who are most likely to display the most balanced viewpoints.

Thus, Aristotle sees those in their prime as much more moderate than the young or the elderly with respect to fear and confidence, optimism and cynicism, honor and expediency, frugality and extravagance, anger and desire.

While encouraging speakers to attend to the emotional viewpoints of their auditors in ways that are mindful of characteristic age differentiations, Aristotle (BII, XV-XVII) subsequently, but more briefly, deals with variations in emotional emphases commonly associated with people’s (a) advantages of birth, (b) accumulations of wealth, (c) positions of power, and (d) encounters with good fortune.

Further preparing speakers for the audiences they may encounter, Aristotle describes those of *noble birth* as not only inclined to be ambitious but also contemptuous of others who do not share comparable heritages.

Aristotle characterizes the *wealthy* as insolent and arrogant, assuming that all things can be had at a price and insisting that all honors are due them as a consequence of their wealth. Aristotle further observes that the newly rich are more disposed to arrogance and display than are those whose fortunes have more traditional roots.

Aristotle claims that those in *positions of power* are much like the rich in overall disposition but that the powerful tend to be more courageous and are less inclined to focus on petty matters.

Those encountering *good fortune* also are seen (like the wealthy) to be presumptuous and inconsiderate in their dealings with others, but Aristotle suggests that these people maintain a particular (although not readily apparent) sensitivity or vulnerability to the gods or other sources of their good fortune.

Aristotle then ends this discussion of people’s advantaged circumstances by stating that somewhat opposite emotions would be expected of people disadvantaged in these same regards.

**Enacted Features of Influence Work**

After this instructive analysis of emotionality, Aristotle (BII, XVIII) focuses more directly on the enacted or engaged features of persuasive activity. Briefly commenting on deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle addresses the more general construction of speeches:
The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions...This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do something, as when we advise a man about his conduct or try to change his views: the single person is as much your judge as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that anyone is your judge whom you have to persuade. Nor does it matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition; in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow the opposing arguments, and we attack these as we should attack an actual opponent...

We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. All orators are bound to use the topic of the possible and impossible; and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in the future. Again, the topic of size is common to all oratory; all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making deliberative speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in the law-courts. (Aristotle [Barnes]: BII, XVIII)

Attending to the more overtly engaged aspects of rhetoric, Aristotle subsequently deals with (1) generating and refuting proofs; (2) amplifying and diminishing the images of things; and (3) arranging and deploying the components of the speech.

Even here, however, readers will recognize the ways in which anticipatory, contemplative and adjustive features of speaker activities, permeate the more situated features of oratorical performance and interchange.33

**Generating and Refuting Proofs**

As a means of introducing the matter of proofs (i.e., claims, arguments, cases) and challenges that speakers normally present in forensic cases, Aristotle embarks on a consideration of (1) possibilities and probabilities prior to discussing (2) the formulation of proofs and (3) their points of vulnerability for challenge.

**Possibilities and Probabilities**

Focusing first on possibilities or potentialities of a highly generic sort, Aristotle (BII, XIX) argues that things are possible under the following conditions: (a) if one can develop a contrary, then the opposite is possible (e.g., if one could be ill or do good, then being well or doing evil are possible); (b) if one thing is possible, so is another of a similar sort; (c) if something more excellent can be achieved, a lesser version is possible; (d) if something has a beginning, an end is possible; (e) if something has an end, a beginning is possible; (f) if something subsequent appears, the antecedent condition is possible; (g) if someone loves something, that thing is possible, (h) if we can influence others, the things under their control or production are possible; (i) if the parts are possible, so is the whole possible, and vice-versa; (j) if a category exists, so may its members, and vice-versa; (k) if things can be made

33 Aristotle is a behaviorist, but a behaviorist very much in the human agency sense of G. H. Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969). Aristotle’s behaviorism (i.e., conceptualization of activity) thus, is centrally predicated on human language, reflectivity, choice, intentionality, and meaningful interchange.
without talent, so it may be possible to improve it with technique; (l) if less capable people can do something, it is possible that more competent people can do it as well.

Since possibilities do not insure that things will happen, Aristotle next asks about *probabilities*; whether something likely took place.

Here, Aristotle states that (a) if less likely things have occurred, then more common things probably have also taken place; (b) if subsequent things have occurred, then their antecedents likely have taken place; (c) if people were willing to do something, they likely did that unless some obstacle was encountered; (d) if people who are inclined to act in certain way are angry, they are more likely to act in those manners; (e) if people are on the verge of acting in certain ways, they likely will act in those fashions; (f) if people have made preparations to act or have engaged in antecedent acts, they are likely to pursue those acts through to completion.

In developing these materials on possibilities and probabilities Aristotle establishes some lines along which proofs or arguments may be developed.34

**Proofs, Examples, and Enthymemes**

Aristotle (BII, XX-XXVI) follows his consideration of possibilities and probabilities with *arguments* (or proofs) generated by (1) example and (2) enthymeme.

As with matters possible and likely, examples and enthymemes may be used by speakers in their attempts to establish the greater plausibility of their positions. The viability of any argument or proof, thus, ultimately rests on audience viewpoints or definitions of the competing claims made by the speakers.

Whether based on actual past events or inventions of events (as in *Aesop’s Fables*, which Aristotle references), any sorts of *examples* or other things that speakers relate to the case of hand may be used to illustrate (and dramatize) points, set interpretive frames for audiences, or to supplement the arguments developed in enthymemes.

The value of any examples (as in fictional or authentic, sustained or fleeting) in establishing or contesting cases, as with other aspects of the art of rhetoric, is contingent on (a) the ways that speakers deploy these comparison points and ultimately (b) on audience receptivity to the materials presented to them.

**Enthymemes** (BII, XXII) are arguments intended to provide deductions or reasoned conclusions about the specific matters under consideration, such that things become more notably affirmed or refuted through the claims, applications, and inferences developed within.

Normally, the speaker makes a claim for the validity of a specific principle and then attempts to show that some noteworthy features of the case under consideration (via connecting statements or rationale of some sort) would be subsumed by, or exists in opposition to, the principle invoked at the outset.

Insofar as the proofs thusly generated are accepted as evidence of the guilt or innocence of the defendants involved in particular cases, these arguments (even if highly presumptive and logically suspect) may be pivotal to the overall disposition of the case.

34 Interestingly, Cicero (*De Inventione* Book I xxiv-xxviii; Book II iv–xvi) more adequately focuses analysis on what actually happened in particular instances; i.e., attending to the situated flows of the events under consideration. This may reflect Cicero’s greater involvements in prosecuting and defending (versus observing) actual cases.
Enthymemes are often employed in conjunction with *maxims* (BII, XX-XXI). Denoting variants of moralist standpoints and/or folk wisdoms, maxims may be (a) introduced to specify principles as well as (b) used to justify speaker viewpoints or conclusions.

Regardless of the tactics and materials with which speakers work, though, Aristotle recognizes that people’s concerns with, and notions of, proofs (and refutations) can be expected to vary relative to judges’ (a) educational backgrounds and (b) the particular sources that judges accept as authorities regarding the cases at hand.

Aristotle (BII, XXII-XXIV) subsequently provides an extended list of enthymemes that speakers may invoke in establishing deductions or fostering other inferences that members of the general public might find convincing.\(^{35}\)

Here, Aristotle considers such tactics as (a) considering the opposite of a thing in question, arguing that if the opposite thing lacks the opposite quality, then the thing in question may also lack the quality attributed to it; (b) taking key words in the case and displaying their problematic quality, showing that things do not always have the quality assumed in the instance at hand; (c) focusing on things that normally occur with one another, positing that if the one occurs the other is to be expected; (d) arguing *a fortiori*, that if greater things (e.g., gods) do not possess particular qualities, then one should not expect these qualities of lesser things (e.g., people); and (e) attending to time considerations, wherein one insists on acknowledging priorities and consequents in appropriate sequences.

Other enthymemes may be generated by speakers: (f) making use of opponents’ claims to contradict opponents’ positions; (g) defining the terms of reference more precisely so that cases may be built more decisively within these restricted contexts of understanding; (h) eliminating alternative explanations in the case at hand so that the only option remaining becomes entirely feasible; (i) using induction, whereby one argues from a specific instance to a general principle; and (j) invoking the authority of previous decisions or referencing the viewpoints of more revered sources.

Still other enthymemes may be developed by (k) breaking accusations into specifics so that the limitations of these accusations might be more apparent; (l) recognizing that any act can usually have good and bad consequences, speakers may focus selectively on the good or bad features in developing their cases; (m) because the things that people approve of openly are often not the things that they desire secretly, one may emphasize the viewpoint (public display or private advantage) opposite to that one’s opponent has taken; and (n) arguing that the results produced by some antecedent would occur when that antecedent condition occurs again.

Other arguments may be pursued by (o) noting that the same people do not always adopt the same standpoint in doing the same things; (p) asserting that a possible motive is the effective motive; (q) invoking (selectively) an array of motives or standpoints that people may assume in doing (or avoiding) certain things;\(^{36}\) (r) focusing on any inconsistencies in opponents’ positions; and (s) when defending someone who has been charged or denigrated by another, one may allege that these false claims are motivated by other motives.

\(^{35}\) As with Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* more generally, this listing tries to preserve the overall flow of his material (as opposed to attempts to reorder his presentation). The breaks introduced here are simply to allow reader to more easily digest a massive array of tactics.

\(^{36}\) Here, Aristotle (BII, XXII) notes that both Pamphilus and Callipus had developed volumes on rhetoric centrally around considerations or inferences of motives (i.e., a vocabulary of motives).
Tacticians may also develop enthymemes by (t) arguing (after the fact) that opponents should have selected the better course of action; (u) using people's past mistakes as a basis for accusation or defense; (v) insisting that what is true of the whole is true of the parts or vice-versa; (w) using indignant language to enhance one's position; (x) using consequences (or practices) to argue for motives; and (y) representing things as causes because they happened to occur before particular events.

Contesting Cases

Although observing that the preceding tactics (and others) may encourage auditors to develop certain viewpoints regarding the cases at hand, Aristotle is clearly aware of the problematic and negotiable nature of forensic definitions. Thus, referring to some of his earlier work (Topics), Aristotle subsequently deals with the matter of people raising objections to the cases being developed and the forms that these may assume (BII, XXV).37

Refutations of enthymemes, Aristotle contends, are developed through (a) counter-deductions or (b) objections. First, since the deductions of enthymemes reflect reasoned opinions, other reasoned opinions may be developed to oppose the conclusions reached by one's opponent.

Speaker objections to opponents' enthymemes may assume four dimensions. Thus, challengers may (a) attack opponents' principle statements, (b) replace opponents' statements with more advantageous but similar premises; (c) introduce premises that contradict opponents' principles; or (d) quote previous judgments that are at variance from the stances adopted by opponents.

Further, Aristotle states, because enthymemes are built from probabilities, examples, evidence, or signs, these are precisely the points at which these proofs may be contested. As with deductions more generally, Aristotle is highly cognizant of the distinction here between accurate deductions (as in rigorous evidence, logically sound inferences) and those that may be deemed credible by auditors.

Amplifying and Diminishing Images

Book III of Rhetoric deals with linguistic style and delivery. While Aristotle has comparatively less regard for these matters, he states that because rhetoric is so steeped in images, the subject of expressivity has considerable importance for understanding the persuasion process more broadly.

Although observing that the poets were the first to establish expressivity as communicative feature, and win fame accordingly, Aristotle (BIII: I) counsels skepticism regarding the value of poetic expression for communicative clarity. Thus, after referencing his volume, Poetics, in which he deals with the matters of delivery, expressivity, and audience experiences in some detail, Aristotle (BIII, II) emphasizes the importance of clarity and authenticity for achieving a greater sharedness of meanings in oratory (particularly in forensic and deliberative rhetoric).

37 Aristotle also distinguishes amplifications and diminution from enthymemes, observing that statements attempting to magnify or minimize things should not be confused with arguments developed through deduction.
Relatedly, Aristotle encourages orators to use words that are familiar to auditors and convey things as these are known. He also suggests that speakers employ metaphors that (strategically) represent the viewpoint adopted by the speaker in ways that are clear, charming, and pointedly distinctive.

Conversely, Aristotle (BIII, III) contends that prose is rendered ineffective when speakers: misuse compound words; use words that seem strange to auditors; develop long or frequent poetic descriptions (artificial eloquence); and generate inappropriate metaphors (as in extensively theatrical, far fetched, or obscure).

In contrast, Aristotle (BIII, V) proposes that those wishing to be more effective as communicators be attentive to the matters of connecting words more completely; using terms distinctively, precisely, and in ways that minimize ambiguity; and respecting typical rules of grammar.

Aristotle (BIII, VI) also discusses ways of enhancing and minimizing eloquence of style. Thus, he considers the options associated with (a) descriptive statements vs. more concise referents; (b) poetic vs. more direct metaphors; (c) more abstract or pluralized vs. concrete or singular references; (d) disrupting typical prose by emphasizing certain components; (e) dropping usual connecting words; and (f) drawing on contrasts or opposites.

More generally, Aristotle (BIII, VII) encourages speakers to be mindful of the advantages of style in rhetorical settings. Thus, he reminds speakers to (a) adjust their style to the sincerity and dignity of the occasion; (b) employ emotional language to convey speaker viewpoints to audiences; (c) relate to audiences in ways that intensify speaker sincerity; (d) speak in ways that are both readily understood by the audiences at hand and attentive to audience circumstances (as in age, gender, locale, education, life-style); (e) present speaker positions as representing the broader or more generalized viewpoints (knowledge, values) of people beyond their immediate audiences.

Likewise, Aristotle observes that (f) speakers who have stated things too strongly may correct these overstatements showing (tactically) that they also critically consider their own words. He also cautions speakers (g) about appearing to be too careful or overly prepared, lest this be taken as a sign of insincerity by auditors.

Aristotle (BIII, VIII) next comments on rhythm (stating that prose should be neither metrical nor void of tempo), before considering the flow and division of prose. Here, Aristotle (BIII, IX) distinguishes text that is more continuous in its development (as in Herodotus’ The Histories) from that which is divided into parts of various sorts.

Noting that divisions may generate a greater sharedness of direction and comprehension, Aristotle considers a number of variations (e.g., simple flowing divisions vs. thesis and antithesis) and some limitations of divisions in prose.

From here, Aristotle (BIII, X) focuses on the use of metaphors. Envisioning metaphors as offering something entertaining to auditors by virtue of the novel or insightful comparisons speakers may invoke, Aristotle is particularly attentive to (a) the proportionalizing effects (as in amplifying or diminishing things) that speakers may generate through metaphors; (b) the capacities of metaphors to convey action to auditors; (c) the stimulating and entertaining (as in surprising) potential of metaphors; and (d) the abilities of metaphors to express folk wisdoms, ironies, and paradoxes of thought.

Subsequently, Aristotle (BIII, XII) considers some distinctions between written and spoken rhetoric.

While noting that written oratory is typically more precise and is designed to generate its primary effect through reading, Aristotle emphasizes that spoken oratory is intended to be presented. He cautions that when spoken rhetoric is recorded as
text and read apart from its enacted content, it is apt to appear amateurish, if not absurd.

Likewise, various spoken devices such as disjunctures of words and phrases, repetitions, and amplifications may have compelling effects in live presentations but appear poorly configured in written text.

Aristotle further likens the oratory pitched to public assemblies with that of scene painting, arguing that greater detail and complexity may render these speeches ineffective.

By contrast, judicial rhetoric generally requires more precision, especially when a single, more astute judge is involved. However, when dealing with larger crowds, Aristotle observes, a dramatic delivery and a strong voice may be particularly effective.

**Arranging and Deploying the Components**

The last topic with which *Rhetoric* deals is arrangement. Arrangement focuses on the parts of a speech and the ways the materials in each part may be organized.

After stating that speeches revolve around two major parts (1) the statement or claim and (2) the related proof or demonstration of speaker claims, Aristotle (BIII, XIII) rounds these off by adding (3) an introduction and (4) a conclusion. Thus, in order, he introduces (1) the *proem*, (2) the *narration*, (3) the *proof(s)*, and (4) the *peroration*.

While reminding readers of the differing ways that speeches may be presented (both across deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative speeches and within instances of these more specifically), Aristotle discusses these four components in turn.

Representing a more formal or systematic introduction to the speech, the *proem* or *exordium* parallels the prologue in theatrical productions or the prelude to musical selections. It is here that the speakers set equivalents of the scene and characters or the tone and tempo for the auditors.

Still, the introduction has differing relevancies with respect to deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial rhetoric.

Observing that introductions are apt to be used in deliberative oratory only when auditors do not know the situation at hand or when two or more speakers assume oppositionary positions, Aristotle assigns has a decidedly different quality to the introduction in epideictic or demonstrative rhetoric. Here, he notes, the proem serves more like a musical prelude to the ensuing expressions of praise or condemnations.

In judicial cases, the proem or exordium is typically used to set the stage for the ensuing drama. However, instead of keeping judges in suspense about the direction of the case, Aristotle encourages speakers to state their positions in clear and direct terms (the suspense will be in the adequacy of the proofs and challenges thereof).

Further, whereas plaintiffs conventionally use the introduction to vilify or condemn defendants, defenders typically employ their introductions to neutralize negativities directed toward the targets of the accusations.

Aristotle also envisions exordiums as places in which judicial speakers attempt to (a) pursue the good-will of judges, (b) encourage disaffections with their opponents, and (c) focus auditor attention on certain matters while distracting them from other concerns. Thus, speakers may encourage auditors to define certain matters as important, admirable, or pleasing; or, conversely, as irrelevant, shameful, or disgusting.
Aristotle then further observes that the task of selectively focusing auditor attention on particular aspects of the situation is by no means unique to the introduction. It is relevant to all parts of the speech.

Aristotle also notes that speakers who have weaker cases may spend proportionately more time on the introduction in hopes of diverting attention from other aspects of the case.

By contrast, again, speakers involved in deliberative or political oratory are likely to employ exordia or more extended introductions only when speakers intend to (a) establish their own relevancies to the situations at hand; (b) address their opponents in some way; (c) deal with anticipated audience resistances; or (d) redefine the context through embellishments (make things appear more or less consequential than presently seems).

Aristotle (BIII, XV) then indicates how defendants may use introductory statements to neutralize objections or negative opinions that auditors may have about their cases. Thus, defenders may (1) openly deny the viewpoints or claims of prosecutors, (2) contend that little or no harm was done to the other, or (3) reject any disgraceful features of the case.

Likewise, defenders may (4) admit acts, but argue that these: (a) were done honorably or had redeeming qualities; (b) were matters of mistake, misfortune, or necessity; or (c) involved acts or outcomes that were unintended by the defendant.

Defenders may also (5) direct aspersions toward accusers, claiming that the plaintiffs (a) have done similar things themselves, (b) had earlier accused others (found innocent) of similar things, or (c) otherwise are suspect of motive and tendencies to portray things in the worst possible manners.

Narrations or statements of the case (Aristotle, BIII, XVI) also vary by the three types of rhetoric. As well, in many deliberative cases and some instances of judicial oratory, speakers may forego an introduction as such and proceed more directly to the issue or statement of the facts in the case at hand. Aristotle subsequently delineates and compares speakers' narratives or accounts of the three major types of oratory.

Because of its expressive qualities, demonstrative oratory is notably less constrained by matters of chronological sequence, clarity, or completeness.

In judicial oratory, Aristotle counsels speakers to be clear and direct, as well as selective in the ways in which they present materials to judges. Typically, too, while claimants are apt to be more detailed in building their cases, defenders are likely to be comparatively brief (as in denouncing claims, asserting innocence).

Further, since the emphasis in judicial narratives is generally not only on the things done but also commonly reflects on the characters of the people involved, Aristotle observes that these statements allow speakers to pursue appropriate modes of emotional response by the ways in which speakers depict the people involved.

In deliberative oratory, Aristotle notes that speakers may reflect on past events but they cannot provide actual narrations or statements of fact regarding the future (since these things have not yet happened). Still, Aristotle contends that speakers attempting to convince others should speak with great certainty about impending events and should be prepared to provide detailed explanations for their claims.

In judicial cases, narratives or statements of facts revolve around proofs (and refutations). Aristotle (BIII, XVIII) observes that judicial arguments focus on (a) whether the act has been done; (b) whether it was harmful; (c) whether the acts and outcomes were intended; and (d) what sort of justice is appropriate.

In epideictic or demonstrative oratory, speakers typically develop their statements around things that honor or condemn the case at hand. Speaker
amplifications (as "proofs"), thus, generally involve enumerations, elaborations, and evaluations of the features of the people or situations that speakers wish to emphasize.

In deliberative rhetoric, the emphasis is on establishing (or questioning) (a) the likelihood of some future situation, (b) the practical nature of the action proposed, (c) the virtuous qualities of this undertaking, and (d) the utility or viability of the action in question.

While viewing examples (denoting comparison points) as representing the primary forms of proof in deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle identifies enthymemes or deductive proofs as most appropriate to judicial cases. Even here, however, he cautions speakers against using enthymemes: (a) in extended series; (b) on all subject matters; (c) to invoke emotionality on the part of judges; and (d) to convey character.

Addressing judicial oratory further, Aristotle states that speakers who are unable to formulate viable enthymemes (in confirmation or refutation) should strive to establish the integrity of speakers' own characters so that auditors might view speakers as more virtuous and, therefore, credible sources.

As well, while noting that the enthymemes developed in refutation are generally more compelling (situated and responsive) than those developed in accusation (planned, initiatory), Aristotle observes that claimants may offset some challenges likely to be presented by defenders by anticipating and neutralizing these before hand.

When responding to prosecutors, Aristotle states that defenders should speak more directly against claimants. Aristotle also deems it important that defenders dispose of any major negativities (as in claims, reputations) introduced by claimants, in an attempt to minimize auditor hostility. Somewhat relatedly, Aristotle observes, where speakers may feel vulnerable to audience disaffection, speakers may present their own viewpoints as representing those of some third (more esteemed) party.

It is conjunction with proof and refutation that Aristotle (BIII, XVIII) also considers the topics of interrogation, answers, and humor.

Aristotle states that interrogation may be employed productively when the opponents' answers would: (a) render the opponent's earlier claims absurd; (b) serve to establish the speaker's conclusion; (c) contradict the opponent's earlier position; or (d) require an opponent to adopt an ambiguous or an evasive position on a point that the opponent formerly insisted was central to the case.

Aristotle discourages speakers from asking questions that may generate effective objections from opponents as well as from embarking on extended sets of questions (since auditors may have difficulty following arguments of this latter sort).

When faced with interrogation, especially equivocal questions in which speakers deliberately restrict respondent choices, Aristotle suggests that respondents answer questions more fully. Likewise, when questions appear to lead respondents to unfavorable answers, Aristotle proposes that respondents answer in ways that more directly establish objections or qualifications to the questions asked.

Making reference to a fuller (but unfortunately now lost part of Aristotle') Poetics in discussing the role of humor, jest or ridicule in oratorical settings, Aristotle observes (citing Gorgias) that speakers may nullify seriousness with humor and

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38 Aristotle posits that deliberative oratory is generally more difficult than judicial because deliberative speaking (a) depends on the uncertainty of the future, (b) lacks the structure of the law as a basis for dealing with cases, and (c) offers comparatively fewer opportunities for tactical digression.
displace humor with seriousness. At the same time, Aristotle cautions speakers to be mindful of their situations and suggests that people of higher stations generally rely on irony rather than buffoonery or more base forms of humor (again, mindful of audience receptivities).

Aristotle (BIII, XIX) then concludes Rhetoric with a discussion of the peroration or conclusion to the speech. Whereas the purpose of the conclusion in deliberative rhetoric is to prompt a desired decision, and demonstrative speeches may be concluded with expressive sentiments of various sorts, Aristotle identifies four objectives that speakers may pursue in the epilogue in judicial rhetoric.

The first task is to reaffirm the moral characters of the participants, whereby speakers commend their clients (and/or selves) and vilify their opponents.

The second objective is to selectively magnify or minimize the facts as the speaker earlier established these in the case.

The third goal is to intensify appropriate emotional responses (as in anger, pity, envy) toward the various participants on the part of auditors.

The fourth concern is to review of the case, indicating directly, clearly, and emphatically how one's case is superior to one's opponent.

Then, simultaneously concluding (a) his consideration of the epilogue, (b) his advice to speakers, and (c) his volume on rhetoric, Aristotle directly addresses his auditor:

I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgement. [Aristotle, Rhetoric, BIII, XIX [Barnes]]

In Conclusion

Given the scope and depth of the conceptual material that Aristotle presents on rhetoric, it may be useful to highlight some of the more central emphases in his text. As before, I will follow the overall flow of Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Whereas Aristotle approaches rhetoric as the study of all means of persuasive communication and places great emphasis on words, Aristotle also is quick to remind us that influence work needs to be examined well beyond the particular words that constitute the text of the speech. Thus, Aristotle is explicitly attentive to (a) the qualifications, preparations, and tactics of the speakers, (b) the fuller, developmentally engaged nature of the speech, and (c) the viewpoints and dispositions of those attending to these interchanges as auditors or judges. Rhetoric, thus, is to be understood as purposive, reflective, enacted, adjustive realms of interchange, the outcome of which is always dependent on audience receptivities, definitions, and decisions.

Distinguishing deliberative, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle not only is attentive to the relevance of rhetoric for political, judicial, and honorific contexts but he also specifies the sorts of concerns and challenges that typify the practices of rhetoric in each of these settings. Although his text clearly has been developed mindfully of the complexities of forensic rhetoric, Aristotle also makes it apparent that the study of persuasive endeavor is of great importance relative to decisions, policy, and practices across the broader political spectrum. Likewise, rhetoric also is relevant to public acclamations and denunciations of particular people, events, or other objects.

Aristotle’s analysis of forensic rhetoric is remarkably comprehensive. Thus, he directly addresses wrongdoing, justice, and the contingencies of cases handled in the
courts. Notably, in contrast to those who might endeavor to explain crime and deviance as the products of cosmological, physiological, psychological, demonological, or other matters acting upon or from within particular individuals, Aristotle approaches wrongdoing as meaningful, reflective, purposive activity. He also posits that the same elements and processes used in explaining other human activity would be applicable to explanations of wrongdoing. Accordingly, Aristotle is explicitly attentive to perpetrator abilities, viewpoints, interests, and definitions of self; perpetrator definitions of the targets of their ventures; and perpetrator definitions of the situations (and the contingencies thereof) in which their activities are developed.

In discussing justice, Aristotle considers the differences between, and respective implications of, written law, natural law, and conceptions of equality as these notions might be applied to the particular cases at hand. In addition to addressing these three aspects of justice in both relativist and situated terms, Aristotle considers the related matters of indignation and the assignment of blame.

Still, while framing matters at a broad level, Aristotle also details some of the central conceptual implications of formal laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths in judicial cases.

In Book II, Aristotle focuses more directly on the art or technique of rhetoric. Attending to the eventual goal of rhetoricians obtaining favorable judgments in the cases they represent, Aristotle provides a highly compacted analysis of the ways in which rhetoricians may (a) try to maximize their credibility as speakers, (b) attend to, engage, and shape the emotional viewpoints and experiences of their audiences, and (c) selectively adjust their presentations mindfully of the broader orientational frameworks that are likely to characterize audiences in particular life circumstances.

In sections xviii–xxv of Book II, Aristotle deals more pointedly with (d) the matter of generating and refuting proofs. Mindful of the objective of encompassing all modes of rhetoric, Aristotle not only addresses the more technical features of judicial rhetoric but also writes mindfully of the typically less complex interchanges that one encounters in other settings. In this section of Rhetoric, Aristotle (i) provides an extended consideration of possibilities and probabilities, (ii) specifies the major ways that proofs (i.e., evidence to substantiate claims) may be established, and (iii) more specifically indicates the specific points at which various kinds of proofs may be challenged.

Then, attending to the idea that people know things through the images that they have of these matters, Aristotle begins Book III of Rhetoric by discussing the ways that speakers may try to emphasize and/or diminish particular images of the matters under consideration. Here he deals more specifically with style and delivery.

While stressing the value of clarity and authenticity in developing one’s position, Aristotle also considers the nature and implications of “eloquence of style” for rhetorical effect. Relatedly, he considers the ways that rhetoricians may recast the images that their auditors have of specific things through instances of deception, metaphors, more pointed object references, selective focusing, and the specific contrasts they invoke. Aristotle also is mindful of the ways that speakers may contextually alter the images of particular things by highly situated changes in the styles in which they relate to their audiences (i.e., by adjusting and readjusting the images of things the speakers convey) at specific points in time.

39 Those familiar with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics will see that he pointedly invokes a singular analytic (pragmatist) frame in explaining the entire range of virtues and vices (also see Prus 2007a).
Having established the broader frame as well as the more central, enacted features of rhetoric in highly compacted but analytically detailed terms, Aristotle concludes Rhetoric with a more explicit consideration of the ways in which the major components of rhetoric may be organized and adjusted as situations develop. Thus, he attends to the proem or introduction, the narration or the account of the case (the events, speaker positions, and associated matters), the proof (including evidence and refutations) of cases, and the peroration or conclusion. Even as he concludes this text, Aristotle not only describes the purposes of each of these components but also reengages earlier aspects of his analysis as he indicates the ways that people more strategically may engage these features of the encounter.

Because speech (and speech-related influence work) is so fundamental to the lived human community, Aristotle's Rhetoric not only provides us with a base for comprehending wide ranges of human interaction but also generates vital insights into the processes by which people propose, articulate, emphasize, and contest the particular meanings assigned to humans and/or other matters.

In addition to its relevance for identity work and persuasive endeavor, Aristotle's Rhetoric provides remarkable insight into the ways in which people engage activity in collective arenas as well as develop their activities in more solitary contexts (as in making preparations, reflective deliberations, assessments, and personal adjustments). This statement also indicates with remarkable clarity and depth how people's experiences with emotionality can be shaped and resisted by others.

Despite its overall coverage, this paper understates the relevance of Aristotle's Rhetoric (as well as his other works) for the social sciences more generally and sociological analysis more specifically. For Aristotle (also see Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, and Poetics), community life revolves around sets of meaningful, deliberatively engaged, and actively constructed processes (activities and interchanges).

Aristotle is fully aware of people's capacities for learning and intentional recollection; deliberative, sequenced activity; knowingly attending to the past, present, and future; anticipating the viewpoints of single and multiple others; managing the impressions they give off to others; strategizing and invoking deceptions; and making all sorts of assessments of, and adjustments to, others within the contexts of cooperation, competition, conflict, alliances, and so forth. Indeed, Aristotle's rhetoric is pertinent to the study of all manners of group and intergroup associations.

Beyond Aristotle's related (1) pragmatist position on humans as biologically-enabled, linguistic, deliberative, active agents, Aristotle has much to offer social scientists with respect to (2) the matter of intersubjectivity or the extended centrality of language in human interchange; (3) an explicit appreciation of what Erving Goffman (1959) would term “impression management;” (4) the study of influence work in a more direct and engaged sense; and (5) an extended analysis of emotionality as a feature of influence work.

Unfortunately, most of those in philosophy and rhetoric have failed to sustain Aristotle's emphases on (1) the importance of studying rhetoric as dynamic fields of activity (and interchange) and (2) envisioning rhetoric as a thoroughly fundamental feature of community life. For Aristotle, thus, rhetoric as a realm of study not only contributes to a more viable understanding of human group life but, interrelatedly, a more adequate appreciation of rhetoric presupposes the broader study of the human
condition (i.e., biological and behavioral capacities, language, images, relations, values, goals, mindedness, emotionality, and deliberative, strategic interchange).\textsuperscript{40}

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43BCE) will emerge as the most competent scholar of rhetoric after Aristotle (Prus, 2008). Although highly insightful and extremely valuable for the articulating many aspects of the practice of rhetoric and providing some sustained historical-comparative analysis of Greek and Roman rhetoric even Cicero was not able to sustain Aristotle’s concerted philosophic viewpoint on human knowing and acting. Nor, relatedly, was Cicero able to span the divide between philosophy and rhetoric that Socrates and Plato had earlier generated (also see Cicero, \textit{Brutus}; Rosenfield, 1971; Vickers, 1988).

Thus, while there is much to be learned from Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine and other rhetoricians who followed after Aristotle, it is Aristotle who “wrote the book on rhetoric” and to whom we may most productively return if we intend not only to bridge the academic gulf between philosophy and rhetoric (or, to paraphrase Cicero, “maintain the connection between thinking and speaking”) but also to develop a more sustained and comprehensive understanding of ways in which human group life is accomplished in practice. For those in the interactionist (and broader pragmatist) tradition, Aristotle’s rhetoric is a treasure chest waiting to be accessed and productively applied in comparative and adjustive terms to the study of human knowing and acting.

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I am grateful to Beert Verstraete for his extended discussions of classical thought with me as well as his thoughtful reading of an earlier draft of this paper.

\textsuperscript{40} Although Aristotle does not provide a distinctive methodology for studying human interchange, contemporary scholars may appreciate Aristotle’s emphasis on examining things in the instances in which they occur so that one might arrive at more adequate conceptions of the essences of things they are taken to represent. Aristotle also insists that people arrive at the meanings of things through comparative analysis, in which instances are examined with reference to the similarities and differences that one observes in the instances one examines (i.e., inductive reasoning). Those familiar with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Blumer (1969) will recognize the more basic affinities of their positions on research and analysis with those of Aristotle on these matters.
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Citation

Biography, Media Consumption, And Identity Formation

Abstract

This paper proposes that the biographical or narrative interview is an important method in exploring the relationship of media consumption to identity formation. The paper takes issue with those theorists who place media consumption at the centre of identity formation processes. Rather, in line with the work of British social theorist John Tomlinson, the paper argues the need to see the relationship between media and culture, in the process of identity formation, as an interplay of mediations between culture-as-lived-experienced and culture-as-representation. On the one hand we have the media, representing the dominant representational aspect of modern culture while on the other we have the lived experience of culture which includes the discursive interaction of families and friends and the ‘material-existential’ experiences of routine life. Our media consumption choices and the meanings we take from the media are shaped by these lived cultural experiences while the media we consume also impacts on how we make sense of these experiences. The paper argues that the narrative or biographical interview is a useful way to explore this interplay of mediations in the process of identity formation.

Keywords
Media consumption; Identity formation; Biography; Narrative interview; South African youth.

The idea of ‘self as story’ both overlaps and contrasts with other models of identity. It also extends the idea of ‘culture’ and ‘media’ beyond the organisational structures of, say, the culture industries, broadcasting or the published media, into the everyday modes in which we express and construct our lives in personal terms, telling our own stories. It makes the assumption that it is valuable to look not just at the products of professionals and specialists but also at the practices of ordinary people in their everyday lives. (Finnegan 1997: 69)
Media consumption and identity formation

The centrality of consumption to identity formation in modern societies has been argued by a number of writers. According to Miller (1997: 26), whereas a century ago the identity of individuals was rooted in production – as workers or owners – today it is consumption which confers identity. This is because consumption is the one domain over which individuals feel they still have some power (also see Featherstone 1987: 55-70; Slater 1997: 24; Mackay 1997: 8; Brown et al. 1994: 813-827; Miles et al. 1998: 81-84).

For some writers it is media consumption in particular that lies at the heart of this process. Thompson (1995: 75; 211) writes that in late modern society, many of the traditional sources of identity – religion, the family – have lost their legitimacy, especially for young people. As a result, individuals increasingly fall back on their own resources for identity construction, with ‘mediated symbolic materials’ playing a crucial role in this process. Kellner (1995: 1) has similarly argued that in contemporary industrial society, a ‘media culture’ has emerged which helps ‘produce the fabric of everyday life...shaping political views and social behaviour, and providing the materials out of which people forge their very identities”. He writes:

Radio, television, film, and the other products of the culture industries provide the models of what it means to be male or female, successful or a failure, powerful or powerless. Media culture also provides the materials out of which many people construct their sense of class, of ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Media culture helps shape the prevalent view of the world and deepest values: it defines what is considered good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil. Media stories and images provide the symbols, myths, and resources which help constitute a common culture for the majority of individuals in many parts of the world today. Media culture provides the materials to create identities whereby individuals insert themselves into contemporary techno-capitalist societies and which is producing a new form of global culture. (Kellner 1995: 1)

Such claims for the centrality of consumption in general and media consumption in particular to identity formation have not gone unchallenged. Warde (1996: 305), for example, has argued that the “production view of the self” underestimates the social context of identity formation – including the variety of kinship and associational practices which create and sustain social relations – while overemphasising the role of cultural products – particularly media products and icons of fashion – in this process. Tomlinson, in his discussion of the role of media consumption in identity formation, argues that overly-strong claims for media power arise as a result of media theorists seeing the media as determining rather than mediating cultural experience:

[W]hat we make of a television programme or novel or a newspaper article is constantly influenced and shaped by whatever else is going on in our lives. But, equally, our lives are lived as representations to ourselves in terms of the representations present in our culture: our biographies are, partly 'intertextual'. (1991: 61)

Tomlinson believes that we should instead view the relationship between media and culture as a subtle "interplay of mediations" (1991: 61), a dialectical relationship between culture-as-lived-experience (including the discursive interaction of families and friends and the 'material-existential' experience of routine life) and culture-as-
representation (primarily via the media, recognised as the dominant representational aspect of modern culture).

**The social and the individual**

There is arguably another dialectic we should keep in mind in our discussion of the media’s role in identity formation processes: that between the individual and the social. Silverstone has written of the need for sensitivity towards “…the plurality of the social and the individual, a plurality which in turn involves both a sociology and a psychology, and their interrelationship…” (1990: 175). Grisprud has called for media theorists to develop “more nuanced ideas about how socio-cultural structures and forces on the one hand and individuals and their minds and choices on the other work in relation to each other in the reception of media texts” (1995: 9), while Therborn points out that the forms of human subjectivity “…are constituted by the intersections of the psychic and the social” (1980: 16). Hoijer has argued the need to take into account “the interplay between culture and cognition” (1998: 169) while for Bonfadelli (1993: 232) media use and competency has to be perceived as the result of biographical experience with various media, and that these processes are embedded in the ecological contexts of family, neighbourhood, school and so on.

**The narrative interview**

Within media studies, the narrative or biographical interview provides a generally ignored, but potentially fruitful method for exploring both the intertextuality of everyday life and the social/individual dialectic. Hermanns defines this research method:

In the narrative interview, the informant is asked to present the history of an area of interest, in which the interviewee participated, in an extempore narrative…The interviewer’s task is to make the informant tell the story of the area of interest in question as a consistent story of all relevant events from its beginning to its end. (quoted in Flick 1998: 99)

At the start of the interview is the ‘generative narrative question’ which serves not only to stimulate the production of a narrative, but also to focus the discourse or exposition on the topical area and the period of the biography with which the interview is concerned (Flick 1998: 104). The interviewee’s account should not be an argument for or against a particular issue but should instead deal with how ones present attitudes came about (Flick 1998: 99). Importantly, research questions pursued from within this approach should contextualise biographical process against the background of concrete and general circumstances (Flick 1998: 105).

A sub-genre of the narrative interview is what Flick refers to as the “episodic interview” (1998: 110) in which a single overall narrative is not requested – as in the narrative interview – but rather several delimited narratives are stimulated. The interviewee is asked to present episodes or narratives of situations that seem to be relevant to the question of the study (for example: “If you look back on your life, when did you first start watching television? Could you tell me about your favourite programmes? Why were you drawn to these particular programmes?”). Flick (1998) believes that episodes as an object of such narratives, and as an approach to the experiences relevant for the subject under study, allow a more concrete approach than does the narrative of the life history. In summary, the episodic interview allows
normal everyday phenomena (for example, media consumption) to be analysed primarily through orienting to a series of key questions concerning the situations to be recounted.

Highlighting moments of epiphany as experienced by the subject is a way of further focussing the episodic interview, and is an approach which runs implicitly through my own previous work in this area (Strelitz 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005). As defined by Denzin (1989) in his discussion of Interpretive Research, these moments reflect those experiences “that leave marks on people’s lives” (1989: 14-15) and radically alter and shape the meanings persons give to themselves and their life projects. The existential thrust of this approach sets it apart from other interpretive approaches that examine the more mundane, taken-for-granted properties and features of everyday life and it is this, I believe, that makes it suitable for investigating areas of focused concern, such as, in this case, media consumption and identity formation. It allows us to “operationalise” Tomlinson’s (1991) insight into the “interplay of mediations” in that it enables the researcher to move back and forth between important biographical moments, demonstrating how these have shaped media consumption preferences and conversely, to examine how the media consumed has impacted on the individuals’ understandings of these moments.

In this paper I will focus primarily on the school experiences of my subject both during and following the collapse of apartheid in South Africa. As will become clear, the schooling system was (and continues to be) a crucial site for the production and reproduction of class and “race” inequalities in this country. It is thus perhaps unsurprising then that during the interview my subject narrated his life through the important markers of his school experiences.

**Apartheid South Africa**

The interview discussed in this paper was conducted in 1999 with Luthando, then a student at Rhodes University in South Africa. Luthando was born in 1978 in the black township of Mdantsane near East London in the province of the Eastern Cape. His father was a teacher and his mother a nurse. Until the age of 16, the social and political context of his life was apartheid (separateness), the segregationist policies introduced by the National Party on assuming power in 1948.

The apartheid system itself was built on the forms of domination and privilege that arose during the period of European conquest and settlement following the arrival of the Dutch in the Cape in 1652, and the segregationist policies that developed along with the later industrialisation of South Africa following the discovery of diamonds in 1869 and of gold in 1886 (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989: 1; Wolpe 1988: 63; Davenport 1991: 518; Marks and Trapido 1987: 7). The Nationalist Party built on this segregationist tradition through the introduction of legislation which established distinct biological categories to divide the “racial” groups and keep them, through further legislation, separated at the political, economic and social levels – hence separate residential areas, schooling, amenities and so on (Davenport 1991: 328).41

41 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 made marriages between whites and people other than whites illegal, the aim of which was to freeze racial categories for all time (Ross 1999: 116). This was followed by the Population Registration Act in 1950, which was designed to assign everyone to a racial group. Also in 1950, an amendment to the Immorality Act of 1927 prohibited sexual intercourse across the colour line (Ross 1999: 116). In addition to the whites and the Africans, the Population Registration Act also recognised, as different “race”
As Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989: 58) note, South Africa was projected not as a nation-state, but as a region comprised of several national states and national communities. Liberty was defined as national self-determination, and equality as equal full nationhood. It was envisaged that African people would attain political rights in their respective Homelands or, in the case of the coloured people and Indians, in their respective communities. However, in practice there was no semblance of equality. The legal/political system defined a category of white subjects who had the right to vote, economic rights of land and property ownership, monopoly rights to certain kinds of jobs, social rights to education and training, state medical care, and an array of other public amenities (Wolpe, 1988: 63).

Opposition to the apartheid regime went through a number of stages. In 1960 the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) were banned. In 1973 the wide-spread strikes by African workers ushered in a period of intense labour unrest and the growth of black trade unionism. In 1976 the Soweto students’ uprising sparked of school closures and student/police battles nationwide, followed by a strengthening of exile and extra-parliamentary political opposition in the 1980s.

Wolpe (1988: 103) notes that while the government used emergency powers to control opposition, it was restrained from adopting the ‘Chile option’ by external pressures from the United States (which imposed economic sanctions in October 1986), various European and Commonwealth countries, as well as from corporate capital and liberal forces within its own ranks. Within a few years deadlock had been reached between the forces of oppression and those of the people. Within the dominant faction within the ANC it was believed that a negotiated settlement, rather than revolution, was the only way out of the impasse, and this necessitated the recognition of the ANC and other opposition forces. In November 1987, Govan Mbeki, a prominent ANC leader was released from prison, followed by the other Rivonia trial defendants including Walter Sisulu in 1989, and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. In this way the ANC was effectively unbanned, and negotiations could proceed. This process culminated in the first democratic elections in South Africa, held in 1994, which brought the ANC to power.

Mdantsane township

As noted above, Luthando grew up in the township of Mdantsane, then part of the Ciskei Homeland. During the early 1960s, under the Group Areas Act, blacks were evicted from East London properties that were in areas designated as "white only" and forced to move into townships on the outskirts of the city. As Nel points out, the creation of townships such as Mdantsane reflected “attempts by the authors of apartheid to organise both urban and rural space in South Africa along lines of race” (Nel, 1990: 305). Townships were not only the reflection of a particular political ideology, but also served an economic function providing cheap labour for adjacent centres of capitalist enterprise, in this case East London (Nel, 1990: 306). From its inception Mdantsane suffered from overcrowding, poverty, unemployment, crime, malnutrition and under-developed infrastructure. By 2005 little had changed and the township had a population of approximately 175 783 and covered an area of 92 square kilometres, making it the second biggest township in South Africa after Soweto and only slightly smaller than the “white” city of East London with 212 000
residents. The social inequalities that were reflected in black townships under apartheid remain in Mdantsane. Only 23% of residents are employed and most household still earn less than the subsistence level. There remains a lack of access to basic services: 42% of residents are without electricity, 12% without piped water, and 61% are without telephone services (The Department of Provincial and Local Government 2005).

These then are the social and material conditions that shaped Luthando’s youthful world.

**Luthando’s schooling**

*Primary school*

During the turbulent 1980s in South Africa, when the country witnessed two states-of-emergency, the young Luthando experienced the brutality of the apartheid state:

Mdantsane was very militant. I would see raids and all that. I would see people’s houses being burnt. I can still remember one time I saw a person with a tire round his neck…it was very traumatic for us to watch that, but that was what was around you.

Despite the brutality of his lived conditions of existence, the ‘social logic’ of the apartheid state meant that for a number of reasons, he was slow in developing a critical political consciousness. Firstly, his educational choices and opportunities, like those of all black township youth, were severely curtailed as he had to attend a local township-based Department of Education and Training (DET) school. During the years of apartheid, Bantu Education was administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET). The acronym DET was used to refer to these poorly resourced schools located primarily in African townships and rural areas. Bantu education’s differential syllabus, with an emphasis on practical subjects, was clearly designed to prepare Africans for subordination in the workplace (Davenport, 1991: 535). Thus the ‘hidden curriculum’ of DET schools, such as the one Luthando attended in Mdantsane, was to inculcate a sense of social inferiority and insubordination into the pupils.

Furthermore, during the years of Luthando’s youth, the ever-present possibility of violent state response to political opposition to the status quo – usually through imprisonment – meant that his parents steered away from discussions of politics.

Because my uncle and some of his friends had been arrested, my parents tried to shield me from politics. They never spoke about it at home – my mother was afraid I would go out onto the street and start talking things. If you said anything about the ANC or whatever in Mdantsane in those days you would be detained. So I grew up not knowing much about politics.

Finally, the mass media, in particular the state-controlled radio and television stations, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) helped naturalise the political and social status quo. Thus, one of the functions of the state run television and radio stations was to mediate, through the local content programmes, a coherent apartheid-based reality which underlined the importance of ethnic values through the promotion of tribal imagery and themes (Tomaselli and Tomaselli 1989). While independent newspapers existed and were often critical of aspects of apartheid, their reporting practices were deeply circumscribed by numerous censorship laws.
including, in the 1980s, a prohibition on reporting on banned people and organisations. Steven Lukes’ comments on the relationship between ideology and power are apposite to many apartheid subjects, black and white:

…the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial. (1974: 24)

The naturalness of white superiority under apartheid was experienced by Luthando.

In Mdantsane if you played football well they’d call you an mhlungu meaning ‘you play like you’re a white person…you can do your stuff’. If you scored a goal they’d say the goal was like umkhumshile, which means that ‘scoring a goal is the same as speaking English well’. When we covered our school books it was rare to find someone with a black actor on his books. I remember I had Maradona on one of my books…never local black soccer players.42

Luthando explains that the images he and his friends appropriated came from “what we’d see on TV”. However, these were primarily foreign (American) programmes as the overly-didactic nature of local television (and radio) programmes during the apartheid years, held little appeal:

Local radio was boring for me and I never used to listen. They used to have these stories about ancient times...about cattle and people and how they used to live and all that. I couldn’t relate to those things. On television there were Xhosa dramas, but they were boring...very serious...more to do with talking...very little action.

Instead, like many young viewers, he was drawn to the American action series and films broadcast on the English language television service:

I enjoyed The A-Team, Knightrider, and McGyver. I watched a lot of American cartoons. At school we were taught English second language so we couldn’t speak it well. I didn’t understand what the characters were saying but I could watch the pictures. You weren’t thinking, you were just seeing some big guys fighting and some action.

Given Luthando’s poor English language skills – “my English was poor, I came from Bantu education” – and his rejection of local indigenous language programming,

42 Steve Biko, President of the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO), rooted in the Black Consciousness movement, was deeply aware of the acute sense of social inferiority, that blacks experienced under apartheid, a result of the ideology of white superiority. In 1970 he wrote: But the type of black man (sic) we have today has lost his manhood. Reduced to an obliging shell, he looks with awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as the “inevitable position”...In the privacy of his toilet his face twists in silent condemnation of white society but brightens up in sheepish obedience as he comes out scurrying in response to his master’s impatient call...His heart yearns for the comfort of white society and makes him blame himself for not having been “educated” enough to warrant such luxury...All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave and ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity. (quoted in Gerhart 1978: 286)
it is unsurprising that he was drawn to the American action programmes. As Gerbner (2000) has noted, the focus on action and violence rather than dialogue is one of the reasons behind the global popularity of Hollywood action television and film. In addition, it was also the relative freedom and affluence of the black film and television characters that attracted Luthando and which gave him the symbolic means to begin to puncture the reality of black subjugation under apartheid.

I realised that America, compared to South Africa, is another country and that started affecting me. Whenever you see America you see beautiful black people, nice cars and all that. I used to think America was all that.

Significantly, it was the tacit recognition by the National Party government that foreign television programmes could undermine the ideology of apartheid that led to the delayed introduction of television into South Africa. The Meyer Commission of Enquiry which was set up to consider “matters relating to television” was very clear about the political imperatives of the new service which was eventually introduced in 1976:

A television service for South Africa…should be founded on such principles as will ensure that the Christian system of values, the national identity and the social structure of its various commitments will be respected, preserved and enriched…(quoted in Strelitz and Steenveld, 1994: 38)

Secondary school
Another important psychic rupture occurred when, after completing his primary schooling, Luthando’s parents sent him to a previously all-white Model C high school, Selborne College, located in an affluent white suburb of East London. In 1992 the Nationalist Government issued an Education Review Strategy which established Model C schools which deracialised previously all-white schools. Compared to township schools these were well-resourced and provided a superior education but the relatively high fee structure ensured that they remained primarily white.

It was a difficult transition from the poverty of Mdantsane to the relative affluence of East London. Luthando was the only Black student in his class and was encountering white youth, outside of television representations, for the first time. In addition, the relatively poor education he had received at his township primary school left him ill-prepared for the more demanding scholastic requirements of Selborne College.

When I was in primary school in Mdantsane I used to be the first in class. Then I went to Selborne and for the first time I started to fail subjects. Before I used to be a confident young man but now I was not too sure of myself. I was sort of apologetic when I talked to people. Also, my English was poor – I’d never been taught how to speak the language properly. I used to be clever when I was at primary school and suddenly when I’m up with these guys who are white, I always come bottom half. It was the environment, it didn’t accommodate me – I felt foreign.

In 1990 Nelson Mandela was released from prison and political organisations such as the ANC and PAC were unbanned. Alternative political visions were now tolerated and could now be openly discussed and this impacted on Luthando’s engagement with the dominant Euro-centric school culture:
I still didn’t feel like I belonged at Selborne – we were being tolerated. I remember our history teacher used to speak a lot of propaganda – telling us how bad the ANC was. But then my uncle came back from exile and he had his own propaganda. We would watch films on [Steve] Biko and Malcolm X…he would read me poems that he’d written and all that. He influenced me a lot. By standard 8 [grade 10] my English had improved and I was getting good marks. Some type of confidence came back. I was challenging most of these white guys. Sometimes they would say something and I would raise my hand and object. I was called a troublemaker by the teachers and students. For example, we read Shakespeare and all of that. I asked, “why can’t we read something we can all relate to…something I can be accommodated to?” The teacher just told me, “that’s the syllabus and that’s the way it is”. They always had this thing about tradition…they didn’t want to change because it was tradition. I wanted to prove them wrong.

Growing in confidence, Luthando also objected to the marginalisation of soccer in the schools sports programme. 44

When it came to sport we told the school that if we [black pupils] play rugby we will again look inferior but if we play soccer we know that we can compete with you guys. We formed a soccer team which was made up of a lot of black pupils. It was successful but Selborne didn’t like it because it took away people from rugby. It wasn’t funded by the school…if we needed transport no-one would be willing to take us.

The need to re-assert their marginalised identity led a number of black pupils to form a Xhosa society “for people who were interested in our culture”. His growing social and political awareness was also reflected in his media consumption choices.

At this time I started listening to a lot of reggae. I met Rastafarians who had a lot of influence. One of them gave me a Bob Marley tape and I listened to what he was saying and it was really true. He had a lot of Black Consciousness messages about being proud of yourself. He also sang about those things that I could relate to like poverty, people not being educated, the brutality of the police…things that were happening in Kingston Jamaica had also happened here in South Africa…I experienced them growing up in the township.

Luthando inserted the meanings of reggae music into his experience of Mdantsane and his experience of Mdantsane into the meanings of reggae music – each was influenced by and validated the other. Reggae, although a foreign music form, “authenticated” Luthando’s local experience of racial subordination (for a discussion of the processes through which local identities are constructed out of material and symbolic resources which may not be local in their origins, but should still be considered “authentic” see Massey 1992: 11-15; Miller 1992: 164-165).

At the same time, mass mediated black American popular culture became increasingly important to Luthando with actors and sports-stars providing important role models.

43 Steve Biko was a well-known South African Black Consciousness student leader and writer who was murdered by the South African police in 1977.

44 The racial divide in South Africa is reflected in its sporting codes with whites and blacks dominating the playing of rugby and soccer respectively.
I remember writing an essay at high school saying that I wish that South Africa could be like America where there’s racial harmony and all that. You would see black Americans, the way they dress, they’re big…theirs ladies have long stringy hair, the kinds of cars they drive. You never see any ghettos, you see all these posh places… I wanted to be like them. I became influenced by hip hop music. The musicians rap about their money, their women, the gold rings, the food they eat. I liked that. I even said to one guy who was arguing with me at school…he said, ‘no you can’t play cricket, you can’t play this, you can’t play that’. I said, ‘no, look at Michael Jordan. A black person given a chance will succeed’. I used to look at Michael Jackson and would say, ‘he was given a chance and he succeeded. Even us, give us a proper chance and we can succeed’. By 1994, 1995, I was quite comfortable being black.

Mediated black American culture thus provided Luthando with the symbolic means to distance himself from the South African reality of white domination and black subordination providing an example of what Thompson (1995) has referred to as “symbolic distancing”. In his critique of the media imperialism thesis, Thompson points out that part of the attraction of global media for local audiences is that their consumption often provides meanings which enable “…the accentuation of symbolic distancing from the spatial-temporal contexts of everyday life” (1995: 175). The appropriation of these materials, he further notes, enables individuals “…to take some distance from the conditions of their day-to-day lives – not literally but symbolically, imaginatively, vicariously” (1995: 175). Through this process, he writes, “…[I]ndividuals are able to gain some conception, however partial, of ways of life and life conditions which differ significantly from their own” (1995: 175). Thus, global media images can provide a resource for individuals to think critically about their own lives and life conditions (1995: 175) (also see Davis and Davis 1995; Appadurai 1990; Deswaan 1989; Morely 1992; Strelitz 2002).

Besides what he had experienced through black American popular culture, the desire for material accumulation was also a result of what Luthando’s everyday experiences at Selborne and in the Mdantsane township.

I wanted money. People that went to Selborne were rich…there were lawyers and accountants driving around in their big cars…[Mercedes] Benzes, BMWs and all that. My mother would come and pick me up in her little car and you’d see all these other large cars. Also, in the township you need money to feel important, that you are actually somebody. The township is very materialistic. If you saw a guy you would say, ‘ah, he’s the man’, because he drove around in a BMW…even if he stole it or whatever…he’s got a big house, all the women come to him. As a township boy you would aspire to be like him. All the professionals that have made it, they don’t stay in the townships anymore. The role models are few. Unfortunately the role models are these guys. Besides rap, there was this craze for black American movies. They started coming out in about 1993…they talked about having money, drinking champagne, caviar and all that.

Here we see the double articulation of the role that global media can play in local cultures. Besides providing the means to transcend perceived local oppressions, they also help disseminate the acquisitive culture of capitalism (see Schiller 1991). Luthando’s attraction to black American popular culture also needs to be seen within the context of the changing social relations in South Africa following the
demise of apartheid. The need to transform apartheid-based social relations and des-
racialise the economy has meant that the post-apartheid state has been a liberal and 
modernising one, perhaps best symbolised by the South African constitution which 
enshrines individual equality before the law (Bond 2000; Mangcu 2001; Marais 
2001). For, as Nielsen (1993: 2) writes, that the essence of cultural modernisation is 
to be sought in the process of "individualization", the expanding degree of separation 
of the individual from his or her traditional ties and restrictions (in this case, not only 
pre-modern social relations, but social relations structured by the apartheid state).

A number of writers have argued for the central role played by American 
popular culture in this transition to modernity. Schou (1992) describes how American 
popular culture became a guide to “mental transformation” as Denmark underwent 
the process of modernisation after the second world war:

In Denmark, daily existence was changing for many as we left our agrarian 
past and approached a new status as an industrial nation. A new self-
awareness was sought in order to come to terms with this changing world, 
new and more sophisticated ways of looking at life, new ways to 
communicate. The inspiration had to come from the most industrial nation in 
the world. American popular culture became a guide during this mental 
transformation…One could say that it was instrumental in bringing about the 
‘mental’ modernisation of Denmark. (1992: 157)

Similarly, both Tomlinson (1991: 140) and Drotner (1992: 44) believe that the 
attraction of Western media has to be seen in the context of the attraction and 
subsequent spread of liberal capitalist modernity (also see Berger 1973).

Arguably, black American popular culture, as a “carrier of modernity”, provided 
Luthando with the symbolic means to re-imagine himself as a modern subject 
(shaped in part through his consumptive practices), no longer tied to the “place” of 
social subjugation to which he had been assigned by the apartheid state.

**Luthando attends Rhodes University**

Despite South Africa’s 1994 transition to a non-racial democracy, it remains a 
deeply divided society. Samir Amin characterises the divisions thus:

There is the overwhelmingly white section of the population whose popular 
culture and standard of living seem to belong to the ‘first’ (advanced 
capitalist) world…Much of the urban black population belongs to the 
modern, industrialising ‘third’ world, while rural Africans do not differ much 
from their counterparts in ‘fourth’ world Africa. (“Foreward” to Marais 2001: 
vii)

These inequalities are reflected in the lives of young people. Writing on the 
social and educational inequalities that exist amongst South African youth, Van Zyl 
Slabbert et al. (1994: 56-60) have noted that the country’s social dynamics have 
placed white South African youth in areas where housing is readily available. Almost 
all whites have electricity, water and water-borne sewerage in their homes, refuse 
removal, tarred roads and street lighting. White income levels are relatively high and 
poverty is minimal. Whites have access to adequate schooling with high enrolments. 
Retention levels at school level are good and white youth dominate tertiary education 
institutions. The white population growth is low. White people as a group are largely 
urbanised and relatively unaffected by unemployment (Van Zyl Slabbert et al. 1994: 
56).
While Van Zyl Slabbert et al. (1994: 57-58) distinguish between poor rural and urban middle class Africans, they argue that on the whole, African youth live in a different world compared to white youth. It is a world of unemployment, poverty, high population growth rate, inadequate schooling and largely unavailable basic social amenities (1994: 57-58). Coloured and Indian youth in South Africa appear to be positioned between African and white youth. Population growth and urban/rural ratios among the coloured and Indian communities are similar to those of the white community (Van Zyl Slabbert et al. 1994: 57-58).

In 1999, when this interview was conducted, these social and educational inequalities that existed under apartheid were in evidence at Rhodes University. The campus had 4,411 registered students: Indian (10%), African (36%), Coloured (4%), and White (50%) (Rhodes University 2000).

This is despite the fact that African students comprised 83% of the total South African school population. Furthermore, the campus demographics did not reflect the demographics of the country as a whole which, according to the census figures, gave the percentages of the population in South Africa by “population group” as African (77%), White (11%), Indian (3%), and Coloured (9%) (Central Statistics 1997).
These anomalies could, however, be explained by the history of the Apartheid education system in South Africa discussed earlier, which sought to entrench and ‘normalise’ the Apartheid ideology through the differentiated system of education. Given this history, the demographics at Rhodes University was not surprising, nor the fact that in 1996 only 12% of African students had grade 12 compared to 30% of Indians, 12% of Coloureds, and 41% of Whites (SAIRR 1999).

At the time of the interview, the staff complement at Rhodes University reflected these disparities. According to the university’s Digest of Statistics for the year 2000, 89% of the academic staff were White, 2% Indian, 2% Coloured, and 7% African. When it came to senior administrative staff, 68% were White, 2% Indian, 13% Coloured, and 17% African. On the other hand, the service staff were largely African – 100% in academic departments and 96% in the residences (Rhodes University, 2000). All of this contributed to the perception amongst many black students that there was a pervasive ‘white culture’ at the university which was insensitive to the needs of black students (for further discussion see Strelitz 2002; 2005).

As a result of his township and school experiences, as well as his exposure to black American popular culture, Luthando was clear about what he wanted to do on graduating from school:

I wanted to have money and the only way to have money is through education and getting the right degree. That’s why I decided to do a Bachelor of Commerce degree at Rhodes University.

Luthando’s Model C school experience led him to believe that he “knew how to handle white guys”. However, his entry into Rhodes University presented a new set of challenges and reflected his school experience of being an outsider.

Even at Botha House [his male residence] when we have a ‘braai’ [barbecue], it’s a problem because we [black students] can’t relate to the rock and roll that the white guys play. Most black guys don’t drink punch. We drink beer but the residences only provide punch. If we don’t go to these functions, then it seems as if we don’t want to be part of the house…but they don’t cater for us. When I first came here I asked, ‘why can’t we have the kind of food that we eat. Even at home I don’t eat lasagne and those types of things…it’s not nice’. You’ll never get an African
meal here and when you complain they’ll just tell you you’re a minority. We are always critical of Rhodes…it’s too liberal, it’s too white.

His political awareness and emerging belief in the need for black unity and a strong black identity was entrenched by his contact with other black students at the university with whom he starting mixing exclusively.

We have to be united against this hostility that we experience. If there’s a problem in my residence and it’s basically black guys versus white guys then you normally have a caucus and you say, ‘this is the problem’. I’ve been influenced a lot by guys studying postgraduate social sciences. Whenever there’s a beauty contest it’s a white or an Indian person who comes up ‘Miss whatever’. So the one comrade told me you have to question the official criteria for the way they choose…so it’s questioning everything. At mealtimes we sit around the table and discuss what Thabo Mbeki [the President of South Africa] said...so if you were not reading the papers you’d get left behind and they’d ridicule you for that. So you read books, you read things, you start watching the news regularly…it’s nice because you get these ideas and you sit and debate.  

Many of these new friends had only attended DET schools (thus reflecting their working class status) and were sometimes critical of his Model C school background.

Sometimes there would be jokes like, ‘hey, you come from a Model C school…you’re just like them’ and you’d have to prove your blackness to them. It was quite enlightening.

As had occurred earlier in his life, changed social circumstances were reflected in changed media preferences.

Now I watch Generations [a locally produced soap opera containing mainly black characters] and the local talk shows. But I don’t watch Felicia. It’s boring because she’s always talking about when she was in America. Her ideas are always Westernised and pro-America. So I just watch mostly South African programmes. I also still watch American movies because that’s all the movie houses have. But I’m now more critical of these movies. I was watching Airforce One...you just laugh at it…it’s like American propaganda the way they glorify the country. So you just sit there and have fun. It’s not influencing you anymore.

When this interview was conducted, Luthando was part of a group of African male Rhodes University students, primarily the friends he referred to earlier in the interview, who gathered every night in a viewing room they had named the Homeland, attached to one of the male residences, to watch primarily South African produced television programmes. As already discussed, apartheid was premised on the classification of people into different “race” groups and their segregation into

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45 The desire to read newspapers and watch television news expressed by Luthando was supported in interviews with other African students on the Rhodes campus (Strelitz 2005) and contradicts the findings of Katz (1992: 33) and Buckingham (1997: 348) that young people are no longer interested in conventional news media.

46 For 10 years, from 1994 to 2004, Dr Felicia Mabuza-Suttle, an American-educated Black South African, hosted and produced a weekly television talk show on local television.
different residential areas, educational systems and public amenities. Under this policy, the reserves, known as Bantustans or the Homelands, saw land, which had been set aside in 1913 and 1936 (by the 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act) consolidated into ten ethnic geo-physical units. These “national states” were the only places where Africans were allowed to exercise political and economic “rights” (Stadler 1987: 34). Disenfranchised from the South African state, it was here that Africans were supposed to express their political, economic and cultural aspirations – no longer as South Africans but as citizens of these independent states. However, since the first national democratic elections in 1994, the African National Congress-led government has promoted the idea of a unified South African national identity (Steenveld and Strelitz 1998). The voluntary return to a symbolic ‘homeland’ by these students, and their rejection of foreign television, was, as I have elsewhere argued (Strelitz 2002; 2005) a result of their desire to separate themselves physically and symbolically from what they perceived to be the white modern culture of Rhodes University.

I have discussed the Homeland more extensively elsewhere (Strelitz 2002; 2005), but in summary, what emerged from focus group and individual interviews was that like Luthando, many students had grown up watching foreign television programmes. I argued that one needed to understand their early attraction for Western (primarily American) films and television programmes as part of the attraction and subsequent spread of capitalist modernity discussed earlier in this paper. Importantly, their rejection of these programmes coincided with their coming to Rhodes University. Given that many of these students came from working class township backgrounds, the values they now associated with American culture, I argued, were those they experienced as the middle class culture on campus and from which they felt estranged. This estrangement was largely due to their feelings of social inferiority, a result of their often poor grasp of English (the medium of instruction at Rhodes University), their relative material impoverishment when compared to the majority of black and white middle class students, and their sense of educational inferiority as a result of their DET schooling. As a result, they felt the need to consolidate and signify their difference and assert a strong local (and sometimes essentialist pre-modern) black identity. The nightly ritual of exclusively local black television consumption in the Homeland was one of the means of achieving this. And while Luthando came from a slightly more affluent background, and was educationally and socially more prepared than many of his Homeland peers for dominant Rhodes University student culture, it would seem that his alienation was rooted, ironically, in his historical school experiences of white middle class culture.

In line with my argument, Thompson (1995: 205) has written that contact between different traditions, in this case, modern contacting traditional, can give rise to intensified forms of boundary-defining (identity-as-difference) activity. He notes that attempts may be made to protect the integrity of traditions, and to reassert forms of collective identity which are linked to traditions, by excluding others in one’s midst. He adds:

> These boundary-defining activities can both be symbolic and territorial – symbolic in the sense that the primary concern may be to protect traditions from the incursion of extraneous symbolic content, territorial in the sense that the protection of traditions may be combined with the attempt to re-moor these traditions to particular regions or locales in a way that forcibly excludes others. A region becomes a ‘homeland’ which is seen by some as bearing a privileged relation to a group of people whose collective identity is shaped in part by an enduring set of traditions. (1995: 205)
During interviews I conducted with students who attended the Homeland, Luthando justified this need for a separate viewing space for (primarily Xhosa-speaking) black students, differentiating their viewing preferences from those of white students.

I think it’s because we have different interests from the students who, for example, like watching *Ally Macbeal* and all those American programmes. They like to watch M-Net [a local pay-per-view channel that carries primarily American series and films] and things like that. We like to watch local productions like *Generations* and *Isidingo*. They like to watch rugby and we like to watch soccer.

He also spoke of the Homeland being a space in which he felt at ease.

There’s mutual respect amongst the guys who come to the Homeland. When you’re watching something there you know you won’t get offended. Because these other white guys, like in Botha House, you sometimes get offended by the jokes they make about particular races and things like that. In the Homeland you don’t get that. It’s comforting to be in the Homeland.

In contrast to many white students, whose preference for foreign television is because of its greater dramatic realism – better acting, staging, scripting and so on – Luthando, like the other Homeland students, found greater realism in local productions.

Unlike other programmes, *Isidingo* is real. The people there, the blacks and whites...you can see the division and they get treated in a way that’s real. It’s not like other programmes that try to show people in harmony. You also see how rural people live. It’s not artificial stuff like you see on other foreign TV programmes.

As noted earlier, keeping up-to-date with the current political developments was important for Luthando and this was reflected in his regular viewing of television news.

I like being informed. I feel comfortable that way. A friend of mine said something interesting. He said white students here at Rhodes think they’re from England or somewhere else and for them to watch the news would be to force them to face the reality that they’re in South Africa. To be ignorant about the news is much better for them. Also, at the Homeland, there are lots of debates, and you are ridiculed if you didn’t know current issues. So it is important to know what is going on in the news.

Interestingly, Luthando’s desire for upward mobility remained but now he found his aspirations reflected in *Generations*, a local soap opera which dealt with the lives of African advertising executives.

I also like watching *Generations*. I aspire to be in those positions. Even though *Generations* is not real, I think everyone wants to buy a Benz and stuff like that. So when you see black people being successful it’s nice because in most of the programmes black people are slaves and servants and things like that. So it’s nice because you can see that black people are in charge. You watch it and you aspire to that.
Conclusion

This narrative interview allows one to track some of the significant moments in Luthatando’s biography and to show the relationship between these moments, structured by his changing socio-political context and his media consumption patterns. I have argued that the narrative interview is an appropriate method to capture what Tomlinson (1991) refers to as the “interplay of mediations” between lived and mass mediated culture. Such an approach provides a corrective to those theories which overemphasise the role of media consumption in identity formation and importantly, helps us move beyond the debate within audience studies between those approaches stressing the determining power of the media, and those that highlight the interpretive freedom of audiences. A close reading of media preferences at different moments in the life of an individual allows us to appreciate that both our media consumption decisions and the meanings we take from texts, are influenced by the contextual setting of consumption and other sources of cultural experience.

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Citation

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Literary Field and the Question of Method – Revisited

Abstract

Field theory is one of the most efficient and influential analytical schemes in the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, which he consistently developed in his model of literary field. The analytical reliability of the model derives from the way in which Bourdieu combines the structural category of “field” with the phenomenological categories of “doxa” and “habitus”. This article argues that Bourdieu’s selective application of the two phenomenological categories produces a static structural model of literary field where all processes are explained in causal and deterministic terms. The article further seeks to present an alternative reading of the same categories within a discursive model where the processes in literary field and the motivations of its agents are driven by field’s discourses rather than by its rigid structures.

Keywords

Field theory; Literary sociology; Literary history; Husserlian phenomenology; Collective identity; Collective memory; Critical sociology

This article will analyze key categories in the literary sociology of Pierre Bourdieu—literary field, literary doxa, and habitus—and will discuss how they enhance and confine sociological understandings of literary worlds. Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus and his phenomenological insights about literary field have inspired new directions in the sociology of literature and have also influenced cross-disciplinary studies. Many of them use these categories either as explicit analytical concepts or they combine them with the studies of the networks of production, reception, or distribution of the literary texts and the organization of these processes

in literary field.\textsuperscript{48} With regard to phenomenological contributions of Pierre Bourdieu to sociological theory, I wish to argue two things. First, that Bourdieu’s use of the three categories—field, doxa, and habitus—produces a coherent analytical framework which is informed by phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl on the one hand but is firmly grounded in the premises of causality and functionality on the other. Second, that Bourdieu’s selective application of phenomenological categories of “doxa” and “habitus” to his sociology of literature produces a static structural model of literary field in which all of its processes and motivations are explained in deterministic terms. This paper will seek to present an alternative reading of the same categories within a discursive model of literary field where field’s processes and the motivations of its agents are driven field’s discourses rather than by its rigid structures.

Though the following argument is mostly theoretical, it was inspired by the case of the literary field known as Die Gruppe 47 (Group 47) which was one of the most influential literary groupings in the German Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{48} It emerged in 1947 as an avowedly apolitical association yet less than two decades later it became one of the major political forces in the country. The transformative processes within the Gruppe inspired the methodological argument outlined in this article. The Gruppe 47 was also one of the most contentious literary groupings—in the fifties its writers disregarded for having encouraged the revival of the memories about National Socialism whereas in the seventies they were acclaimed for it. Many of them became the icons of the German literary and intellectual fields where they still hold their canonical positions.\textsuperscript{50} Its success, its cultural and political influence, and its controversial nature made the Gruppe 47 an intriguing object of sociological and literary studies which examined it as a literary field that (re)produced a specific kind of literary habitus—that of a writer as a public intellectual.\textsuperscript{51} While acknowledging the


\textsuperscript{49} The Gruppe 47 was founded in 1947 and it officially disbanded in 1968. It broke-up mainly due to the conflicting political positions of its members toward the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the US war in Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{50} A younger generation of the Gruppe’s writers (Günter Grass, Martin Walser) entered the literary and the public lives in the sixties, and until nowadays they have monopolized the moral discourse on the war and the Holocaust. Some literary historians emphasize inner tensions and the ideological inconsistencies on these issues within the Gruppe 47. Hans J. Hahn, “Literarische Gesinnungsnazis oder spätbürgerliche Formalisten? Die Gruppe 47 als deutsches Problem”; ed. Stuart Parkes and John J. White, “The Gruppe 47 Fifty Years on”: A Re-appraisal of its Literary and Political Significance”, German Monitor. No.45, 279-292. Some studies brought in the Gruppe’s latent anti-Semitism. Klaus Briegleb, Missachtung und Tabu: eine Streitschrift zur Frage: “Wie antisemitisch war die Gruppe 47?” (Berlin: Philo, 2003).

\textsuperscript{51} A study of the French postwar literary field by Gisele Sapiro is rather instructive. On an example of Jean-Paul Sartre, Shapiro illustrates the effect of the “intellectualization” of the French literary field on other West-European literary fields. She argues that the role of a public intellectual, endowed with an authority to comment the political and social events, became highly fashionable also outside France. See “Forms of politicization in the French literary field.” Theory and Society. Vol. 32, No. 5,6 (2003). A similar study by Helmuth Peitsch shows how keenly the
analytical value of Bourdieu’s concepts of field, doxa, and habitus, the case of the Gruppe 47 prompts their following reconsiderations.

Firstly, I will argue that, in addition to Bourdieu’s description of literary field as of a space of the (re)distribution and the (re)production of cultural capital, the field is also a space that puts forward a question or a set of questions. They may embrace a dilemma about an identity of a social group or the whole society vis-à-vis its historical experience or its momentary situation. For instance, in American literature it has been the question of slavery, which has gained tremendous social exposure in the past two decades.\textsuperscript{52} Literary fields in Europe pose a range of questions as well. British postcolonial literature has brought in a dilemma about the ethno-cultural identity of the immigrant Brits between their Eastern origins and their Western experience, whereas French literature poses questions about the French cultural identity which has been facing the crisis of civic engagement and socialization.\textsuperscript{53} Austrian and German ‘Literature of Remembrance’ (Erinnerte Vergangenheitliteratur) has for the past fifty years addressed either the failure of Austrian society to deal with its Nazi past or the challenge to reintegrate that past into German collective memory.\textsuperscript{54} A search for an answer to the question “at stake” is the source of the dynamics of the literary field—it grounds and shapes it.

Secondly, if the literary field is a discursive space shaped by questions then the production of literary text cannot be driven only by a writer's motivation to succeed in the field, as Bourdieu claims. It must also be driven by the questions that are at stake in that field and by the writer’s naïve belief to respond to those questions freely. Bourdieu calls this uncontested belief in the autonomy of the field, its texts, and its model and the concentration on the doxa's reproductive function obfuscates its other dimension—that of an enabling attitude. Naivety does not necessarily have to make field's agents less autonomous; unlike Bourdieu shows, it does not need to reduce them to the thoughtless carriers of field’s norms but, rather, it can instigate debates about the field’s rules and the questions that are at stake in it. While it can be argued that the question(s) that constitutes the field eventually gives rise to aesthetic, political, or historical discourses, it can be assumed that the naïve belief to respond to them freely generates the conditions of possibility for such discourses to emerge.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{52} In American literature, the legacy of slavery began as an implicit literary theme. William Faulkner's trilogy \textit{Snopes} (1940-1959), was among the first serious attempts to articulate the phenomenon of slavery from the perspective of a white American. From the seventies on, Toni Morrison has represented most consistently African-American voice in the US literature about slavery (\textit{The Bluest Eye}, 1970; \textit{Beloved}, 1987; \textit{Jazz}, 2004, or \textit{Tar Baby}, 2004). Her novel \textit{Paradise} (1998) is a rare example of a uniquely sensitive and honest articulation of the shady moments in the history of underprivileged people. E.L. Doctorow’s most recent novel \textit{The March} (2005) is yet another return of a white author to the theme of slavery.

\textsuperscript{53} In British literature, the stories by Salman Rushdie articulate the experience of multiple cultural identities. (\textit{East, West: Stories, or The Ground Beneath Her Feet}). In French literature, themes like identity, politics, and alienation intertwine in the novels of Jean-Paul DuBois (\textit{A French Life}), Antoine Volodine (\textit{Ficton du Politique}), or of Milan Kundera (\textit{Identity; Ignorance}).

\textsuperscript{54} In Austrian literature, the criticism of Austria’s National Socialist past reaches back to the works of Ingeborg Bachmann from the sixties (\textit{The Book of Franzan}; \textit{Malina}). Nowadays, it resounds for instance in Thomas Bernhardt’s playwrights (\textit{Der Heldenplatz}), or in Elfriede Jelinek’s novels (\textit{Wonderful, Wonderful Times}; \textit{Lust}; \textit{Greed}).

\textsuperscript{55} I was encouraged to make this argument by Jeffrey Goldfarb. In his comparative analyses of Gruppe 47 embraced the French example. See “Die Gruppe 47 und das Konzept des Engagements”, ed. Stuart Parkes and John J. White, “The Gruppe 47 Fifty Years on”: A Re-appraisal of its Literary and Political Significance”, \textit{German Monitor}. No.45, 25-52.
Thirdly, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as of the field’s embodied knowledge revolves around the questions what does the literary habitus embody and how. Habitus internalizes the rules of the field during the process of its adaptation to the field’s structures and according to Bourdieu’s model, the adaptation is habitus’s main mode of relating to the field. This emphasis on adaptation and on the determining nature of embodiment obliterates the relevance of experience as yet another form of practical knowledge which habitus possesses. As I will show later, embodiment of the rules can be a creative as much as a determining process which can produce similar outcomes, such as the decisions to accept or to reject the rules, but completely different experience from arriving at these decisions. If we study literary field as a discursive space, which puts forth question(s) about the group’s identity, then writers’ habituses embody not only the knowledge of field’s structures, as Bourdieu claims, but also of field’s quintessential questions. Such knowledge is grounded in writers’ personal or mediated experience with social worlds in which these questions originate. For instance, a shared experience of war and of Germany’s totalitarian past connected the different generations of writers in the Gruppe 47. This analysis does not want to allege that all literary fields challenge their audiences with existential questions, such as collective identity, nor does it want to argue that all literature encourages collective self-reflection of a group or society but it attempts to provide an adequate analytical framework for those literary fields that do.

Overview of Bourdieu’s Functional Model

Bourdieu’s analytical model of literary field systematically debunks the aura of the literary world—a world conventionally viewed as a refuge of individual autonomy and artistic freedom. By unveiling the calculative and strategic nature of artistic practices, Bourdieu’s model deflates the myths about disinterestedness of art and about unrepressed creativity of an artist. Perhaps as a trade-off for its methodological clarity the model disregards a pervasive ambivalence in the structure of the literary field, which emerges from two different but compatible possibilities for a writer—to succeed and to have her voice heard. The following overview will focus on the reductive premises in Bourdieu’s model and will discuss how they compromise this ambivalent structure of the field. Bourdieu generally characterizes literary field as a structure with an inbuilt self-reproductive mechanism, which is determined by other fields that momentarily dominate it, whether they are economic, political, ideological, intellectual, or careerist (Bourdieu 2000; 1993; 1996). Literary field has two poles—autonomous and heteronomous. The former is characterized by high cultural capital of its authors and their readers and the latter by the writer’s economic success and the access to it is restricted by consecrated writers, who determine its aesthetic

artistic practices in the communist Poland and in the United States, Goldfarb points out subversive powers of the performing arts vis-à-vis the power of the state or the market and their political or economic restrictions. He shows that while negotiating their own autonomy, artists took for granted the legitimacy of their claim to autonomy and therewith achieved unexpectedly efficient results. See Jeffrey Goldfarb, On Cultural Freedom: An Exploration of Public Life in Poland and America. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), and The Persistence of Freedom: The Sociological Implications of Polish Student Theatre. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

The tradition to ‘debunk’ the aura of art is rather salient in critical theories; it reaches back to Walter Benjamin’s canonical essay which de-auratizes visual art in order to reveal its political (mis)uses by the totalitarian regimes in the Third Reich and in the Soviet Union. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, Illuminations. (New York: Schocken Books, 1968) 217-252.
criteria, and by literary critics, who have the power of judgment over the quality of literary work. The entry to the heteronomous pole is practically unrestricted since literary quality here is measured by economic success and “with respect to the demands of the general public (Bourdieu 1996: 285)” rather than by artistic standards.

Those newcomers to the field who aspire to the positions in the autonomous pole perpetuate the so-called “struggle for consecration”—a struggle that reproduces the inherent controversy between the consecrated and the avant-garde artists. Bourdieu maintains that the newcomers are the quintessence of the avant-garde artists because, in their aspiration for literary esteem, they subvert the existing literary canons by continuously introducing new styles into the field. This avant-garde “principle of permanent revolution (Bourdieu 1996: 239)” was instituted in the literary field in the 19th century, and has functioned as its modus operandi ever since. The tradition of the avant-garde is a cumulative one because it is habitually reproduced by each newcomer and a non-reversible one because the very intention to surpass it is already inscribed in the rules of the field. Bourdieu argues that this functional symbiosis between the habitual and the structural components of the avant-garde tradition constitutes the relative autonomy of literary field vis-à-vis other fields. It also constitutes its specific history where the field’s autonomy is taken for granted because, as Bourdieu observes, it is “difficult to deduce [literary autonomy] directly from the state of the social world (1996: 242).”

I would argue that this part of Bourdieu’s epistemology, with the emphasis on the field’s structure and its reproduction, field’s rules and their inscription in the writers, the access to the cultural capital and to the positions in the field, is embedded in the language of efficiency. Efficiency is the main criterion for assessing all interactions in the literary field in which, as Bourdieu argues, the relationships are not chosen individually, as we commonly believe, but are given objectively. It is a common scientific praxis that the scientists who study the structure of the fields’ relations overlook this given nature of relationships, as Bourdieu (1996) confesses:

It is thus that a first effort to analyze the ‘intellectual field’ stopped at the immediately visible relations between agents engaged in intellectual life: the interactions between authors and critics or between authors and publishers had disguised from my eye the objective relationships between the relative positions that one and the other occupy in the field, that is to say, the structure that determines the form of those interactions. (pp. 181-182)

To view field’s relations as objectively given has several consequences for the model where ‘objective’ can be understood as a proxy to ‘institutional’ because all interactions among agents are determined by the field’s institutions, their hierarchy, and their efficiency. Objectiveness further implies some kind of conclusiveness since the rules that are encoded in the institutions are more resistant to the change. This correlation between the objectified (institutional) and the habitual (individual) relations

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57 An example of such struggle was a rivalry between Impressionists and “Salon” painters in the 19th century France. See Mary Rogers, “The Batignolles Group: Creators of Impressionism”, Milton C. Albrecht, James H. Barnett, and Mason Griff, ed. The Sociology of Art and Literature; A Reader. (New York: Praeger, 1970).

58 Science is also one of the fields where the “newness” is at stake. To succeed in scientific field, its agents have to play the game of newness by introducing new insights, theories, methods, etc. See Homo Academicus. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
Bourdieu argues that this transfer of relations is possible due to “general properties of the economic field are viewed and evaluated like the relations in economic field (market). The economic practices…which can be applied—through the categories like capital or the unitary notion of the market (1999: 127)” and its deterministic force reduces each habitus. Judith Butler makes an important insight when she argues that Bourdieu’s efficiency is translated into the functional dependences between the field and the relations to power relations, Bourdieu designs a model in which the rationale of the agents with the highest cultural capital and symbolic power. By reducing all power and, similarly, the asymmetry within the literary field is always for the sake of the latter. Asymmetric relations between the fields are always for the sake of the field of Marxist theory of infrastructure and superstructure where the former determines the latter. Asymmetric relations between the fields are always for the sake of the field of power and, similarly, the asymmetry within the literary field is always for the sake of the agents with the highest cultural capital and symbolic power. By reducing all relations to power relations, Bourdieu designs a model in which the rationale of efficiency is translated into the functional dependencies between the field and the habitus. Judith Butler makes an important insight when she argues that Bourdieu’s “unitary notion of the market (1999: 127)” and its deterministic force reduces each field, including the market itself, into a static and atemporal entity. The literary field is a space which is also determined by power relations, as we read: “The field of power is the space of relations of force between agents or between institutions having in common the possession of capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields. It is the site of the struggles between holders of different powers (Bourdieu 1996: 215).”

Notwithstanding Bourdieu’s characterization of the literary field as a space of “perpetual development (1996: 242)”, or of antagonistic relations, these counter-processes, if they occur, do not generate alternative spaces but are reconciled by those fields of power (economic, political, careerist, etc.) that momentarily motivates it. Do agents comply with the rules normatively, because they recognize their own possibilities vis-à-vis the field’s norms or do they comply gullibly, when they routinely reproduce the rules? Bourdieu’s model leaves this dilemma unresolved. The model suggests that, on the one hand, field’s agents reproduce the rules habitually without any unawareness of their confines but on the other hand, they deploy them strategically because only strategic use of the rules can guarantee their success in the field. This incongruous description of the practices of literary habitus raises questions what do the agents actually reproduce and whether the two sides of their action—habitual and rational—can be reconciled by a single actor (habitus) in the way suggested by the model. Reservations about these conciliatory practices and the question whether they can be fully explained by the functional model will be analyzed in the section on habitus.

According to the Bourdieu’s functional model, the relationships in the literary field are viewed and evaluated like the relationships in economic field (market). Bourdieu argues that this transfer of relations is possible due to “general properties of the economic practices…which can be applied—through the categories like capital or power—to other fields while respecting their most concrete singularity (1996: 183).” In their highest symbolic form, economic relations assume the form of power relations and the operative logic of economic field transcends into the field of power. This import of the logic of one practice (economic), into the particularities of the other one (literary) underscores the asymmetry in Bourdieu’s model, which is reminiscent of Marxist theory of infrastructure and superstructure where the former determines the latter. Asymmetric relations between the fields are always for the sake of the field of power and, similarly, the asymmetry within the literary field is always for the sake of the agents with the highest cultural capital and symbolic power. By reducing all relations to power relations, Bourdieu designs a model in which the rationale of efficiency is translated into the functional dependencies between the field and the habitus. Judith Butler makes an important insight when she argues that Bourdieu’s “unitary notion of the market (1999: 127)” and its deterministic force reduces each field, including the market itself, into a static and atemporal entity. The literary field is a space which is also determined by power relations, as we read: “The field of power is the space of relations of force between agents or between institutions having in common the possession of capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields. It is the site of the struggles between holders of different powers (Bourdieu 1996: 215).”

dominate it. The same conciliatory concept of antagonisms pervades also Bourdieu’s definition of avant-garde which he views as a ruling principle of literary field. According to it, the entire subversive potential of avant-garde is subdued to the routine that “is inscribed as a matrix in each newcomer (1996: 243).” Those writers who master the rules replace their canonized counterparts but the field’s constellation and the hierarchies of its positions remain unchanged. The generative capacity of avant-garde is not obliterated—it still introduces new genres—but its subversive quality is instrumentalized for the sake of maintaining the field’s status quo.

All of the above categories in the functional framework—the relations and the rules in the field, the principle of the avant-garde, or of the power struggle—serve as the mechanisms for the reproduction of a relative autonomy of literary field. In it, autonomy represents the highest form of symbolic capital and therewith the highest form of power. Autonomy and power are the directly proportional variables and their straightforward equation—the higher the degree of autonomy the higher the monopolization of power—stands in the background of a complex network of relations in Bourdieu’s functional model. The claim to autonomy, which is a kind of claim to power, requires legitimacy since, as Weber’s concept of legitimate domination reminds us, there is no power without a legitimate belief in it. Bourdieu notices, that what gets reproduced in the literary field is a belief in its autonomy that was once established as the field’s primordial doxa (illusion) and integrated as a rule in the field’s structure. Reproduction of the belief in autonomy and the entire process of its legitimization unfold as a power game (between the consecrated writers and those who aspire to their positions) in which illusion of autonomy represents the highest stake for all involved, as Bourdieu (1996) asserts:

It is in the relationship between the habituses and the fields to which they are adjusted to a greater or a lesser degree...that the foundation of all the scales of utility is generated: that is to say, the fundamental adhesion to the game, the illusion, recognition of the game and the utility of the game, the belief in the value of the game and in its stakes—the basis of all the allocations of meaning and of value. (pp. 172-173)

The metaphor of game indicates two (implicit) assumptions: that the outcomes of the game are predetermined by its rules and that the rules remain unchallenged because the consensus on them is a precondition for playing the game. This dualistic structure of literary field, which is given by the rules of its autonomy on the one hand and by their habitual reproduction on the other, identifies two sources of the field’s legitimization: on rational and on irrational grounds. Legitimization on rational grounds relies on the institutional sources of autonomy, whether they are physical institutions like publishing houses or symbolic ones like consecrated writers, because they glorify artistic freedom and creativity, as well as the literary field as a unique space where these values are recognized and pursued. On the other hand, legitimation on irrational grounds relies on the belief which takes such a freedom for granted. The discrepancy between the rational nature of the rules (of autonomy) and

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60 In Max Weber’s typology of legitimate domination, each type rests on a different premise, being it rationality, tradition, or charisma, yet only the rational type of domination is explicitly anchored in the rules. The traditional one rests in the authority of those who exercise the tradition while the charismatic one in the “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person.” Max Weber, “Basic Sociological Terms”, *Economy and Society*. Vol. I & II, ed. Guenther Roth and Klaus Wittich, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) 215.
the irrational belief in them is strikingly similar to Weber's concept of bureaucratic domination. In bureaucratic sphere, too, the "validity of the claims to legitimacy may be based on.... rational grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of patterns of enacted rules (Weber 1968: 215)"; without ever challenging those rules. In both fields, power is claimed rationally and justified irrationally, as a habit. The challenge of Bourdieu's model of literary field is perhaps most salient in its juxtaposition with Weber's concept of bureaucratic sphere which highlights the legitimizing function of belief. According to Bourdieu, in literary field the belief in the autonomy does not only conceal the conformist and utilitarian nature of artistic practices but, more importantly, it gives them the illusion of their independence—the illusion without which the field could not be sustained.

Such an ostensibly functional explanation of the role of belief raises a doubt whether the actual texture of belief in (artistic) autonomy is not much richer than the perfunctory function ascribed to it in Bourdieu's sociological paradigm. In his critical appraisal of Weber's concept of legitimacy, Paul Ricoeur notices the deficit of the concept on the side of belief and makes a more general contention that: "Beliefs contribute something beyond what sociologists understand to be the role of motivation. (1986: 201)." He argues that belief carries within itself something more than what can be rationally explained in terms of interests and proposes motives as a more adequate explanatory framework: "The question of belief persists because we cannot speak of legitimacy without speaking of grounds and grounds refer to beliefs. Ground is both a ground and a motive. It is a motive...functioning as a reason for (1986, p.202)." Ricoeur's outline of the dualistic structure of belief is instructive for it uncouples its rational and irrational sides that Bourdieu's model attempts to reconcile. Attentive reading of Ricoeur can also elucidate one conceptual omission of Bourdieu's conciliatory attempt, namely the opacity of belief, which is derived from experience because, as Ricoeur argues, every belief is ultimately grounded in experience. It is precisely this ambiguous structure of belief and its unpredictability that Ricoeur points to and which, most likely, discredits belief from a repertoire of reliable categories in Bourdieu's model. In it, belief and experience are taken as social facts that have to be objectified. Strictly spoken, in Bourdieu's model the belief in literary autonomy and the experience which grounds that belief are adjusted to the objective forces and to a single type of rationality—that of power and domination. Bourdieu's insistence on objectively given structure of the field thus produces an atemporal, and a static model where the reciprocity of all relations is either absorbed by the field's structures or is a-priori excluded by them. The above analysis of the concept of belief in the autonomy and the auxiliary mechanism of its reproduction, like the power struggle or the rules of the field, suggests two shifts in the conceptualization of literary field—from its determining (objective) to its discursive structure and from its causal-functional to motivational framework.

**Literary Field as Question**

In addition to Bourdieu's definition, literary field can also be viewed as an ambivalent space which accommodates two different but reconcilable sets of writer's motivations—to succeed and to have her voice heard. It can further be assumed, that the contents and the pursuits of these motivations are informed by the question(s) that permeate the field. This analysis will now turn to a concept of literary field in

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61 Legitimacy based on traditional grounds, that is on the “belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions”, might also apply to literary field. (Weber, 1968:215)
which the field’s structure is discursive rather than objectively given, the writers’ belief in their autonomy (doxa) is reflexive rather than habitual, and literary habituses are shaped also by the field’s question(s) and not only by its rules. A discursive nature of literary field is mainly given by questions which are at stake for the writers as well as for a community whose dilemma(s) they address. In most literary fields, it is usually one initial question that has been re-formulated by several literary generations. For instance, first question that modern literature articulated was about the autonomy of a bourgeois individual vis-à-vis the society that had increasingly emphasized individual liberties (Habermas 1989). According to Ian Watt novel, which emerged as a new literary genre of modernity, most fully reflects “individualistic and innovative orientation of bourgeois subject (1957: 13)”, unlike previous genres which conformed to traditional practices.

I wish to argue that the 19th century literary fields in Europe established not only their institutions, as Bourdieu shows, but they also introduced a range of intellectual and anthropological themes which persisted until the following century. Among them, perhaps most revealing literary themes of the times revolved around the crisis of traditional authority and the institution of patriarchal family, which poignantly illustrate novels of Thomas Mann, Franz Werfel, and Franz Kafka. The taboo of sexual identity was another powerful literary theme of the times which was vociferously brought up in the works of Stefan Zweig, or Robert Musil. In the works of the Late Modernists, the dilemma about individual autonomy escalated into the anxiety about the effacement of subject, which they ascribed to the anomalies of a highly rationalized modern world. In the works of Kafka, the locus of this anxiety lied in an unrestrained growth of the bureaucratic control of social life; in the novels of Musil it dwelled in the paralyzing power of state machinery, whereas in Marcel Proust’s opus about subjective time (which might have anticipated Foucauldian anxiety about the effacement of subject), it resided in the frailty of one’s own memory vis-à-vis the memories of the others.

Autonomy was also collective value. It was highly acclaimed in the 19th century Europe by those ethno-national groups which were striving for their political and cultural independence from the Hapsburg Monarchy and were the precursors to small nation-states which emerged after the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I. Meanwhile, in the Central Europe began to form the largest national

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62 For instance, Thomas Mann’s family saga Buddenbrooks exposes the crisis of bourgeois concept of patriarchal family in the early 20th century. Similarly, the short story by Franz Werfel, Not the Murderer, which attempts to legitimize the parricide, or Metamorphosis by Franz Kafka, which renders an intimate portrayal of a family suffocated by paternalistic rules, challenge patriarchal authority of the times. Theme of sexuality dominated Austrian literature which was under a strong influence of Freud’s writings. An emergent discipline of psychoanalysis resounded in some of Stefan Zweig’s novellas. Such as Conflicts (Verwirrung der Gefühle), or in or Robert Musil’s ingenious short story The Confusion of Young Törless.

63 Among others, three major novels dealt extensively with these themes: The Trial by Franz Kafka, The Man without Qualities by Robert Musil, and Remembrance of Things Past by Marcel Proust.

64 In Hapsburg Monarchy, these emancipative attempts took place in the second half of the 19th century either in a form of ethnic uprisings—of Poles, Slovaks, or Bukovinians—or of political negotiations between Hungarians, Czechs, and the Austrian government. Hungarian negotiations resulted in the Austro-Hungarian political compromise that gave the Hungarian part of Hapsburg Monarchy the status of confederation. On the other hand, Czech negotiations generated frustration rather than political gain, which was largely due to the inability of the Czechs to consistently articulate their political requirements. This deficit in the Czech political experience fuelled Czech nationalism and later it became a source of their resentment toward German. Miroslav Hroch, “Real and Constructed: The Nature of the Nation,” The State of the
state which emerged from the fragmented German states that were later united in *Deutsches Kaiserreich* (German Empire). In the 19th century Europe, political projects of collective autonomy were glorified by nationalistic literatures that became the main vehicles and instigators of the emergent national, cultural, and political identities. For instance, the Polish Romantic writers emphasized the grandeur of the Polish nation vis-à-vis the Russians, the Prussians, and the Hapsburgs to whom Poland lost independence for more than one century. The Czech nationalist writers emphasized cultural and moral distinctiveness and, indeed, a superiority of Czechs qua their Germanic rulers, and the nationalist poets of the Slovak Romanticism expressed the same attitudes toward the Hungarians, whom they denounced as their oppressors. These emerging nations delineated also the boundaries of numerous literary fields, among which the German literary field was the largest, the most prolific, and the most influential one. In that field, the question of collective identity has been perhaps the most lasting, consistent, and variegated literary theme. It was first raised by the Early Romantics (1795-1804) who found the sources of German identity in a distinctive aesthetic value of German nature and its connection with the arts. The Late Romantics (1815-1848) redefined German identity in ethno-national terms, when they grounded it in old German mythology. The opacity of the historical origins of German nation and its atemporal character gave the identity discourse a distinctive undertone of mythical nationalism. The Late Romantics were...

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German Empire was founded in January 1871, a year after the victory of the Prussians in Franco-Prussian war, mainly with the assistance of Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck became the first Chancellor of the new state. The Empire collapsed in 1918 and the Weimar Republic was declared.

The correlation between nationalistic movements and national literatures is not confined to Europe. For instance, Wendy Griswold’s study of the Nigerian literary field points out the similar interdependencies in between the process of nation building and the emergence of national literature postcolonial discourse. Griswold notices that for most Nigerian writers, the main challenge is to grasp the flux of Nigerian society that is caught between its indigenous tradition and the hegemonic discourse of western (post)modern ideology. Their writings bear witness of Nigerian’s everyday life, such as tensions between urban and countryside live-styles, gender or generational split in the construction of social roles. Nigerian writers express their commitments to social aesthetics at home and to the search of Nigerian cultural identity, which they express as a universal human concern. According to Griswold, this is precisely the quality with which Nigerian literature impresses outside audiences. See Wendy Griswold, *Bearing Witness: Readers, Writers and the Novel in Nigeria*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1885) or the novelist Henryk Szenkiewicz (1846-1916) portrayed the tragedy of three Polish partitions: in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Mickiewicz, an author of Polish national opus *Mr. Tadeasz*, was involved in nationalistic uprising in 1848, which demanded the independence of Poland. In the same year, Czechs and Slovaks claimed their cultural and political autonomy from the Hapsburgs.

A major Czech nationalist writer Alois Jirasek (1851-1930), glorified cultural and historical traditions of the Czech people. His historical novels (*The Darkness; The King of Husites; or Against All*) communicated a strong anti-German sentiment which pervades also contemporary political and historical mainstreams. For instance, an analysis of Czech media and political discourses by Emanuel Mandler exposes the xenophobic tone of the debate about the expulsion of the Sudetten-German minority after 1945 and about the declaration of Czech-German atonement in 1992. See *Die deutsch-tschechische Welt - ein Märchen?*; *Politische Kommentare in der tschechischen Presse 1998 – 2002*. (Ttitling Dorfmeister, 2003). On the Slovak side, the poets of Slovak Enlightenment (Miloslav Sladkovic, Ludovit Stur) who took part in the bourgeois uprising in Vienna in 1848, were the main protagonists of Slovak emancipation movement which demanded autonomy from Hungarians.

Late Romantics influenced other artistic schools, particularly the artists of *Jugendbewegung* at the early 20th century. In the twenties, these literary schools gave way to high modernism that was followed by the avant-garde forms, such as dada, futurism, and expressionism. Erika und...
undoubtedly, one of key social media that fostered the ideological and the cultural climate of the German unification in 1871. However, their legacy echoed much longer. They laid intellectual grounds for the historical dogma *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) which, in the 1930s, translated the writers of a synonymous literary field into their major literary theme. The writers of *Blut und Boden* redefined the identity question once again—this time in terms of German racial superiority. The disastrous consequences of National Socialist racial doctrine altered the context and the substance of the search for German postwar identity and the issue of identity, which was so prominent during the Third Reich, was completely silenced until the 1950s. Then, the writers of the *Gruppe 47* challenged West German society to answer one fundamental question: “Who are the Germans?” Are they a defeated or a liberated nation? Are they the victims of war or its perpetrators? And are they a nation with the new future or are they bounded by a duty to remember? A search for answers to these questions became a history of the struggle over the interpretation of Germany’s National Socialist past, in which the *Gruppe 47* played a fundamental role. By dealing consistently with the identity question, the *Gruppe* produced a literary narrative about German totalitarian past—a narrative that was simultaneously an eloquent testimony about the reluctance of West German society to deal with that past.

The question about (West)German postwar identity was reformulated several times by the *Gruppe*’s writers who, it can be argued, developed two main narrative perspectives in their accounts of Germany’s war past: of shame, and of guilt for the World War II and the Holocaust. Both narratives had different moralizing insights and operated as distinct narrative regimes that were shaping German collective memory. In the fifties, the aftermaths of war and the revelations of war crimes were still overwhelming even for the *Gruppe*’s writers and they significantly restrained their ability for critical writing. In the literature of the fifties resounded shame and embarrassment that contrasted with the political culture of atonement in Adenauer’s era. The novels of Martin Walser and Wolfgang Koeppen revealed monstrousness of “ordinary” people who were serving Nazi regime and evoked embarrassment and disgust about their successful restoration. In the 1960s, the literary narrative of shame gave way to the narrative of German guilt for war and the Holocaust, which grounded the ideological identity of West German political and intellectual lefts. A homology between literary and political fields (the *Gruppe 47* and the Social Democratic Party/SPD) began to form in the 1960s, when some of the *Gruppe*’s writers supported the electoral campaign of SPD. The homology solidified in the early 1970s, when the SPD’s politics of memory and the literary narrative of the *Gruppe* leaned on the same premise of guilt. Guilt narrative entered social institutions and, for more than one decade, it became the only official interpretation of the country’s National Socialist past.

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72 Some of the *Gruppe*’s writers, like Hans Werner Richter, Günter Grass, or Siegfried Lenz, continued their political commitments to SPD until the party’s victory in 1969. Grass himself spent two years touring West German cities with the SPD electoral campaign and captured his impressions in a diary-style novel *The Diary of a Snail* (1972).
albeit in its implicit form, was a major and the most consistently developed theme in the Gruppe 47; it can, undoubtedly, be viewed as yet another modification of the original identity question raised by the Early Romantics. If we return to the question about the Gruppe’s success we could argue two things: to produce a lasting effect on the society, the field’s literary narrative(s) have to enter public institutions and penetrate the discourses of media, education, and the politics. Secondly, it is usually a combination of all these networks that shape the (official) collective memory of society.

**Discursive Structure of Literary Doxa**

If literary field is a question-bound discourse then literary doxa is a mode of writer’s involvement with field’s question(s)—this is the basic relational scheme in the discursive model. In this section, two modalities of the literary doxa will be juxtaposed: its habitual (passive) mode, when doxa serves as a mechanism of field’s reproduction (Bourdieu), and a discursive mode, when doxa extends into the writer’s attitude toward field’s questions. While Bourdieu’s sociological translation of the concept of doxa from Husserl’s phenomenology is confined to its naïve mode, the discursive concept of doxa goes beyond Bourdieu’s limited use of Husserl and draws from the capacity of doxa to extend into the reflexive attitude and to generate discourses. The distinction between habitual and reflexive (discursive) attitude is relevant for the studies of literary field because it points to a co-dependence of a discourse and a reflexive mode of doxa, which is completely overlooked in Bourdieu’s model. Bourdieu’s concept of literary doxa is a modification of Husserl’s thesis about the unity of the “natural world” and our belief in it, which Husserl calls ‘natural attitude’. In Husserl’s phenomenology, natural world is always there for us as a practical world of values, norms, and habits (lifeworld), and to this world, we hold natural attitude when we take everything in it for granted, including our own existence. Even if we, temporarily, expose ourselves to other worlds and take other attitudes we will always return to the force of natural attitude. Husserl (1998) maintains that natural world, with its values, viewpoints, habits and traditions, “remains on hand, afterwards, as well as before, I am in the natural attitude, undisturbed in it by the new attitudes (p. 55).” It is not enough that we take the world and ourselves in it for granted but we also believe in this relationship. Husserl calls such uncontested belief doxa and maintains that doxa is inseparable from the world. The unity of these two validities (Geltungseinheit)—of the world and of our belief in it—constitutes social spaces that we inhabit.

Any sphere of human activity is a practical sphere and Husserl’s emphasis on praxis, as means of our self-constitution in the world, strongly resonates in Bourdieu’s theory. There is a theoretical consensus between Husserl and Bourdieu’s understanding of praxis as a routine activity and this habitual mode of social praxis is the locus of Bourdieu’s critical sociology. Bourdieu (1996) questions objectivity of sociologists, particularly those studying the arts, because they are often unaware of their own participation on the cultural traditions that they study:

> Probably because they are protected by the veneration of all those who were raised, often from their earliest youth, to perform sacramental rites of cultural devotion (the sociologists being no exception), the fields of

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*it Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics since 1989*, *Social Science History*, 22:4 (winter 1998), 548-571.

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The parallel between Husserl and Bourdieu’s projects ends at this point, which is due to their different understandings of social function of naivety and of its potential. Bourdieu maintains that naivety of doxa obstructs our knowledge of social reality whereas Husserl believes that it uncovers it; according to Husserl, practical world is a source of knowledge. Bourdieu, who relies on scientific objectification of social world, thus increases a gap between naïve (unreflective) and scientific apprehension of reality. On the other hand, for Husserl, practical world raises questions about itself and about its own constitution and therewith it engenders “a new but a peculiar science about the doxa that is hold in contempt and yet entitled to lay the respectable grounds of episteme (1998: 178).” Doxic (unreflective) being in the world is thus also an inquisitive being because it can open our everyday experience to scientific interpretations and this fundamental turn in the conceptualization of practical world of the doxa is completely unnoticed in Bourdieu’s methodology.73

Husserlian doxa encompasses a range of attitudes and, analogously with this expanded view, so does literary doxa. It is not habitually absorbed by the agents of literary (artistic) field but undergoes a process of its own modifications when the writers change their initial, naïve belief in autonomy.74 The range of doxic attitudes is, in fact, a variation on a single, original doxic belief starting at its initial stage (Urdoxa/Protodoxa), progressing to its interim stage (Zuwendung), when we turn our opinion about reality towards its prediction, and culminating in the final stage when we project our opinion into the social world. During that process, we develop different levels of knowledge about reality that we initially took for granted. Husserl shows us that doxic views are less limiting than we tend to think because naiveté does not have to be our ultimate position but only an interim one. In his comparative analysis of Husserl and Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa, John Myles points out that: “Doxa is a basic form of knowledgeability derived from experience, embodied and socialized formations of the unconscious strata of urdoxa. “Below” this central area is proto– or urdoxa, the taken for granted or undiscovered which underlies most states of consciousness except projection and reflexivity (102).”75 According to Myles, the

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73 In his essay, Crisis and Reflection, James Dodd analyzes modalities of doxa in Husserl’s phenomenology of lifeworld. Dodd maintains that doxa is our “first encounter with the world”, when we grasp the world as a question that is “open to its further articulations.” In this sense, doxa precedes knowledge because it is the first step toward our apprehension of the world as a problematic entity. James Dodd, Crisis and Reflection: An Essay on Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 155.

74 For a sociological illustration of this argument, see the analyses of artistic practices in the totalitarian Poland in the works by Jeffrey Goldfarb. See Goldfarb. The Persistence of Freedom (1980).

75 In his insightful article on Bourdieu’s adoption of doxa, Myles identifies six modalities (stages) of doxa. The first four modalities (Orthodoxy, Zuwendung/transitions, Protention/opinion, and Heterodoxy/predictiveness) are on the level of protodoxa, or of an unreflective knowledge that we tend to ‘take-for-granted’. The last two modalities (Projection and Reflexivity) are on the level of a reflexive understanding of social world and our belief in it. Myles’s more nuance analysis of Husserlian doxa points to the consequences of its inadequate understanding in Bourdieu’s theory which polarizes the everyday (non-scientific) and the reflexive sociological knowledge of social world and thus it overlooks the mimetism that lies in the core of every human praxis. As Myles asserts: “A reflexive sociology, one that links rationality with body and practice, should adequately conceptualize the potential of reflexivity to arise from everyday experience. (104)
taken-for-granted knowledge of reality influences our pre-reflexive as well as our reflexive attitudes because even in the reflexive stage we cannot completely detach our intuitive knowledge from our intermediate experience with reality.

In the context of the field theory, Myle’s insight means that at the initial, naïve stage, we consciously espouse field’s structures, its rules, and its games, and we rationally legitimize our intuitive knowledge of the field. At the second, reflexive stage, our doxic belief develops away from a naïve attitude because it is informed by our experience of the field, when we enter the field’s discourse, interact with other agents, and adjust our beliefs (naïve attitudes) accordingly to these interactions. In the context of literary field, this discursive praxis involves writers’ negotiations about their autonomy vis-à-vis field’s rules and its questions and I would further argue that this interactive mode of being in literary field is its inherent feature.

Husserlian protodoxa has yet another dimension that reaches beyond a conventional or historical understanding of primordiality—doxa is our original attitude toward social world. Literary protodoxa is also something more than a historically first belief in autonomy—it is a source of and the main reference point for all later believes in the autonomy of literary worlds. This phenomenological distinction has one consequence for Bourdieu’s model which emphasizes the historicity of literary doxa. Bourdieu studies historical origins of literary doxa to show that neither its validity nor the erroneous belief in the autonomy on which it rests are ever contested in literary field. Contrary to this view I would argue that if naïve attitude enables literary praxis than it is irrelevant for our understanding of that praxis whether such attitude rests on the objectively correct belief or the erroneous one. I would even argue, contrary to Bourdieu’s reproductive theory, that doxic (naïve) attitudes are not reproduced, albeit habitually, but are imitated. Hence, the praxis of literary doxa unfolds as a ceaseless recurrence of the original belief in the autonomy and its modifications because, inevitably, every return to the original belief is different.

What are the implications of this theoretical debate for the sociology of literary field? If we return to the German literary field, we can track down its protodoxa to the 18th century when it was first articulated by a circle of the Early Romantics around Friedrich Schlegel. For the Early Romantics, art was a man’s refuge from modern society where one could distance oneself from social world in order to connect to it as different human being. Through art, humans could restore a repressed mode of communication, a possibility to express and understand human experience, and generally a better world. Literature was viewed as the only form of artistic praxis which was able to simultaneously free itself from society and to connect back to it through social criticism and reflection. Romantic communities, which lived and ‘acted out’ their art in everyday life, thus launched the tradition of living of one’s own aesthetic style which, through a set of rules, shaped the writer’s identity. On the one hand were these rules confining, on the other they made it possible for writers to detach themselves from social world and to abstain from its conventions. This


76 Early Romantics attempted to define an autonomous place with no relation to social reality—a utopian place outside the vicious circle of society. A philosopher and a literary critic Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) considered art to be such a place and he argued that it had to be “functionally dissociated” from the outer world. Schlegel found inspiration for his ideas in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment, particularly in Kant’s view that the emancipation of the arts was an inevitable outcome of modernization. Josef Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays. Thomas Pfau, Ed., (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994)
protodoxic belief in autonomy was initially practiced also by the writers of the Gruppe 47 who abstained from political and aesthetic discourses which they viewed as their two major confines. In the fifties, the writers still declared the Gruppe as an avowedly apolitical association with an exclusively aesthetic agenda, searching for new literary language. Theodor Adorno was the first one to address the fallibility of German literary language when he pointed to the procrastinating legacy of Nazi aesthetics full of floral language and obscure metaphors. Adorno’s penetrating insights triggered the literary debate in the Gruppe which resulted in an adoption of a strictly non-ornamental, ascetic literary style known as New Realism. Yet, the debate climaxed with an unexpected esthetic trajectory of Günter Grass who combined the style of New Realism with his own ornamental and metaphoric language—precisely the kind of language that the Gruppe 47 denounced as a residuum of Nazi aesthetics.

Grass’ trajectory is sociologically interesting for two reasons. Paradoxically, it was Grass’ rich metaphoric language, and not the style of New Realism, which laid the foundations of literary and political narratives of German guilt for war and the Holocaust. Literary historian Thomas Kniesche speaks of Grass own concept of metaphoric language—the one that is freed from its metaphysical vagueness and it suitable for scrutinizing reality. Kniesche notices that Grass historicized the metaphor by “turning it to history”—that is by framing it with always concrete social context. Grass’s metaphoric language thus challenged postwar clichés about Nazism as a deception of the credulous people or as a momentary lapse of reason. Grass mastered historical metaphor in his major postwar novel The Tin Drum, which, I would argue, was the first articulation of German guilt in German postwar literature. In the novel, Grass uses a rhetoric figure that I would characterize as a metaphor “without exit”, which does not leave a way out from guilty conscience. Guilt is the only conscience that Grass’ novel provides and all attempts to alleviate it are doomed to failure. Grass historicizes guilt by weaving it into individual memories of the novel’s main protagonist; hence, guilt, which remains universal on the level of a concept, is personalized through the memories because it is always somebody’s guilt that the novel brings up.

Grass’ trajectory anticipated a shift in the commitments of the Gruppe’s writers from aesthetic to political questions and envisioned their confining effect on their artistic autonomy. Literary debate is interesting for it shows that the new aesthetics was not imposed on writers but was negotiated by them, and provokes the assumptions that these negotiations were conducive to the politicization of the Gruppe in the sixties. Secondly, it challenges the dominant assumption that political positions inform aesthetic attitudes of writers, which are prevalent in the sociology of literature (Bourdieu 2000, 1996; Sapiro 2003; Griswold 2000).

The distinction between the functional and the discursive approaches to literary doxa is perhaps most salient when we study doxa in its naïve mode. According to Bourdieu’s functional model, naïve belief in the field’s autonomy is imposed upon the habituses when they follow and reproduce its rules. According to the discursive model, naivety can vary from habitual to strategic apprehensions of the field, its rules,

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77 Heinrich Böll was the “founding father” of New Realism. He declared its the principles in the essay on Trümmerliteratur (literature if rubbles), which he first read at the Gruppe’s meeting in 1952, and promoted them in the novel Acquainted with the Night (Und sagte kein einziges Wort, 1954). Heinrich Böll. „Bekenntnis zur Trümmerliteratur.“ Saufraumungs Arbeiten: Erzählungen aus Deutschland 1945-1948. Ed. Thomas Friedrich, Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983, Pp. 5-9.

and its questions. Once naivety turns from a belief into an attitude, it undergoes “Husserlian” cycle of doxic modalities—from the initial naïve attitude, through its projection into everyday praxis, and finally to its reflective understanding. In the context of literary field, the persistence of literary autonomy is comparable with, what Jeffrey Goldfarb calls, the persistence of cultural freedom. Such freedom emerges from a free public realm where public institutions that are “relatively autonomous from societal power centers (1982: 40)” provide the terrain for relative autonomy of artistic practices. In Goldfarb’s analysis of the performing arts, artistic freedom begins as an attitude but unfolds as a pursuit in which artistic imagination complements the unpredictability and the creativity of social world. Artistic creativity can withstand its own autonomy vis-à-vis the political and the economic constraints that constitute the terrain for artistic innovations precisely by confining them. Goldfarb’s insights about creativity as a locus of artistic autonomy plays with the idea of autonomy of art as if it was social fact and are contiguous with the view of doxa as a force which, too, can generate autonomous spaces qua other fields of power and of its persistent naivety as a locus of this generative power. It can be argued that precisely in its naivety lies the enabling power of doxic attitude as a valid alternative approach to reality yet, it is not validity in a normative sense of rendering or falsifying the truth about social world, but in a sense of different apprehension of that reality.

Habitus and Experience

Habitus is a social entity that tangibly connects two more abstract categories analyzed in this article—the field and the doxa. It is a site where objective structures intersect with subjective experience. As a consequence of this intersection, habitus is a locus of the tension between the lived experience and its articulation vis-à-vis social world—an articulation that remains exasperatingly inadequate. A deficit in the communication between these two structural components of habitus—to encounter reality and to narrate about this experience—is a source of its ambivalent configuration. How do sociologists deal with this ambivalence? Bourdieu’s methodological solution lies in his concept of embodiment, which reconciles the tension between the objectively given external forces and an individual body for the sake of the forces. The process of embodiment unfolds as an internalization of the field’s structures during which the external reality (of the field) becomes the embodied reality of a habitus. In social praxis it means that we incorporate the external structures that shape us, the rules that control our behavior, the conventions that determine our interactions—the entire apparatus of everyday coercion that subtly, or blatantly, disciplines our bodies. Not only do we internalize the rules and accept their limitations, we keenly reproduce them and carry them out without being aware of their restrictive nature. We may even appreciate this sense of our own limits qua the world because the clear contours of our actions and possibilities add the certainty to our lives and, perhaps, even endow them with meaning. Then, the docility of the body rises to the docility of the mind. Our minds, too, dutifully follow the rule, to borrow the phrase from Charles Taylor, and we comply also mentally. But do we

79 Goldfarb shows that under the conditions of high ideologization and politicization of art in socialist era, Polish theatre was at peak of its artistic innovations and experimentation. In: Goldfarb, The Persistence of Freedom, 80, 128.

fully comply and can we? Do not our ambivalences persist? And are the spaces where we can abstain from that omnipresent docility only illusory products of the game that we all play or are they real for precisely the same reason?

In Bourdieu’s model, an answer to these questions lies in the formative power of field’s structures. Field relates to habitus as to the space of actual position and possibilities which “appear to wait for and call for [their] fulfillment (1996: 231-2)”. This basic mode of being in the field—of maintaining positions and positions taking—unfolds as a social game which is controlled by the field’s rules. In the literary field, the game has its historical specificities, such as the game’s relative independence from other social constraints, as Bourdieu (1996) notices:

Since everything produced there [in the literary field] draws its existence and meaning, essentially, from the specific logic and the history of the game itself, this game is kept afloat by virtue of its own consistency, meaning the specific regularities which define it and the mechanisms—such as the dialectic of positions, dispositions and positions-takings—which confer on its own conatus. (p. 248)

Bourdieu maintains that the game is nothing else than participation on the illusion of the autonomy which is “rooted in the illusio, the collective belief in the game, and the values of its stakes (1996: 276)”. By internalizing the rules of the game that is played in the given field, habitus becomes an epitome of that field—its embodied knowledge. All agents in the field have the same implicit understanding of the game—as far as the rules are functional and the game makes sense, this imitative praxis reactivates the game and corroborates the rules and the structure of the habituses.81

Bourdieu’s insistence on the durable constitution of habitus has one curious implication on his model: on the one hand, the model emphasizes the historicity of habitus yet on the other it overlooks the individual phases in its history. The model tacitly assumes that habitus remains the same during the entire process of its adaptation to the field and thus it eschews the different stages of the internalizing process, such as familiarization with the rules, their appropriation, acceptance, or rejection. Judith Butler (1999) maintains that this deficit on the temporal side of habitus is due to Bourdieu’s focus on the “objective domain of the social field, a field described almost exclusively in spatialized terms (p. 125)”. Due to this temporal deficiency, the model describes the reproduction of the rules as a mechanical process. Butler challenges this ‘practical mimeticism’ which in Bourdieu’s theory “works always to produce conformity and congruence (p. 118)” and thus leaves unaddressed the question of ambivalence that is at the core of every imitation. She argues that “mimetic acquisition of norm is at once the condition by which a certain resistance to the norm is also produced; identification will not ‘work’ to the extent that the norm is fully incorporated, or, indeed, incorporable (p. 118)”. Butler’s insights weaken the deterministic tone of Bourdieu’s concept of embodiment and point in the direction of experience as a source of the ambivalent structure of habitus.

In this respect, Husserl’s distinction between the two types of experience—mediated (Erfahrung) and lived one (Erlebnis)—is quite relevant for the category of literary habitus that articulates and shares both types of experiences in the field, albeit differently. For instance, experience of literary autonomy is mediated (Erfahren)...

81 Charles Taylor notices that: “express rules can function in our lives only along with inarticulate sense which is encoded in the body. It is this habitus which activates the rules.” Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”, 43.
through tradition whereas direct experiences (*Erlebnis*) of the writers are usually shared through their stories. Unlike mediated experience, which is shared collectively as a written, oral, or habitual tradition, direct experience is lived individually and can remain unarticulated. However, once the lived experience (*Erlebnis*) is articulated in a narrative and is vested with a belief it becomes a collectively shared experience. The same dynamics applies to the mediated tradition of autonomy (*Erfahrung*): what for habitus was an initially vague intuition about its autonomy becomes, via praxis, its embodied knowledge of the field. James Dodd (2004) shows that in Husserl’s phenomenology, the embodiment of tradition undergoes different stages when, by accepting tradition, we embody its “received meaning…as something unclear but nevertheless passively given, even understood (p. 132)”. Yet, this passive understanding is not the final stage of the appropriation of tradition but, as Dodd maintains, it is a precursor to “possible new ways of understanding (p. 133)”. Dodd views passivity as a dormant potential for the future trajectories of experience and argues that: “passively embodied, it [tradition] is open to being taken up a kind of second life (p. 134)”. More nuance view of the embodied understanding of tradition illuminates the different stages also in the appropriation of a belief in autonomy.

Each literary field has its own history of the embodiment of autonomy. The Gruppe’s history began with the debate about literary aesthetics, which marked a trajectory in the writers’ apprehensions of their autonomy. The internalization of tradition of autonomy (*Erfahrung*) went in parallel with the politicization of writers, which was set off by the appeasing politics of memory practiced by CDU—it’s main aim was to pacify the disturbing memories about National Socialist past. Throughout the 1960s, most of the Gruppe’s writers engaged in different fractions of the West German political left and the political cleavages among them resulted in the disbandment of the Gruppe. Both processes were highly discursive and they encouraged and facilitated numerous questions about Germany’s Nazi past and about the aesthetic form(s) in which that past could best be accounted for. I would argue that during these political and aesthetic contestations, the writers of the Gruppe 47 embodied aesthetic and political discourses of their literary field rather than its rigid structure. For instance, literary aesthetics of Günter Grass was a compromise between the old, metaphoric language and the style of New Realism that the Gruppe adopted as its literary canon. Similarly, writers negotiated their political stances, whether it was with their literary peers or with West German society at large. This reference brings us back to the dilemma about the fusion of rational and habitual strategies in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus mentioned in the beginning...

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82 Paul Connerton’s classification of memory works with three types: personal, cognitive, and performative. Personal memory equals personal history that can be reflected only by an individual herself. This memory can remain unspoken, even though it is often shared. Cognitive memory, on the other hand, consists of knowledge which needs the particular context in which it can be remembered; habitual memory is the reactivation of past knowledge through performance. Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*. (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22-27.

83 The amnesty granted by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to NSDAP criminals in 1954, the accession of the Federal Republic to NATO in 1955, and the ban of Communist Party in 1956, were among those political events that mobilized West German intellectuals in the late 1950s.

84 In the early sixties, the turbulent political events in and outside the Federal Republic divided the Gruppe in three ideological fractions: moderate liberals (Werner Richter, Günter Grass, and Sigfried Lenz), who continued their commitments with SPD; socialists (Heinrich Böll and Martin Weiss), who took a strong critical stance against SPD, and the leftist radicals (Martin Walser and Hans Magnus Enzensberger), joined the New Left. These political and ideological cleavages deepened during the second half of the sixties and brought the Group 47 to its end. See Heinz Ludwig Arnold, *Die Gruppe 47*. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2004) 125.
of this article. Such fusion in a single habitus is problematic in functional model in which the belief in autonomy does not rest on rational grounds but is habitually adopted via literary praxis and its rules. On the other hand, in the discursive model is literary praxis understood as a process during which field's agents switch between rational strategies and habitual or intuitive behaviors. Discursive model works from an assumption that the basic mode of being in the literary field, its modus operandi, is to negotiate the degree of one's autonomy and not to take it for granted, as Bourdieu asserts. This interactive mode of being in the field is mainly given by a specific question, or a set of questions that procrastinate there and which, eventually, can motivate a writer to enter the field. Writer's relation to the field's question(s)—whether they concern past or recent events, a specific historical or experience, or one's position and orientation in the world—can also be informed by her lived or mediated experience. Experience in its direct form (Erlebnis) is one of those ambiguous variables that sociologists dilute by objectifying it—by explaining it as an inevitable outcome of the structural processes (Bourdieu 2000; 1996). A more synthesizing concept of experience, which fuses its lived and its mediated forms, can illuminate also the formation of (literary) habitus of the Gruppe 47 and the two types of motivations that were entwined in it: to succeed in the literary field and to relate to the question about Germany's Nazi past. The motivation to succeed was guided by the formalistic strategies of the Gruppe's literary canon (New Realism) but also by a relative freedom of writers to variegate the principles of that canon or to depart from it completely, as was the case of Günter Grass. The motivation to respond to the field's question was driven by the writers' personal experiences with the recent past, which they shared through their literary texts and expressed in their political attitudes. All of the writers lived through (Erlebte) war and the totalitarian regime of the Third Reich; most of them were enlisted, sent to the front, ended up as the US prisoners of war, and all of them witnessed the rise and the fall of National Socialism.

With respect to embodiment and its relevance for the formation of literary habitus, it can be argued that the constitution of habitus is a multidimensional process in which writer's experience is not fully absorbed by the field's structures but becomes one of its productive sources. It can further be assumed that a writer, who

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85 This also applies to all past events that a writer did not experience personally but which circulate as identity narratives for a group to which the writer belongs. They constitute indirect experience that serve as reference points for writer's work. For instance, slavery is one of the most durable mediated experiences that has been reiterated and re-articulated as a literary question in the US literary field.

86 For instance, in her analysis of the literary habitus of The Gruppe 47, Sabine Cofalla uses Bourdieu's concept of objectification of writer's experience. The study aligns writers based on the objective forces, such as class origins, cultural or intellectual backgrounds, to argue that they were conducive to the construction of the middle-class habitus that prevailed in the Gruppe. According to Cofalla, similar social backgrounds of the writers determined thematic and stylistic ranges of their texts. The study, nevertheless, illuminates neither motives nor sources of the critical attitudes toward these middle-class values that prevailed in the writers' political commitments in the sixties. Cofalla, "Elitewechsel im literarischen Feld nach 1945." German Monitor, No.45, 244-262.

87 Heinrich Böll's novel And Where Were You, Adam? (1951) or Wolfgang Borchert's play The Man Outside (1947) were among the first post-war writings, yet they were still more descriptive than critical. First critical accounts of Adenauer's Germany appeared in Wolfgang Koeppen's novel Pigeons on the Grass (1951). Gruppe's literature took a more political turn in the sixties with Rolf Hochhuth's play Deputy (1963), which marked the line between the critical and the descriptive accounts of war. In the late sixties, Grass in his play Local Anaesthetic (1969) and Lenz in his novel The German Lesson (1968) criticized older generation for its keen and thoughtless participation on the practices of the Nazi state.
is a carrier of literary habitus, does not fully adapt to the field but, by variegating its rules, he negotiates the degree of his autonomy in that field. Contrary to Bourdieu's insight that these negotiations are motivated predominantly by writer's desire to succeed in the field I would argue that they are motivated also by her desire to articulate her testimony about social world. With Goldfarb we might say, that this insistence on cultural freedom is not a rigid stance but a creative attitude toward the changing social world. If, following Husserlian phenomenology, we understand experience as knowledge then its two modalities—as mediated and as lived experience—are two different stages of habitus's knowledgeable ability. This is an important trajectory in the formation of literary habitus under the discursive model where autonomy is practiced and corroborated through ceaseless negotiations. Undoubtedly, literary autonomy as a permanent state of literary field remains an illusion, yet it is an illusion which yields power to generate relatively autonomous spaces.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this analysis was to challenge a generalized use of the dominant assumptions in the sociology of literature that literary praxis is shaped and motivated by the same conformist practices as any other kind of human praxis, and that this conventionalism is disguised by literary doxa. This article does not deny or ignore such congruence between literary and non-literary worlds, nor does it disregard the legitimacy of Bourdieu's concerns about social construction of artistic practices and artistic tastes since reasons for appreciating the arts as well as the choices of what will be appreciated often vary from pragmatic to, indeed, appalling. In this respect, Bourdieu's scrutinizing insights about the logic of these practices are, and will continue to be acknowledged as exceptionally illuminative. However, it remains to be asked whether to ascribe the absolute validity to these phenomena is an adequate method for sociological understanding of the art worlds and of what is distinctively important in art as social practice. Undoubtedly, literature will continue to challenge our sociological imagination about the world that we inhabit and study. However, the counter-opinions to Bourdieu's theoretical premises, as they were outlined in this article, were inspired less by the world of the text than by the challenge to understand those social spaces that make such response possible.

**Note**

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88 In his major study of the social construction of taste, Bourdieu analyzes social function of art as the means of social stratification. He exposes the mechanisms that facilitate the (mis)uses of art for the purposes of acquiring and maintaining of social status. See Bourdieu, *Distinction* (1984).
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Social Risks and Challenges of the Post-Socialist Transition Period in Estonia: Analysis of Biographical Narratives

Abstract

In research on social risks and insecurity qualitative methods have obvious advantages and successfully complement statistical quantitative approaches, which have been practiced for decades. This study is based on the thirty-two in-depth interviews collected in the period June 2003 to January 2004 for the project “Life Plans and Life Paths in the Post-Socialist Estonia.” The interviewees are representatives of the so-called “generation of winners”, i.e. the people aged 20 or 30 years at the beginning of the period of post-socialist reforms. The paper examines representations of social risks and challenges of the transition period in the biographical interviews as well as discursive patterns and strategies that interviewees use to produce relatively coherent biographical narratives.

Keywords
Post-Socialist Transition; Generation of Winners; Social Risks; Biographical Narratives; Discourse Analysis

In Estonia as in other post-Soviet countries, the transition to a market economy opened new opportunities—such as private enterprise and self-employment—yet it also engendered new risks, such as unemployment, decline of social status, and pauperization. Such risks and opportunities were unevenly distributed among different groups in the general population. As has been noted repeatedly, changes in the former socialist countries entailed a transition from the old-age-oriented society to a new, youth-oriented one. Young age became a particularly important factor of social success in the early 1990s. Presuming their success in the job market, people aged 20-30 years at the beginning of the period of post-socialist reforms have been called the cohort of “winners” (Titma, Tuma and Silver 1998). Further sociological analysis, however, has shown that not all of the “winners” have been successful, and that the cohort actually includes a considerable number of “losers” (Helemâe et al. 2000).
Our paper examines how this “generation of winners” represents social changes of the 1990s and their impact on people’s lives, as well as how “winners” cope with social failure and manage their identity in disruptive circumstances of post-socialist reforms and transition to a market economy. The paper relies on data from the study “Life Plans and Life Paths in the Post-socialist Estonia: Life Stories of the Generation of Winners,” a collection of personal interviews from 2003–2004 that examines representations of what is perceived as social failure and insecurity in these biographical interviews. We proceed in our examination from the main premise of critical discourse studies: that discourse is a mode of social action and, as such, forms a mobile interface between language and society. In response to social changes and uncertainty, individuals tend to develop discursive and behavioral patterns to manage risks and challenges, to cope with the new socio-economic situation, and to overcome the constraints the situation imposes on them (see, e.g., Zinn 2005). In the first section of our paper we offer a survey of the period of social changes in Estonia as well as potential risks and challenges the respondents from the generation of “winners” may have encountered. From there we move to concentrate on the biographical interviews from “Life Plans,” analyzing discursive patterns and strategies formed in response to social challenges.

**Transition period in Estonia**

A high degree of liberalism and a modest role of state were characteristic of the economic reforms in the period of transition to a market economy. Estonia is often used as an example of successful development, especially compared to other post-socialist countries (World Bank 1996). On the other hand, the Estonian “history of success” is criticized because of increasing social inequality and deepening tensions between generations and economic sectors as time passes (Estonian Human Development Report 1997).

In Estonia as in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, transition to a market economy was accompanied by a considerable reduction of the labor market and changes in the distribution of income (World Bank 2002). The employment rate was steadily declining from 1989 and during the whole period of the 1990s. Work was neither compulsory nor guaranteed, as it was in the Soviet era, when finding a job was relatively easy and full employment was actually achieved. The state’s ultraliberal post-socialist economic policy provoked the growth of unemployment. In just a few years unemployment became the everyday reality rather than an abstract phenomenon for many people. According to data from the Estonian department of statistics, the unemployment rate among the able-bodied population was at its highest point (14%) in 2000 and 10% in 2004 (Labour Force 2005). The process of the transformation of Estonian society had modified the means for seeking employment: the rate of jobs found via official channels was steadily decreasing, whereas the role of informal connections in securing employment became increasingly important. Increased difficulty in finding a job without informal mediation is a symptom of the impending closure of labour market, a situation typical of other post-socialist countries as well (Kazjulja 2002; Clarke 2000). Taking into account the changes in the sphere of employment, the state obviously prioritized economic growth over development of social support systems, which led to heightened social insecurity and susceptibility of the population to social risks like unemployment and pauperization.
The economic transition in Estonia engendered opportunities as well as risks, though both were distributed rather unevenly across different groups of the population. The unequal distribution of risks and opportunities can be usefully explained with the help of the path-dependency theory, which argues that different "capitals" and capacity to convert them according to new social and economic rules determine individuals’ and groups’ positions within the stratification system of transforming societies. In a changing economic situation, people use capital already accumulated in the previous political and economic systems in new ways, since accumulation of a new capital requires time, as one type of capital might have been converted into another. In post-Soviet Estonia, for example, the political elite of the Soviet era had an opportunity to convert their political power into economic capital (Rona-Tas 1998). Being in the “right place” at the beginning of reforms was an important factor of success. Since the labor market was strongly segmented in the Soviet time, the structural capital—the individual’s place in the structure of economy—determined an individual’s prospects in the labor market. Those who worked in large state companies like plants and factories were the first to be affected by unemployment and/ or decline in social status as the economic structure changed. These people, mainly Russian-speaking and thus the main ethnic minority of Estonia, did not have sufficient individual resources, such as citizenship or knowledge of the state language, to succeed in the new labor market. In their case, the risks of market economy prevailed over any new opportunities. Meanwhile, leaders and specialists, who had more opportunities to use and convert their social and cultural capital, were less susceptible to unemployment due to their former, Soviet-era professional status.

Youth became a particularly valuable capital in the early 1990s, and the advantage of gradual accumulation of life experience was rather underestimated. Changes in generational influence occurred in both state structures and the economy. New enterprises were set up and directed chiefly by young people (Tallo & Terk 1998: 15). As we have already mentioned, people aged 20-30 years at the beginning of the period of reforms have been called the cohort of “winners” because of their successful careers and the society’s propensity to see youth as an advantage (Titma, Tuma and Silver 1998).

“Winners’” success in the labor market has been often related to the timing of their entry into it (Helemäe et al 2000). At the beginning of the period of reform, representatives of the cohort were either close to high school graduation or at the very beginning of their careers. Their experience of work in the framework of the old Soviet system was minimal or non-existent and, consequently, they were more apt to take new business and entrepreneurial opportunities than older workers. Legal regulation of the business sphere was weak, and the market was not yet competitive in the beginning of the transition period. Thanks to these favorable conditions, representatives of the younger cohort were able to better orient themselves in the new market situation in comparison to older generations, who had a longer experience of working in the planned economy. Sociological research has shown that the victory of the generation of “winners” has been relative, however, and that the cohort of “winners” in fact includes a considerable number of “losers” (Helemäe et al. 2000). These individuals have encountered significant financial hardships, and have experienced and continue to experience social insecurity, in some cases living at or near poverty level.

Today Estonia is a country with a developed market economy. Though comparable to other countries with middle range income, it occupies a modest position among them. At least with respect to the level of incomes, Estonia is closer to the poorer countries than to the richer ones. Due to the recent positive changes in
the Estonian economy, such as growth of employment, increase of wages, pensions, allowances and, what most important, the real incomes of the population, the rate of people living in and at risk of poverty has considerably diminished. Still, 2004 data from the Estonian department of statistics shows that incomes of a large part of the population do not exceed the absolute poverty line (In 2004, a person on monthly income less than 106 euro was recognized as living under the poverty line). Thus, in 2004, every sixth resident of the country, every seventh family and a quarter of all children lived under the officially recognized line of poverty (Household Living Niveau 2004, 2005: 67). Non-working members of the family—the unemployed, children, those who have caring responsibilities for children or disabled people, pensioners whose pension is minimal— are more susceptible to poverty (Trumm 2005). Other risk factors such as a low level of education or disability resulting from illness further increase the general risk of family poverty.

Estonia ranks among those countries in which strategies facilitating the rise of the economy did not lead to a decline in poverty (Heinrich, G 2003). Along with traditionally vulnerable groups (single mothers, families with a large number of children, non-working pensioners etc.), the radical reforms conducted in Estonia from the beginning of state independence affected social groups that found themselves immediately living under the poverty line in the new economic system—the unemployed and underpaid, for instance. The so-called “new poor” are able-bodied people often at the peak of their abilities, not necessarily unemployed, yet not earning enough to maintain a decent standard of living. As a result of growing differentiation of incomes, increase in relative poverty occurs: a number of people grow poorer in respect to relatively prosperous groups and new opportunities.

Data and methods

Our article is based on data from a project conducted in Estonia near the turn of the twenty-first century—“Life Plans and Life Paths in the Post-socialist Estonia: Life Stories of the Generation of Winners”—which was supported by the Estonian Science Foundation. Our analysis is based on the thirty-two in-depth interviews collected in the period June 2003 to January 2004 for “Life Plans.” The sample of respondents was drawn from a longitudinal study “Life Paths of a Generation” (PG), launched in 1983 when a research group from the University of Tartu and the Estonian Academy of Sciences, under the leadership of Professor Mikk Titma, interviewed graduates from secondary educational institutions (see for example Titma et al 1998). PG observed the life course of a specific cohort from secondary school graduation until the end of the 1990s.

The PG cohort were educated in the Soviet system in the mid- and late 1980s, and entered labor market in the early 1990s, in the period of reforms accompanied by the growth of inequality, devaluation of choices made before the reforms, necessity of adaptation to the new system, and social stress (see e.g. Kutsar 1995). Because the PG cohort were approximately 24-26 years old by the beginning of 1990s and were the most advanced cohort in terms of education, we considered longitudinal data to provide time-dependent information on the inner differentiation of the ‘winners of transition’ and the factors that led them to failure or success. In this paper, we use the method of discourse analysis to examine processing of social and biographical data by the interviewees.

We proceed from the main premise of critical discourse studies: that discourse forms a mobile interface between language and society. Social representations
become fixed in discourse in the course of social interaction. The network of social representations—beliefs, attitudes and values—constitute the nodal points between language and other social practices (see e.g. van Dijk 2005: 301; van Dijk 1998: 4-14). Social representations simultaneously mold people’s perceptions and thinking, and reproduce and regulate social relations. Thus, discourse is important in both the production and the maintenance of social order (Corsaro 1985: 167).

The interviewees from the generation of “winners” rarely describe social risks or social failure directly. The latter are most often conceptualized implicitly, via representation of social processes and the impact they have on people’s lives and society. Interviewees foreground the factors that influence their own or other people’s lives and lead to social success or failure. To describe and analyse these implicit representations we rely on the parameters developed in the framework of critical discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk 1985, 1998, 2001, 2005; Fairclough 1995, 2001, 2003; Antaki 1984). They are: representation of social processes and events in discourse; representation of agency and causality (whether the processes are represented as functions of definite agents or as anonymous; the nature of agency and participation); temporal organization of the narrative and dependence of the temporal scheme on the interviewee’s present situation (social success or failure); discourse modality and evaluation of events; discursive positioning; and construction of narrative identity. Ultimately, our aim is to study how social changes of the 1990s and the necessity of their narratization affect social construction of the world by the generation of “winners”—that is, how the interviewees conceptualize social changes of the 1990s (events, processes and actors) as well as how they react to social challenges (threat of social failure and pauperization) and manage their social identities in these autobiographical narratives.

The work with respondents was conducted in the form of a semi-structured biographical interview. The interviewees were asked to narrate their life stories, starting from birth, with minimal intervention on interviewer’s part. The latter’s role was coordinating, drawing respondents’ attention to the most significant biographical events, particularly the details of education and career. Essentially, the interviewer’s task was to encourage respondents to talk and elaborate on what they had said.

The semi-structured interview is a joint production by interviewer and interviewee (Wengraf 2002: 3). The interviewer provides the respondent with thematic foci, drawing his/her attention to certain biographical facts or social events. The interviewee is relatively free in his/her selection and presentation of the material to fill in the framework suggested by the interviewer (Rosenthal 1993: 65). C. K Riessman reveals that interviewees sometimes resist interviewers’ “efforts to fragment their lived experience into thematic (code-able) categories” and their “attempts to control meaning” (Riessman 2002: 695-696). However, the life-story originates in the social environment common for the interviewee and interviewer. An apparently spontaneous narrative obtained in the course of the interview is a result of implicit selection and interpretation of the events from the perspective of the present. Social constraints as well as collective representations accepted in the society influence respondents’ speech and behavior; social structure “is constantly being reaffirmed and transformed in the interaction between biographical experience and socially defined schemata” (Rosenthal 1993: 60). Thus, the biographical interview combines spontaneous narration with implicit selection and codification. The interview conveys “tacit and unconscious assumptions and norms of the individual or of a cultural group,” which “are less subject to the individual’s conscious control” than direct statements, at least in some respects (Wengraf 2002: 115).
Analysis of biographical narratives

The optimistic version of social consensus regarding the period of economic reforms in Estonia, propagated and supported by media, represents it as time of rapid and successful changes. It also stimulates negative stereotyping of social failure and poverty, which are seen as temporary phenomena that result partially from the shortcomings in social policy and partially from people's unwillingness or inability to adapt their lives to new social and economic conditions. Our analysis of the interviews seeks to show whether and to what extent respondents naturalize or problematize the social consensus. In what follows we shall make some observations on how the social situation of the 1990s is constructed in respondents' discourse with the emphasis on social risks and failure. Discourse analysis allows us to observe how people construct a coherent world view based on their understanding of events and phenomena.

Representation of social agents and processes.

The structural changes in society are foregrounded as kernel elements of the biographical narratives. Both relatively successful and relatively unsuccessful—in terms of career and income—respondents highlighted a crucial impact the structural changes had on their lives, as well as the radical character and wide scope of these changes, which affected nearly all strata of society.

Social events enter the narratives primarily as elements of biography rather than as separate phenomena of social world; their meaning varies within various biographical frames. Thus it is particularly significant that, though the period of changes has had a different impact on respondents' destinies and has been perceived differently, the majority of the biographical narratives display common narrative regularities and recurrent thematic patterns (topics and subtopics). According to van Dijk, “a concept or a conceptual structure (a proposition) may become a discourse topic if it hierarchically organizes the conceptual (propositional) structure of the sentence” (van Dijk 1977: 134). The topic of a discourse is a macroproposition that provides its local and global coherence (van Dijk 1985). We examine representations of the transition processes in terms of both thematic constituents (topics and subtopics) and agency. In narratology, subtopics (motifs) are defined as both elementary thematic constituents of discourse and minimal narrative units or statements: “the discourse can be said to state the story through a connected set of narrative statements” (Prince 2003: 55, 64). Thematization and representation of agency are the two basic factors of narrative dynamics.

In the “winners’” biographical interviews, the transition period of the 1990s is generally thematized as a drastic change that enabled new choices, yet was accompanied by some kind of loss or social shock—whether temporary or continuing—such as loss of feeling of security, loss of property or reduction of income. The individual “emplotments” and subjective processing of information distinguish particular narratives even as they generally fall into this pattern (Gülich & Quasthoff 1985: 174), yet the topic of “destabilization” (destabilization leading either to further aggravation or relative stabilization and improvement of situation) is invariable. Insofar as interviewees conceptualize the transition process as potentially threatening their social stability and material prosperity, one may infer that social failure and pauperization are seen as plausible consequences of the process, which may affect everyone, rather than exclusive phenomena whose action applies only to
the perceived “lazy” or “worthless” members of society, as in the case of negative stereotyping of social failure and poverty.

As a rule, the precise nature and character of social transformations are not specified in the interviews. The biographical narrative typically emphasizes the consequences of social processes and impact they have on the respondent’s life, his or her relatives’ and acquaintances’ lives or the situation in the region, where they live, rather than the processes themselves.

The first example is taken from an interview with a relatively successful respondent who has graduated from the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute, holds the posts of director and supply manager in a village school, and finally becomes an owner of a small bus company. He is concerned about the privatization of land and property in the 1990s, which, when brought about without a clear plan or social protection measures, has turned to be damaging for the local life. The respondent avoids direct inferences, however, and makes instead a series of “remedial corrections” in his discourse to narrow down the scope of the process. Here we introduce the notion of “remedial correction” as a discursive component of the “remedial interchange,” which is aimed at impression management and transforming potentially offensive or consensus-breaking acts into socially acceptable ones to help the actor preserve his or her reputation (Goffman 1971: 109):

Interviewer: Had the big changes of the ’90s changed your life as well?

Interviewee: Sure they did. I moved to this place in ’89. Though I didn’t happen to see any political life here. Only on TV. Neither struggle for independence nor... even hadn’t a chance to go to the night song festivals. Here it all went its own way and rather quietly. Here I saw the collapse of the local life, I mean the collapse of the sovkhoz [Soviet collective farm], and what people did then, there were different variants [of behavior] [...]

Interviewer: ...Hadn’t the collapse of the sovkhoz emasculated it [the local life] here?

Interviewee: Let’s say, the sovkhoz as an economy unit had totally emasculated itself... Whether it was good or bad, it might have continued as a production unit, but it was rather people’s mistake, I think. There are bad people everywhere... But perhaps it was right to sink it altogether, but, on the other hand, to distribute everything. The Otepää sovkhoz preserved some production units, a pigsty, rather large, and a milk-herd. It continues as a private limited company. Some people keep on working there [...]. The rest of agriculture has been completely destroyed [...]

Interviewer: There are still nice places here.

Interviewee: Yes, the village is not desolated. Apartments prices are still high here [...]. People are coming from everywhere, from Tallinn, and Swedes, and Finns. In this sense the local life had not collapsed.

In respondent’s narrative, the following subtopics constitute different types of “changes”: struggle for independence, night song festivals, collapse of the Soviet collective farms (sovkhozes) and “emasculating” of local life. Only the last two subtopics refer to respondent’s immediate personal experience. The “collapse” and “destruction” are examples of negative thematization. The local consequences of the reform are represented in negative terms, but the reformation itself is conceptualized...
as an anonymous process, without indicating the agents who might have been responsible for negative effects. This anonymity is intensified through nominalization and use of process nouns (‘Local life collapsed’/ ‘The collapse of local life’). Nominalization, i.e. representation of processes as entities, entails occultation of causal aspects and objectification of the process. As a result of nominalization, “the agents of processes, people who initiate processes or act upon other people or objects, are absent from texts” (Fairclough 2003: 12-13).

Further, due to rewording, the scope of collapse is narrowed down: it was only a sovkhoz, not local life as a whole, that collapsed. In the next segment of discourse, a hypothetical generalized agent of the process is added (“bad people”); here, a socio-economical problem is represented as a moral one. The intransitive use of the verb “emasculate” in contrast to the transitive use of it in the interviewer’s question is also noteworthy: it represents the process (emasculating) as reflexive, turning back to itself. Finally, the scope of the process is narrowed down again as the interviewee points out that local life has not collapsed due to the development of tourism.

Passivation, nominalization, use of reflexive and intransitive verbs, generalized nouns and pronouns, indefinite adjectives are typical means of the anonymous representation of social processes and backgrounding of agency in the majority of interviews. The process of changes is most often represented as anonymous; its causes and agents are backgrounded or generalized (all, everybody, nobody, they, etc.).

**Interviewee** [male track driver]: [C]ollective farms started falling apart [...] I worked also for a rent company for several years. Then the land return started, and everything collapsed altogether. [here and throughout emphases added.- M.G., M.K.]

**Interviewee** [female teacher]: Then the Estonian Republic already came into being. And everybody left school [because of low wages]

**Interviewee** [female former veterinary doctor, works as a selling agent for a toy company]: Soon those changes started to happen, and it was impossible to keep fur animals any more and everybody was poor and [laughs] ... there was no food... and the company itself was on sell, on the verge of bankruptcy...

[On her work as a hotel supply manager]: [I]t was [an] awfully funny and edifying time [...] Yet the salary was not paid there.

**Interviewee** [male owner of a small company]: [W]e were a young family during the period of changes, and an opportunity to get our own place for living disappeared ...

**Interviewee** [male engineer]: In the 1990s, the whole state financed (as it always was) melioration system disappeared in Estonia [...] ... then the Estonian crone came into being and building work stopped in Estonia altogether for a while.

**Interviewee** [woman, orderly]: I wasn’t sacked, I resigned. You know, it was the time when those companies were privatized, and things fell apart, so... Salary wasn’t paid, I was paid only 130 per month. One had to reconcile oneself to it, there was no sense in doing this work.

**Interviewee** [male university research fellow]: [H]onestly speaking, the worst thing was that this Master’s studies system had been introduced and
nobody knew what did they want. In my case the conditions were the same as for the doctor [PhD] today.

Interviewee [female laboratory assistant]: Of course, there were redundancies in the late ’90s. Three times. But I’ve managed to stay. 
Interviewer: Don’t you fear to lose your job now? Do you fear more now than before?

Interviewee: On the contrary, there is less fear now. It was more fear of being fired before. Now people get so used to redundancies that they even don’t care. 
[...] Should there be a redundancy, should Terko [the company] collapse, one would have to seek a job. But there are no jobs here.

Interviewee [female research fellow]: Then it started... collapse or destruction. According to the rumours from the institute that reached me, all younger staff quit the job.

Interviewee [male miner]: [A]nd then it [all] collapsed in ‘89-’90. then I came here, to the town, to my brother, to work as a sanitary technician in the building project. [...] And in 1992 the sanitary technique company also... everything was being reformed. First there was a state company, then a cooperative [company], then the co-operative fell apart because the chairman left... then I lost my job.

Representation of social change as anonymous and suppression of agents naturalizes socio-economic processes and their negative effects and blocks analysis of the social situation and awareness of one’s own position within it.

The social actor’s role is reduced to either “benefiting from the situation” or “suffering from the situation.” Social actors are represented as affected by the situation and being “at the receiving end” of the situation as Objects (Patients) or Beneficiaries (Leeuwen 2003: 44). As Beneficiaries they are those that “the opportunities are given to;” they act due to favorable opportunities. Beneficiaries may be activated as actor-participants, yet their secondary role in the process is always spotlighted: they can benefit from the situation, but they neither initiate nor control it. Here we consider Patient and Beneficiary as narrative roles. Similarly to the Greimassian actants, they belong to the deep level of narrative syntax and not to the surface linguistic structure.

When positioning themselves with respect to social action, interviewees often assume the role of the patient (I was not paid, I was not sacked, etc.) or beneficiary (I was given an opportunity, they offered me a job, etc.). On the other hand, both relatively “successful” and “unsuccessful” interviewees often implicitly refer to their inability or the impossibility of them benefitting from the new social situation in such a way that they become the active agents:

Interviewee [female shop manager]: I know that many people of our generation did well, those who knew how to use this time properly.

Interviewee [unemployed female]: When the large changes started to happen, everybody went to commerce. I mean merchandise, delivery...this shuttling didn’t attract me. It was probably because I hadn’t quick wits for something significant...to catch something elusive by tail... Since people with quick wits were able to use favourable moments...
The biographical topics common for both relatively successful and unsuccessful interviewees are the loss of one’s command over circumstances, and exclusion from the process of decision-making in the course of social changes. As a rule, these topics refer to the lasting influence of suprapersonal factors on speaker’s destiny. Exclusion from the sphere of decision-making as well as social success or failure are often attributed to the fatal powers beyond the respondent’s control (“it just happened so”; “it came by itself, without any effort on my part;” “I was just lucky enough;” “it was bad luck;” etc.). The representation of social processes as anonymous and “agentless” propounds fatalistic explanations of events. Respondents tend to represent structural and individual factors as fated and/or endowed with a fatalistic meaning. In this case, agency is ascribed to suprapersonal powers.

The interviews show that there is no definite, univocal connection between recurrent biographical topics and their narrative resolutions, which shape the denouements of the biographical stories (social success or failure). Certain biographical topics and subtopics foregrounded by both successful and unsuccessful respondents (hard and intensive work, mobility or open-mindedness) may or may not lead to success as the narrative resolution. The fact that the same individual characteristic (e.g. mobility or open-mindedness) may become a factor of either success or failure reveals that social failure and poverty are represented as predominantly suprapersonal phenomena. There are examples of social mobility and effort (the respondent changes job, improves his/ her qualification or is retrained) that do not lead to promotion or improvement of respondents’ situations. “Wrong” choices in the past that were not perceived as wrong at the time, representation of changes as too rapid and radical (“all that we were taught turned upside down”), fatigue from the reforms—all these motifs manifest the decrease of control over one’s own life and point to the natural, physical and psychological limits of adaptation, including the finitude of human life.

As a result, certain conservatism or failure of adaptation, when considered against the neutral or negative thematization of “changes” and related motifs (effort, mobility, etc.), may acquire a positive meaning in the biographical interviews. Interviewees regard it as a manifestation of certain axiological values such as commitment to tradition and profession and a desire to preserve relative individual autonomy and command over one’s own life.

Social change and construction of temporality.

Personal time always mediates social construction of temporality. There are different levels of the “negotiation of time” (Brockmeier 1995: 116) in personal narratives. Certain patterns of personal time perception tend to crystallize into social time patterns.

In the biographical interviews, the period of social changes of the early 1990s serves as the critical point to which personal time schemes are anchored and with respect to which they take on their meaning. The interviews with unlucky respondents display particularly sharp contrast between the two parts of the biographical narrative—“before” and “after” the transition, with the latter part as a period of either relative stabilization or further destabilization of their conditions. Yet interviews with both relatively lucky and unlucky respondents comprise a considerable number of positive representations of the previous system of social support which, despite its restrictions and rigidity, provided social guarantees, a sense of stability, and definite perspective on the future. These representations are situated on the spatiotemporal
axis “now” versus “then,” where the two poles are in a contrastive relation. The representations of the past are often half-veiled or introduced indirectly, by contrast. Respondents’ speech alone is insufficient to interpret the social representations: the analyst should rely on his/ her knowledge of the context and the process of inference to arrive at an interpretation.

Interviewee [female teacher]: I think that the education system was much simpler and better in the Soviet time, and children were much more taken care of since all children were equal indeed.

The respondent also mentions school uniform, free lunches, cheap guided tours and hobby circles for pupils as examples of “care about children” in the system of state support. Other respondents mention high incomes and bonuses in collective farms, broader opportunities to satisfy their cultural needs (e.g. to visit museums and concerts), as well as maximum employment in the past. In these cases, the past provides a positive background against which the meaning of social changes and reforms is measured.

The temporal scheme of a life-story is structured from the perspective of the present. As a rule, the stories of the unlucky respondents are focused on the contrastive relations between present and past. In the stories of the respondents who perceive their present condition as relatively stable or an improvement on previous conditions, presumable tensions between the present and the future are foregrounded: the future is often represented as a source of anxiety. Both successful and unsuccessful respondents express concern about further changes that may threaten their relative stability. The desire to maintain stability prompts the interviewees to avoid definite prognoses for the future, or to limit the scope of prognostication.

Interviewee [male owner of a small company; on the European regulations, which threaten small companies]: This is the most troublesome issue at the moment, that there is no chance to develop a small enterprise in the same way, which is actually the source of income for many families [...] This is the problem which does not leave in peace neither on day nor at night [...] It’s a very, very sad future.

Finally, successful respondents tend to concentrate on the present and its advantages. Thus, a woman who studied economy in Tallinn Pedagogical Institute spent a year in Vienna as a guest student studying law and international relations, worked as an economist, employee in a lawyer’s office and currently works as a freelance translator, considers her present situation quite satisfactory. She admits that her work has its benefits and drawbacks, yet appreciates first of all the opportunity to freely dispose of her own time and be her own master while having a relatively stable income. When asked about the future, she reflects that while planning can be helpful, she has no formulated or definite plans and is “open to life”:

On the one hand, I am myself open to life; on the other, to arrive somewhere it is good to know where do you want to arrive. At the same time, it works best of all for me this way. But this propaganda machine today, that one need[s] to know everything, how and by what means ... Every person has a different road...

The narrative scheme with the prevalence of the present and indeterminacy of the future is not only a manifestation of respondent’s satisfaction with the present situation, but the way to oppose the ideology of success and achievement based on
the “futuristic” model of progressive development according to which every successive step towards the future depreciates the value of previous states. Thus, certain mistrust for the future or propensity to limit the future is common for both lucky and unlucky respondents.

In sum, both successful and unsuccessful respondents often experience difficulties in maintaining the continuity of time schemes and reconciling past, present and future. The joint construction of the past and the future from the perspective of the present is a basis for a coherent biographical narrative (see e.g. Ricoeur 1984). The critical, disruptive events did, however, have an impact on the biographical construction. As a result, temporal schemes with a prevalent past and/or present dominate in the biographical interviews.

**Evaluations: social change and discourse modality.**

The conversation model provides a more flexible framework for a study of interpretations and explanations than the causal attribution theory often employed in the quantitative research. In the framework of the conversation model, causal attribution is recast as the identification of alternative states of affairs or counterfactuals (Antaki 1994: 28-29). Alternative event-descriptions introduce implicit causality, which sometimes surfaces in the form of modal or grammatical contrasts, e.g. alethic, deontic, axiological or epistemic constraints (Fairclough 2003: 164-180).

Interviewees employ a combination of factual and counterfactual explanations (alternative event-descriptions) as a means to resolve the conflict between intentions (desires, beliefs) and external or internal constraints, as they experience financial hardships and perceive themselves to be economically disadvantaged, but also claim commitment to profession and do not complain about their choices.

Let us take as an example an interview with a teacher who belongs to the “risk group” of single mothers. In her biographical narrative, the choice of profession is represented as culturally stipulated, motivated by love of literature and books as well as the inspiring example of her own school teacher. Social ties (classmates, course-mates, and friends who have chosen the same profession) are listed as another important choice factor. From this perspective, the choice is represented as voluntary and axiologically valuable. However, while considering alternative unrealized possibilities of life-events, the interviewee indicates the restrictions imposed on her life by the Soviet social system and represents her choice of job rather as compulsive or necessary:

The choice of profession... If one was not compelled to follow the job assignment at the time... I had an assignment and I had to stay at the same place for 3 years, otherwise I would have never gone to school.

Interviewer’s question about the opportunities of changing jobs later makes the interviewee check on counterfactual versions to substantiate her choice and indicate the limits of her possibilities. She argues that although her childhood dream of being an agronomist has never came true, that is best, since such a profession is useless nowadays. Similarly, unwillingness to lose social guarantees and lack of necessary qualifications (e.g. knowledge of English) prevented her from becoming a secretary in a private company. Finally, the respondent resorts to the fatalistic factors that have determined the course of her life: “I was lucky;” “it just happened so;” “[it] all happened as if it was predetermined;” etc. In essence, the absence of choice or unwillingness to change the job is explained fatalistically.
In sum, the interviewee represents her situation as a result of (1) voluntary and conscious choice of profession that was valorized as “good” or “valuable” in the social and cultural context where the interviewee belonged at the moment of choice (axiological constraints); (2) an unavoidable necessity or obligation when considered against the other, alternative choices (alethic and deontic constraints); (3) a result of coincidence of personal intentions and action of fate or providence (alethic and epistemic constraints; the unknown or inaccessible processes are ascribed to supernatural powers).

Interviewees, whose qualifications are not sufficient to provide them a satisfactory position at the job market, tend to explain their condition solely in terms of alethic and deontic constraints (possibility/impossibility, obligation) and to consider counterfactual event-descriptions as axiologically more valuable. For example, an interviewee who used to work as a shop-girl, a cloak-room attendant and currently works at a clothing factory, regrets missing the opportunity of entering the system of higher education to study mathematics and computer science as she had earlier planned:

First, I think, life would be more interesting now, the level of life would be different, the level of communication would be different than it is now. It would be probably more interesting [...] Had I entered [high school], the contacts... life would be more interesting. Currently it is dull, boring, monotonous.

Here, counterfactual event-descriptions are used (1) to elucidate a combination of constraints and intentions that determine choice of profession or life path that leads to the present condition; (2) as a positive or negative background against which the choices are measured. The alternative event-descriptions provide the opportunity of “re-playing” the past choices, of their \textit{aposteriori} justification or condemnation and, thus, partial compensation for the discontinuity of temporal schemas and impossibility of establishing coherent links among past, present and future.

\textbf{Self-representation and management of identity in disruptive circumstances}

While approaching the problem of identity in the biographical interviews, we take the conversation-analytic perspective on identity famously developed in Harvey Sacks’ early work and adopted in Antaki and Widdicombe (1998). From conversation-analytic perspective, identity is a result of indexical and occasioned casting of a person into a category with “category-bound features,” relevant and procedurally consequential to people’s interactions (Antaki and Widdicombe 1998: 3). Thus, identity becomes related to the whole conversational configuration and varies from one situation to the next. The biographical interviews display narrative management of biographically disruptive events that destabilized speakers’ identities. In this case the “occasioned construction of identity” is a response both to the critical events and to the necessity of their narrativization in the biographical interview.

The interviews with unsuccessful respondents are particularly symptomatic in this respect: they show how people forced to cope with a low standard of living or social failure maintain their social “face” in the situation of interaction (see Goffman 1967). Sociologists call the phenomenon of adaptation to the low standard of life the paradox of the “satisfied poor” (Kutsar 1995: 37-38). It should be emphasized, however, that the posture of resignation or adaptation is often implemented as a contextual strategy of “face” preservation and impression management—that is, as
part of social performance. Discourse analysis may reveal this posture’s provisional and defensive character.

The interviews display that imagined stability and “voluntary poverty,” as reactions to rapid changes and inability to cope with such changes, may be manifestations of different social masks or “faces” and, as such, may be connected to different strategies of self-representation. The “change” is perceived as undesirable and therefore suppressed or superseded into the area of counterfactual statements. Construction of the actual state of affairs is aimed at maintaining and legitimizing self-consistency of a storyteller: “In the act of storytelling, participants to human interaction are supposed to give a consistent picture of themselves as characters.” Life-story telling is a form of face protection (Alasuutari 1997: 9, 11). We distinguish three main types of self-representation and “face protection” characteristic of the unlucky interviewees.

1. First, respondents may be dissatisfied with low income and limited opportunities for participation in social life, its traditions and customs, yet they may appreciate the relative stability of their condition and prefer it to any changes, for better or for worse. In this case, the actual state of affairs is conceptualized as neutral as compared with the alternative description of a further hypothetical regress:

   Interviewee [female laboratory assistant]: Who knows how to change, in what direction. It may have been worse, if I changed.

   Interviewer: Are you afraid of losing your job now?

   Interviewee [female tailor]: In principle not, because there are many clothing factories around. We would find [the one]. The only fear is that the wages will be even lower, and I won’t be able to do everything what I did before, when growing older. This is the fear I have.

   […] There are practically no desires, significant desires. I know it won’t be better. One must stick to it [the present situation] and not to slip down.

   Interviewee [female production controller; on her work in “Elcoteq”]: What is good here is that I have a job at the moment and am even paid something for it. Only to have the means for existence. [“Elcoteq” is a company that offers low-paying jobs.]

   The interviewee recognizes his/her condition as socially and economically disadvantaged, yet has no intention to change it and interprets it as relatively satisfactory.

2. Second, the attitude of “voluntary poverty” may serve as a strategy of idealized self-representation. Performance as self-representation of an individual before a particular set of observers is based on a “working consensus;”, that is, it is “socialized”, molded, and modified to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is presented” (Goffman 1959: 35). As such, it embodies the accepted values of the society and presents a slightly idealized view of the self and the situation. From this point of view, the relatively poor respondents are forced to justify their situation and defend their self-dignity, referring to their situation as a result of free choice. This strategy of self-preservation may be termed “stoic performance.” The following respondent is a medical orderly in a care treatment hospital section, where many dying patients are treated. She does hard work for a very small monthly salary [2000 crones; about 127 euros]. In the 1990s, she worked at a low-paying job at a shoe factory. Asked about things that might have had an impact on her life, she
“I wouldn’t say that something has influenced me. All decisions I’ve made, I’ve made them myself.”

*Interviewer:* How have the recent changes in Estonia influenced your life?

*Interviewee:* All has gone more or less smoothly, I don’t see anything that would have awfully influenced me. Perhaps more travelling, more movement is seen now, there was a desire [to travel] in Russian time. But I’m not a big traveller after all to awfully wish to go somewhere. Should one invite [me to travel], even then I would think before.

[When asked about her salary: How one can cope with that?] We use to joke that if we had a lot [of money], we could hardly cope so well. And we’re doing well [...] I’ve not died from starvation yet, and I wouldn’t say I am underfed [...] I never say I’m doing bad. Let it be bad, I’m still well. You think that all’s going well, and it’ll go.

Explanation of certain way of life as the result of individual choice (“I was not sacked, I resigned myself;” “I’ve made all my decisions myself”) is in obvious contradiction with the interviewee’s references to the absence of choice as the actual cause of her actions (low-paying job, no spare money to travel, very modest nutrition habits, etc.).

An unemployed man describes his position at the labor market as almost desperate, yet nevertheless, when asked about his choice of profession (military building school, a too-narrow specialty that became useless in the new economic situation, and a cause of respondent’s inability to find a job), he justifies this choice and considers it a source of moral dignity:

I think that otherwise I wouldn’t have a character like that. I think I would have been much weaker had I not entered the military school. I think it wasn’t a bad choice. Perhaps not the best choice, but not a bad one, indeed. It gives a lot.

3. Finally, respondents who claim commitment to their profession and are inclined to see it as mission (e.g. a teacher, a medical nurse) but are dissatisfied with an income level they perceive as close to poverty typically show certain ambivalence in their self-descriptions. They are inclined to justify their choices and life-paths as compared with counterfactual event-descriptions, yet are dissatisfied with their present conditions and view themselves as victims of social injustice. Such respondents are also inclined to assume a collective identity: a generalized subject (the noun designating a representative of the profession, such as “teacher,” “nurse” etc.; the plural form of the first-person subject pronoun, the generalized form of the second-person pronoun or the impersonal “one”) is a rather typical means of their discursive positioning and self-representation.

For instance, the aforementioned teacher, who claims to be loyal to her profession and high standard of teaching, argues that her income is not in accordance with her social status and qualifications. She cannot afford to realize her cultural and educational needs, e.g. to visit theatre or cinema, to travel, to subscribe to newspapers—a condition she conceptualizes as “poverty”:

A teacher might visit theatre to see what children saw, might read those books, watch those movies. It would be nice to travel... You need a kind of ... charisma in teacher’s position, so that your personality would attract them, to be able to influence them.
When bringing forward different motivations for choosing her profession (pedagogical mission, obligation, necessity, fate, etc.), she claims that her qualifications and qualities do not bring her due reward in the present social system ("the state does not valorize my work and qualifications"): 

And what is the most abusing is a too large amount of work [...] It exhausts emotionally, psychically and physically [...] I feel myself abused, the abuse of poverty is an endless torment since it exhausts. You can cope, survive... Yes, I know I live better than some people, yet in this position and at this level of education I think I deserve more, so that I could give more as well.

Another example is a hospital nurse, whose narrative reveals that people experienced poverty before the reforms as well, yet in her opinion there were more opportunities to cope with it on the local level:

Well, there was a decent hospital here in Russian time, and when this reformation of hospitals began... it was turned into a recovery treatment hospital, we had decent sections up to this time, we had, well, a separate section of inner diseases, we had a separate section of neurology, we had a separate children's section... and when this, you know, reformation and all this stuff began, everything, you know, fell apart, then we felt most of all sorry... the children's section was very valuable for our local hospital, because we, how to say, perhaps it was wrong, but there is a lot of unemployed people in our region, and in the families, where children got ill, and mother cannot buy a medicine – she just has no money for this... we just took the child to the hospital and the child got treatment and opportunity to be in a warm room... and once this was taken away from us, these children were just left [without care]...

In her narrative, the nurse uses the two types of collective identity: the institutional "we" (people of certain profession) and the "we" as members of local community (in "our" region). In the narratives of dissatisfied or unlucky respondents, the collective or institutional "we" refers to a disempowered social subject whose rights or capacities are restricted by anonymous agents of social changes.

We might label three delineated types of discursive self-representation and defensive strategies employed by unlucky respondents economically disadvantaged by social changes the "resigned loser," "satisfied" or "stoic loser," and "dissatisfied (revolting) loser."

In sum, structural changes in the society that have the most significant impact on respondents' lives occupy a prominent position in the biographical interviews. Individual factors leading to social failure or success are rather downplayed. Only 3 of 32 interviewees mentioned individual characteristics that had a negative impact on their destiny: a female who refers to her husband's temporary gambling addiction that caused financial hardships in the family, and two Russian-speaking respondents who refer to their poor knowledge of the Estonian language as restricting their chances at the labor market. Unlucky respondents sometimes refer to their inability, unwillingness or the impossibility of their using the new social situation as virtual causes of social failure. The interviews show that the condition subjectively perceived as poverty may be converted to a positive value providing stability, relative control over one's own life or feeling of commitment to a profession (vocation) and may become a source of moral satisfaction. Relative control over one's own destiny is often preferred to success and achievement. Both structural and individual factors are often endowed with a fatalistic meaning. The social agents and processes are not
clearly identified or analyzed; as a rule, the processes are represented and perceived as anonymous and the agents backgrounded or omitted. These discursive strategies are characteristic of both relatively lucky and unlucky respondents’ self-descriptions. Insofar as the motivations of respondents’ behavior or causes of their condition are obscured, it is difficult to single out definite biographical motifs (e.g. types of “right behavior” or thinking) that would necessarily lead to success or allow avoiding failure.

Summary

In their biographical narratives, interviewees foreground structural changes as having the most significant impact on their lives and the life of the society. The period of social changes (the 1990s) serves as the horizon with respect to which biographical facts take on their meaning. Both relatively lucky and unlucky interviewees implicitly or explicitly highlight social stress and difficulties in adaptation to social change. Other important regularities are the representation of social processes as anonymous, backgrounding of agency, and a modest role ascribed to the individual in the period of transition and later. The social actor’s role is often reduced to the ability to use, benefit or suffer from the situation. A number of respondents feel themselves to be excluded from the sphere of social decision-making and therefore prefer relative stability and control over their lives to success and achievement.

Both successful and unsuccessful respondents represent the period of social changes as a critical, disruptive experience. Their interviews display certain difficulties in maintaining the continuity of time schemes, in linking the past, present and future and, thus in producing a coherent biographical narrative. Evaluations of the condition subjectively perceived as social failure or poverty by the interviewees are ambivalent: as a rule, they mark both negative and positive aspects of this condition. Relative control over one’s own life and a feeling of relative stability are often valorized above social success. The high appraisal of self-sufficiency and relative control over one’s own destiny is common for both relatively lucky and unlucky interviewees. If the former are dissatisfied with low incomes and hard job, the latter sometimes feel that their qualifications are higher than needed in their position or the job conditions are too sensitive to social and political factors. However, even if the job does not meet their expectations, respondents most often prefer stable income and commitment to changes. The less successful respondents either employ defensive strategies of self-positioning, representing themselves as “voluntary” or “satisfied poor,” or refer to collective identity to explain social failure or insecurity. Alternative (counterfactual) event-descriptions provide the opportunity for respondents to “re-play” past choices and thus partially compensate for the discontinuity of temporal schemas, inconsistencies in identity management and the impossibility of constructing a coherent biographical narrative.

The interviews display that the “victory” of “winners” has been relative: a number of them experience financial hardships, perceive their income as insufficient to satisfy their social and cultural needs, or refer to the decrease in control over their own lives. The analysis of the biographical narratives has also disclosed the strategies that respondents use to cope with social challenges as well as discontinuities and disruptions that serve as symptoms of difficulties respondents have experienced or continue to experience in their efforts to overcome their socio-economic situations.
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Citation

Software Review: QDA MINER – The Mixed Method Solution for Qualitative Analysis by Provalis Research

Working on qualitative data is more and more connected with the use of some professional software designed for qualitative data analysis. Those researchers who employ software for qualitative analyses to conduct research agree that this is a useful tool that gives opportunity to deal with large amount of empirical data. The software extends the researcher’s mental capabilities to organize, to remember, and to be systematic (Konopasek 2008: 1). Also my own experience lets me say that professional software for qualitative data analysis makes conceptual work much easier. In my research concerning a mobbing issue I used software for qualitative data analysis (Atlas TI) in the process of data collecting, coding and to make some conclusions on each stage of research practices (Chomczynski 2008). Properly designed software enables researcher to deal with large data and make operations that would be much more time consuming in “traditional” work. Professional program for qualitative data analysis should also help a researcher in his conceptual work. However, Konopasek emphasizes that even the most advanced software has no chance to replace researcher’s mental activity. Humans, not machines, do the crucial work of coding and retrieving—i.e., decide what passages of data should be marked by what terms to be searched and browsed later on. The hope that the program would do more and be able to replace the analytic mind is foolish (Konopasek 2008: 1). It is hard to disagree with words above but advantages of professional software for qualitative data analysis are convincing enough to attract little attention to this.

There are a few software types for qualitative data analysis available on the market. We should mention ATLAS TI, CAQDAS, NVIVO and of course QDA MINER. Despite of the fact that there are visible differences between them, they have much in common. Computer programs enable a researcher to work on different data (written documents, images, audio and visual data) gathered in some specific project or groups of projects in research.

According to my experience very important criterion of software assessment is the easiness of use. Those programs that base on intuitive way of operations made by researcher are often much more useful than sophisticated, hard to manage software.

The second important criterion is the number of possible operations that a computer program enables a user to make on data. The more operations a researcher is able to do using the software, the more it reflects his/her intentions and
creativity. My assessment to large extent bases on comparison between QDA MINER with other software that I have ever tested, especially ATLAS TI on which I usually work.

**The first steps**

When we launch the QDA MINER we have three options to choose: create a new project, open an existing project or open a project that we have recently opened. It is visible on a graphic below.

![Graphic 1. First step options](image1)

When we use QDA MINER for the first time and we press button “Create a new project” the next window appears.

![Graphic 2. Second step options](image2)

The next step is to choose the option that fits our plans. When we choose the first button “Create a project from a list of documents/images” there appears the next window with documents and images available on our hard disc or other types of memory. Despite of the information that a user can choose PDF documents, my attempt to open some PDF document gave a rather poor result. A document that opened in QDA MINER had little in common with the original version. Document had no title and first paragraphs, some parts of text were mixed and changed. The same problem occurred when some HTML file was opened. There was no such problems with assigning word documents and graphics. Generally the procedure of loading following documents to project is rather complicated and not easy in comparison to ATLAS TI.
**Front view and some basic functions**

QDA MINER bases on the similar ideas and solutions like other software for qualitative data analysis. In my opinion it can be treated as its strength because of similarity with other programs which lets us save our time and energy in looking for proper functions. Some of them we can see below.

![Graphic 3. Front view](image)

In the central part is located a view on an assigned document. On the left margin there is a space for codes that a user can create working on a document. The procedure of coding is less comfortable in comparison to ATLAS TI. To make a code a user has to mark some part of text and press a proper button on the top window. It could be much more convenient if there was a function of pop up window initiated by click of right mouse button. There is also no possibility to create codes not connected with categories. A user is forced to make connections from the very beginning of a coding process while he/she may have no conception what is relation between a code and a proper category. The good idea is the possibility to choose a color for codes visible on the left margin. This makes easier segregating codes of some specific type.

Procedures of operations on codes are not impressive in comparison to ATLAS TI tools. We can add, delete and edit (edit means rename or link with other category) a code but not link it with another one. In result there is no possibility to make a map that could graphically reflect mutual connections between specific codes. It is the serious disadvantage that influences progress especially on the
conceptual level of work. The software also does not enable us to effectively investigate connections between codes and quotations they relate to. In ATLAS by double clicking on selected code there appears a pop up window with quotations that relate the chosen code. We have also no clear information about the number of connections between codes and quotations. What seems to be the major disadvantage there is no possibility to make the same named code for different quotations within specific category… Moreover there is no sufficient integration between different documents within a project that is necessary for effective work. It makes operations on codes that come from different documents difficult.

The final assessment

In my opinion QDA MINER requires some necessary improvements that will enable a user managing his data in a more comfortable way. It will let shorten time consumed on uploading and using documents during research work. Also the operations should be more intuitive what is an important condition especially for those who work on QDA MINER for the first time.

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Citation

Piotr Bielski  
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by Marie E. Eisenstein, Baylor University Press, Waco (Texas) 2008, pp. 172

This book is a passionate voice in the debate on religious tolerance and conservative Christians’ political attitudes. The work is situated in the political context of the contemporary United States, where a dispute between progressive liberals and conservatives takes place on various levels of social and international policy (rights of homosexuals, stem cell research, right to abortion, justification of war in Iraq). Although these political cleavages seem common to all western democracies, the so-called neo-conservative revolution, revival of religious cults of different Christian denominations, widely examined usage of religious language by president George W. Bush and the Republican elites are usually ascribed to the United States. Some authors, mostly holding a liberal viewpoint, perceive American religiosity as a threat to democracy, its basic values such as tolerance, as well as to logics and science (e.g. the case of Christian Churches that demand elimination of theory of evolution from schools). They speak of two Americas: liberal East and West Coasts versus conservative South. Eisenstein’s book is an interesting defence of the conservative Christian viewpoint as it presents a struggle of a political scientist who speaks against marginalising of these voices as out-of-date, intolerant, authoritarian, etc.

One of the liberal authors, Chris Hedges, published a book entitled "American fascists: The Christian Right and the War on America" in which he emphasized threats posed by the conservative Christians. According to the critiques, the driving force behind these sects’ success is negative, as it refers to the post modern isolation, alienation, insecurity and fear that people experience. As Hedges stated in the cited book (2006, 21), "within this mass of divergent, fractious and varied groups is this group of powerful Christian denominationists who have latched on to the despair, isolation, disconnectedness and fear that drives many people into these churches". Eisenstein's view is opposite and her intention is to defend the thesis which is already included in the title: Christianity builds democracy. She says that only people who adhere to certain values can be tolerant whereas people who do not respect any values cannot be tolerant. She cites surveys stating that believers are generally happier than non-believers and thus imagines faith as a positive choice of individuals.

Eisenstein conducted a research in the county of Indiana using mostly quantitative techniques, combined with one qualitative technique, namely a group
focus interview. According to her results, the religious people fully respect the values of liberal democracy and are reconciled with the democratic procedures. According to her beliefs, one can fully support tolerance and democracy while simultaneously rejecting certain homosexuals' privileges or women's right to abortion as long as this denunciation is expressed through procedures proper to democracy. Being deeply entrenched in a particular American context, the author criticizes "Jeffersonian enlightenment" and the Jefferson's idea of "wall of separation between religion and state". She argues that religious people can foster progressive changes in the state and consequently brings as examples Martin Luther King, Quaker Protest against slavery or Catholic movements for workers' welfare. In the U.S. Christian religions, thanks to their multiplicity and coexistence, did not promote intolerance, as for instance in some European countries where one denomination grasped hegemony.

The author's thesis is that deeply religious people are more than often not Amish-type communities critical of technologies and modern life, but "ordinary" contemporary people that go shopping to malls, listen to pop music and experience the same anxieties as others. Moreover, she suggests that people who consider themselves religious might be more eager to render voluntary services and more tolerant towards atheists than the atheists towards them. She also argues that increased education leads to more religious commitment.

In particular, Eisenstein wants to challenge three types of, what she considers, prejudices against conservative Christians. The first one, called "sectarian bias", contains all types of comparisons of conservative Christians with radical Muslims expressed in critical expressions such as "Christian fundamentalists" which depicts them as intolerant "crusaders". In her focus research, the author found out, that conservative Christians do not see any authority higher than the American government and do not promote any other form of government than the democracy. She opposes division of Christian denominations, churches and practitioners into "good ones" accepting women and gay rights as well as other "progressive" viewpoints, and those "bad ones" which with their conservative views are seen by some intellectuals as "detrimental to democracy". What author dislikes the most is a formulation of opinions about an intolerant character of Christianity as a whole based on an observation of some individuals or groups.

The second bias called "reason or rationality bias" employs rational choice theory in order to disapprove of religion due to its "irrational" nature. She believes that religious commitment can be rationally justified. The third bias, called psychological, consists of all the theories that seek root of religious commitment in personality features, such as Adorno's concept of "authoritarian personality" of the religious. It also includes opinions such as one about eagerness of believers to accept external powers as their lack of belief in one own talents. Eisenstein said herself, that "it is extremely difficult to overcome the perception that only weak or those with some type of personality or societal problems would choose religious belief or activity, even among educated citizens (p. 127)". The author concludes that the Founding Fathers as well as presidents of the U.S. were declared Christian practitioners and there is no problem of intolerance or rebellion against liberal democracy among Christians. Moreover, she claims that liberal democracy and capitalism are positive outcomes of Christianity. It was the American Revolution started by people respecting religion that gave birth to democracy – she argues - and not the violent French Revolution set off by opponents of religion. Eisenstein recalls the figure of John Locke, a 17th century English philosopher and a Christian practitioner, who spread the concept of natural rights of individuals. The author
comes even to dubious conviction that “only in countries and continents influenced by
the Judeo-Christian tradition has science, economic advancement, technology, and
finally, liberal democracy been established for any long-term duration” (p. 124).

The book lacks qualitative research or ethnography which could portray the
viewpoint of conservative Christians and their lifestyle, how they combine traditional
convictions with demands of modern life, how their children socialize, etc. The author
limited herself to respondents' views on "faith and democracy" issues. When it comes
to quantitative research it might be easily questioned as not representative for entire
country as her data were collected in one single county. The author seems radical in
her views and often does not provide enough arguments to support them. The vision
offered by Eisenstein seems to be not less subjective and unfortunately biased than
of the authors that she fiercely criticizes as she presents a priori one-sided positive
assessment of historic and contemporary role of Christian groups in U.S. According
to me, the author did not pay enough respect to the others' serious arguments but
simply refuted most general opinions that might be harmful to the American
believers. Is it an utterly unacceptable attitude of social scientists to look for
psychological, sociological or economic factors in increase of religiosity? For sure the
author is right in reminding us that religiosity awakes altruistic attitudes but generally
there is the "bright" side and "dark" side of religious commitment which should be
equally explored. In the end, the Ku Klux Klan, Confederation supporters and other
fanatics exist among Christian conservative even if they are small minority but their
attitudes can awake some concerns. The author did not deal with the concerns which
have been globally awakened by the employment of religious language by American
government to justify its political and military goals. Some questions raised in this
book mostly refer to values, which is the domain of politics. For example, it is politics
not science that can give answers to important questions such as whether
democracy should give full freedom to its critiques.

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Integration – An Outline from the Perspective of the Sociology of Knowledge

In this conceptual essay we argue that the study of migration can substantially benefit from an interactionist notion of integration. Basing our considerations on Berger’s and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge, we develop a differentiated understanding of integration as an ongoing process which comes to be institutionalized in characteristic forms. With regard to these forms of institutionalization, we focus our attention on the relatively stable spheres of social action characterized by Anselm Strauss as social worlds, structures that are continuously produced anew and altered through processes of segmentation, intersection and legitimation. Furthermore, we propose five ideal types of social worlds reflecting the perspective of migrants. In addition, we indicate the transnational scope of social worlds and the importance of personal coping strategies. We emphasize the significance of the conflicts occurring in and between social worlds as part of processes of integration and highlight a number of strategies that make symbolic integration within the public sphere possible. Furthermore, we list central institutionalized cultural forms and social modes which have a decisive impact on interaction between migrants and the autochthonous population: categorization, stereotyping and drawing boundaries, negotiating, conflict and permanent reflection. Finally, we explain the specific contribution our approach offers to the current theoretical discussion in the field of migration studies and close with a summary of our arguments.

Keywords: Sociology of knowledge; Migration; Integration; Social worlds; Arena; Conflict

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Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Pragmatist Analysis of Persuasive Interchange

Approaching rhetoric as the study of persuasive interchange, this paper considers the relevance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for the study of human group life. Although virtually unknown to modern day social scientists, this text has great relevance for contemporary scholarship. Not only does Aristotle’s text centrally address influence work (and resistance), identities and reputations, deviance and culpability, emotionality and deliberation, and the broader process of human knowing and acting in political, character shaping, and courtroom contexts, but Aristotle also deals with these matters in remarkably comprehensive, systematic, and precise terms. Attending to the human capacity for agency, Aristotle also works with a sustained appreciation of purposive, reflective, adjustive interchange. Hence, whereas this text is invaluable of as a resource for the comparative transhistorical analysis of human interchange, it also suggests a great many ways that contemporary scholarship could be extended in the quest for a more adequate, more authentic social science.

Keywords: Aristotle, rhetoric, influence, activity, agency, identity, emotions, justice, culpability, symbolic interaction, pragmatism
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Biography, Media Consumption, And Identity Formation

This paper proposes that the biographical or narrative interview is an important method in exploring the relationship of media consumption to identity formation. The paper takes issue with those theorists who place media consumption at the centre of identity formation processes. Rather, in line with the work of British social theorist John Tomlinson, the paper argues the need to see the relationship between media and culture, in the process of identity formation, as an interplay of mediations between culture-as-lived-experienced and culture-as-representation. On the one hand we have the media, representing the dominant representational aspect of modern culture while on the other we have the lived experience of culture which includes the discursive interaction of families and friends and the ‘material-existential’ experiences of routine life. Our media consumption choices and the meanings we take from the media are shaped by these lived cultural experiences while the media we consume also impacts on how we make sense of these experiences. The paper argues that the narrative or biographical interview is a useful way to explore this interplay of mediations in the process of identity formation.

Key words: Media consumption; Identity formation; Biography; Narrative interview; South African youth

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Literary Field and the Question of Method – Revisited

Field theory is one of the most efficient and influential analytical schemes in the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, which he consistently developed in his model of literary field. The analytical reliability of the model derives from the way in which Bourdieu combines the structural category of ‘field’ with the phenomenological categories of “doxa” and ‘habitus’. This article argues that Bourdieu’s selective application of the two phenomenological categories produces a static structural model of literary field where all processes are explained in causal and deterministic terms. The article further seeks to present an alternative reading of the same categories within a discursive model where the processes in literary field and the motivations of its agents are driven by field’s discourses rather than by its rigid structures.

Keywords: Field theory; Literary sociology; Literary history; Husserlian phenomenology; Collective identity; Collective memory; Critical sociology
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Social Risks and Challenges of the Post-Socialist Transition Period in Estonia: Analysis of Biographical Narratives

In research on social risks and insecurity qualitative methods have obvious advantages and successfully complement statistical quantitative approaches, which have been practiced for decades. This study is based on the thirty-two in-depth interviews collected in the period June 2003 to January 2004 for the project “Life Plans and Life Paths in the Post-Socialist Estonia.” The interviewees are representatives of the so-called “generation of winners”, i.e. the people aged 20 or 30 years at the beginning of the period of post-socialist reforms. The paper examines representations of social risks and challenges of the transition period in the biographical interviews as well as discursive patterns and strategies that interviewees use to produce relatively coherent biographical narratives.

Keywords: Post-Socialist Transition; Generation of Winners; Social Risks; Biographical Narratives; Discourse Analysis
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